This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

LELAND·STANFORD·JVNIOR·VNIVERSITY

THE

DUBLIN REVIEW.

THE

DUBLIN REVIEW.

VOL. XVIII. NEW SERIES.

JANUARY——JUNE,

MDCCCLXXII.

LONDON:
BURNS, OATES, & CO., 17 & 18, PORTMAN STREET,
AND 63 PATERNOSTER ROW.
DERBY: RICHARDSON & SONS.
DUBLIN: JAMES DUFFY; W. B. KELLY; McGLASHAN & GILL.
BALTIMORE: KELLY, PIET & CO.
MONTREAL, CANADA: SADLER & CO.
1872.

14253

184647

STANFORD LIBRARY

GARRISON LIBRARY

CONTENTS.

ART. I.—LIBERALISM RELIGIOUS AND ECCLESIASTICAL.

Constitutive tenets of Catholic liberalism 1
Common origin of these 3
Temporalism 5
Intellectualism 10
Indifferentism 12
Ecclesiastical liberalism 14
Objections considered against the denunciation of Catholic liberalism . 15
Such denunciation required in the interest of souls 24

ART. II.—NATURE AND THE POETS.

Study of Nature always associated with Religion 25
Views of Dr. Dircks 26
Greek and Roman Poets in relation to Nature 28
Milton's Pagan tone of thought 30
Mr. Morris's neo-Paganism 31
Shelley's Nature-worship 32
Ancient sense of the discord in Nature 34
Christianity in relation to Nature 35
The Poet's mission 38
Specimens of Nature poetry 41
Dr. Newman on the Powers of Nature 42

ART. III.—MR. MILL ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY.

Domestic controversies on this matter 44
The issue joined with Mr. Mill 47
Moral goodness a simple idea 48
Certain moral truths self-evidently necessary 51
Intuitive knowledge that all acts, morally evil, are prohibited by a Personal Being 55
This Being inferred to be Supreme Legislator of the Universe . . 56
Mr. Mill's appeal to man's primordial faculties 58
Mr. Bain's appeal to divergences of moral judgment 62
Mr. Mill implicitly embraces the doctrine which he speculatively opposes 71
Criticism of his *speculative position* 74

LELAND·STANFORD·JVNIOR·VNIVERSITY

GARRISON LIBRARY
MALTA

CONTENTS.

ART. I.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE RELIGION.

A philosophical examination of subjective religion, or religiousness, a necessary part of a complete philosophy of religion. . . . 249
Subject-matter of such an examination 250
Methods of investigation 252
Functions 253
Object and general plan of Mr. Baring-Gould's work 255
Its execution 256
Not only our intellect, but no part of our nature, can, if properly used, mislead us 258
First argument 262
Second argument 263
Third argument 265
Two consequences 265
Primarily and secondarily religious instincts 267
Mr. Baring-Gould's arguments against Positivism 270
He accounts an instinct pointing to immortality to be the first of the forces which urge man toward religion. His analysis of it . . 273
The second force is the moral law 274
Asceticism 278
The ethical leanings of Polytheism and Monotheism contrasted . . 279
The religion of utilitarianism 280
He accounts an instinctive tendency to look for a cause of observed effects to be the third force urging man toward religion; and appears to hold the volition-theory of causation 281
The last of the primarily religious instincts is a disposition to form an ideal of attainment, which postulates the existence of an absolute ideal, God 283
Concluding Remarks 284

ART. II.—FATHER LIBERATORE, FATHER HARPER, AND LORD ROBERT MONTAGU.

F. Liberatore's language on Catholic Liberals 285
General statement of his doctrine 287
Reasons for raising the question 288
F. Harper's volume 293
Lord Robert Montagu's work 297
Character of F. Liberatore's work 309

THE

DUBLIN REVIEW.

The Irish National Schools 430
The O'Conor Don on higher education 432
The O'Conor Don on the state of Irish Catholic opinion . . . 434
The relation of English public men to Catholics 437

Art. IX.—The Gothic Revival.

Art. X.—Notices of Books.

Archbishop Manning's Sermons on Ecclesiastical Subjects . . . 452
" " Dæmon of Socrates 455
Dr. Melia's Hints and Facts on the Origin of Man 459
Mr. Darwin's Origin of Species 459
La Civiltà Cattolica 459
Dr. Newman's Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford 463
Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Conciliorum 465
Dr. Hefele's History of the Christian Councils 467
F. Tondini's Pope of Rome and the Popes of the Oriental Orthodox Church 469
The Patriarch and the Tzar 473
Mr. Burgon's Last Twelve Verses of the Gospel according to S. Mark vindicated 477
Mrs. Hope's Conversion of the Teutonic Race 483
Mr. Hepworth Dixon's The Switzers 485
Mr. Howley's Universities and Secondary Schools of Ireland . 490
Messrs. Cox and Jones's Popular Romances of the Middle Ages . . 492
Miss Elliot's Pictures of Old Rome 494
F. Brownlow's Church of England and its Defenders 495
Mr. Baring-Gould's Lives of the Saints 496
Memoir of Paul Seigneret, Séminariste de Saint Sulpice . . . 498
First and Last Acts of the Commune 499
Monsignore Patterson's Martyr Spirit 501
F. De Sarasa's Compendium of the Art of Rejoicing 502
The Demonstration in Baltimore and Washington in honour of Pius IX. 503
Spiritual Contract of the Soul with God 504
F. Keller's Panegyric of S. Joseph 504
Catholic Progress 504

THE

DUBLIN REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1872.

Art. I.—LIBERALISM RELIGIOUS AND ECCLESIASTICAL.

La Chiesa e lo Stato. Del P. Matteo Liberatore. Napoli: Giannini. 1871.

Lectures on certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans. By John Henry Newman, D.D. London: Burns and Lambert. 1850.

LAST October we mentioned, that F. Liberatore's work had been forwarded to us for review; and we expressed a hope (p. 509) that in our present number we should be able, not only "to give our readers a general sketch of his argument," but also "to vindicate the practical importance of writing on such a theme in times like the present." On reflection we find it will be more convenient, if we postpone for this quarter all comment on the details of F. Liberatore's exposition. We shall do no more therefore at present, than argue for the opinion, that most important service is done, under existing circumstances, by dwelling emphatically on such doctrines as those which he has set forth. We have more than one reason for so thinking; but we shall confine our remarks to that, which weighs with us far more than all others put together. We refer to the partial development of those anti-christian views which are denoted by the name "liberalism,"—not only in their proper home the mind of materialists and pantheists —but among children of the Catholic Church; nay, to a limited extent, among some few persons, who otherwise deserve our sincere respect and admiration.

Indeed Catholic liberalism* is to be found in stages indefinitely varying from each other; and there are those, more or

* The writers of the "Civiltà Cattolica" sometimes say, that a "Catholic liberal" is a contradiction in terms. We quite concur with this statement, in the sense in which they evidently intend it. But they would not of course deny, that certain persons, more or less imbued with liberalism, submit their intellect *(so far as intention goes)* to the Church's actual definitions of faith, *and even frequent her sacraments.*

less tinged with its spirit, who would be unaffectedly shocked by its more extreme manifestations. The *tendency* however of a Catholic liberal is to such opinions as these. He considers the Church's infallibility as strictly confined, to her testification of revealed dogmata; and her authority in governing as strictly confined, to what bears immediately on individual and personal religion. In other words he denies to her all jurisdiction, whether of teaching or ruling, in matters primarily temporal; however indubitable and momentous may be their indirect relation with revealed truth or with individual orthodoxy and piety. Further he tends to consider that Catholics have no very great advantage over externs, either as regards the help given them by their religion towards leading a good life and reaching heaven, or as regards the particular type of goodness which they respectively recognize. And even if we went no further, we have landed the extreme Catholic liberal in a somewhat startling conclusion. For since he considers the Church's province as strictly confined to the immediate sphere of individual piety and faith—and since *within* that sphere (according to him) she confers no very important benefit on her children — he must rank the benignancy of her influence at a very low point indeed. But in consistency he cannot stop here. He holds that hardly any social calamity has ever existed so grievous, as what he calls "persecution"; i. e. the laws enacted and enforced, for repression of heresy, during the ages of faith. Now it is undeniable, that for the existence of such laws the Church is mainly responsible. Our extreme liberal then must infer, that whereas the Church's benignant influence has always been small, her malignant influence (wherever she is able to have her way) has been simply appalling. And so soon as he has distinctly arrived at this conclusion,—one would think it must be a mere question of circumstances, how many weeks or months longer he will remain in her communion.

We have been commenting exclusively, on what may be called the liberal's "objective" process of thought; the objective connection of one opinion with another. The number is always very small, of those who carry forward a premiss to its legitimate outcome; and we are far from implying that the present case is an exception to the rule. Yet it need hardly be pointed out, that any principle, which leads in consistency to a detestable conclusion, must itself be an evil principle; inflicting very serious injury, not only on those who embrace it, but potentially *through them also on* the Church: and moreover that as time proceeds—*in the course of generations*—evil principles are always found *issuing in their legitimate* results. It is worth our while therefore

for various reasons to inquire, whether those respective tenets, which in their combination constitute liberalism, are so many unconnected evil weeds, rising up spontaneously in various parts of corrupt human nature;—or whether they spring from one common root. Our strong impression is, that the latter is the true account of them; that they are intimately connected with each other, as having one common origin. That common origin—as we estimate the matter—is a denial, more or less explicit, of that vital Catholic doctrine, which is stated by our English Catechism as the first and most rudimental of all; and which is laid down by S. Ignatius, as the "Foundation" of his whole spiritual structure.

"Why did God make you?" asks the Catechism; and the prescribed answer is, "To know Him, serve Him, and love Him in this world, and to be happy with Him for ever in the next." In like manner the "Spiritual Exercises" of S. Ignatius; "Principle and Foundation," that is, of the whole Exercises: "Man has been created, that he may praise the Lord his God, and show Him reverence, and serve Him, and by means of this save his soul." Again. "We should not wish on our part for health rather than for sickness, wealth rather than poverty, honour rather than ignominy, and so on accordingly in all other things; desiring and choosing those things alone, which are more expedient to us for the end for which we were created." Now it is almost a truism to say, that man arrives more nearly at his *personal perfection*,—is more worthy of admiration and respect,—in proportion as he achieves more successfully the end for which he was created. It follows therefore from the above statements, that man arrives more nearly at his personal perfection—not at all in proportion as he possesses greater bodily health and strength, or higher intellectual endowments and cultivation,—but exclusively in proportion as he is more prompt and disposed to love and serve God.* "Our perfection," says

---

* In illustration of our statement in the text, the following passages may be cited, from Dr. Ward's "Essays on the Relation of Intellectual Power to Man's True Perfection," with one or two slight changes of expression:—

"Every thing is more perfect, in proportion as it more nearly reaches its proper end; or to put the same thing in other words, in proportion as it more completely accomplishes its proper work, its ἔργον as Aristotle would say. A locomotive engine is more perfect, in proportion as it more combines strength, speed, and safety: the art of medicine is more perfect, in proportion as it enables the student more successfully to cure disease. Now to apply this. Our body is more perfect, in proportion as we more combine health, strength, speed, and the rest. Our poetical faculty is more perfect, in proportion as we possess a keener power of appreciating poetical beauty. Our practical faculty is more perfect, in proportion as we possess genius and fertility of resource, for devising and carrying out plans of practical action.

Suarez, "consists in union with God; but charity it is which unites us to God": and all other theologians without exception similarly express themselves.* This being laid down, our first thesis may be thus stated. The implicit rejection or the forgetfulness of this doctrine, we say, leads directly (among other evils) to three profoundly anti-christian habits of thought; viz. idolatry of intellect, idolatry of temporal greatness, and indifferentism. The complex of these three habits may fairly be called "religious liberalism." And our second thesis is, that "religious liberalism" leads

---

Our philosophical faculty is more perfect, in proportion as we have a greater power (to use F. Newman's words) of grasping a large multitude of objects in their mutual and true relations. But we, as *persons*, as *men*, are more perfect,—have more nearly achieved our proper end, have more completely accomplished our proper work,—exclusively in proportion as we are more morally and spiritually perfect. This surely is a most definite and intelligible statement; and no different statement can be made on the subject, consistently with Catholic doctrine." (p. 49.)

"That view of human perfection, which is implied by Catholic doctrine and practice, is comprised in the three following propositions. (1.) Just as various men are called to other modes of life,—to be poets, or lawyers, or merchants, or clockmakers, or professional singers,—so some of us are called to the occupation of intellectual activity in one or other branch of knowledge: in theology, or philosophy, or history, or physical and mathematical science, as the case may be. (2.) Just as all other men act more perfectly and become more perfect, in proportion as they make their external work an instrument of interior perfection;—so those of us who have *this* vocation act more perfectly and become more perfect, in proportion as we make our *intellectual* exercises an instrument of interior perfection. (3.) One man is more perfect than another, in precise proportion as he is more spiritually perfect. No one ever thought of saying that A tends to be more perfect than B, because he sings better, or makes better clocks; nor yet because he has more muscular power, or has worked more assiduously at its development: so neither does A tend to be more perfect than B, because he has greater *intellectual* power, or because he has worked more assiduously at its development. True indeed, A may sing, or make clocks, or practise gymnastics, from some supernatural motive and with a pure intention; in which case these exercises do so far increase his real perfection: and in like manner (neither more nor less) *intellectual* exercises, if practised from some supernatural motive and with a pure intention, increase his true perfection. But this is not because he possesses musical, or muscular, or intellectual, power; nor yet precisely because he exercises that power; but exclusively, because he makes such exercise his instrument for advance in piety. (pp. 42–3.)

* The soul, says F. Newman, which "has faith in the word of God" "understands that wealth and notoriety and influence and high place are not the first of blessings and the real standard of good; but that saintliness and all its attendants . . . . are the high and precious things, the things to be looked up to, the things to be reverently spoken of." ("To Mixed Congregations," *p. 109.*)

Dr. Ward sets forth the unanimous testimony of theologians to the doctrine expressed above, in an Appendix to the Essays already cited. (pp. 80–94.)

irresistibly to that further "liberalism," which may be called "ecclesiastical"; viz. a denial of the Church's teaching and ruling authority in that portion of secular science and politics, which affects directly or indirectly the religious welfare, whether of the individual or of society.

We will begin with what (for want of a better name) we will call "temporalism"; the idolatry of temporal greatness. F. Newman has expressed the doctrine of S. Ignatius's "Foundation" under this particular aspect, in words of characteristic energy, which have (thanks partly to Mr. Kingsley and Mr. Lecky) obtained a world-wide renown. The Church, he says,

> Holds that it were better for sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions who are upon it to die of starvation and in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin. ("Anglican Difficulties," p. 199.)

Such indubitably, as F. Newman says, is the doctrine of her, who has been commissioned by God infallibly to teach mankind. Nor need we say how utterly distasteful and contemptible is such teaching, in the eye of that anti-Catholic world which surrounds us; for to that world, interior piety, purity of intention, love of God, are as nothing, when they conflict or seem to conflict with national wealth, power, and aggrandisement. If we would convince ourselves of this, let us look at its employment of that ill-used word "patriotism." We will suppose such a case as the following. Some Englishman so dearly loves his country, that he feels most keenly her national sins: he well knows indeed the national sins of France, of Germany, of Italy; but they do not grieve him as do English sins, though he may think them equally heinous, because he does not love France, Germany, or Italy, as he loves England. He fancies that he sees one special root of these sins in England's *temporal greatness:* we are not endorsing such an opinion, any more than we are assailing it; but it is a very intelligible one. The Englishman then, whom we are supposing, is led by his keen love of his country to desire her temporal humiliation: he expresses accordingly his wish, that she may be unsuccessful in some war which she is waging; that she may descend to a secondary place among nations. All this, we say, arises from his love of his country; for if he loved her not, it would be a matter of comparative indifference * to him how

* By "comparative" indifference we mean, that he would not grieve more for England's offences against God than for other nations' offences against God.

much she multiplied her sins: yet the very charge brought against him would be, that he is "unpatriotic." By "patriotism" then, in the world's parlance, is not meant "love of our country's highest interest," but "love of her temporal greatness." Nay it precisely means a *preference* for her temporal greatness over her spiritual good; for our Englishman will be dubbed "unpatriotic" on no other ground, than that conversely he prefers her spiritual good to her temporal greatness.*

It will be seen then, that we are as far as possible from blaming an Englishman for loving his country: we should as soon blame a mother for loving her son. But suppose some mother's love takes a worldly direction; suppose she is far more anxious for her son's taking an influential position in life—for his being popular and clever and highly esteemed and wealthy—than for his growing in piety and the love of God. Two judgments, on that supposition, may be confidently passed. In the first place the existence of such sympathies is a dark blot in her interior character, and must deplorably injure her spiritual growth; while in the second place they will almost inevitably issue in *acts*, which are cruelly injurious to her son's welfare. The application is obvious.†

Such is the plague of "temporalism," which so widely infects non-Catholic Europe. It is an absurd and extravagant compliment, to speak of this evil spirit as consisting in a preference for a nation's temporal good over its spiritual: on the contrary, those imbued with such a spirit are usually as indifferent to the former as to the latter. "It would be obvious for me," says

---

* Three years ago we quoted the "Pall Mall Gazette's" emphatic enforcement of this foul idolatry. "The lasting *glory and greatness*," says the writer, "of the English nation and the British Empire is about the *highest object* at which English politicians can aim. Cases may be imagined in which the general *interests* and sympathies of Europe would be in favour of the enemies of England; but it would not be the less true in that case that an Englishman, who *took that view*, and *acted on it*, would be *an infamous traitor*." We observed on this passage (Jan. 1869, p. 92, note) that "it is worth while to see what an English newspaper, universally accounted respectable, has ventured to state. The highest aim of a politician then, it seems, is not at all his country's moral and religious welfare; the diminution of crime, the increase of contented industry, increased purity of morality: nor even is it the advancement of its temporal welfare; the increase of innocent enjoyment, the diminution of squalid poverty, the accessibleness of medical aid for illness and of legal redress for injuries. All these should be entirely subordinate, it seems, to that paramount one, of its 'lasting glory and greatness.'"

† "Spirituale emolumentum . . . ejus est pretii, ut quæcunque hujus mundi gloria et faustitas in comparatione illius planè in nihilum esset computanda." (*Pius IX.* "*Nôstis* et nobiscum.")

F. Newman (p. 209), "to retort upon the cold and selfish system" promoted by worldly politicians; "to show you how the many are sacrificed to the few, the poor to the wealthy; how an oligarchical monopoly of enjoyment is established far and wide, and the claims of want and pain and sorrow and affliction and misery are practically forgotten." It is not the *people's* temporal *enjoyment*, but the *country's* temporal *greatness*, which these liberalistic fanatics so highly appreciate.

In illustration of our remark, we may appeal to some very carefully balanced statements made by F. O'Reilly, S. J., in the November number of the "Month," on the state of the Roman people when under the dominion of the Holy Father. He speaks of that state in the present tense. "They are in general well off" he says "as regards the necessaries of life. They are sufficiently clad and provided with dwelling accommodation. There is but little distress, and I may say no misery; certainly much less want than is to be found in many countries, which *are set up as models of prosperity*. The taxation is very moderate. There are abundant means of education for the different grades of society; nay more, the children of poor parents have opportunities of high education, without expense and at the same time without discredit, *such as certainly are not to be found in these countries*, nor probably in many others. There is every facility for literary pursuits, which flourish there extensively. The fine arts too are largely cultivated and with great success. Commercial and industrial enterprise is also encouraged and is progressing" (p. 402). "The Roman people are happy, leading a peaceful life, with almost universal sufficient means of support, and widely-spread comfort and no oppression" (p. 405). Now we may fairly take the English Protestant newspapers, as exemplifying this spirit of "temporalism" against which we inveigh.* And we appeal to all readers of those newspapers, whether what we are going to say does not truly describe the course they have taken. The statements made by F. O'Reilly are taken from a very well known work (Mr. Maguire's), which has been long before the public and is in everybody's hands. No attempt whatever has been made to disprove the alleged facts, nor indeed has any interest been shown about them. The Romans have been considered by every newspaper scribe to be under an intolerable grievance—not because their secular well-being has been less than that of other men—but because

* "Contemplate the objects of" the English "people's praise, survey their standards, ponder their ideas and judgments, and tell me whether it is not most evident, from their very notion of the desirable and the excellent, that greatness and goodness and sanctity and sublimity and truth are *unknown to them*." (F. Newman "to mixed congregations," pp. 102-3.)

they have no material *greatness*, whereon to feed their pride and vain glory; because a Roman cannot *boast* of being a Roman, as an Englishman loves to boast that he is an Englishman.*

Now in modern times, and especially in Protestant countries, there is (as every one knows) a large amount of cordial and even of intimate intercourse between the Church's children and externs; and Catholics are constantly brought into contact with non-Catholic literature. If then the Protestant world is profoundly imbued with the disease we have described — with this idolatry of temporal greatness,—it is absolutely inevitable that Catholics shall have caught the infection, except so far as they may possess some special safeguard. Now we do not for a moment deny, that intellectual heedlessness and dulness (however otherwise undesirable) may operate to no small extent as such a safeguard. There is many a Catholic, who without reflection utters a number of worldly and anti-Catholic sentiments,—which he has caught up indeed from Protestant society, but which he has in no respect mastered and made his own: his language is the echo of the world around him, not the

---

* "Sanctissima Christi religio . . . avertit quidem Italos ab infelicis illius gloriæ splendore quam illorum majores in perpetuo bellorum tumultu . . . posuerant, sed unà simul Italos ipsos, Catholicæ veritatis luce collustratos, ad sectandam justitiam et misericordiam, atque adeo ad præclara etiam pietatis in Deum et *beneficentiæ erga homines* æmulanda opera excitavit." (Pius IX. "Nôstis et nobiscum.")

F. Newman ("Scope and Nature of University Education," p. 116) does not hesitate to lay down, as a "most precise view of a Christian's duty" declared harmoniously by Scripture and the Fathers, "to labour indeed for a competency for himself and his," but on the other hand "to be jealous of wealth whether personal or national." This greatly illustrates what we have said in the text.

It has always however appeared to us, that in this most impressive passage (pp. 115—128)—though not speaking at all too severely against the particular writer whom he criticises—he has nevertheless not quite done justice to the importance of *Political Economy*; and this from not sufficiently bearing in mind, that the scope of that science is the *distribution*, no less than the *production*, of wealth. Let us suppose that the civil ruler, from sympathy with the true and momentous principle enunciated by F. Newman, aimed at adapting his legislation to the diminution at once of extreme wealth and of extreme poverty: he could not effect his purpose, except by help of political economy.

We would also ask (with diffidence) a further question. Would there really be any danger to be dreaded from increase of national wealth, if that wealth were distributed very far more equally than now it is? As things now are, the poorest class in a country like England are deplorably destitute. Is there really any *opposite* danger? Is there any danger lest the poorest class of any country should ever—through any possible increase and distribution of national wealth—be so well off as to injure their spiritual *interests?*

true utterance of his inmost thoughts. Nor would we deny, that there may be even active-minded and intelligent Catholics, who do but give a passive otiose assent to such phrases, without lodging deeply in their heart the correspondent ideas. But on the whole and in the long run it is impossible to doubt, that deep draughts of the poison will be imbibed by children of the Church—the deeper perhaps in proportion as the process is *unconscious*—unless they are guarded by some special corrective and antidote. Nor do we see what special corrective and antidote can even be *alleged* to exist, except the imbuing their mind energetically in one shape or other with the doctrine of S. Ignatius's "Foundation." In other words, a large proportion of those active-minded and intelligent Catholics, who mix unreservedly with Protestants and who do not take special pains in the direction we have indicated, will inevitably be possessed in greater or less degree by that anti-Catholic and anti-Christian temper, on which we have been enlarging.

How deeply this temper must deform and disfigure their interior—how miserably it must cripple and dwarf spiritual growth—has been sufficiently implied, in the illustration we drew from a worldly-minded *mother*. How utterly and (one may say) even grotesquely such a temper will place them out of harmony with the Church's mind and spirit, we cannot better express than in F. Newman's most forcible words. "The Church," he says ("Anglican Difficulties," pp. 199, 200), "would rather save the soul of one single wild bandit of Calabria or whining beggar of Palermo, than draw a hundred lines of railroad through the length of Italy, or carry out a sanitary reform in its fullest details in every city of Sicily, except so far as these great national works tended to some spiritual good beyond them. Such is the Church, O ye men of the world, and now you know her. Such she is, such she will be; and though she aims at your good, it is in her own way,—and if you oppose her, she defies you. She has her mission, and do it she will, whether she be in rags, or in fine linen; whether with awkward or with refined carriage; whether by means of uncultivated intellects, or with the grace of accomplishments." The loyal Catholic politician or public writer makes it his chief endeavour, to work unreservedly in sympathy and harmony with this mind of the Church. But such action is "folly and feebleness" in the eye of the world; and in the eye also of any Catholic, who has permitted himself to learn from the world its characteristic lessons. He and the Church are at cross purposes in matters of social action; and were it only in self-defence, he is driven to contend against her claims to influence society, and to intervene with authority in matters primarily temporal.

There is a different exhibition of the evil spirit which we have called "temporalism," in that hatred of restraint and subordination, which in these days is often accounted even a virtue. We have abstained from dwelling on this,—not because it is less antichristian than the pseudo-patriotism against which we have inveighed, but in some sense for the opposite reason. It is in truth so *manifestly* antichristian, that no Catholic can need to be put on his guard against it.

On "intellectualism," the second constituent of "religious liberalism," it is not necessary to enlarge: because we can refer to another publication for a fuller exposition of what we would say; viz., to Dr. Ward's two Essays, on "the Relation of Intellectual Power to Man's True Perfection," republished in the second volume of the "Academia" papers, from which we have given extracts in an earlier note. By its own nature, this evil spirit is far less widely extensive than the other of which we have spoken; because comparatively few can *appreciate* intellectual excellence: yet externally to the Church it almost makes up, by its intensity, for the partialness of its extension. Consider e.g. this amazing burst of Lord Brougham's. "It is no mean reward of our labour" in scientific studies, says this inveterate man of the world, "to become acquainted with the prodigious genius of those who have *almost exalted the nature of man above its destined sphere*; and who hold a station apart, rising *over all the great teachers of mankind*"—God Incarnate and His Apostles of course inclusively,—"and spoken of *reverently*, as if *Newton and Laplace were not the names of mortal men*." No worshipper of stocks and stones ever perpetrated a more degrading idolatry than this. And the judgment of a consistent Catholic on such insane rant will be understood from the fact, that Lord Brougham considers Newton and Laplace to be "almost exalted above the destined sphere" of humanity, precisely because of their possessing certain qualities, which are possessed in an immeasurably greater degree by Satan and his angels. It is hard on Newton to be so spoken of; for in many ways that eminent astronomer was worthy of sincere respect. But on the various moral excellences which he seems to have possessed—his humility, simplicity, public virtue—Lord Brougham has not a word to say. It is in consequence of his having (as Lord Brougham thinks) approached so much more nearly than most other men towards intellectual equality with the evil spirits, that Lord Brougham speaks of him just as the Catholic might speak of S. Ignatius or S. Francis of Assisi.*

---

* Even Mr. Stuart Mill on this head will read a good Catholic lesson to *intellectualists*. "The ultimate end," he says, "from which" intellectual

A remark may be made in this case, precisely similar to that which we made in the former. Catholics of powerful and highly trained mental endowments will inevitably become steeped in intellectualism, except so far as they are protected through the influence of that doctrine, which is S. Ignatius's "Foundation." And the Catholic intellectualist is in some sense the Church's most dangerous enemy; from the very fact that (since he *is* a Catholic) the Church's children are commonly less on their guard against his counsels. As one out of a thousand instances, take a question which is at this moment of singularly urgent importance: that of higher Catholic education. No one indeed can be more earnestly desirous than is a loyal Catholic, that those among the leisured classes who love the Faith, should also possess the highest and completest attainable intellectual education. The intellect is an engine of tremendous power; and Catholics therefore can never hold their own, unless their intellectual training be fully equal to that of their opponents. Great indeed is the evil, so far as in any given place the Church may possess no children, who can defend her cause with fully adequate intellectual power. But then there is another evil possible, and greater still; viz. that her nominal sons may *assail* her cause with fully adequate intellectual power. There is no one thing which she has more to dread, than the disloyalty of men possessing highly trained intellects, who are in some sense Catholics, and who do not take public rank therefore as her avowed enemies. Such is the very result, to which every Catholic intellectualist is (more or less consciously) directing his efforts. He labours earnestly, that Catholics shall receive full intellectual training; while he is (to say the least) altogether inactive and indifferent as to the still more important end, that they shall be educated in clear intellectual appreciation of her various principles, and in deep harmony with her mind and spirit. But if they are not carefully educated in *this* direction, they will move, spontaneously and by the very force of Protestant example, in the extremely opposite one; and at this moment we are inclined to think, that there is no rock ahead so dangerous as this. If we had really to choose between two undesirable alternatives,—it is indefinitely a less evil, that the Catholic gentry of England should be ever so inferior to their Protestant fellow-countrymen in mental power and cultivation,—than that they should lose one particle of that reverence for ecclesiastical authority, which is now their noble characteristic.

"studies take *their chief value*," is "that of making" men "more effective combatants in the great fight which never ceases to rage between Good and Evil." (Inaugural Address at St. Andrew's, p. 97.)

And at last this instance is but one, among a whole family of illustrations which might be given. In every single question e.g. which concerns education of any class in the community,—the difference of practical view will be fundamental, between those who hold one and the other doctrine. The difference, we say, will be fundamental, between those on one hand, who hold that intellectual culture in itself ipso facto elevates man towards his true perfection;—and those on the other hand who hold (in accordance with the Church's spirit) that such culture is but a powerful instrument, which *may* indeed be a momentous influence for good, but which needs special concomitant moral training to prevent it from being a grave calamity.

We have spoken on the *public* evils which ensue, so far as this idolatry of intellect exists among Catholics. It cannot be necessary to enlarge, on the deadly blight with which such a spirit withers the interior growth of all whom it infects in its more extreme shape; and on the grievous spiritual detriment which every Catholic suffers, in proportion as he submits to its influence.

We next proceed to "indifferentism," the third ingredient of "religious liberalism" which we mentioned at the outset. On a former occasion (April, 1865, pp. 459—469) we considered this bad principle, with special reference to the Syllabus and other Pontifical definitions; and in a still earlier number (Oct., 1863, pp. 458—472) we exhibited to the best of our power its unreasonableness and irreligiousness. We assume, from those earlier disquisitions, that it includes two distinct elements, to mention no others.

Firstly, an indifferentist tends to think, that the performance of external duties constitutes the whole of morality; that a man is truly good, so only he abstains from robbery, lying, injustice, outrage,—and performs various acts of public spirit, generosity, forbearingness, compassion. But the good Catholic lays extreme stress on the *motive* for which such acts are done: whether on the one hand for worldly purposes, for the sake of self-complacency and human praise, at best from natural temperament;—or on the other hand as acts of submission and obedience, done with a pure intention of conforming to God's good pleasure. There are certain personages, held up by the Church to her children's reverent gaze, as exhibiting the true type of sanctity, carried to a heroic extent: we refer of course to canonized saints. This type of sanctity is identical from its earliest rudiments; it is based throughout on purity of intention, mortification, repentance, and prayer; it is fed by the fulness of Catholic doctrine, as that doctrine is livingly and *energe*tically impressed on the mind by the Church's whole

atmosphere and spirit. The good Catholic lays extreme stress on this special type of character; whereas the indifferentist tends to think, that there is no such very pronounced difference, between Catholic goodness on one hand, and the goodness of pious Protestants, unitarians, and deists on the other.* The good Catholic holds that so far as any man, even without fault of his own, is unimbued with Catholic doctrine—and much more so far as he has embraced any doctrine inconsistent therewith—he suffers a most serious calamity; whereas the indifferentist thinks that he is hardly any loser at all, for that there is no appreciable ethical difference between a pious Catholic and a pious Protestant. We wish indeed we could be more certain than we are—though the supposition is very dreadful—that there are not some professing Catholics, who *do* recognize a gulf as separating the saintly spirit on one side from non-Catholic piety on the other; and who in their heart of hearts *sympathize* with the latter, as against the former.

Now it is so plain as hardly to need expression, that this particular exhibition of indifferentism results inevitably, from an implicit rejection or forgetfulness of S. Ignatius's "Foundation." The beauty and unity of the Saint's character consist precisely, in his making the Creator's love and service his one end; and in his caring no otherwise for creatures, than as the latter may *conduce* to that end. He is ever gazing with the eye of faith on things not seen; and for that reason prizes beyond words those great and glorious Objects, which the Church places before his spiritual vision. It is in a soul so disposed, that the seed of Catholic doctrine produces due flower and fruit: while on the other hand, just so far as men forget the "Foundation," they are out of sympathy with the Saints, and fail to appreciate the value of dogma.

The indifferentist then, as we have seen, thinks that men suffer no considerable loss, when without their own fault they are ignorant of Catholic doctrine. But now secondly he further thinks, that such ignorance is *very seldom* men's own fault; or in other words he gives extraordinary extension to the plea of invincible ignorance. We admitted in a former article (April, 1865, p. 461) that the cases seem comparatively rare (so far as we can conjecture) in which the English Protestant's ignorance of Catholicity is *proximately* vincible; in which he has means of knowing for certain, at once and now, his obligation of submitting to the Church. But however this may be, we strongly think that in a large number of instances his ignorance

* See F. Newman's whole sermon on "Saintliness the Standard of Christian Principle."

is remotely, even if not proximately, vincible. We strongly think, that very many Protestants would soon be brought towards a vision of the truth, if they would be diligent in such pious exercises as are most fully within their proximate power; regular habits of self-examination, prayer for forgiveness, prayer for increased light, prayer for purity of intention, meditation on those religious truths which they already know. And obviously every Theist may at once be certain, that such exercises are his only way for securely growing in God's favour and in the full knowledge of His truth. Any one therefore, who altogether neglects them, and who in consequence of such neglect fails to ascertain the divine origin of Catholicity, is precluded from the plea of invincible ignorance. And even if he *had* that plea, it is quite incredible that such a person can have that kind of belief in the doctrines which he does hold, as can with any show of plausibility be accounted divine faith: while it is a rudimentary doctrine of the Church, that *without* some act of divine faith no individual adult can possibly be saved. An indifferentist denies or ignores all these considerations. He is wonderfully generous of what is not his own; and he will pronounce ex cathedrâ as a matter of course, that a whole crowd of Protestants, unitarians, deists (perhaps even pantheists),* whom he may happen to know, are on the high road to heaven, clothed with the mantle of invincible ignorance. Nor need we pause to point out at any length, how entirely this hallucination originates in the neglect or denial of S. Ignatius's "Foundation"; and in that disregard for the exercises of practical piety, which inevitably *results* from such neglect or denial.

The violent opposition of indifferentism to the Church's most fundamental maxims, is even more obvious than that of temporalism or intellectualism. The Church abhors heresy as the deadliest of evils, and prizes religious truth as the one foundation of every highest blessing. Accordingly good Catholics have in every age esteemed the Catholic Faith to be so priceless a treasure, that its possession is cheaply purchased by any amount of labour and self-sacrifice. To the good Catholic, the Faith is as everything; to the indifferentist, it is as nothing.

We have now enumerated those three antichristian habits of thought, which seem to us the chief constituents of what is usually meant by "religious liberalism"; viz. temporalism, intellectualism, indifferentism: and we have shown that all

* It may perhaps be worth while to remind our readers of the Catholic doctrine, that no adult can possibly be saved, who does not at least exercise explicit faith in "Deus Unus et Remunerator."—See Denzinger, *n.* 1039.

three originate in neglect of S. Ignatius's "Foundation." These, it is obvious, will inevitably issue in that further "liberalism," which we have called "ecclesiastical." Those who are entirely out of sympathy with the Church, will grudge any extension of her power either in teaching or governing; those who account her social maxims narrow-minded and pernicious, will not admit her divinely given authority in the temporal order; those who are steeped in every modern error which she has denounced, will be slow in recognizing the *infallibility* of such denunciations. Here however we must loudly and earnestly make an explanation, to avoid being guilty of extreme injustice. There are various Catholics,—denying the Church's infallibility in matters not primarily dogmatic, and her power in matters not primarily spiritual—who are by no means deeply tinged, and some of them not tinged at all, with *religious* liberalism. This was doubtless a far commoner case some fifty years ago, than it can be now; because the Holy See had then spoken much less emphatically on the subject than she has of late: still such instances are certainly to be found even now. We by no means say then, that all who deny such power to the Church are religious liberals; but we do say conversely, that all religious liberals concur in denying such power to the Church. Take e.g. the vast majority of those Catholics, who at this moment deny the ex cathedrâ character of the "Unam sanctam" or the "Mirari vos"; and who, not content even with this, confidently account those doctrines *false*, which are therein declared. Surely it is a plain matter of common observation and common sense, that they are not led to this opinion by theological considerations—concerning the tests of an ex cathedrâ Act, or the testimony of Tradition on the extent of infallibility—but by their dislike of those verities, which the said utterances set forth and inculcate. Nor do we designate by the name of "ecclesiastical *liberalism*" any one's error concerning the Church's extent of authority, except so far as in his particular case such error results, from the liberalism which we have called "religious."

Two objections, closely connected with each other, have from time to time been made, against our very severe judgment of liberalism, religious and ecclesiastical. How can this spirit, it has been asked, be really so odious and antichristian as we allege, seeing that liberals are still suffered to remain within the Church? We are really obscuring—so it is thought—the Church's very note of dogmatic unity, in our zeal against our fellow-Catholics. Then secondly, when we draw a distinction (as we are charged with doing) on our own mere individual

theory, between "sound" and "unsound" Catholics,—are we not acting on that very principle of *private judgment*, which we so heartily denounce? And this moreover, with no small disturbance of the Church's rest and tranquillity?

We might begin by pointing out in reply, how extremely small is the proportionate number of pronounced Catholic liberals; really like a drop of water in the ocean, if compared with that vast number of Catholics, rich and poor, who are at heart untainted with the plague. Still of course the question of *principle* is not affected by this circumstance; and we will proceed therefore to consider successively the two objections just mentioned.

Now in the first place, no controversialist has ever dreamed of maintaining, that the Church's unity of faith implies what the first of these supposes. *Heretics* no doubt are excluded from the Church's body. But a multitude of opinions have been expressly condemned by the Church herself, as erroneous, savouring of heresy, tending to heresy, and the like, which are not strictly heretical; and though doubtless any one who deliberately holds such tenets after the Church's condemnation commits (materially at least) mortal sin, yet he is not excluded by their profession from the visible Body of Christ. It is the Church herself therefore, which has taught by most undeniable implication, that Catholics remaining Catholics may nevertheless hold tenets, erroneous, savouring of heresy, and legitimately leading thereto. And in accordance with this, the Vatican Council has expressly declared (Preamble of the "Dei Filius") that "many even of the children of the Catholic Church have strayed from the path of true piety"; that "by the gradual diminution of truths held by them" "the Catholic sense has become weakened in them"; that "they are found *depraving the genuine sense* of the dogmata which Holy Mother Church holds and teaches, and *endangering the integrity and soundness of the Faith.*" From the mere fact then that liberals are not actually excluded from the Church, there does not arise so much as the faintest presumption, that various liberalistic tenets may not be erroneous, savouring of heresy, and legitimately leading thereto; nor yet that liberalism may not "deprave the genuine sense" of revealed dogmata, and "endanger the integrity and soundness of the Faith."

For ourselves however we cannot but hold, in regard to some extreme manifestations of liberalism, that they directly *contradict* (and not merely *imperil* and *corrupt*) revealed truth. We proceed therefore with a further consideration. No Catholic who looks at the very surface of history can say, that all tenets without *exception, which* contradict revealed truth, are condemned by *the Church as heretical,* from the time when they are first

advocated prominently and systematically. To make this clear, we need not go beyond what is actually before our eyes. Since July 1870 it has been infallibly certain, that Gallicanism directly contradicts revealed truth: yet it had been prominently and systematically advocated by Catholics,—nay had been made their basis of energetic rebellion against the just authority of the Church's divinely appointed ruler—for almost two centuries before its condemnation as heretical. In truth, when some error directly contradictory to revealed truth first makes its appearance—however keenly the reigning Pontiff may see its malignant character—he is very often obliged by considerations of charity to deal with it warily and cautiously. He never fails indeed (as we shall presently mention) to put the faithful on their guard against it; nay and to speak so distinctly, as to leave no doubt whatever of its falsehood in the mind of any Catholics, who simply desire to know and follow the Church's mind. But it is quite another thing, expressly to anathematize it, and to take on himself the immediate reponsibility of all those disciplinary measures which would thereupon be required. Undoubtedly, from the first moment when such an error appears, it is (to use F. Newman's language) "in *visible course* of expulsion"; "its eradication is but a matter of time"; and when once it is expelled, it is expelled for ever. This is the Church's true note of dogmatic unity; and there is a fine passage of F. Newman's, using that note for the very purpose of controversy, which is so singularly to the point, that we shall take the liberty of here inserting it almost entire, notwithstanding its great length. We italicise one or two sentences; and should add, that the Anglican controversialist to whom he is referring, is Mr. Palmer, of Worcester College, Oxford. Those disorders, says F. Newman, which have in various times afflicted the Church,—

> Have but assayed what may be called the active unity and integrating virtue of the see of St. Peter, in contrast to such counterfeits as the Anglican Church, which, set up in unconditional surrender to the nation, has never been able to resist the tyranny or caprice of the national will. The Establishment, having no internal principle of individuality except what it borrows from the nation, *can neither expel what is foreign to it, nor heal its wounds*; the Church, a living body, when she becomes the seat of a malady or disorder, *tends from the first to the eradication of it, which is but a matter of time*. This great fact, *continually occurring in her history*, I will briefly illustrate by two examples, which will be the fairest to take, from the extraordinary obstinacy of the evil, and its occasional promise of victory;—the history of the heresies *concerning the* Incarnation, and the history of Jansenism. *Each controversy had reference to a great mystery of the faith; in each every inch of the ground was contested*, and the enemy retired step by

step, or at least from post to post: the former of the two lasted for between four and five hundred years, and the latter nearly two hundred. . . . .

Let us fancy an erudite Nestorian of the day living in Seleucia, beyond the limits of the Roman empire, and looking out over the Euphrates upon the battle which was waging between the See of St. Peter and *the subtle heresy of the Monophysites*, through so protracted a period; and let him write a defence of his own Communion for the use of theological students. Doubtless he would have used that long contest as a decisive argument against the unity and purity of the Catholic Church, and would have anticipated the triumphant words of a learned Anglican divine, with reference to that Jansenistic controversy, which I reserve for my second example. "This very [Monophysite] heresy," he would have said, "has, in opposition to all these anathemas and condemnations, and in spite of the persecution of the temporal powers, continued to exist for nearly [300] years; and, what is more, it has existed all along in the very heart of the Roman Church itself. Yes, it has perpetuated itself in all parts of that Church, sometimes covertly, sometimes openly, exciting uneasiness, tumults, innovations, reforms, persecutions, schisms, but *always adhering to the Roman communion with invincible tenacity.* It is in vain that, sensible of so great an evil, the Roman Church struggles and *resorts to every expedient to free herself from its presence;* the loathed and abhorred heresy perpetuates itself in her vitals, and infects her bishops, her priests, her monks, her universities; and, depressed for a time by the arm of civil power, gains the ascendancy at length, influences the counsel of kings, ... produces religious innovations of the most extraordinary character, and inflicts infinite and permanent injury and disgrace on the cause of the Roman Church."

Such was the phenomenon which Monophysites had presented, above a thousand years before the rise of a heresy, which this author seems to have fancied the first instance of such an anomaly. The controversy began amid the flourishing schools of Syria, the most learned quarter of Christendom; it extended along Asia Minor to Greece and Constantinople; and then there was a pause. Suddenly it broke out in an apparently dissimilar shape, and with a new beginning, in the imperial city; summoned its adherents, confederates, and partisans from North to South, came into collision with the Holy See, and convulsed the Catholic world. Subdued for a while, it returned to what was very like its original form and features, and reared its head in Egypt with a far more plausible phraseology, and in a far more promising position. There, and in Syria, and thence through the whole of the East, supported by the emperors, and afterwards by the Mahometans, it sustained itself with great ingenuity, inventing evasion after evasion, and throwing itself into more and more subtle formulas, for the space of near three hundred years. Lastly, it suddenly appeared in a new shape and in a final effort, four hundred years from the time of its first rise, in the extreme West of Europe, among the theologians of Spain; and formed matter of controversy for our own Alcuin, the scholar of St. Bede, for the interposition of Charlemagne, and the labours of the great Council of Frankfort. It is impossible, I am sure, for any one patiently to read the history of this series *of controversies, whatever* may be his personal opinions, without being

intimately convinced of the oneness or identity of the mind which lived in the Catholic Church through that long period; which baffled the artifices and sophistries of the subtlest intellects, was proof against fear, despondency, and temporal expedience, and succeeded in establishing irrevocably and for ever those points of faith with which she started in the contest. Any one false step would have thrown the whole theory of the doctrine into irretrievable confusion; but it was as if some one individual and perspicacious intellect, to speak humanly, ruled the theological discussion from first to last. That in the long course of centuries, and in spite of the apparent failure, in points of detail, of the most gifted fathers and saints, the Church thus wrought out the one and only consistent theory which can be formed on the great doctrine in dispute, proves how clear, simple, and exact her vision of that doctrine was. Now I leave the retrospect of this long struggle with two remarks;—first, that *it was never doubtful to the world, for any long time, what was the decision of authority on each successive question as it came into consideration;* next, that the series of doctrinal errors which was involved, tended from the first to an utter overthrow, each decision of authority being a new and further victory over it, which was never undone. *It was all along in visible course of expulsion from the Catholic fold.* Contrast this with the denial of baptismal grace, viewed as a heresy within the Anglican Church; has the sentiment of authority against it always been unquestionable? Has there been a series of victories over it? Is it in visible course of expulsion? Is it ever tending to be expelled? Are the influence and the prospects of the heresy less formidable now than in the age of Wesley, or of Calamy, or of Baxter, or of Abbot, or of Cartwright, or of the Reformers?

The second controversy which I shall mention is one not so remarkable in itself, not so wide in its field of conflict, nor so terrible in its events, but more interesting perhaps to us, as relating almost to our own times, and as used as an argument against the Church's unity and power of enforcing her decisions, by such writers as the theologian, of whose words I have already availed myself. For the better part of two centuries Jansenism has troubled the greater part of Catholic Europe, has had great successes, and has expected greater still; yet, somehow or other, such is the fact, as a looker-on would be obliged to say, whatever be its internal reasons, of which he would not be a judge, at the end of the time you look for it and it is gone.

There was a time when *nearly all that was most gifted, learned, and earnest in France, seemed corrupted by the heresy;* which, though condemned again and again by the Holy See, discovered new subterfuges, and gained to itself fresh patrons and protectors, to shelter it from the Apostolic ban. What circle of names can be produced, comparable in their times for the combination of ability and virtue, of depth of thought, of controversial dexterity, of poetical talent, of extensive learning, and of religious profession, with those of Launoy, Pascal, Nicole, Arnault, Racine, Tillemont, Quesnel, and their co-religionists, admirable in every point, but in their deficiency in the primary grace of a creature, humility? What shall we say to the prospects of a school of opinion, which was influencing so many of the most distinguished Congregations of the day; and which, though nobly withstood by the Society of Jesus and the Sulpicians, yet at length found an entrance

among the learned Benedictines of St. Maur, and had already sapped the faith of various members of another body, as erudite and as gifted as they? For fifteen years a Cardinal Archbishop of Paris was its protector and leader, and this at a distance of sixty years after its formal condemnation. First, the book itself of Jansenius had been condemned; and then, in consequence of an evasion, the sense of the book; and then a controversy arose whether the Church could decide such a matter of fact as that a book *had* a particular sense. And then the further question came into discussion, whether the sense was to be condemned with the mere intention of an external obedience, or with an internal assent. Eleven bishops of France interposed with the Pope to prevent the condemnation: there were four who required nothing more of their clergy than a respectful silence on the subject in controversy; and nineteen wrote to the Pope in favour of these four. Before these difficulties had been settled, a fresh preacher of the same doctrines appeared in the person of Quesnel; and on the Pope's condemning his opinions in the famous bull "Unigenitus," six bishops refused to publish it, and fourteen formally opposed it; and then sixteen suspended the effects of it. Three universities took part with them, and the parliaments of various towns banished their Archbishops, Bishops, or Priests, and confiscated their goods, either for taking part against the Jansenists or refusing them the Sacraments.

As time went on, the evil spread wider and grew more intense, instead of being relieved. In the middle of last century, *a hundred years after the condemnation of the heresy at Rome*, it was embodied in the person of a far more efficacious disputant than Jansenius or Quesnel. The Emperor Joseph developed the apparently harmless theories of a theological school in the practical form of Erastianism. He prohibited the reception of the famous bull "Unigenitus" in his dominions; subjected all bulls, rescripts, and briefs from Rome to an imperial supervision; forbade religious orders to obey foreign superiors; "suppressed confraternities, abolished the processions, retrenched festivals, prescribed the order of offices, regulated the ceremonies, the number of masses, the manner of giving benediction, nay the number of waxlights." He seized the revenues of the bishops, destroyed their sees, and even for a time forbade them to confer orders. He permitted divorce in certain cases, and removed images from the churches. The new Reformation reached as far as Belgium on the one hand, and down to Naples on the other. The whole of the Empire and its alliances were apparently on the point of disowning their dependence on the Apostolic See. The worship of the saints, auricular confession, indulgences, and other Catholic doctrines, were openly written against or disputed by bishops and professors. The Archduke of Tuscany, imitating the Emperor, sent catechisms to the bishops, and instructed them in his circulars or charges; while a Neapolitan prelate, instead of his ordinary title of "Bishop by the grace of the Holy Apostolic See," styled himself "Bishop by the grace of the king." Who would not have thought that Henry of England had risen from his place, and was at *once in* Vienna, Belgium, Tuscany, and Naples? The reforming views had *spread into Portugal; and,* to complete the crisis, the great antagonist of *Protestantism, which* was born with it in one day, and had ever since been *the best champion of the* Holy See, the Society of Jesus itself, by the in-

scrutable fiat of Providence, is, in that hour of need, to avoid worse evils, by that very See suppressed. Surely the holy Roman Church is at length in the agonies of dissolution. The Catholic powers, Germany, France, Portugal, and Naples, all have turned against her. Who is to defend her?

Yet what has been the issue?

Fifty years have passed away since the time of those wonders, and we, my brethren, behold in our degree the issue of what our fathers could but imagine. Great changes surely have been wrought, but not those which they anticipated. The German Emperor has ceased to be; he persecuted the Church, and he has lost his place of pre-eminence. The Gallican Church, too, with its much-prized liberties, and its fostered heresy, was also swept away, and its time-honoured establishment dissolved. Jansenism is no more. The Church lives, the Apostolic See rules. (pp. 258-268.)

Certainly there are differences, between the instance of Monophysism or Jansenism on the one hand and of liberalism on the other; just as there are mutual differences between the two former instances themselves. And there is on the surface indeed this important difference, that the number of pronounced Catholic liberals is comparatively so insignificant. We are insisting however, not on the points of difference, but on the points of similarity. Our argument is this. The Monophysite and Jansenistic spirits were indubitably heretical, and were cognizable by all Catholics as vehemently and earnestly opposed by the Holy See: yet it was only by slow degrees and in the course of centuries, that *either* poison was finally expelled from the Church's system. No one therefore can legitimately infer that the full liberalistic spirit is not strictly heretical, from the mere fact that for a much shorter period it has partially resisted the efforts made by the Holy See for its extermination from the Church. We say "partially"; because no one acquainted with religious events will doubt, that great progress has already been made in the desired direction.

We will next reply to the second objection above mentioned. It is urged then, that we are really exercising undue and intolerable private judgment, when, with all the energy we can command, we denounce certain opinions, advocated by persons whom the Church tolerates within her bosom. But this objection proceeds on an assumption, violently and (one may even say) monstrously at variance with fact: an assumption namely, that the Church never puts the faithful on their guard against any error, without actually excluding from her communion those who profess it. Take the heresy of Gallicanism, as one case out of a hundred. Gallicans as such were not expelled *from the Church's communion*, until a year and a half ago. *And yet from the very moment* when the articles of 1682 were

published, the Supreme Pontiff and great majority of Catholic bishops expressed their condemnation thereof so significantly and impressively, that it was utterly impossible for any Catholic, who looked really to the Church for religious guidance, to have so much as one moment's doubt concerning her true mind. The Holy See at once promulgated its disapproval and annulment of the articles; and subsequently condemned their republication at Pistoia, as "temerarious, scandalous, and grossly injurious to the said Holy See": while the great body of Catholic bishops heartily adhered on the matter to their visible head. Now the very same fact has throughout been quite as emphatically exhibited, or rather very much more so, in the case of liberalism. The very utmost which a Catholic liberal dreams of attempting is, to show that he is not as such actually excluded from the Church: he does not think of denying, that his opinions have been visited with every kind of ecclesiastical censure short of anathema.* We need mention only one out of a hundred instances. Indifferentism was denounced by Gregory XVI. as "a most fruitful source of the Church's evils, spread in all directions through the artifice of evil men"; the vindication for every man of liberty of conscience was described as not merely an "absurd and erroneous opinion," but rather an "insanity"; the existing liberty of publishing irreligious books was characterized as having "spread a curse over the face of the earth." Nor has any liberal yet been able to adduce any argument of the faintest plausibility, for calling in question the ex cathedrâ character of Gregory XVI.'s Encyclical. It would be precisely as reasonable to question the ex cathedrâ character of the "Unigenitus" or the "Auctorem Fidei." †

---

* This consideration also involves the answer to a very obvious objection, which may be made by Protestants. How can the Church be a faithful guide, they may ask, if she does not warn her children against so pestilential a principle as we account liberalism? She *does* warn them against it most emphatically.

† The Vatican Council has defined it to be of Catholic Faith, that the Roman Pontiff is infallible whenever "in discharge of his office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians he defines, in virtue of his Supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church." But in the "Singulari nos" Gregory XVI. had thus spoken to the whole Catholic Episcopate. "In which Encyclical Letter"—viz. the "Mirari vos"—"*in discharge of our office*, we declared *to the whole Catholic flock* sound doctrine and that *which alone it is lawful to follow* on the heads mentioned therein." "He [Lamennais] endeavoured to overthrow *the Catholic doctrine* which *we defined in our above-named Letter*, according to the *authority committed to us unworthy*, concerning due subjection to civil authority . . . . *the deadly contagion of* indifferentism," liberty of speech and conscience, &c. *We hardly see how any form* of words is even *imaginable*, which should more *distinctly express that the* "Mirari vos" appertains to that class of utter-

Now "private judgment" means the adopting opinions on one's own individual judgment; and the *sacrifice* of private judgment means the submitting one's own intellect to the prescription of authority. And if this be so, we maintain that the course we have pursued is more pointedly at variance with the principle of private judgment, than is any which has ever been recommended in preference. The grossest exercise of private judgment *possible*, to a Catholic remaining such, is that he shall accept the Church's definitions *of faith*, while he refuses submission to her remaining large mass of infallible teaching. Then a further unreasonable exercise of private judgment (as we consider) is displayed by those, who will not yield firm interior assent to any authoritative teaching, which is not strictly infallible.* But so far from being an undue exercise of private judgment,—it is on the contrary the loyal Catholic's one legitimate course, that when the Church's mind is plainly exhibited, he shall do everything in his power to denounce and expose all those errors, which she manifestly desires to repress.

It is of course quite a different question, how this can be most advantageously effected. Take for instance this case of liberalism: in what way can the Catholic most legitimately labour, under guidance of the Holy See, to assail and overthrow it? Well at all events nothing but good can result from such a course as we have pursued in this article; supposing only that our views are on the whole true, and our arguments sound. If there be a class of errors still existing among Catholics, which the Holy See has emphatically censured,—nothing but good can come from showing (if indeed we have shown) that such errors mainly flow from one common source, and that source manifestly antichristian. But it has been questioned whether *further* it be wise, to press on the attention of liberals the Church's repeated and emphatic condemnation of their system. No one indeed can possibly doubt, that by no course of proceeding will an educated Catholic more securely protect himself from all liberalism and all treason against S. Ignatius's "Foundation,"—than by studying, in order to accept, the whole body of anti-liberalistic utterances, which have issued from the Holy See. But it has been questioned, whether the pressing those utterances on unwilling ears be not a "kill or cure" remedy, which may kill rather than cure. Now if we are addressing loyal Catholics, it suffices to reply, that from the

---

ances, which the Vatican Council has defined to be infallible in their teaching.

* *See our remarks last July, from* p. 142 to p. 154, as to the particular *kind of authoritative teaching* here intended, and its claim to acceptance.

very nature of the case this responsibility rests with the Holy See. It is the Holy Father, who issues and promulgates these repeated condemnations; and those who draw attention to them, are acting only as his children and servants. But if such an argument is disloyally urged against the utterances of Rome themselves,—we would beg objectors to explain, if they can, in what other way the Supreme Pontiff can so effectively promote his great enterprise, of gradually exterminating from the Church all remaining leaven of these evil principles. Doubtless the Holy See, as we have said, chooses her own times and methods for condemning error; but when did she ever aim at *permanent* "peace" except "through the truth"? Accordingly the "Civiltà Cattolica," which has always possessed a semi-official character, has constantly and urgently insisted on the Pontifical condemnations of liberalism; and now F. Liberatore has collected many of the papers contributed by him to that periodical, in the important volume which we have named at the head of our article.*

We conclude for the present with one final word. It has been thought in some quarters, that we have been reckless, as regards the interest of souls, in those constant appeals to the Church's condemnation of liberalism, which we have repeated for so many years. We must here however distinguish, between the question of *fact* and the question of *opinion*. As a matter of *fact*, we have been so far from not *considering* the interest of souls, that the very contrary is true. The very principal thought which has animated our exertions has been our conviction, that under existing circumstances liberalism in its various shapes is the most subtle, and (partly for that very reason) the most dangerous poison of the soul, against which it is necessary for the more educated Catholics to be put on their guard. This, we say, is what we testify as a matter of *fact*. But we have of course no right whatever to complain if, as a matter of *opinion*, some critic should consider our views on this head to be exaggerated, fanciful, or even fundamentally mistaken. Only we would beg such critic, before he finally acquiesces in this judgment, to consider the arguments we have brought together in the article which we here terminate.

* The "Civiltà" of Nov. 18 (p. 439) lays down a very clear doctrine, on the Church's authority in relation to the State. Spiritual matters are of course exclusively within the Church's jurisdiction. In mixed matters the Church has pre-eminence in such sense, that she can directly annul secular laws which are contrary to those of God and the Church. Matters purely temporal—such as the army, finances, the civil tribunals—may fall indirectly under the Church's jurisdiction, so far as any law on such matters is injurious to the people's spiritual welfare. It is much to be observed, that this semi-official journal considers such plain speaking expedient under existing circumstances.

Art. II.—NATURE AND THE POETS.

Nature-Study, as applicable to the purposes of Poetry and Eloquence. By Henry Dircks, LL.D., F.R.S.E., M.R.S.L., &c. Second Edition. Edinburgh: Nimmo. 1870.

The Earthly Paradise: a Poem. By William Morris. Fifth Edition. London: Ellis. 1870.

In every age of the world the study of Nature has been intimately associated with Religion. It was a misdirected love of God's beautiful Creation which in great measure gave birth to the paganism of antiquity, for modern philologists have abundantly proved that the whole scheme of ancient mythology resulted from the personification and idealization of natural phenomena. The gods of Greece and Rome, as well as of the North and the far East, can all be identified in the powers of visible Nature, and their marvellous achievements, which have been woven by the poets into such exquisite legends, can all be recognized in the action of day and night, the dawn and the gloaming, and the varied operations of the elements and seasons.

And turning from what is merely human to what is divine, we find that Sacred Scripture itself abounds in passages which associate the majesty and beauty of the created world with the unseen glory of Him who "walketh on the wings of the winds" and "speaketh in the voice of the thunder." If to all this we add the witness of our own emotional impressions when we ourselves are brought into the presence of the great mysteries of Nature,—the fierce thunderstorm, or the mighty ocean, or the solemn midnight,—we are forced to acknowledge that between Nature and Religion there is some strong connecting tie.

But let us not be too hasty. Dr. Dircks has written an elaborate book to impress upon the world in general, and on poets in particular, that this is all nonsense. He professes to give us a "Grammar of Nature-Study" which shall arrange and systematize the beauties of Nature much in the same way as Science has arranged and systematized the various departments of Creation for a different purpose and from a different point of view. With this design the author has selected passages from the poets, aphorisms, proverbs, &c., drawn from Nature, and has arranged them under certain headings, with a

view to our studying Nature in all its departments, just as a student in the British Museum may study the earth's crust, from the igneous rocks to the latest tertiaries, by means of the geological specimens which are there arranged for him. As a collection of "elegant extracts" the book has its value, but it is easy to see that the real drift of the work is not so much to *systematize* the study of Nature as to *materialize* it. The author has no patience with any poet who can discern anything more in Nature than he can see with his two eyes. He terms any attempt which goes beyond this "a visionary and imbecile attempt to expound Nature by affected mysteriousness," and "an unhappy ambition to go beyond the broad daylight workings of Nature, which never has been and never can be successful." * And he quotes with approbation the following passage from Moir's "Lectures on our Poetic Literature":—

> The latter-day poets seem principally to have a desire to exhibit the influence of physical nature on the operations of the fancy and the intellect; and we have in consequence simply their gropings amid the arcana of minds, *in search of those hidden links of mystery which connect the seen to the unseen.* But this, as the general subjective material, can scarcely be termed poetry.†

In other words, Dr. Dircks is making a bold attempt to "secularize" not only poetry, but Nature itself. It is the grand idea of the present age to secularize everything, but we scarcely think that the present attempt will have much success. For turn to whatever age or whatever school of poetry we will, the attitude of the poets towards Nature is always found to be the reflex of their religious system and intimately connected with their religious feelings; and in proportion as they are wanting in religious feeling, they are wanting also in the love of Nature. We quite agree with Dr. Dircks in this, that all poets are more or less susceptible of the impressions of the natural world. For there never was and there never could be a poet who could look with mere indifference on the beauty and majesty of the visible creation, with its ever-shifting scenery of rain and storm and sunshine, and its strange emotional influences over the human heart. Not every poet has made Nature the theme of his song, for there are other sources of Castalian waters; but still some appreciation of Nature has of necessity found a place in the heart of all real poets, and a true ear can catch the faint melody of its inspiration running in an undertone through the most martial of their music.

But this appreciation of Nature, though common to all the

---

* Preface, p. xiv. † Page 49.

poets, differs most widely both in *degree* and in *kind*. The love, or the admiration, or the reverence, or the sympathy with which Nature is regarded by different poets and different schools of poetry, is as diverse as the hues of her flowers or the tints of her rainbow. The stern old bards of Greece and Rome, who loved to think of the rising sun as the chariot of the god of Day, whirled along by fiery steeds through the shining portals of Aurora, could scarcely be said to *love* Nature at all. Schiller has justly observed, in a passage quoted by Dr. Dircks, that "the Greek poet is certainly, in the highest degree, correct, faithful, and circumstantial in his descriptions of Nature, but his heart has no more share in his words than if he were treating of a garment, a shield, or a suit of armour. Nature seems to interest his understanding more than his moral perceptions; he does not cling to her charms with the fervour and the plaintive passion of the poet of modern times." The classic poet has little in common, as regards his appreciation of Nature, with him who sings of

> Dewy morn, and odorous noon and even,
> With sunset and its gorgeous ministers,
> And solemn midnight's tingling silentness,
> And autumn's hollow sighs in the sere wood—

The poet who loved to

> Linger long
> In lonesome caves, making the wild his home,
> Until the doves and squirrels would partake
> From his innocuous hand his bloodless food
> Lured by the gentle meaning of his looks—*

Still less with him who writes in sober prose: "I pass almost the whole day in the open air, and hold spiritual communion with the tendrils of the vine, which say good things to me, and I could tell you wonders:" † or again with that English poet who writes of himself in youth,—

> The sounding cataract
> Haunted me like a passion; the tall rock,
> The mountain and the deep and gloomy wood,
> Their colours and their forms, were then to me
> An appetite, a feeling, and a love.‡

But how it comes to pass that the appreciation of Nature by the poets has been so varied, and the attitude of their minds towards the same creation so utterly contradictory, can never

---

* Shelley, "Alastor." † Goethe. ‡ Wordsworth.

be understood unless we take religion into account. If we trace the many-sided sympathies of man with Nature to their true source, we shall find that they all spring originally from religious sentiment, whether true or false; and consequently to try and sever the poet's study of Nature from those religious aspirations for which Dr. Dircks has so much disrelish, is something like an attempt to sever light from the sun or heat from fire.

The whole history of poetry bears abundant testimony to the inseparable union to which we have alluded. Look, in the first instance, at the attitude which is displayed towards Nature by the old pagan poets of Greece and Rome. In trying to appreciate this, we must bear in mind that these poets were nurtured in a school whose influences it is difficult at this distance of time to realize to ourselves. Not only had they scant and erroneous ideas of the physical world and its many phenomena, but they were imbued with a religious system in which the beauties and wonders of Nature were interwoven with ethical and metaphysical doctrines. No wonder then if the prevailing sentiment which coloured their poetry when Nature displayed its mysteries before them, appears to have been at first one of almost childlike awe. The early poets were giants in their way; but when they first stood in the awful presence of Nature, they seemed like children, awe-struck and bewildered. Sunrise and sunset, the storm and the thunder, the grandeur of the ocean and the magic of the moon-lit sky, the moaning of the forest and the murmurs of the mountain stream,—all these things passed before them like a gorgeous panorama which they gazed upon and marvelled at, but failed to comprehend. And the result was what might have been expected. Either they fell down and worshipped, idealizing the powers of Nature, and imagining "the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon, to be the gods that rule the world," * or else they fell into the opposite extreme, and seeing nothing in Nature that was intelligible to them, they gradually degraded it into a mere background for their pictures. The earliest pagan poets,—those who, so to speak, founded mythology, must evidently have taken the first view: they were Nature-worshippers. But the great classic poets, who lived in more civilized and more critical times, took the second. Nature was to them beautiful, but unintelligible, and so they restricted themselves to one single source of inspiration, viz., *Man*,—his godlike heroism, his virtue, his weakness, his suffering. The

* Wisdom xiii. 2.

very gods of classic poetry became mere men. Of this Cicero complains: "Fingebat hæc Homerus, et humana ad deos transferebat, mallem divina ad nos." * And meanwhile Nature, which they had the privilege of seeing in all its charms and watching in all its marvellous transfigurations in sunnier climes than ours, became in their eyes only a grand theatre on which men and women played out the tragedy of life. The mountain and the forest and the broad ocean were to them nothing but an imposing stage, and the storm and the rain and the sunshine, which chased each other in succession overhead, were but the ὄψις—the stage machinery—of this awful theatre, guided by dextrous but invisible agency. This is so apparent that both in Homer and Virgil, almost every allusion to Nature reads like a mere stage direction, elegantly worded perhaps, but only thrown in as a parenthesis. Take, for instance, the admired passage in the fourth book of the "Æneid," *et ex uno disce omnes*:—

> Nox erat, et placidum carpebant fessa soporem
> Corpora per terras, silvæque et sæva quierant
> Æquora; quum medio volvuntur sidera lapsu,
> Quum tacet omnis ager, pecudes, pictæque volucres,
> Quæque lacus late liquidos, quæque aspera dumis
> Rura tenent, somno positæ sub nocte silenti:
> At non infelix animi Phœnissa, &c. †

It is surely not hypercritical to call such a passage as this, graphic though it may be, a mere stage direction. "It is Night: the stars are shining: everything is at rest." That is all; for the night and the stars and the silence of the whole earth seem not to convey the slightest emotion to the heart either of the poet or of his heroes. Compare the passage for one moment from this point of view with the well-known description of the same scene by a modern poet:—

> 'Tis midnight: on the mountains brown
> The cold round moon shines deeply down;
> Blue roll the waters, blue the sky
> Spreads like an ocean hung on high,
> Bespangled with those isles of light
> So wildly, spiritually bright;
> Who ever gazed upon them shining
> And turned to earth without repining,
> Nor wished for wings to flee away,
> And mix with their eternal ray? ‡

---

* "Tusc. Quæst.," i. 65. † "Æneid," iv. 522.
‡ Byron, "Siege of Corinth."

And these two extremes in the attitude of the old pagans towards Nature,—the extreme of *worship* and the extreme of what we will term in the absence of a better name, *landscape-love*, is strangely but very accurately reproduced in such of our modern poets as inherit not the mere mannerisms, but the sympathies also of the ancients. These are sometimes styled the "neo-classic poets," but it would be equally correct to term them "neo-pagans."

Take up Milton for instance. If there ever was a poet who boldly carried the ideas, the sentiments, and we must add the beauties, of pagan thought into the sanctuary of Christianity, and robed the sacred figures of angels and archangels, and the very Persons of the Blessed Trinity in garments borrowed from the wardrobe of Olympus, that poet was John Milton. Dr. Channing, in his brilliant but blasphemous essay on Milton, has held him up as the great opponent of the doctrine of the Divinity of the Son of God, that corner-stone of Chistianity, and of that other fundamental doctrine, the Creation of the universe out of nothing, which may be said to be the starting point of revelation.* Milton no doubt was a "religious-minded man," but so was Homer, and no impartial reader can fail to see that the religious sympathies of "Paradise Lost" are far more of a piece with those of the "Iliad" than those of the Gospel. His "Eternal Father" is only another Zeus, his "Messiah" in his chariot of flame, at whose right hand

---

* "Our Trinitarian adversaries are perpetually ringing in our ears the names of Fathers and Reformers. We take Milton, Locke, and Newton, and place them in our front, and want no others to oppose to the whole array of great names on the opposite side. Before these intellectual suns, the stars of self-named orthodoxy 'hide their diminished heads.'" And further on:—"He [Milton] is totally opposed, as were most of the ancient" (*i. e.* Pagan) "philosophers, to the doctrine of God's creating the universe out of nothing."—"The Character and Writings of John Milton," by W. E. Channing.

We beg any of our readers who may still consider it unfair to class Milton among "Pagan poets," to recall to mind some of the many passages of which the following is a specimen. It occurs in his "Christmas Hymn":—

"The shepherds on the lawn
Or ere the point of dawn
Sat simply chatting in a rustic row:
Full little thought they then
That the mighty Pan
Was kindly come to live with them below."

This is the Miltonic version of "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt amongst us." Some of our readers may recall the fierce terms in which F. Faber, while an Anglican, wrote of that "execrable rebel and heretic Milton."—See his "Life and Letters," by J. E. Bowden, p. 205.

Victory
Sat eagle-wing'd; beside "whom" hung his bow
And quiver with three-bolted thunder stored,

flashes on us like another Apollo; his Satan is another Prometheus, conquered but not subdued, and his "Archangels ruined" are only the Titans over again under new names. This much by way of apology, if apology be needed, for ranking Milton among Pagan poets. And that Milton inherited one of the two Pagan views of Nature and enlisted it in his service as a mere background for his pictures, is not merely acknowledged by his greatest admirers, but even paraded as one of his leading merits. Thus Mr. St. John, the editor of his Prose Works, has laid it down as an axiom which he has deduced from a life-long study of his master, that "after all, landscapes" (note the word) "are only valuable as a background to human action: they are nothing in themselves. And the utter inability of mere brute matter to call forth the energies of poetry, is evident from the writings of those *doctores umbratici* who in every age have wooed the muse; their representations, like nothing in the heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth, being but so many wild dreams, and their sentiments and language every way worthy of the matter." *

Mr. Morris is unquestionably one of the most talented of living poets. But unhappily his views are tinged with that *neo-Paganism* which so many of our poets have inherited from Milton; and we have placed his name at the head of this article because he may be regarded as the coryphæus of the whole band of living classicists. In his best work, "The Earthly Paradise," he claims for himself, at first and last, a strange and touching title:—

The idle singer of an empty day.

His songs are exquisite; graphic, melodious, and full of pathos; but in one respect at least he is truly an "idle singer." He carries his readers through the circle of the whole year: he pauses on each month, and paints it with a master's hand, and yet passes ever on, not understanding what he paints. The ever-changing scenery of heaven and earth is to him the mere drapery of a theatre: in his own words,—

The earth and heaven through countless year on year
Slow changing, were to us but curtains fair,
Hung round about a little room, where play
Weeping and laughter of man's empty day.†

---

* Milton's Prose Works, edited by J. A. St. John. Preface.
† "The Earthly Paradise:" L'Envoy.

And if Milton and his followers represent one Pagan school, the *landscape-school,* in their attitude toward's God's mysterious Creation, we have not far to seek to find representatives of those more primitive poets who, as they studied Nature, felt a strange spell creep over them at the wonders of the vast universe, and, in the words of Scripture, "with their beauty being delighted, took them to be gods." *

Among the number of these Nature-worshippers is the brilliant and passionate Shelley. He wrote a treatise to disprove the existence of God: he degraded humanity by moral doctrines that are simply revolting; and by a conclusion that has at least the merit of being true to his premisses, he fixed his heart on the grandest thing that remained to him, and bowed down in worship to the Visible Creation. In his poem of "Alastor," which is still sublime in its deformity, he has poured out his tribute of worship to Nature with something of the inspiration of a Sibyl:—

> Mother of this unfathomable world!
> Favour my solemn song, for I have loved
> Thee ever and thee only; I have watch'd
> Thy shadow, and the darkness of thy steps,
> And my heart ever gazes on the depths
> Of thy deep mysteries. . . . .
> In lone and silent hours,
> When night makes a weird sound of its own stillness,
> Like an inspired and desperate alchymist
> Staking his very life on some dark hope,
> Have I mix'd awful talk and asking looks
> With my most innocent love, until strange tears
> Uniting with those breathless kisses, made
> Such magic as compels the charmèd night
> To render up thy charge: and though ne'er yet
> Thou hast unveil'd thy inmost sanctuary,
> Enough from incommunicable dream,
> And twilight phantasms, and deep noonday thought
> Has shown within me, that serenely now
> I wait thy breath, Great Parent, that my strain
> May modulate with murmurs of the air,
> And motions of the forest and the sea,
> And voice of living beings, and woven hymns
> Of night and day, and the deep heart of man.†

Many centuries ago, a far more acute philosopher than Shelley was tempted on by the beauty of Nature to seek God

---

* Wisdom xiii. 3. † Alastor, 18.

where he did. But with a far different result. "I asked the earth," he tells us, "and it said, 'tis not I.' And all things therein confessed the same. I asked the sea and the deeps and the living things thereof, and they answered, 'We are not thy God; seek higher above us.' I asked the fleeting air above, and the whole region of it with its inhabitants cried out, 'Anaximenes is mistaken, I am not God.' I asked the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars; 'Neither are we,' said they, 'the God whom thou seekest.' And I said to all these things which stand around the doors of my flesh, 'You have told me concerning my God that you are not He; give me at least some tidings of Him.' And they all cried out with a loud voice: '*It is He that made us.*' My asking was my considering them, and their answering was the beauty I discovered in them." *

Happy would it have been if every similar questioner could have caught the whisper of the same answer.

How far Lord Byron and other modern poets belong to the same school as Shelley, we do not stop to inquire. As for Byron himself, all through his poetry he is a brilliant inconsistency,—"all things by turn and nothing long." At times he writes like a pure Pagan; at others, by an apparent recoil from his own extravagance, he gives utterance to the highest and purest aspirations of Christianity. But we imagine that any reader who should try to form a consistent opinion of him from the predominant spirit of his poetry without any extraneous aid of biography, would set him down as a giaour or a corsair, without sufficient humility to worship anything.

But let us go a step further in investigating the relations of Nature-poetry to religion.

Between the two extremes of Milton's mere *landscape-love* and Shelley's *worship*, there is, it seems to us, a middle attitude of mind towards the glorious universe that surrounds us, which is the result of a just knowledge of the relationship of visible Nature to God, on the one hand, and to man, on the other. Nature is not without mysteries. To some men, indeed, nothing is probable unless it appeals to their own trumpery experience. Yet there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in most men's philosophy. And if this is true of the physical side of Nature, it is no less so of the æsthetic side. To rank Nature as a divinity is a gross falsehood: yet there are no falsehoods in the world that do not cover up and usurp the place of some truths which they resemble; and it may be laid down as an axiom that though an error may be crushed, it can never be genuinely confuted without uncovering

* S. Augustini Confess., x. 6.

the sacred truth which lies hidden at its centre. If men therefore have been found to worship Nature, depend upon it there is something more mysterious in

Earth, ocean, air,—beloved brotherhood,

than matter-of-fact men may choose to believe. A chain of reasoning which has resulted in a false conclusion, may yet have started from a true principle; and its whole miscarriage may be due to ignorance or misconception, which has introduced one false link somewhere in the chain. And this will abundantly account for the false conclusion whereby, from the mystery and grandeur of Nature, it has come to be worshipped as God. To the old Greeks and Romans, Nature was necessarily a beautiful enigma. Its origin, its plan, its destiny were as obscure as the processes of its action, or the laws of its motion. The winds obeyed one master, and the ocean another, while the thunderbolt was the prerogative of a third. Thus there was no unity in creation. The fixed stars, changeless in their relative positions, and the five planets that moved among them "in mystic dance," were self-existent and eternal fires, or deities that presided over man, or the mysterious fountains of human life.* That Nature was in some sense at war with man, that it lacked something that was needed to its perfection, was evident at a glance. Poets sighed for a better age, in which Nature should be reconciled to man. Of that visionary age they sang:—

> Ipsæ lacte domum referent distenta capellæ
> Ubera, nec magnos metuent armenta leones.
> Occidet et serpens, et fallax herba veneni
> Occidet.†

But this derangement in Nature, this discord in the universal harmony of things, was only another mystery to them. And as it had no explanation, so it had no meaning. Thus Nature was to them a sealed book, of which they saw the bare outside, the mere binding, so to speak, and it was beautiful; but to open it, and to turn its pages, and to study it, and to love it with a sympathizing love because they felt the meaning of its teachings, was beyond them.‡

---

* Even Cicero, who rejects so many fables, has left us the following: "Hisque" (i.e. hominibus) "animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus quæ sidera et stellas vocatis, quæ globosæ et rotundæ, divinis animatæ mentibus, circulos suos orbesque conficiunt celeritate mirabili," etc. ("Somnium Scip.")

† *Virgil, Eclog.* iv.

‡ *We are reminded here of* Drummond's exquisite sonnet, "The Lessons *of Nature," which we are glad* to see has found a place in Mr. Palgrave's

But Christianity has poured a flood of light upon all things. It has opened out to view new fields of knowledge, lit up the dark windings of many labyrinths, and shed its clear light on the dark side of many mysteries. And one of the mysteries on which this light has fallen is Nature. What the learning of Egypt, and the patient watchfulness of the Chaldean, and the keen intelligence of the Greek failed to fathom, this new light has made manifest to the world. We know now certain truths connected with the Visible Creation which, to the ages of pagan antiquity, were thoroughly unknown and unsuspected; and these truths, when once known, explain abundantly the strange charm which its beauties work upon the mind of man. That there is some such strange charm which needs explanation, we must all confess. We must all have been conscious at times of that strange mixture of sadness and awe which steals upon us in the presence of the calm ocean, or the still midnight, or the summer twilight, like "the unspoken language of another world,"—which makes us feel an actual sympathy with the great Universe around us, and yet we know not how, or why.

> To him who in the love of Nature holds
> Communion with her visible forms, she speaks
> A various language . . . .
> Go forth under the open sky, and list
> To Nature's teachings, while from all around,—
> Earth and her waters, and the depths of air,—
> Comes a still voice :—*

or in the words of another poet,—

> There is a pleasure in the pathless woods,
> There is a rapture in the lonely shore,
> There is society where none intrudes,
> By the deep sea, and music in its roar.
> I love not man the less, but Nature more

"Golden Treasury" (LVIII.) In the *major* of the sonnet, the world is likened to a "fair volume," in which "he who turns the leaves with care" may read of God: the *minor* runs as follows:—

> "But silly we, like foolish children, rest
> Well pleased with coloured vellum, leaves of gold,
> Fair dangling ribands, leaving what is best,
> On the Great Writer's sense ne'er taking hold.
> Or if by chance we stay our mind on aught,
> It is *some picture on the* margin wrought."

* *Bryant, "Thanatopsis."*

> From these her interviews, in which I steal
> From all I may be, or have been before
> To mingle with the Universe, *and feel*
> *What I can ne'er express, yet cannot all conceal.**

Let us see what Christianity has taught us about Nature to solve this world-old riddle.

It has taught us *two* truths. It has taught us in the first instance that the Visible World is a mirror in which—faintly, it is true, but faithfully—is reflected the image of the Creator,—His Unity, His Immensity, His Beauty.

And it has told us further that the Visible Creation has been linked into a strangely intimate union with man by Him who created both,—so intimate indeed that Nature has even participated in the Fall of man, by which

> Disproportion'd sin
> Jarr'd against Nature's chime, and with harsh din
> Broke the fair music that all creatures made
> To their great Lord.

Moreover, Visible Nature still participates in the mysterious punishment of man's transgression, and is waiting to be transfigured and to regain its perfection when regenerated man shall regain his.

S. Paul, who has left so few points of Christian doctrine unhandled, has clearly touched upon each of these two mysteries. That the Visible Creation is in some sort a mirror of God's majesty he tells us in so many words. For, speaking of the Almighty's manifestation of Himself to man, he has these words: "His eternal power and Godhead, though they be invisible, yet are seen ever since the world was made, being understood by His works, that they [who despised Him] might have no excuse." †

And on the second and more startling doctrine,—that of the union of Nature with man in a brotherhood of punishment, of hope, and of future restoration,—a union which unconsciously weaves the tenderest ties of sympathy between sinful man and suffering Nature, S. Paul is equally explicit. "The longing of the Creation," he says, "looks eagerly for the time when the glory of the sons of God shall be revealed. For the Creation also was made subject to decay,‡ not by its own will, but

---

* Byron, "Childe Harold."

† In this and the following quotation we use Mr. Conybeare's translation *as representing the* argumentative sense rather than the exact words of the *Apostle.* (*"Life and Epistles* of S. Paul," chap. xix.)

‡ *Vulgate* "to vanity."

because of Him who subjected it thereto in hope: for the Creation itself also shall be delivered from its slavery unto death, and shall gain the freedom of the sons of God when they are glorified. For we know that the whole Creation is groaning together and suffering the pangs of labour which have not yet brought forth the birth." *

On this remarkable passage, S. Chrysostom comments as follows:—"What is meant by this, 'the Creature is made subject to vanity'? It means that it has become corruptible. And why? On account of thee, O man, for thou hast assumed a body subject to death and pain, and the earth has received a curse and brought forth briers. . . . . But you may exclaim, What? Is the earth cursed and rendered corruptible on my account? Yes, truly: yet for all that it is not [permanently] injured, for on thy account also it shall hereafter be rendered incorruptible once more. This is the meaning of those words, 'in hope.'"†

Here then we see laid bare before us by Christianity the two secret springs of that solemn influence which Nature exerts over man, and which causes the true poet's heart

> Ever to beat in mystic sympathy
> With Nature's ebb and flow.

To some indeed it may seem that to seek in such deep religious truths the explanation of what they may conceive to be mere poetical sensibility, is fanciful and far-fetched. But if any deliberately think this, it is because they take but a shallow view of the true scope and meaning of poetry. The true poet is not a mere "builder of lofty rhyme,"—one skilled to enchant the ear with the "linked sweetness" of harmonious words, or to weave strange legends into harmonious verse, any more than he is a mere word-painter of physical Nature, as Dr. Dircks

---

* Romans viii. 19, et seq.

† Τι εστι, Τῃ ματαιοτητι η κτισις υπεταγη; φθαρτη γεγονε. Τινος ενεκεν και δια τι; Δια σε τον ανθρωπον. Επειδη γαρ σωμα ελαβεις θνητον και παθητον, και η γη καταραν εδεξατο και ακανθας και τριβολους. . . . Τι λεγεις, φησι; κακεῖς επαθε δια σε και φθαρτη γεγονεν; Αλλ' ουδεν ηδικηται· και γαρ αφθαρτος εσται δια σε παλιν· τουτο γαρ εστι το, Επ' ελπιδι. (Chrysost.: In Epist. ad Rom. Homil. xiv. *c.*) Compare S. Jerome's words on the text of Habacuc, "Elevatus est sol, et luna stetit in ordine suo." He writes: "Quia enim creatura liberabitur a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriæ filiorum Dei, quæ nunc vanitati subjectum est, propter eum qui subjecit eum in spem libertatis, cum in consummatione mundi omnis creatura fuerit liberata, liberabitur et sol et luna, et in *suo* stabunt ordine." (Hieron. in Abacuc. cap. 3. Ed. Ben. *v.* 652.) *This renovation of* nature is frequently alluded to in Scripture; *v.g. 2 Peter iii. and* Apoc. xxi. 5.

would have us believe.* He has an office far higher and more sublime. The true poet is one whose thoughts are deeper than his fellow-men's, and the yearnings and aspirations of whose heart are keener and more divine;—one too who can force into human words an echo at least of some of the deep harmonies which make music in the depths of his own soul. We say, *of some;* for De Quincey says well that *all* thoughts have not words corresponding to them; many of them in our imperfectly developed nature can never express themselves in acts, but must lie, appreciable by God only, like the silent melodies of a musician's heart, never to roll forth from harp or organ. The poets, in the words of an earnest writer,† are a kindred race with the prophets "whose lips the cherubim have touched with fire from the altar." If this is not a true description, if the poet is a mere teller of quaint tales and dreamer of strange dreams,—if he is really and truly nothing better than

The idle singer of an empty day,

then away with him!—let Plato's advice be followed and banish him from our republic. But in reality every age has seen the connection between poetry and religion and has recognized the sacred office of the poets. Cicero, after Ennius, calls them *holy*, and says that they are among men as the special gift of the gods.‡ In a late publication, an Oxford Professor of Poetry has done full justice to the high source of their inspiration. "Different," he says, "as are the forms which at different times poetry has put on, they seem for the most part to be derived from one single source,—that dissatisfaction I mean with what is present and close at hand, which is one of Nature's silent promises to the heart, one stimulus to the advancement of our race, one evidence of the abiding greatness of man. Even when the poet plunges headlong into lower elements, and prostitutes his genius by investing frivolous pleasures or animal passions with his draperies of beauty and grace, it is but an angry recoil from the pressure of the Infinite,—the 'desire of

---

* "The great charm of poetry of a high order is its peculiar power of presenting in a novel and pleasing form phases of Nature previously unobserved and comparatively unseen." ("Nature-Study," p. 44.)

† J. A. St. John.

‡ "Atqui sic a summis hominibus eruditissimisque accepimus, cæterarum rerum studia et doctrinâ et præceptis et arte constare; poetam naturâ ipsâ valere, et mentis viribus excitari, et quasi divino quodam spiritu inflari. *Quare, suo jure,* noster ille Ennius sanctos appellat poetas, quod quasi *deorum aliquo dono atque* munere commendati nobis esse videantur." (Cic., *Orat. pro Archiâ.*)

the moth for the star,' driven back upon itself, and maddened by its bitter disappointment." * The same thought inspires the "Poet's Song" of Tennyson :—

> The nightingale thought, "I have sung many songs,
> But never a one so gay,
> For he sings of what the world will be
> When the years have died away":

and in the "Holy Grail" the same poet speaks of

> The sacred madness of the bard
> When God makes music through him.

Naturally, therefore, we connect poetry with religion. And when we take into account the two great revelations which the Christian religion has made to us concerning the visible world, we naturally expect to find that the attitude of Christian poetry towards Nature may be summed up in two words,—*Reverence* and *Sympathy* :—Reverence, because in Nature, the God of Nature is dimly visible; and Sympathy, because there are such intimate bonds of fellowship between Nature and ourselves. And we venture to assert without fear of contradiction that this *à priori* expectation is fully realized in those poets whom neither the influences of an extinct paganism nor the still stronger influences of a living infidelity have carried aside out of the grand high-road of truth.

We should have to overload the page with quotations if we desired to illustrate this;—and unnecessarily, for no one, we are sure, who is familiar with such poets as Wordsworth and Longfellow will question it. Nay, even in some of the songs of paganism, we fancy that we can catch the low tones of instinctive sympathy and reverence, faintly heard amid the loud and sometimes discordant notes of wilder music. We might point perhaps to that beautiful passage in Homer, in which the fall of the autumn leaves forces on the poet the thought of that decay which is common to ourselves and them :—

> Οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοιήδε καὶ ἀνδρῶν.
> Φύλλα τὰ μὲν τ' ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει, ἄλλα δέ θ' ὕλη
> Τηλεθόωσα φύει, ἔαρος δ' ἐπιγίγνεται ὥρη·
> Ὣς ἀνδρῶν γενεὴ, ἡ μὲν φύει, ἡ δ' ἀπολήγει. †

Or to those many passages in which Horace's sensitive mind broods sadly over the same thoughts :—

> Immortalia ne speres, monet annus et almum
> Quæ rapit hora diem. ‡

---

* "*Lectures on Poetry*," by Sir F. H. Doyle, p. 23.
† *Iliad, Z.* 146.
‡ *Horatii Carm. iv.* 7.

But in these poets such passages are the exception, in Christian poets the rule. And the office of the Christian poet in his relation to Nature does not stop here: it extends even further still. For all men, in fact, when gazing on the beauties and the terrors of Nature are sensible at times of those deep emotions, which Christianity enables us to recognize as instinctive reverence and instinctive sympathy. For all men have something of the poet in their composition.* But the true Christian poets have a still higher faculty. They are the Prophets of Nature. They stand between Nature and their fellow-men, as of old the prophets stood between God and His people. They are Nature's *Interpreters*. Thus a living writer has said truly that by the keen perception of the poets, "the delicate mysteries of Nature come to be unveiled and recognized"; and again that "the passion of the poet detects and brings to light the secret analogies between the visible and invisible worlds, and shapes them into song."† And one of the poets has written of himself,—

> To me be Nature's volume broad display'd;
> And to peruse its all-instructing page,
> Or haply catching inspiration thence,
> *Some easy passage, raptur'd, to translate,*
> My sole delight.‡

Even we little men cannot stand in the presence of Nature, without—in the laughing words of Dickens—"feeling unutterable things." At others we may sometimes smile ourselves, but are we not all conscious of this feeling in our own breasts? Is there not a language in the ocean and the forests and the storm—an unspoken something—that we half understand and can find no words for?—which makes us cry out,

> What are the wild waves saying
> In their eternal roar?

It is like the handwriting on the wall of Baltassar's banquet-hall; it needs some wise man to interpret it. There it is; but what it means is a mystery. And the poets are Nature's seers. To them is given the mystic power to "read the writing and to show the interpretation thereof." In this indeed lies the great distinction between the true poets of Nature and those

---

* This thought is strikingly developed by Hazlitt in his Lectures on the *English poets*: Introductory Lecture.

† *Quoted by Dr. Dircks* as specimens of meaningless platitudes.

‡ *Thomson.*

elegant verse-makers (often ladies) who love so much to compose sonnets and epigrams on the ocean, and the brook, and the violet, and who write so many pretty lines that mean nothing, and begin with *O!* These are the people who bring the love of Nature into discredit. But we may lay it down as a law, that however much *sensibility* to Nature a writer may possess, he can never be a true Nature-poet without the power of interpretation.

One of the grandest and truest fragments of Nature-poetry in our language is the well-known passage on the ocean, which occurs at the end of "Childe Harold." What could be nobler than this single stanza?—

> Thou glorious mirror where the Almighty's form
> Glasses itself in tempests; in all time,
> Calm or convulsed—in breeze, or gale, or storm,
> Icing the pole or in the torrid clime
> Dark-heaving; boundless, endless, and sublime—
> The image of Eternity,—the throne
> Of the Invisible; even from out thy slime
> The monsters of the deep are made; each zone
> Obeys thee: thou goest forth, dread, fathomless, alone!

In this and the preceding stanzas we have not merely the indistinct sensation that we must all have experienced at the sight of the "dark and deep-blue ocean," photographed, as it were, by a skilled artist, but we see the poet standing before us in the character of an interpreter, translating into human words the mystic language of the sea. This is the true poetry of Nature.

In the above example the poet forces us to look on that side of Nature which claims the *reverence* of man; but there are still more difficult passages in Nature's volume to be interpreted; we mean those half-inaudible whisperings which at times thrill through our souls when the face of Nature is "soft and still and colourless," filling us with a gentle sadness:—

> Sympathies
> More tranquil, yet perhaps of kindred birth,
> That steal upon the meditative mind
> And grow with thought.*

Seldom indeed can these low whisperings be grasped even by the poet so firmly as to be imprisoned in song, for even the greatest can say no more than Shakespeare's "Soothsayer,"—

> In Nature's infinite book of secrecy,
> A little I can read.

---

* Wordsworth.

And yet at times this has been attempted, and sometimes with success.

Nature, then, rightly read, is full of religion; so full indeed that not only have ill-disciplined minds mistaken it for God, but we occasionally meet with profound and religious thinkers, who are unable to credit that this marvellous world is made up of mere brute matter, and who, while they reject the old heretical doctrine of an *anima mundi*, yet seek in some supernatural theory a solution of the world's mysteries. Thus Dr. Newman, whose acuteness is beyond the questioning of criticism, has always believed and taught that visible phenomena are a mere cloak hiding the invisible agency of Angelic spirits. In his Anglican sermon on "The Powers of Nature," he speaks thus:—

> I do not pretend to say that we are told in Scripture what Matter is, but I affirm that as our souls move our bodies, be our bodies what they may, so there are Spiritual Intelligences that move those wonderful and vast portions of the Natural World which seem to be inanimate; and as the gestures, speech, and expressive countenances of our friends around us enable us to hold intercourse with them, so in the motions of universal Nature, in the interchange of day and night, summer and winter, wind and storm fulfilling His word, we are reminded of the blessed and dutiful angels. . . . . Every breath of air and ray of light and heat, every beautiful prospect, is, as it were, the skirts of their garments, the waving of the robes of those whose faces see God in heaven.

And then he asks what would be the thoughts of a man who "when examining a flower, or a herb, or a pebble, or a ray of light, which he treats as something so beneath him in the scale of existence, suddenly discovered that he was in the presence of some powerful being who was hidden beneath the visible things he was inspecting, who, though concealing his wise hand, was giving them their beauty, grace, and perfection, as being God's instrument for the purpose, nay whose robe and ornaments these wondrous objects were."* And in another place he writes:—

> All that we see is destined to burst forth into heavenly bloom, and to be transfigured into immortal glory. In that day shadows will retire, and the substance show itself. . . . . Above and below, the clouds of the air, the trees of the field, the waters of the great deep will be found impregnated with the forms of everlasting spirits, the servants of God which do His pleasure.†

---

* "*Parochial Sermons*," vol. ii.

† *Ibid., vol. iv. p. 223.* In his "Apologia," Dr. Newman ascribes this *belief of his to the* influence of the Alexandrian school.

Sir Francis Doyle in lecturing on this subject, sums up Dr. Newman's views in the following words:—

> He scarce believes in any rose, in any actual rainbow; the stars themselves are little better than phantom lights, visionary flashings of that great dream, woven between the soul and God, which men agree here to call, for the moment, our visible and material universe.

We have no design of criticising at present this spiritual view of Nature: we allude to it only to strengthen the position which we have assumed in opposition to such writers as Dr. Dircks, that Nature-study and Nature-poetry are pre-eminently religious, and, as a necessary consequence, replete with mystery. As for Dr. Newman's particular view, true or false, it is no invention of his. It seems to have been half-professed by F. Faber,* and certainly can be traced far back into Christian antiquity. Some may think they see a confirmation of this view in those Canticles of Sacred Scripture in which, as in the Canticle of the Three Children, the sun and moon and stars are all called upon by name to praise the Lord. The reader may also recall the curious hymn of S. Francis of Assisi,† which may seem to imply the same belief.‡ But without passing any opinion on it as a theory, it serves to prove how deeply Nature is pervaded by religion. The study of Nature belongs to two departments of human thought, Science and Poetry, one having regard to the physical aspect of visible Creation, the other to the æsthetic: and in one respect at least Science and Poetry are in harmony; —we mean in bearing witness to the close connection between Nature and Religion. Shallow men indeed are fond of crying out that science is a dangerous thing, and one that leads away from God; but in reality, properly understood, it is a study little less than sacred. And in the same manner it is often asserted that the poetical side of Nature too is calculated to ensnare man by its beauty and mislead the heart; but surely it is not hard

> To look through Nature up to Nature's God.

Those who can see nothing in the vast and awful Universe but

---

* See "Blessed Sacrament," note, p. 344, 2nd edit.

† A translation may be found in "The Life and Labours of S. Thomas of Aquin," by Prior Vaughan, i. 82.

‡ We may also remind the reader that Catholic theology holds that there is a very intimate connection between the Angelic powers and the material universe. S. Thomas of Aquin says, "Omnia corporalia reguntur per angelos." (*Summa I.* q. 110.) And S. Augustine's sentence is often quoted: "Unaquæque *res visibilis in hoc mundo* habet angelicam potestatem sibi *præpositam*." (*Quæst., lib.* lxxxiii. quæst. 79.)

a landscape or a panorama, as well as those who run into the opposite extreme and mistake God's handiwork for God Himself, have only themselves to blame. Nature's teachings, if duly studied, are faithful, and true, and holy; and therefore it is well written—in spite of all the blasphemies which have been uttered in her name—that

> Nature never did betray
> The heart that loved her.

Art. III.—MR. MILL ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY.

An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent. By John Henry Newman, D.D., of the Oratory. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

Dissertations and Discussions. By John Stuart Mill. London: J. W. Parker.

Utilitarianism. By John Stuart Mill. London: Longmans.

The Emotions and the Will. Chap. XV.: The Moral Sense. By Alexander Bain, A.M. London: J. W. Parker.

IN our last number we argued against Mr. Mill, that mathematical truths possess the attribute of "necessity"; and in the present article we are to argue against him, that *moral* truths also are of the same kind. We have done important service, we consider, in our October article, not only towards the particular conclusion there advocated, but towards the conclusion also which we are now to maintain. The doctrine that there are truths possessing that very singular quality expressed by the term "necessary"—this doctrine is à priori both so startling, and also pregnant with consequences so momentous, that the philosopher may well require absolutely irresistible evidence, before he will accept it. This was our reason for placing mathematical truths in the very front of our controversial position; because they afford so much less room than others for confusion and equivocalness, that their "necessary" character is on that account more irresistibly evident. When the philosopher is once obliged to admit that there *are* propositions of this *character*, it is a matter of comparative detail *which* they are.

This therefore is the position of advantage, from which we approach our present theme.

But from another point of view, we are *less* favourably circumstanced in our present than in our former undertaking. There is no difference of opinion worth mentioning as to what those propositions *are* which are called mathematical axioms: and there are only therefore two possible alternatives; viz. whether those axioms are, or are not, self-evidently necessary. All phenomenists are on one side, and all objectivists as a matter of course on the other. But those who hold most strongly the "necessary" character of moral science, differ nevertheless importantly from each other, as to what are those axioms on which the science is founded. Whatever theory we adopt, we must necessarily have for our opponents, not only all phenomenists, but a large number of objectivists also. Even among Catholics, there are some subordinate differences on the subject; and before we enter on our reply to Mr. Mill, there are three little matters of domestic controversy which we must briefly consider, in order to make clear the precise position which is to be our controversial stand-point.

The first of these relates to a phrase, which we have more than once used in this REVIEW. We are here assuming for the moment, what we are afterwards to defend against Mr. Mill, that there are certain moral axioms intuitively known:* and we have frequently used the phrase "moral faculty," to express that mental faculty whereby such axioms are cognized. F. Liberatore (Ethica, n. 32) understands this phrase to imply, that moral truths are not discerned by the intellect and reason, but assumed by blind propension and instinct. With great deference to so distinguished a writer, we must nevertheless say that this seems to us a complete misapprehension of Reid's and Hutcheson's meaning; and it is certainly removed to the greatest possible degree from our own. By the phrase "moral faculty" we mean neither more nor less (as we have said) than the power, which resides in man's intellect, of cognizing moral axioms with self-evident certitude. For various reasons, it seems to us of extreme importance that attention should be carefully fixed on this power; and we think it very desirable therefore to give it a special name.†

---

* By the term "axioms" are here meant "self-evidently necessary truths." See our article in July, 1869, on "Philosophical axioms."

† It may be worth while also to cite Liberatore's own statement—"hominem individuum universamque societatem ad perfectionem moralem jugiter amplificandam *vi naturæ incitari*, atque ideo typo quodam honestatis *in animis insculpto* gaudere, quo dijudicet quibus defectibus liberari et quibus bonis augeri debeat." (Introductio ad Ethicam, art. iii.)

F. Newman habitually uses the word "conscience," to express substantially the same thing; nor could any word be better adapted to the purpose, so far as regards the ordinary usage of Englishmen. Our own difficulty in so using it arises from the circumstance, that the word "conscientia" has a theological sense, importantly different from F. Newman's, and yet not so far removed from it as to prevent real danger of one being confused with the other. The theological word "conscientia" does not commonly express an intellectual power or *habit;* but an existing *declaration* of the intellect, as to the morality (hic et nunc) of this or that particular act: and so one hears of a "correct" or an "erroneous," of a "certain" or a "doubtful" conscience. Then again, and more importantly, its office is the cognition, not so much of moral *axioms* as of moral *conclusions:* and the first premisses too on which it proceeds, are not merely moral axioms, but include God's positive precepts, the Church's interpretation of the Divine Law, and the Church's positive commands. We cannot then but think it will be more conducive to clearness, if we avoid using this word in F. Newman's sense.

We now proceed to our second preliminary. It is a very prominent doctrine of F. Newman's, that "conscience" testifies emphatically God's existence. And very many Catholic writers hold (as will be presently seen) that whenever reason notifies to me the intrinsic turpitude of this or that act, it thereupon notifies to me the existence of some Supreme Legislator, who forbids it. This doctrine however may be advocated, in two essentially different senses.

On the one hand it may merely be alleged, that whenever reason notifies to me the intrinsic moral turpitude of this or that act, it further notifies, by most prompt and immediate consequence, the prohibition of that act by some Supreme Legislator. We incline to think that such is F. Newman's meaning. At all events we ourselves heartily accept this doctrine, and are to maintain it in the course of our present article.

But on the other hand it may be alleged, that the idea itself—"moral turpitude,"—is either identical with, or includes, that of "prohibition by a Supreme Legislator." We cannot assent to such a proposition. We accept S. Ignatius's teaching in the "Spiritual Exercises," that evil acts possess a "fœditas et nequitia" of their own, "ex naturâ suâ, vel si prohibita non essent." We follow Suarez in holding, that they would be "mala, peccata, culpabilia," even if (per impossibile) there existed *no law strictly so called* forbidding them. We follow Vasquez, *Bellarmine, Lessius,* and other eminent theologians, in their use

of similar expressions.* We are not here arguing against those excellent Catholics who think otherwise:† we are but explaining the position we shall assume, in this part of our controversy against Mr. Mill.

Thirdly the question has been raised among Catholics, whether there can be *obligation*, properly so called, apart from man's knowledge of a Supreme Legislator. So far as this question is distinct from the preceding, it seems to us purely verbal. If, by saying that act A is of obligation, you only mean that its omission would be culpable and sinful,—we hold (consistently with our previous remarks) that there may be true obligation, without reference to a Legislator's prohibition. So F. Chastel (Dr. Ward, p. 482) says "there would still remain *moral obligation*, real duty; though one made abstraction of God and religion." On the other hand, if the term be understood as implying the correlative act of a Legislator who obliges, of course there can be no obligation without full means of knowing such a Legislator.

Without further delay, let us set forth the precise issue which we are to join with Mr. Mill. There is a large number of cognizable truths, which may be expressed in one or other of the following shapes. "Act A is morally good"; "act B is morally bad"; act C is morally better than act D." All these, it will be seen, are but different shapes, in which emerges the one fundamental idea called "moral goodness." We will call such judgments therefore "moral judgments"; and the truths cognized in them "moral truths."‡ Our allegation against Mr. Mill is, that a certain number § of these truths are cognized as

---

* A considerable number of passages to this effect have been cited by Dr. Ward, in his "Philosophical Introduction," from the most eminent Catholic theologians and philosophers, including the expressions mentioned in the text (pp. 429–490). Since that work was published, the phrase used in it—"independent morality"—has been adopted by some French infidels to express certain tenets, which we consider to be as philosophically despicable as they are morally detestable. But the phrase had not been dirtied, to his knowledge at least, when Dr. Ward used it. F. Chastel, S.J. (Dr. Ward, p. 481) raises the question, whether "there is a moral law *independently* of all Divine Law," and proceeds to answer it in the affirmative. Suarez (ib. p. 433) says, "dictamina rationis naturalis, in quibus hæc lex [naturalis] consistit, sunt intrinsecè necessaria et *independentia* ab omni voluntate etiam Divinâ."

† Dr. Ward has done so in his "Philosophical Introduction," pp. 78–90.

‡ We need hardly say that a "moral judgment" may be *mistaken*; and that in that case there is *no* corresponding "moral truth."

§ "'Parentes *cole*'; '*Deo* convenientem cultum exhibe'; 'rationem *sensibus* ne *subjicias*'; *et alia innumera* generis ejusdem." (Liberatore, n. 80.)

self-evidently necessary. These we call "moral axioms." Mr. Mill admits of course that moral judgments are very frequently elicited; but, denying as he does the existence of *any* necessary truths, he denies inclusively that there are *moral* truths self-evidently necessary. The ground which he often seems to take is, that no moral judgments are *intuitions*, but that all are *inferences;* though these inferences, he would add, are so readily and imperceptibly drawn, as to be most naturally and almost inevitably mistaken for intuitions.

That we may bring this vital question to a distinct issue, it is highly important to dwell at starting on the fundamental idea "moral goodness." There is probably no psychical fact, so pregnant with momentous consequences in the existing state of philosophy, as man's possession of this idea. Very many philosophers hold, that it is complex, and resolvable accordingly into simpler elements; we contend earnestly and confidently that it is simple.

The strong bias of our opinion is, that Mr. Mill (as we shall explain in a later part of our article) so far agrees with ourselves; though his *expression* of doctrine would no doubt be importantly different. It is very possible however that the case may be otherwise; and that he may regard the idea before us as consisting of simpler elements. In that case he must consistently say, that "morally good," as applied to human acts, means neither more nor less than "conducive to general enjoyment." Provisionally therefore we shall assume this as Mr. Mill's position.

Now this is an issue, one would think, which must admit of speedy and definitive decision: for there is perhaps no one idea which so constantly meets one at every turn, whether in literature or conversation, as that of "morally good" with its correlatives. "I am bound to do what I am paid for doing"; "how conscientious a man H is!" "K behaved in that matter with much more uprightness than L"; "M is an undeniable scoundrel"; "no praise can be too great for N's disinterested benevolence and self-sacrifice"; "whatever God commands, men of course are bound to do." At this moment we are in no way concerned with the truth or falsehood of such propositions, but exclusively with their *meaning*. Our readers will see at once, that these judgments, and a thousand others of daily occurrence, contain unmistakably the idea "morally good," under different aspects; and if they consider the matter with any care they will further see, that this idea is as distinct from the idea "*conducive* to general enjoyment," as any one can possibly *be from any other.* This is the proposition, which we now wish *to illustrate and establish.*

Take the last instance we gave: "whatever God commands, a man is bound to do"; or, in other words, "whatever God commands, a man acts morally ill in failing to do." Does the Theist mean by this judgment, that the individual's disobedience to God *militates against general enjoyment?* This latter statement may or may not be *true;* but it is no more equivalent to the *former*, than it is to a geometrical axiom. Or let us take such a case as would be most favourable to Mr. Mill's argument; the case of one whom he would regard as among the greatest benefactors of his species. "How noble," Mr. Mill would say, "was the self-sacrificing generosity of Howard the philanthropist!" Would he merely mean by this, that Howard's generosity *conduced immensely to general enjoyment?* He would be the first indignantly to disclaim so poor an interpretation of his words. By the term "noble" then, or "morally good," Mr. Mill means much more than "conducive to general enjoyment."

But the particular idea — "moral *evil*" — deserves our especial consideration, as exhibiting in clearest light the peculiar character of moral judgments. Take any very obvious case of wickedness. Consider, e.g., the judgment elicited by David concerning his own past course of action, when Nathan had said to him "Thou art the man." Or suppose I had been guilty of such conduct in an exaggerated shape, as that ascribed to Lord Bacon (truly or falsely) by Lord Macaulay. A politician of high and unblemished moral character, with whose political principles I am heartily in accordance, has admitted me to his friendship and trusted me with his dearest secrets. I find however, as time goes on, that my best chance of advancement lies in attaching myself to the opposite side. Filled with passionate desire for such advancement, I make political capital by disclosing my friend's confidences to his opponents; and I embark heartily in a course of political enterprise, which has for its end his ruin. As I am about to reap the worldly fruit of my labours, I am seized with a violent illness: and in the tedious hours of slow recovery, I "enter into myself," to use the expression of ascetical writers; I judge, that my successive acts have been "morally evil," "wicked," "sinful." I judge, as a consequence of this, that I have rendered myself worthy of punishment; that if there be a Moral Governor of the Universe, He views my conduct with detestation; &c. &c. We are not at this moment alleging that these various judgments are *true*, but only considering their correct analysis. And surely Mr. Mill will not on reflection maintain, that when I am pondering on the moral turpitude of my past conduct, I am in fact merely thinking of its evil effects on general enjoyment. Doubtless, *when I reflect on the malitia* of having supported a political

cause which I deem unsound, I base this malitia greatly on the evil which I have thereby tried to inflict on my country; but I base it also in part on the *concomitant* judgment, that to inflict such injury is intrinsically evil. And when I reflect on the malitia of my ingratitude, and of my having perfidiously violated my friend's confidence,—in all probability the question does not ever so distantly present itself, whether general enjoyment is promoted or retarded by such practices.

We are arguing against the theory which we provisionally ascribe to Mr. Mill; viz., that the idea "morally good" is equivalent with the idea "conducive to general enjoyment." But it seems to us that this whole matter may be clenched, so as to render all evasion impossible. If this theory were true, it would be a simply *tautologous** proposition to say, that "conduct, known by the agent as adverse to general enjoyment, is morally evil." This proposition, we say, would be as simply tautologous, as the proposition that "two mutual friends desire each other's well-being"; or the proposition, that "a hard substance resists muscular pressure." These two latter propositions are really tautologous: for a desire of each other's well-being is expressed by *the very term* "mutual friends"; and "resistance to muscular pressure" is expressed by *the very term* "hard substance." Now it is an evident logical truth, that the contradictory of a tautologous proposition is simply unmeaning; because its predicate denies that very thing, which its subject affirms. (See "Mill on Hamilton," p. 92.) "There are two mutual friends of my acquaintance, who do not desire each other's well-being";—"some hard substances I have met with, do not resist muscular pressure";—for any *meaning* that such propositions convey, we might even better (to use Mr. Mill's illustration) say that "every Humpty Dumpty is an Abracadabra." Let us look again then at the proposition, that "conduct, known by the agent as adverse to general enjoyment, is morally evil." If this proposition were tautologous, its contradictory would be unmeaning; it would be simply *unmeaning* to say, that "some conduct, known by the agent as adverse to general enjoyment, may be morally good." Will Mr. Mill *himself* say that this is unmeaning? On the contrary, the energetic protest, with which he would encounter its enunciation, sufficiently evinces how clearly he apprehends its tenour.

Indeed Mr. Mill himself, in a very remarkable passage which

---

* *An able writer* in the "Spectator" has criticised our use of the word "*tautologous*" *in our last* number. Our readers will see his remarks, with *our reply, among the* "Notices" at the end of our number.

we shall quote at length before we conclude, contradicts the doctrine which we are here opposing. He says in effect, that it would be morally better for all mankind to undergo eternal torment, than to worship such or such a being, whom he imagines and describes. Now most certainly eternal torment, endured by all mankind, is *less conducive to general enjoyment*, than would be the worship of such a being; and Mr. Mill does not therefore consider "morally good" as synonymous with "conducive to general enjoyment."

Arguments entirely similar to those which we have here given, would equally suffice to disprove any *other* analysis which might be attempted, of the idea "morally good":* and we conclude therefore, that this idea is simple and incapable of analysis.

We are now in a position, to consider satisfactorily the direct point at issue: the self-evident necessity of certain moral truths. Let us go back to the moral judgments on which we have already dwelt; the moral judgments, elicited on his sick-bed by the recently unscrupulous politician. Take any one of their number: for instance; "my divulging what my friend told me in confidence, was morally evil." We maintain that this judgment is the cognition of a self-evidently necessary truth.

On this point let us refer to the remarks we made in October (pp. 288–9), on the notes of a self-evidently necessary truth; and let us apply them to the case before us. It is known to me by my very idea of this my act—so soon as I choose carefully to consider it—that it was morally evil; I intue irresistibly, that in no possible sphere of existence—the relevant circumstances remaining unchanged—could such an act be otherwise; that omnipotence itself could not prevent such an act from being intrinsically base and abominable.† In

---

* Dr. Ward, in his "Philosophical Introduction," has argued similarly, against supposing that the idea "morally evil" is equivalent with "prohibited by God."

† We do not for a moment forget the power, possessed by God, of changing (as theologians express it) the "materia" of the Natural Law: but the existence of this power, so far from conflicting with, on the contrary confirms what is said in the text. The classical instance in point, is the command imposed by God on Abraham, of sacrificing his son; and what all Catholic theologians say is this. God, as the Creator of mankind, could (without disparagement of His sanctity) inflict death on Isaac or on any one else; and it is no more repugnant to His Attributes that He should do this by human intermediation, than that He should do it directly. God's command then intrinsically changed the *circumstances of Abraham's act*; but in either case the morality of *the act is intrinsically necessary*, and external to the sphere of God's Power. *It would have been intrinsically* wrong in Abraham, if he had refused to slay

other words, if it be a self-evidently necessary truth (see p. 289 of our last number) that a trilateral figure is triangular,—it is no less indubitably a self-evidently necessary truth, that such an act as we are considering is morally evil.

How may we consider Mr. Mill to stand in reference to this argument? He agrees with us of course, that mankind do again and again form legitimately, and with good reason, what we have called "moral judgments": judgments reducible to the type "act A is morally good"; or "act B is morally evil"; or "act C is morally better than act D." He adds however, what is quite true, that we have no right to consider any of these judgments *intuitive*, until we have clearly shown that they are not *inferential*: for, as he most justly observes, inferences from experience are often so obviously and spontaneously drawn, that unless we are very wary we may most easily mistake them for intuitions. We are next therefore to show, that there are indubitably some moral judgments, which are not inferential. Our argument runs thus.

If the idea "morally good" be really simple—as we consider ourselves to have now conclusively established—then that idea cannot possibly be contained in the conclusion of any syllogism, unless it be expressly found in one of the premisses.* Take then any one of those moral judgments, which Mr. Mill admits to be legitimately formed. If he alleges that that judgment is an *inference*,—as indeed it very possibly *may* be—he does but shift his difficulty, and in no respect lessens it. If the judgment be really the conclusion of a syllogism, then (as we have said) that syllogism must contain some *other* moral judgment as one of its premisses. If this premiss be itself a conclusion, we are thrown back on an earlier moral premiss; until at length we come to some moral judgment, which is immediate and not inferential. If this primary moral premiss be not cognizable as true, then neither is the ultimate *conclusion* so cognizable: and this is against the hypothesis; for Mr. Mill admits that many moral judgments *are* cognizable as true, and it is

---

Isaac when commanded to do so as God's vicegerent; and God Himself could not make such refusal innocent. On the other hand, it would have been no less necessarily wrong to slay Isaac *on his own authority*; and God Himself could not make such slaughter innocent. It should be added, that no such "mutatio materiæ" can affect the internal acts and dispositions of the will. For instance, God could not possibly command His reasonable creatures to hate each other; and still less to hate Himself. Dr. Ward has stated this doctrine at length as clearly as he could, "Philosophical Introduction," pp. 165–190.

* If "morally good" were a complex idea,—it might be contained of course in the conclusion of a syllogism, without appearing in the premisses except *in its constituent elements.*

one of these which we are here considering. If on the other hand the primary moral premiss *be* cognizable as true,—then a moral proposition is cognizable as true, which is not inferred from experience; and Mr. Mill is obliged to abandon the keystone of his position.

It seems to us then, that the real issue between Mr. Mill and ourselves turns on the question, whether the idea "morally good" be capable of analysis. If it means "conducive to general enjoyment," then no doubt all moral judgments are inferential and founded on experience; but if it be incapable of analysis, then a certain number of moral judgments must be intuitive. And if Mr. Mill once admits that they are intuitive, he will certainly find no difficulty in further admitting, that they are cognitions of self-evidently necessary truths.

We have worded our argument throughout, in harmony with the opinion which to us seems true (see our last number, pp. 306, 307), that axioms are first intued in the individual case, though capable of being universalized. According to this view, what Catholics call "the first principles" of morality, are simply these universalized axioms. Firstly for instance I intue, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that my own betrayal of my friend's confidence was intrinsically wicked; and I then further intue as self-evidently necessary, that all such betrayal in really analogous circumstances possesses the same evil quality. Those philosophers on the contrary who hold that axioms are always intued in the universal, will regard every *individual* moral judgment as the conclusion of syllogistic reasoning, whereof some universal moral axiom has been a premiss. But their substantial argument against Mr. Mill may be precisely the same as our own.

Moreover we have assumed throughout no other datum, except the one for which we argued in July; viz. that whatever my cognitive faculties indubitably avouch, is infallibly true. The strong bias of our own opinion is, that this is the very doctrine which Mr. Mill will call in question; but most certainly he has no right to do so. On one hand, no experience is possible to me—I have no knowledge whatever except of my present consciousness — unless I first unreservedly believe the truth of whatever my memory distinctly declares; while on the other hand (as we have more than once pointed out) Mr. Mill fully admits that I have no ground whatever for this belief, except the present avouchment of my faculties. See our last number, pp. 309, 310. If my faculties convey to me infallible knowledge when they distinctly declare to me a certain past experience,—no less must they convey to me infallible knowledge, when they declare to me (if they do declare) the

self-evident necessity of certain moral truths. If I do not firmly trust them in the latter avouchment, I have no right firmly to trust them in the former. Nay, as we pointed out in October (p. 310), I have really *stronger* grounds for accepting the distinct declarations of my moral faculty, than the distinct declarations of my memory. In the first place intrinsically, it would be in some sense less utterly impossible to believe that I never did betray my friend's confidence, than to believe that such betrayal is not morally detestable. And in the second place extrinsically, I find these obvious *moral* judgments confirmed by every one I meet: whereas for the trustworthiness of my *memory*, I can have no external warrant at all; because my absolute trust in its testimony is a strictly requisite preliminary condition, in order that I may know or even guess what any one human being thinks or says. But we are to meet Mr. Mill in detail on this point, a few pages hence.

This datum then being assumed, we consider that we have built thereon an argument absolutely irrefragable. We consider our reasoning to have established conclusively, (1) that the idea "morally good" is incapable of analysis; and (2) that various moral judgments are cognitions of self-evidently necessary truths. We may add, that if the Catholic reader desires to apprehend the relation which exists between necessary truths and the One Necessary Being, we would refer him to our number for July, 1869, pp. 153, 154. We there stated with hearty concurrence F. Kleutgen's doctrine, that all necessary truths are *founded* on God; that they are what they are, because God is what He is.

Our next thesis is a very simple one; and indeed almost (if not altogether) tautologous. All acts, morally good, are "admirable" and "praiseworthy"; all acts, morally evil, are "the reverse of admirable" and "blameworthy"; all acts are more admirable and more praiseworthy, in proportion as they are morally better.

But now lastly—in order to express the whole doctrine which we would place before our readers—we must make a very important supplement to what has hitherto been said. Let us renew our old picture. I am lying on a bed of illness; and looking back remorsefully on my shameful violation of my friend's confidence, and on a life of dishonest practices directed (as I myself knew) to the detriment of my country's highest interests. Not only I intue that a large number of my past acts have been morally evil, but I further intue that they violated the command of some living Personal Being.* This is

* "*Ipsa ratio naturalis* . . . . discernendo actiones convenientes aut repug-

the further thesis, which we are now to advocate. The general axiom, we maintain, is cognizable, that all morally evil acts are prohibited by some living Personal Being.

Now here let us distinctly explain our meaning. We by no means say—on the contrary, in an earlier part of our article we have denied—that the idea—"morally evil"—either includes or is equivalent with the idea—"forbidden by some living Personal Being." The predicate of an axiom is not commonly included in, or equivalent with, the idea of its subject; for were it so, there would be no axioms except tautologies. Take the parallel case, on which we insisted in our last number: "all trilaterals are triangular." So far is it from being true (as we there pointed out) that triangularity is included in the *idea* of trilaternalness, that on the contrary I call a figure "trilateral" in the fullest sense of that word, before I have so much as considered any *question* as to the number of its angles. Nevertheless the proposition is axiomatic: because, to use F. Kleutgen's expression, "by merely considering the idea of the subject and predicate, I come to see that there exists between them that relation which the proposition expresses"; or (as we ourselves expressed the same thought) because, from my very conception of a trilateral, I know its triangularity.

This then is what we maintain in the present instance. If after such an ill-spent life as we have supposed, while lying on my sick-bed, I ponder in anguish of soul the idea "morally evil" as truly applicable to so many of my past acts,—I find myself to know, by my very conception of that attribute, that these acts have been acts of rebellion against some living personal authority, external to myself. We make this allegation, on the sole possible and the abundantly sufficient ground, of an appeal to the indubitable facts of human nature. We say, "external to myself"; because to say merely that the lower part of my nature has rebelled against the higher, is absurdly inadequate to express my deep conviction. And we say "living personal authority," because it is still *more* absurd

---

nantes naturæ humanæ, *prohibitionem vel imperium divinum* nobis offert." (Liberatore, Ethica, n. 79.) "Hoc" dictamen rationis "sic auditu quodam interno homo percipit, ut verè *imperio aliquo* se astringi sentiat. . . . . Cui voci intrinsecus præcipienti si quis non pareat, sic stimulis angitur . . . . ut . . . . ipsemet se accuset et arguat et pœnam a *supremâ quâdam potestate* sibi infligendam expectet" (ib. n. 80). "Semper in illis" judiciis practicis "involvitur obscurus saltem et indistinctus conceptus *alicujus occultæ potestatis*, ... quæ objectivè spectata non est nisi Deus" (ib. n. 83). On the other hand: "Divina voluntas bonitatem vel malitiam actionibus impertire non posset, *nisi ante præsumatur* bonum esse et honestum Deo præcipienti parere, turpe et *illicitum reluctari*. Hoc non supposito, actio manebit indifferens *etiam post Dei jussum vel prohibitionem*" (ib. n. 27).

to suppose, that there can be rebellion against an impersonal thing; least of all against an abstraction, which is in fact nothing at all. I intue then the axiom, that all morally evil acts are also forbidden me by some living personal authority external to myself.

It is of vital moment here to make manifest, how completely distinct are the two ideas; "morally evil" on one hand, and "prohibited by a Personal Being" on the other. For this purpose, let us take the following proposition: "to do what is prohibited by my Creator, is to do an act morally evil." A moment's consideration will show, that this proposition has an entirely distinct sense from the purely tautological one, that "what is prohibited by my Creator is prohibited by a Personal Being." The term "morally evil" expresses an idea entirely external to, over and above, the idea expressed by the term "prohibited by a Personal Being." And as on the one hand it is no tautology but an axiom, that "to do what is prohibited by my Holy Creator is to do an act morally evil";—so on the other hand we are here urging, that it is no tautology but an axiom, that "all acts morally evil are prohibited by some Personal Being."

But further—as Viva argues*—this Personal Being has on me such paramount claims, that though all other beings in the universe solicited me in an opposite direction, my obligation would in no degree be affected, of submitting myself unreservedly to His command. His Will then is more peremptorily authoritative, than the united will of all existent or possible beings who are not He.

Nay further—and this is put by F. Franzelin†—moral laws hold good for all persons existent or possible; all other persons therefore, existent or possible, are as unreservedly subject to His command as I am. Consequently He is no less than Supreme Legislator of the universe.

F. Kleutgen expresses substantially the same doctrine with Viva and Franzelin, where he says that, "when we vividly represent to ourselves our imperfection and dependence," "God makes Himself felt within us by His moral law, as an August Power to which we are subject." See our number for last April, p. 263.

But there are further facts of human nature to which F. Newman conclusively appeals, as showing how universal and how undeniably intuitive is man's conviction, that acts morally evil are offences against a Supreme Ruler. We will remind

---

* Treating the condemned proposition on "philosophical sin."

† "De Deo Uno," p. 52.

our readers indeed of what we have already said, concerning F. Newman's use of the word "conscience." But we need hardly beg them to observe, how singularly his remarks combine exquisite beauty of expression with strong and irresistible appeal to facts. The italics are our own.

In consequence of this prerogative of dictating and commanding, which is of its essence, Conscience has an intimate bearing on our affections and emotions, leading us to reverence and awe, hope and fear, especially fear. . . . . No fear is felt by any one who recognizes that his conduct has not been beautiful, though he may be mortified at himself, if perhaps he has thereby forfeited some advantage; but, if he has been betrayed into any kind of immorality, he has a lively sense of responsibility and guilt, though the act be no offence against society,—of distress and apprehension, even though it may be of present service to him,—of compunction and regret, though in itself it be most pleasurable,—*of confusion of face, though it may have no witnesses.* These various perturbations of mind, which are characteristic of a bad conscience, and may be very considerable,—self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the future,—and their contraries, when the conscience is good, as real though less forcible, self-approval, inward peace, lightness of heart, and the like,—these emotions constitute a generic difference between conscience and our other intellectual senses,—common sense, good sense, sense of expedience, taste, sense of honour, and the like. . . . . .

Conscience always involves the recognition of a living object, towards which it is directed. Inanimate things *cannot stir our affections:* these are correlative with persons. If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, *this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible*, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same soothing satisfactory delight, which follows on our receiving praise from a father, *we certainly have within us the image of some person*, to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. These feelings in us are such as *require for their exciting cause an intelligent being:* we are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human law; yet, so it is, conscience excites all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and on the other hand it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object to elicit. "The wicked flees, when no one pursueth"; then why does he flee? whence his terror? *Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart?* If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate,

avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive; and is the creative principle of religion. (pp. 104–7.)

We affirm then, as an axiom, that all acts morally evil are prohibited by some Living Person external to the agent; and we affirm, as an obvious inference, that this Person is Supreme Legislator of the Universe.*

We may sufficiently sum up what we have now maintained, in three propositions: (1) the idea "morally good" or "morally evil" is simple and incapable of analysis; (2) there are various human acts, self-evidently known to be morally evil; (3) such acts are further known to be prohibited by a Supreme Ruler of the Universe. If Mr. Mill admitted the two former of these propositions, he would feel no difficulty in the third: in considering therefore the objections he may be expected to bring against our doctrine, we will for brevity's sake dismiss from consideration the last of our three above-named theses.

These objections—as in other similar instances—may be of two different kinds: they may be objections against the *reasoning* adduced for our conclusion, or they may be objections against the conclusion itself. Of the former kind, there is only one which occurs to us as possible; and we believe this to be the very objection, on which Mr. Mill will mainly insist. Take the judgment, applied to some very obviously immoral act,—"act B is morally evil." Mr. Mill may probably admit, both that this judgment is immediate, and also that the idea "morally evil" is perfectly simple: yet he may allege, that such an avouchment is not intuitive, because

---

* It seems to us (speaking with all diffidence) that the view expressed by us in the text is serviceable, on two different doctrinal heads, in harmonizing Catholic writers with themselves, with each other, and with facts. Thus firstly Liberatore, Dmowski, and (we think) all modern Catholic philosophers hold on the one hand that God (according to human modes of conception) cognizes any given act as intrinsically evil, antecedently to prohibiting it by the Natural Law; and yet they hold that, in intuing its moral evil, men spontaneously and inevitably cognize the fact of its being prohibited by some Supreme Legislator. It is not easy to see how these statements can be combined, except according to the exposition which we have drawn out.

Then for another matter of doctrine. The vast majority of theologians follow S. Thomas in holding, that the existence of God is not "per se nota quoad nos"; though they regard it as a truth, *deducible* from first principles by a very obvious and immediate consequence. On the other hand it is admitted by all, that a large number of moral axioms are self-evident and intuitively known; while yet those very writers, who deny that God's existence is "per se nota quoad nos," say that some knowledge of God is included in the cognition of a moral axiom. According to the view given in our text, the knowledge of a Supreme Legislator of the Universe is an *inference*—though a very prompt and obvious one—from the self-evident *truths of morality.*

it would not have issued from the mind "at the time when the mind's revelations were *in their pristine purity.*" The quality of immediately* eliciting on occasion this or that moral judgment, however indubitably *now* possessed, may be no part (Mr. Mill will say) of the mind's *original constitution;* but on the contrary may result, by natural process, from various experiences, through which every man has passed.† Consequently (so he will conclude) this subjective persuasion is no guarantee whatever of objective truth. Such an objection brings us back to certain expressions of Mr. Mill's, on which we animadverted last July (pp. 61—64), and which here again require comment.‡ But we must preface this comment, by a brief exposition of terminology.

We believe there is no difference whatever, among those philosophers who use the word "intuition," as to the signification of that word. Of course nothing could be known at all, unless some truths were known immediately and by their own light; and these are called "first truths." Moreover it is absolutely indubitable, that the facts of "consciousness" properly so called—the mental phenomena which I experience at the present moment—are "first truths" to me. Now the word "intuition" is used, by all who do use it, to express those *other* truths, over and above facts of consciousness, which are known to me immediately and by their own light. Sir W. Hamilton however uses the expression "facts of consciousness," to express *all* first truths: and we think never was there a mode of speech, more exquisitely infelicitous; more singularly adapted to introduce equivocation and perplexity, and to surround the whole subject with almost impenetrable fog. Mr. Mill, while justly disapproving this use of language, yet (much to our regret) adopts it for purposes of argument with Sir W. Hamilton ("On Hamilton," p. 193 et alibi); and this fact must be remembered, in looking at those passages of his, to which we shall

---

* We need hardly say, that we here use the word "immediately" as opposed to "inferentially."

† It should be explained that, in Mr. Mill's opinion, by a process of what he calls "mental chemistry," some idea may *result* from others of the past, while nevertheless in its *present* state it is simple and incapable of analysis. See "Logic" (seventh edition), vol. ii. p. 437. He calls such an idea indeed "complex"; because (as he considers) it "*results* from," it has been "*generated* by," other ideas: but he adds, that it does not "*consist* of" simpler ideas; and its true name therefore in its present state is surely "simple."

‡ Since we wrote that article, we have again examined Mr. Mill's philosophical writings, with a special view to this question; and we find his meaning much more pronounced and unmistakeable than we had fancied.

presently refer. Let us now therefore pass from this question of words to the question of things.

The main thesis of our July article on "Certitude" was, that man's cognitive faculties infallibly testify objective truth; and (as part of this) that I intuitively know whatever my mind immediately avouches. We admitted expressly (in full agreement so far with Mr. Mill) that inferential judgments are again and again *mistaken* for intuitive ones; and in our present article accordingly we have shown (we trust) conclusively, that certain moral judgments are not inferential but immediate. Mr. Mill however in various passages goes much further than we have here implied: he affirms, that the very thing, which my faculties now immediately declare, is not thereby intuitively known; and that I must not accept it as self-evidently true, until I can show that it was declared by my intuitive faculties, at the time "when they received their first impressions"; "at the first beginning of my intellectual life"; when they were "in their state of pristine purity." See "On Hamilton," pp. 152, 160, 171, 176, 185; "Logic," vol. ii. p. 439. In one place ("On Hamilton," p. 173, n.) he repudiates the opinion, that man's intuitive faculties admit of development and improvement by means of practice; and in another (p. 172) implies that no one's intuitive faculties can be trusted, except an infant's "when he first opened his eyes to the light."

Now the answer to all this is really very obvious and conclusive. There is one class of intuitions, of which Mr. Mill heartily admits the existence; those which are called acts of *memory*. In consistency however he must maintain, that he can trust no avouchments of his memory, however clear and distinct,—until he can show that that faculty, "at the first beginning of his intellectual life," before it had received "development and education," nay, "when he first opened his eyes to the light," would have been *capable* of those avouchments. But it is indubitable that he can never prove this: because, so soon as he *attempts* to prove it, he takes for granted at every turn the very thing to be proved; viz. the trustworthiness of his present memory. See our July article, p. 50. So long as Mr. Mill adheres to the philosophical tenet which we are opposing, he cannot in consistency have any reasonable ground whatever for trusting his memory; and *unless* he trusts his memory, he knows nothing whatever of any kind or description, except only his mental experience of this particular moment. In brief, there is no middle term whatever. Either the mind's *present* avouchment must be accepted as infallibly declaring objective truth,—*or* blind, hopeless, and universal scepticism is the inevitable lot of mankind.

Here also we must repeat a remark, which we made in July (p. 63). Never was there a philosophical proposition more preposterously unfounded, than that which Mr. Mill makes the foundation of his whole philosophy; viz. that the *primordial* avouchments of the human mind certainly correspond with objective truth. We may safely challenge him to allege so much as one colourable reason for this proposition, unless he first *assumes* that the mind's *present* avouchments are infallibly true. It is this *latter* proposition which is primarily certain; and the former proposition has no other evidence whatever, except of *inference* from the latter. He denies that very truth, which alone can supply any reasonable ground for what stands as the sole basis of his intellectual speculations. Our reason for this confident statement will be at once understood by those who have read the article to which we refer.

This is our answer to the objection, which Mr. Mill will probably raise. We might have replied to it from an entirely different point of view: for we confidently deny the psychological allegation on which it is built; we confidently deny, that men go through any series of experiences, which could by possibility have generated their present moral judgments. On this head we can refer to an unusually able article, contributed to the "Macmillan" of July 1869 by Mr. R. H. Hutton, called "A Questionable Parentage of Morals." Mr. Hutton's arguments indeed are directly addressed against a theory ascribed by him to Mr. Herbert Spencer;* but they apply à longè fortiori to Mr. Mill's. For ourselves however, we think it better to abstain altogether from this psychological question. We thus abstain, in order that our readers' attention may be more undividedly fixed on what we consider the glaring unreasonableness and utterly subversive tendency of that principle of Mr. Mill's, which alone could give any controversial *value* to such a psychological allegation. Never could we have expected so able a thinker as Mr. Mill, to take up a position so relentlessly suicidal.

We hold then that no such objection will stand for a moment — or has so much as the slightest plausibility — against the reasoning adduced for our two theses. And since we know of no *other* objection, we assume that they are conclusively established. We next therefore proceed to consider such objections as may be raised against our theses themselves, and no longer against the arguments which we have adduced in their behalf. There is only one of these which

* We use this form of expression, because Mr. Spencer afterwards disclaimed that theory.

impresses us as presenting any even superficial difficulty; we refer to the divergence of moral standard, which has prevailed in different times and countries. Mr. Bain lays much stress on this in the chapter, which we have named at the head of our article, and which Mr. Mill (in his "Utilitarianism") commemorates with the warmest commendation. Mr. Bain lays stress e. g. on such points, as "the change that has come over men's sentiments on the subject of slavery" (p. 312). He lays stress again, on the inexhaustible varieties of what may be called ritual morality: on such facts, as that the Mussulman women think it a duty to cover their faces in public (p. 300); the men to abstain from wine (p. 301); the Hindoos to venerate the cow (p. 308); the Buddhists to avoid animal food (ib.). How are such fundamental differences of moral judgment, he asks, consistent with any supposition, that the first principles of moral truth are self-evidently known to mankind as universally and necessarily true?

F. Harper gives the true reply to this obvious objection, in the sixth of his papers contributed to the "Month" on F. Newman's "Grammar." "First," he says, "I observe with Sir J. Macintosh, that people may differ as much as they please about what is right and wrong, but they all nevertheless agree that there is something right and something wrong." But further and more importantly, "we have forgotten the influence that the will has over the intellect in moral matters; and the influence again which passion, affection, prejudice, evil education, custom, have in such subjects over both. By means of these and similar causes, the perception of right and wrong has been blunted, often choked. Still more often it is liable to be misdirected." "These varieties therefore," he adds, "of popular or national judgment, however extensive, prove nothing against the objective evidence and certitude of moral principles; or against the possibility of their subjective evidence and certainty, as reflected in the individual conscience, when left free to its unbiassed determination and in its right balance."

The question however is of immeasurably more prominent importance in our controversy with Mr. Mill, than it was in F. Harper's criticism of F. Newman; and we will therefore draw out, at much greater length and in our own way, what is substantially identical alike with the doctrine of F. Newman and F. Harper.

Firstly however we must observe, that phenomenists here are in the habit of trying most unfairly to shift the burden of proof from themselves to their opponents. We allege with confidence, that we have demonstratively proved our theses. Unless therefore Mr. Bain *demonstrates* the validity of his objection, he

does nothing whatever; for great probability on one side is simply valueless against *proof* on the other. At the same time however we do not for a moment admit, that our antagonists can give even *probable* ground for the validity of their objection.

Then further we would point out, that they appeal from what is known to what is unknown. I am most intimately aware of my own present or habitual thoughts and feelings: I am also in various degrees well acquainted with those of my friends, my compatriots, my contemporaries. Our antagonists appeal from these, to the sentiments of barbarous tribes, separated from me most widely by time or place or both, and of whose circumstances I know next to nothing. And they make this appeal on a question, in which *everything depends on circumstances:* a very little divergence in these often sufficing to change an act, from intrinsically evil to intrinsically good.

We now proceed to give our own explanation of the facts, to which Mr. Bain has appealed: reminding our readers however, that it is no business of ours to prove our explanation sufficient; but Mr. Bain's business to prove (if he can) that it is otherwise. We have already conclusively (we trust) established our position: Mr. Bain has no standing in court, unless he conclusively establishes *his.*

(1) Firstly then, in one respect the most barbarous nations emphatically *confirm* our view. As F. Harper quotes from Macintosh, they may differ as to what is right or wrong, but they all agree that there *is* a right and a wrong. And so it has often been said—though the present writer has no such knowledge as would justify him in affirming it from his own researches,—that every nation, however savage, has some word in its language to express "duty," as distinct from "expediency." Mr. Bain admits throughout, that all those to whom he appeals have that very same idea of what is meant by "right," or "wrong," or "moral obligation,"—which is possessed by Europeans of the nineteenth century.* It is true that he explains the origin and authority of this idea, in a way fundamentally different from our own. But in raising *this* issue, he is amenable to the court of modern and civilized experience; and by considering the most undeniable facts of human nature as it exists around us, we are able (as we trust we have shown) conclusively to establish our own doctrine.

Nay (2) the number of moral axioms is by no means incon-

---

* For instance. "Every man may have the feeling of conscience, that is the feeling of moral reprobation and moral approbation. All men agree in *having these feelings,* though all do not agree in the *matters to which they are applied*" (pp. 297-8).

siderable, which are intued by all men possessing the use of reason throughout the world. In other words, men not only agree everywhere on the *existence* of a "right" and a "wrong," but in no inconsiderable degree on the acts to which they *ascribe* those respective attributes. Take the two instances on which we have ourselves insisted; the sins of David, and of the dishonest and treacherous politician. In either case there is no one, capable of *understanding* such actions, who will not in his cool judgment condemn them without a moment's hesitation. We say "in his cool judgment": because it is manifest that men who are wholly absorbed and excited in the pursuit of some temporal end, refuse commonly even to *consider* the moral character of what they do. But otherwise, "there must be admitted to exist," says Mr. Bain himself (p. 300), "a tolerably uniform sense of the necessity of recognizing some rights of individuals": "there are to a certain point '*eternal and immutable*' moral judgments . . . . in the repudiation of the thief, the manslayer and the rebel": and we may add, no less, of him who becomes the wanton enemy of his benefactor; or who for private ends violates his solemn promise; or who, for personal reward, inflicts on his country what he knows to be a heavy injury.

(3) We shall still further see the existing amount of agreement on moral matters, by another consideration. There are several classes of actions, on which there may be indeed no universally received axiom of the form "act B is morally evil"—where nevertheless all mankind agree in holding as self-evident, that "act C is better than act D." Thus men everywhere will consider some course of conduct more *admirable* cæteris paribus, in proportion as it is more *unselfish;* however little they may agree, as to what *amount* of selfishness is actually immoral. It is said again, that the most barbarous nations regard celibacy as a higher state than marriage, while differing most widely from each other as to the limits of actual *obligation* in such matters. If this be true, we should be disposed to hold that the moral judgment in question is really cognized by all men as self-evidently true. For though Protestants earnestly repudiate this axiom, we should regard this as one of the not infrequent cases, in which men refuse to recognize what they really cognize; we should say that the preternatural hatred of these Protestants for Catholicity, in this as in many other cases, prevents their explicit perception of the most obvious moral truths. But there is no need whatever of insisting on this.*

---

* Mr. Bain, when reciting cases in which "strong antipathies" have been arbitrarily "made into moral rules" (p. 309), has the following shameless

(4) But no consideration perhaps so impressively shows the unanimity of moral conviction even *now* prevalent among mankind, as the following. All mankind, we say, are agreed in holding, that justice, beneficence, veracity, fidelity to promises, gratitude, temperance, fortitude—that these and not their opposites are the virtuous ends of action. By this phrase we mean to express two propositions. On the one hand, every act, otherwise faultless,* is accounted by all men as good, if done for the sake of justice, beneficence, or any one of the rest; while on the other hand every act is accounted by all men to be evil, if it *contravene* these ends. Take any one in their number—say justice—as standing for the rest. Many men doubtless in various times and places have thought it right to do many an act, which Catholics know to be unjust: still they have never thought it right *because* unjust; they have never thought it right, for the sake of any virtuousness which they have supposed to reside in injustice; but because of the virtuousness of *beneficence*, or *gratitude*, or the like. Similarly many men think an act wrong, because they think it unjust; but they never think it wrong, because they think it *just*. They regard this or that just act as wrong, because they regard it as opposed to *beneficence* or *gratitude*, but never because they regard it as required by *justice*. In one word, they think many an act good, simply because prompted by *justice*; but they never think an act good, because prompted by *in*justice. And the same remark applies, to the other virtuous ends of action which we have named above. A "good man," in the judgment of all mankind, means "a man possessing in various degrees the qualities of justice, benevolence, veracity, fidelity to promises, gratitude, temperance, fortitude."

So much on the existing concurrence of moral judgments. Our further remarks are directed, to explain the existing *divergence*.

(5) The moral faculty, like all other faculties and perhaps more than any other, is perfected by cultivation; and the means

---

remark. "There has been a very prevailing disposition to restrict the indulgences of sex. Some practices are so violently abhorred, that they are not permitted even to be named" (p. 310). We must do Mr. Mill the justice to say, that no sentiment can be more violently opposed than this to his way of regarding similar subjects.

* We say "otherwise faultless"; because it is perhaps possible, that an act, known to be intrinsically evil, may be done for the virtuousness of some good end. It is perhaps possible e.g. that I may commit what I know to be a theft on A, for the virtuousness of benefiting some very deserving person B. For ourselves however we doubt whether this *is* possible.

whereby it is cultivated is moral action.* If I only know two or three moral axioms and no others whatever, I know that there are certain acts, intrinsically wrong and prohibited by the Supreme Ruler: or in other words I know that there is a Natural Law—whether its extent be wide or narrow—possessing irrefragable claims on my obedience; and strictly binding, though the whole universe solicited me to rebellion. Every other course of conduct then is glaringly unreasonable, except (1) to obey its precepts carefully, so far as I know them; and (2) to use every means at my disposal—by interrogating my consciousness, by praying for light to this Supreme Ruler, and in every other attainable way—in order to discover the full extent of its enactments. In proportion as I give myself more energetically to this task—and specially in proportion as I labour, not only to comply with strict *obligation*, but to do what is morally the *better* and more pleasing therefore to my Supreme Ruler—in that proportion two results ensue. Firstly the utterances of my moral faculty become far more readily distinguishable from all other intellectual suggestions †; and secondly the number of moral axioms within my cognizance is very rapidly increased. Certainly we maintain with confidence, that no

---

* Similarly F. Harper, as we have seen, holds that the perception of right and wrong has been blunted, often choked, still more often misdirected, by passion, evil education, affection, prejudice, custom. He adds that "the great aim of a true education must be to strengthen the principle of law, and then to direct it in a right channel." F. Newman again is constantly laying extreme stress on the proposition stated in the text.

† There is one especial means, by which moral judgments become more and more pointedly distinguished from all others, in proportion as the agent grows in a habit of virtue; viz. that they are so intimately connected with a sense of *sin*. Moral perception grows so far more quickly than moral action, that a prevailing sense of sinfulness may be taken as an infallible measure of advance in true goodness. It is a peculiar merit of F. Newman's philosophy, to our mind, that he is ever so urgent in insisting on this. Mr. Lecky—whose views as a whole are to us simply revolting—nevertheless speaks well on this point. He criticises ("European Morals," p. 67, note) the language, so commonly found among philosophers of either school, about the delight which is supposed to accrue to every good man from the testimony of his approving conscience, and the pleasure which the good man is supposed to receive from *reflecting* on that delight: like "little Jack Horner," says Mr. Lecky, "who said 'what a good boy am I'!" And he quotes a truly fatuous passage from Adam Smith. "The man who . . . from proper motives has performed a generous action . . . feels himself . . . the natural object . . . of the esteem and approbation of all mankind [!!!] And when he looks backward to the motive from which he acted, and surveys it in the light in which the indifferent spectator will survey it, he still continues to enter into it, and *applauds himself* by sympathy with the approbation of this supposed impartial judge. In both these points of view his conduct appears to him in *every way agreeable. Misery and wretchedness can never enter the breast*, in which dwelleth *complete self-satisfaction*."

man's intellect really avouches as self-evident a false moral verdict, on the case brought up to it for judgment. But nevertheless, in consistency with what has just been said, we have no difficulty whatever in admitting, (1) that those whose moral faculty is uncultivated may easily be mistaken as to its true utterances; and (2) that very often indeed they will see no wickedness in many an act, which those more advanced in moral discernment will intuitively cognize to be evil.

(6) We have said that no man's intellect avouches as self-evident a false moral verdict, *on the case brought up to it for judgment;* and we are now to express our meaning in this qualification, on which we lay great stress. The very notion of an "axiom"—as we have so often quoted from F. Kleutgen—is that it exists wherever, by merely comparing the *ideas* of subject and predicate, I come to see the truth of a proposition. But suppose those *ideas* did not correspond with *objective facts:* in that case of course the supposed axiom is simply delusive, as *applied* to these facts. A first-rate lawyer may give a faultless judgment on a case proposed to him for consideration; but if the case be wrongly drawn up, the judgment is valueless or mischievous. The same is true concerning *moral* judgments; and we will give one obvious instance. To the uninstructed and non-Catholic reader of that unprincipled book Pascal's "Provincial Letters," such a circumstance as the following will happen again and again. He will read in Pascal some propositions, advocated by illustrious Catholic casuists, and will regard it as axiomatic that they are immoral. And yet, if he comes to apprehend those very propositions, as illustrated by the context and taken in connection with the general drift of these casuists, he will entirely revoke his former judgment, and not improbably accept as self-evident the very opposite.

This misstatement of the case is a most fruitful source of apparent divergences in moral judgment. Whether from prejudice and moral fault indefinitely varying in degree, or from mere intellectual inaccuracy and want of comprehensiveness,—it happens again and again, that men totally misapprehend the phenomena on which they judge. We may take an illustration from negro slavery, on which Mr. Bain twice insists (pp. 299, 312) as illustrating his theory. A and B are equally good men, and have therefore equally cultivated their moral faculty. A however has lived mostly among slaves, and is intimately acquainted with their circumstances and character. B on the contrary has derived his scanty information on the subject entirely from slave-holders; and moreover has never had any reason for pondering carefully on such light as the matter would receive, from the known laws of human nature.

Some definite act of harshness to a slave will be cognized by A as self-evidently wrong; while B forms no moral judgment on it at all, axiomatic or otherwise. Mr. Bain himself admits in substance what we are now affirming. "When an abolitionist from Massachusetts," he says (p. 299) "denounces the institution of slavery and a clergyman of Carolina defends it, *both of them have in common the same sentiment of justice and injustice.*"

(7) There are other instances, which are explicable by a process very familiar to Mr. Mill. This writer is constantly pointing out, how very easily an *inference* may be mistaken for an *intuition;* and we have always heartily concurred in his remark. Now many of the judgments cited by Mr. Bain, on the obligatoriness of some ritual observance, are conclusions of a syllogism. "Whatever the Supreme Ruler commands is of obligation: but He commands this; therefore this is of obligation." The only *moral* axiom here is the major premiss, which is indubitably true; and it is an historian's business, not a philosopher's, to trace the origin of the minor. Moreover, although some of these ritual observances should be both intrinsically immoral, and self-evidently *cognizable* as such by one who has duly cultivated his moral faculty;—this admission (as is obvious) does not in any way affect our argument.

(8) In other cases again a moral judgment is the conclusion, not of unconscious, but of explicit and prolonged reasoning. Mr. Bain seems really to speak (p. 312) as though the question, whether slavery be or be not permissible, could be *axiomatically* answered. We do not ourselves think that it is capable of *any* universal solution; we think that what is permissible or even preferable in some circumstances, is intrinsically evil in others. But however this may be, the true conclusion can only be reached by a sustained process of reasoning: a process, in which moral axioms doubtless play a large part; but in which a large part is *also* played by various psychological and social data. And the *moral axioms* will be precisely those premisses, on which *both* parties in the controversy profess agreement.

(9) Finally the instances are by no means few, in which mere antipathy has been mistaken by philosophers for moral disapprobation. It by no means follows, because some body of men abhor some practice, that they regard it as morally wrong. And most fortunately for our purpose, it happens that we have irrefragable proof of this, in facts, which to the grandfathers of living Englishmen were matters of every day experience. We refer to the time, when *duelling* was of social obligation. Some hundred years ago, any layman who refused to fight a duel under circumstances in which public opinion required it, was *treated* as a veritable Pariah: he was received into no society

of gentlemen; no gentleman would give him his daughter in marriage; nay, to associate with him was to be socially excommunicate. From such usages as these, had they occurred in some distant and very partially-known period, Mr. Bain would have confidently inferred, that those who practised them accounted as *morally evil* the refusal to fight duels; and yet no fact in the world is more certain than the reverse of this. These men were in general so firmly convinced of the truth of Christianity, that they regarded with horror the very suspicion of infidelity. On the other hand it is equally undeniable, that they knew duelling to be forbidden by Christianity; because for this very reason no clergyman was expected to fight.* Again, suppose one of themselves—a man too of otherwise profligate life—were lying on his death-bed: they would probably experience a momentary misgiving about his future lot; though they would very likely soon reassure themselves, by some blasphemous plausibilities about God's mercy. But suppose a man of spotless life were on his death-bed, who had been under their ban for his faithfulness to God and his consequent refusal to fight: the very notion would not occur to them, that he had placed his *salvation* in jeopardy by conduct, which nevertheless they so intensely abhorred. A defaulter was accounted by them "no gentleman"; but they never doubted that he might be an admirable Christian. They abhorred his act, because it indicated (as they thought) mental qualities, which to them were intensely distasteful; but not because they regarded it as wicked or sinful.

Some reader may object, that he cannot believe such absurd inconsistency to have existed in "enlightened" England of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We reply firstly, that the facts are simply notorious, and that no one will dream of calling them in question. We reply secondly, that we willingly concede one premiss on which this difficulty is based; viz., these men's ludicrous and contemptible inconsistency. There is no amount of imbecile and childish self-contradiction, we verily believe, which may not be expected from those truly pitiable persons, who deliberately permit themselves in any other course of conduct, than that of labouring earnestly to make their conscience their one predominant rule of life.

Mr. Mill himself admits, that an unfavourable judgment is often formed of acts, which judgment is *mistaken* for one of moral disapprobation, without being so. "All professed moralists," he says (Dissertations, vol. i. pp. 386–7), "treat the *moral* view of actions and characters . . . . as if it were the sole

* See, in our number for last July, p. 84, Dr. Hampden's amazing letter to Mr. Newman.

one; whereas it is only one out of three. . . . . According to the first we approve or disapprove; according to the second we admire or despise; according to the third we love, pity, or dislike." *

We pointed out above, that the onus probandi in this matter rests entirely with Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain. We are in no respect called on to *prove* that we have correctly explained the facts on which they insist; but they are called on to *dis*prove, if they can, the satisfactoriness of our explanation. We have proved our theses on ground totally distinct. They do not advance their cause one step, unless they demonstrate conclusively that their objection to those theses is valid; unless they demonstrate conclusively, that the existing variety of moral judgments cannot be explained by the considerations we have set forth, and by others which might be added. We are very confident, not only that they *cannot* demonstrate this conclusively, but that they cannot render such an opinion even probable. Here however is the advantage of controversy with living men. If they honour us with their attention, we may beg them to name that particular instance of moral diversity, on which they would especially insist; and to give their reasons for thinking, that this instance is conclusive against our position. We promise beforehand that, if they make such attempt, we will give it most explicit notice, and grapple with it in the face of day.

There are no other objections to our doctrine—so far at least as we know of them—which impress us as having the slightest plausibility. Mr. Bain e. g. complains (p. 291) that objectivists assign no *standard* of moral truth. It might as well be said, that they assign no standard of *mathematical* truth. A mathematical proposition is established, if it is either on one hand cognized as axiomatic, or on the other hand deduced from propositions which *are* so cognized: and precisely the same thing may be said of a moral proposition.

Supposing indeed Mr. Bain's opponents alleged that moral truth is purely subjective and created by the human mind—such an objection as his would be intelligible. But this is the very thing, which is denied by objectivists in general, and most emphatically by Catholics in particular. An evil action is undoubtedly called by them "difformis rectæ rationi"; but

* We must incidentally protest against this doctrine of Mr. Mill's, so far as he applies it to what *ought* to be and not merely to what *is*. In proportion as a man advances in virtue and love of God, in that proportion (we must maintain) he approaches to that state of mind, in which he admires and loves those acts most, which *God* most admires and loves; i. e. those which are most excellent.

quite as often "contraria naturæ hominis," or "perturbatio ordinis naturalis." There is an objective "natural order" of actions then, a *moral scale* so to speak; and it is the office of human reason to cognize, not to create it.

It is a favourite argument of Mr. Mill's, that objectivism keeps moral science in a stationary state, and interferes with its legitimate progress. Now the only progress of which, consistently with his principles, he can here be speaking, is that which arises from fresh light being thrown on the *consequences* of this or that action. But objectivists hold as strongly as phenomenists, that the morality of actions is importantly affected by their consequences; and that any light therefore, thrown on the latter, importantly affects the former.

A *Catholic* philosopher indeed does undoubtedly hold, that in a very true sense moral science is stationary; but this conclusion does not result from his objectivism, but from a different Catholic doctrine altogether. He considers, that moral truths are an integral part of Divine Revelation; and that though, like other revealed verities, they admit elucidation and development,—yet they are not progressive in that sense, in which progressiveness may be truly ascribed to a purely secular science. But this whole question—though of the gravest moment—is entirely external to our present theme.

We are not aware of any other arguments, which Mr. Mill has ever alleged against our position. And how insufficient those arguments are, may be seen from the very unsuspicious testimony of Mr. Mill himself; who has not been prevented by them, from unconsciously embracing one principal part of the very doctrine which he opposes. He says with profoundest truth (Dissertations, vol. i. p. 384), that "mankind are much more nearly of one nature, than of one opinion about their own nature"; and it is the very reason of our own sympathy with many exhibitions of his personal character, that he has been quite unable to confine the breadth of his own nature, within the limits of what we must call his own most narrow and *contra-natural* theory. His theory is purely phenomenistic; viz., that "morally good" is simply equivalent with "conducive to general enjoyment," and "morally evil" the reverse. Yet, in almost every page of his writing on moral and political subjects, he assumes the *transcendental* axiom, that "benevolence is morally good" and "malevolence is morally evil": the idea "morally good" being that very transcendental idea, on which objectivists insist, but which Mr. Mill in theory regards as delusive.*

* On the terms "phenomenistic" and "transcendental," see our last number, pp. 307, 309.

We are confident that all familiar with his writings will concur in this remark, when they understand what we mean. This view, constantly implicit, occasionally finds explicit mention. Thus in a passage we shall immediately quote, he says in effect that a benevolent being *may*, but that a malevolent being can *not*, be a legitimate object of *worship*. Elsewhere he describes a habit of disinterested benevolence, as the true "standard of *excellence*"; * he affirms ("On Hamilton," p. 123) that he "loves and *venerates*" moral goodness; and says (Dissertations, vol. iii. p. 340) that "the cultivation of a disinterested preference of duty for its own sake" is "a *higher* state than that of sacrificing selfish preferences to a more distant self-interest." What can he mean by the word "excellence," or the word "venerate," or the word "higher," consistently with his theory? Undoubtedly he is at liberty, without transcending the bounds of phenomenism, to allege that benevolence is *beneficent* and conducive to *the happiness of mankind*: for happiness consists in a series of phenomena; and experience can teach what conduces to the *increase* of such phenomena. But Mr. Mill constantly goes further than this: he calls a habit of disinterested benevolence "high," "excellent," worthy of "veneration" and the like. What right has the phenomenist to such notions as these? What *phenomena* do these notions represent? Wherein is their objective counterpart discerned by *experience*?

But there is perhaps no one passage throughout his entire works, in which Mr. Mill so unveils his innermost nature—nor is there any other to our mind so eloquent—as the following well-known invective of his, against a view ascribed by him to Dean Mansel.

> If instead of the "glad tidings" that there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being, whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, or what are the principles of his government, except that "the highest human morality which

---

* "Man is never recognized by" Bentham "as a being capable of desiring for its own sake the conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward consciousness." (Dissertations, vol. i. p. 359.) But one "*coequal part*" of morality "is self-education; the training by the human being himself of his affection and will" (ib. p. 363) into accordance, of course, with the true "standard of excellence." We assume, that the habit of disinterested benevolence is what Mr. Mill here intends to describe as the "true *standard of excellence*"; for otherwise he would be more inconsistent with *his professed principles*, than we even allege him to be.

we are capable of receiving" does not sanction them: convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do; he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go." ("On Hamilton," pp. 123–4.)

We have two preliminary remarks to make on this most impressive passage, before using it against Mr. Mill's consistency. In the first place, all Catholics will substantially agree with what we understand to be its doctrine. Let the impossible and appalling supposition be put for argument's sake, that men had been created by a malignant being, who commanded them to cherish habits of pride, envy, mutual hatred, and sensuality. The case is of course utterly and wildly impossible: but supposing it, undoubtedly men would be strictly obliged, at whatever sacrifice, both to disobey those commands, and to withhold worship from the being who could issue them.* In the second place, we are quite confident that Dean Mansel meant no such doctrine as Mr. Mill supposes; though we cannot acquit him of having expressed himself with singular incautiousness.

The first inference we draw against Mr. Mill's consistency from the passage just quoted, has been already expressed. He accounts malevolence not merely to be maleficent—which is all that can be said by a consistent phenomenist—but as intrinsically evil and base: so evil and base, that he would rather undergo eternal torment, than worship a malevolent being.

But secondly he brings utilitarianism to a distinct issue; for he says in effect that all men, individually and collectively, should rather undergo everlasting torment, than worship a maliguant being who commands them to do so. His professed theory—the fundamental principle of his whole moral philosophy—is that morality consists exclusively and precisely in promoting the happiness of one's fellow-creatures. Yet here he says, that in a particular case the true morality of all men would lie, in promoting, not the happiness, but the everlasting torment

* On the other hand we should say, that they would *also* be under an obligation, of not doing that which would impair their permanent happiness. Nor of course is there any difficulty whatever in the circumstance, that an intrinsically impossible hypothesis *issues legitimately* in two mutually contradictory conclusions.

of all mankind.* He says in effect, that all men would act basely and wickedly, if they worshipped a malevolent being. And he cannot possibly mean, by the words "basely" and "wickedly," that they would act "*adversely to the promotion of general enjoyment*"; because he holds that this baseness and wickedness would remain, even if such conduct were the sole means of exempting all mankind from an eternity of woe. When a crucial case really comes before him, his better nature compels him to decide sternly, peremptorily, effusively, indignantly, against his own doctrine.

We have now concluded our own case. We must forego what would have been a great accession to our argument, by being obliged to postpone our detailed consideration of Mr. Mill's own moral scheme. But we have already reached the extreme bounds which we had prescribed to ourselves; and in what remains of our present article, can give no more than a most perfunctory criticism of Mr. Mill's doctrine.

Through his whole philosophical career, that gentleman has consistently and most earnestly disclaimed what he calls "the selfish theory"; the theory, which regards morality as consisting in "enlightened self-interest." On the other hand, as we have just pointed out, he cannot, consistently with his phenomenism, admit the existence of transcendental virtue or transcendental obligation; he cannot speak of benevolence as intrinsically excellent, or of its opposite as intrinsically detestable. Disclaiming thus at once the morality of self-interest and the morality of transcendental goodness,—it is difficult at first to see what possible footing is left him: yet he is not left entirely without means of answering the relevant questions. Thus we may ask, what men *mean* when they say that A's conduct is morally detestable, and they therefore abhor it; while B's conduct is morally good, and they therefore approve it. They mean to express—so Mr. Mill may reply without inconsistency—on the one hand that abhorrence which arises in their mind, from a sense that A's habits tend to their grievous detriment; and on the other hand that complacency which arises in their mind, from a sense that B's conduct tends to their enjoyment. See e.g. "Dissertations," vol. i. pp. 155–6; "On Hamilton," p. 572. But then we further ask Mr. Mill, why should I, a given individual, aim, not at my own interest, but that of my fellow-men? why is it my reasonable course to sacrifice myself in

---

* *This remark has* already been made by Mr. Mivart, in his admirable "*Genesis of Species*" (p. 194). He states himself to have derived it from *Rev. Father Roberts.*

their behalf? And to this question, so far as we can see, his answer is glaringly inadequate. He will say indeed very truly, that there is an unselfish element in human nature; that "the idea of the pain of another is naturally painful and the idea of his pleasure naturally pleasurable" (Dissertations, vol. i. p. 137); and that in this part of human nature lies a foundation, on which may be reared the habit of finding a constantly increasing part of my gratification in the happiness of others. Mr. Mill may further say, and indeed does say, that all mankind are prompted by the strongest motives of self-interest, so to educate each individual, as that he *may* thus find gratification in other men's enjoyment. Nay, and he may add further still, —though he would find much difficulty in proving this,— that those who have *been* thus trained lead happier lives in consequence, than they would otherwise have led. But when he has gone so far as this, he has exhausted his resources. He can give no reason whatever why I, a given individual, who have *not* been thus trained,—and who (as a simple matter of fact) find very much less pleasure in other men's enjoyment than in my own—should sacrifice the latter in favour of the former.

We will illustrate the most essential and characteristic part of this doctrine by a little fable, wildly absurd from the standpoint of natural history, but none the less fitted to express our meaning. The cats and rats are in a state of internecine warfare; and the fleas, if left to their natural habits, perform acts, which in various ways injure the former and benefit the latter. Moved by this circumstance, the cats capture a large number of young fleas, and train them to take their pleasure in acts which have an opposite tendency. The cats accordingly dearly prize the trained fleas, and the rats the natural fleas: so much is quite intelligible. But Mr. Mill should add, that the cats feel toward the trained fleas, and the rats towards the natural fleas, that very sentiment, which is called in human matters "moral approbation"; while the rats feel towards the trained fleas, and the cats towards the natural fleas, the sentiment of "moral disapproval."

We are well aware, that Mr. Mill will indignantly repudiate the parallel. What we allege is, that his spontaneous view (so to call it) is directly contradictory to his speculative theory; that the doctrine, constantly implied by him whenever he treats of human affairs, is that very objectivist doctrine, which in theory he denounces. We do not of course mean that his implicit doctrine is *Theistical;* but we do say that it is *objectivist*, as ascribing intrinsic and transcendental excellence to the practice of beneficence. And the indignation with which he will regard

such an analysis of moral sentiments as is contained in our little fable, is to our mind a measure of his wide distance from the genuine utilitarian philosophy.

In theory however, he has made his doctrine even more untenable and (we must be allowed to add) even more odious, by his denial of human free will. There is perhaps no one philosophical theme, on which he has enlarged with so much earnestness and so much power as on this; and yet (so weak is his cause) we think there is no one on which he can be so triumphantly refuted. In our next philosophical article then (which however may or may not appear in our very next number) we shall first meet him, hand to hand and step to step, on this battle-field; and we shall secondly express that detailed criticism on his moral system as a whole, which we had hoped to give on the present occasion.

Since the above was in type, the "Fraser" of this month has published a comment on our philosophical article of last April, called "Certitude in Religious Assent." Our readers will find our reply, in the Notices at the end of our number.

Art. IV.—FICTIONS OF THE FUTURE.

The Next Generation. By John Francis Maguire, M.P. Second Edition. In Three Volumes. Hurst & Blackett. 1871.

Anno Domini 2071. Translated from the Dutch original. With Preface, &c. By Dr. Alex. V. W. Bikkers. W. Tegg. 1871.

The Coming Race. Third Edition. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood. 1871.

SENSATIONAL fiction has taken various forms within this century. Bulwer, who happily half belongs to ancient literature, led the way by introducing us to aristocratic and intellectual criminals. Ainsworth, and now Miss Braddon, have followed suit with their criminals, less intellectual and less aristocratic, if we may say so with Lady Audley's leave. Dickens gives us a murder or a violent death with the circumstantial details of a coroner's inquest. Through all these productions, to name no others, runs the vein of horror which constitutes the sensation. It is a horror interwoven with

various other matters, grave and gay; but we know it is coming, and look out for it. It flavours the preceding passages, to readers who delight in such mental experiences. So, in lionizing the ruinous and haunted mansion, visitors are restless until they have reached *the* one thrilling room, with the ineffaceable stain upon its floor.

But the sated Roman emperor announced a prize to him who should invent some new pleasure. And so, in the literary epicurism of readers who have supped full of horrors, and who have come to yawn even in face of the grinning death's-head at their banquet, a something was needed to spur the jaded appetite into a fresh sensation. Into what region, then, shall the caterer travel for "pastures new"? Whence shall he procure for his imperial patron, the many-headed public, a pabulum, a dainty, yet unknown? To an ordinary imagination, the prospect might seem discouraging. Every crime in the Newgate Calendar has been already presented to the young ladies and gentlemen of England for their affectionate admiration and hearty acceptance. Every production of an unfettered Parisian fancy has found an English translator or plagiarist on the spot. The characters in our fictions have been flung into wells, hurled from steeples, cut into pieces on railways, roasted alive; which catastrophes they have abundantly deserved, inasmuch as they have fired houses, forged wills, starved widows and orphans, put their nearest relatives out of the way, and shown vivacity of spirit and muscular Christianity by playful peccadilloes of a like trifling nature, till we weary of the monstrous that has even become a monotony. *Ohe, jam satis*, we exclaim, with a yawn. Violence, according to the sensational writer, is the normal condition of human life. But even violence can weary, as the howling tempest can lull.

Only, before we throw aside our shilling volume, let us glance beyond it at the results. Schiller's "Robbers" was the sensational novel of the day; and behold, the youth of Germany turns out, hault sentiment on its lips, and pistol in hand, to enact the hero on the highway. Turpin rides to York on his famous black mare; and young brains have reeled with excitement to follow his adventures. Jack Sheppard, the delight and glory of youthful aspirant cracksmen, has reappeared in the conviction of 'prentice burglars, long since inappreciative justice cut short his brilliant career. And the Bulwer and Braddon sensations may have borne fruit, partially unknown to us hitherto. Truth may yet in actual life be displaced from its well by the body of some victim of a lady murderess, *hurled in thither* by the force of powerful fiction.

The field of sensational literature being thus already occupied by industrious tillers, and even exhausted by their succession of crops, it has become necessary to escape beyond it, through some gap in the hedge, if writers are to glean a harvest. And lo! a bright thought flashes, all but simultaneously, on several minds. *Eureka!* the Future! A sensation of what may possibly come; or what, though impossible, may be represented under certain extravagant conditions as coming.

We are, perhaps, in danger of rendering scant justice to the writer who stands first on our list, if we suppose him led into this enticing region in the mere search of a sensation. Mr. Maguire's book, with all its fun, which is "fast and furious," gives token of being written with something of a serious purpose. And herein, we confess, lies our chief regret at seeing it in print. Taken by itself, it might be interpreted as a righteous satire against that American importation into our modern thought, which we must not hesitate to stigmatize as odious, known as Woman's Rights. But, taken in conjunction with a vote given in the House of Commons by the honourable member for Cork, just when the first edition of his book appeared, and supported by some (apparently) serious passages in the book itself, we must suppose him, surprising as it seems, an advocate of the said movement. Certainly, in that case, the ladies who aim at becoming Chancelloresses of the Exchequer, Vice-Presidentesses of the Council, or desire to emulate his Dr. Florence Baldwin or his Miss Elmsley in the keenness and coolness of their surgical operations, have cause to wish that they may be defended from their friends. If anything could overwhelm their cause with inextinguishable laughter, it would be the realization of what the movement means, and what would be its details, as presented in Mr. Maguire's vivid pictures. But if, when the laughter died down, the face of the author should be found more serious than befits a satirist, then the public feeling, if we at all represent or interpret it, would have a tendency to pass from lively to severe.*

---

* A theory is like what the old proverb says about poverty; it makes people acquainted with strange companions. Victor Hugo and Mr. Maguire are about as incongruous rowers in the same boat as can well be conceived; yet the author of "Les Misérables" is here at one with the author of the "Next Generation"; or rather, as we are sorry to put it, *vice versâ*. The "Avenir des Femmes," the Woman's Rights organ in France, has the following letter:—

"PARIS, *Nov.* 7, 1871.

"*SIR,—You were right* in reckoning on me to support the future of *woman. As far back as* 1849, in the National Assembly, I made the reac-

In the shock of battle, during those days when men, locked up in steel, charged one against the other from opposing sides, it must by times have chanced to some knight in full career to note on the shield of his opponent the crescents, or crosslets, or Saracen's head *couped*, denoting that he had fought for Christendom. And doubtless, that moment of recognition of one who shared a brotherhood in arms higher and more cogent than the accidental differences of the present strife, would induce him to raise his lance, or to strike on the shield as gently as the laws of combat might allow. Such is the divided impulse we feel, while a deep conviction renders it impossible to withhold an expression of disapproval from Mr. Maguire's book, supposing him serious. We do not forget that the writer, from whose views in this particular we utter total and grave dissent, has been the eloquent advocate of such causes as the Papacy and Ireland. He has fought for Christendom; and the cross on his shield shall save him from the home-thrust to which we would otherwise lend every nerve.

But what are we to think of such passages and representations as the following? Is the writer in any degree serious in desiring the public concerns of the next generation in England to be thus conducted?

"I say," said Lawless, in a tone prompt and decisive, "we must find a match for Clara Carter; or, in spite of our policy and our leaders,—Selina Bates, our able Chancellor—Meliora Temple, our popular First Commissioner of Works—Eva Robertson, our Minister of Education, and all our other people, men as well as women,—why we must go to the dogs. That is my opinion."

"Lawless has hit it," said Sir John. "We must match Clara Carter, or be content to go out; and I must confess the movement would be rather a humiliating one under the circumstances. If we have to go out, it is for

---

tionary majority laugh by declaring that the natural corollary of the rights of man were the rights of women and children. In 1853, at Jersey, when in exile, I made the same declaration over the tomb of a woman named Louise Julien, who had been driven from her native country for her political opinions; but that time nobody laughed, everybody cried. I continued my efforts in the cause of justice to women in *Les Misérables*, renewed them at the Lausanne Congress, and I have just repeated them in the *Rappel*. The equilibrium between the rights of men and the rights of women is one of the conditions of social stability. That equilibrium will be established sooner or later. You have, therefore, done well to put yourself under the protection of that supreme word, the future. I am with those who, like you, desire progress and nothing but progress.—I shake your hand.

"VICTOR HUGO."

Clara Carter the Sovereign should send; for, beyond question, she—and she alone—is the cause of the present crisis."

"But where are we to find Clara Carter's match?" inquired Hassell.

"Can we get her?" asked Cameron.

"Is she to be had?" doubted Hassell, who had been more than once suspected of a tender leaning to Carterism.

"We must find her, and we must get her, and she must be ours," said Lawless, with emphasis. . . . .

"Perhaps the Widow Coleville?" suggested Hassell.

"No, little Fogarty," said Danvers.

"I guess Janet Macpherson," said Cameron. . . . .

"Lawless is right again,—he does know whom I mean," said Sir John. "And, gentlemen, if there be a girl in the Three Kingdoms who can save us from falling to pieces, it is she on whom I calculate. The Widow Coleville goes in exclusively for Indian affairs, and thinks in Hindostanee; little Fogarty is too flighty and skittish,—that affair of Mackintosh's hat was too bad." . . . .

"Oh, yes, I saw something of it in the Parliamentary Jottings of the *Daily Champion*. But, Sir John, why not Janet Macpherson?" inquired Cameron, with national eagerness.

"Janet is too sedate; she hasn't go enough in her for the post. The girl I rely upon is—Grace O'Donnell."

The mention of the much-expected name was received with a burst of approval. (vol. i. pp. 23–29.)

Accordingly, Sir John's sister goes on a mission to Grace, to induce her to become the "Whip" of the Ministerial Party.

"My brother says Mr. Lawless would not oppose what was really necessary to the safety of his Party. But you won't refuse—you can't—I know you won't. Sir John says you are a brave, high-spirited girl, a match any day for Clara Carter—I call her odious. For my part, I can't understand what the men see in her. To be sure, she has eyes——"

"Mary, say to Sir John I will think of what you tell me. But I must, of course, consult Papa. But go, Mary dear, and leave me to myself; for I must put on my wisdom cap, and think—oh, so profoundly."

"Grace, you are a positive love, a downright darling; and I am so glad, and John too will be so glad—and Grace—but—but, dear, dear, I am so happy! Thank Heaven, Miss Carter has got her match at last!"

* * * * *

"There, Fitz, don't mind what I say. I am low-spirited, perhaps on account of Papa. But it is trying to one's nerves, under such circumstances, to hear of nothing but Clara Carter and her brown eyes, and how she winds the Scotch round her little finger; and how, after subduing the Welsh, she is to try her skill on the Irish—you, Sir, I suppose, among the number!" (pp. 47, 52.)

Now, if all this were meant as a lively skit on the absurdities

of a theory which is grotesque at a distance, and only becomes hateful as one draws near enough to see it in detail, it might be condoned; though, even then, three volumes make up rather a large dose. Nor can we quite suppose the author to have really fallen into such an *ignoratio elenchi* as to give us these representations as any serious step to advance the cause of "Woman's Rights." We are left to the conclusion that Mr. Maguire made the first sketch of his book with a purpose, more or less defined, of saying something in its favour; and then, overcome by his quick perception of the ludicrous, filled up his canvas in a less determinate and a lighter strain. We picture him to ourselves somewhat as Garrick between Tragedy and Comedy, in Reynolds' celebrated picture. The high-souled Muse lays on the great mime a firm but tranquil hand, and points with the other to the lofty destiny of expounding her inspirations. But Comedy, buoyant and impetuous, will not have it so, and drags him away; while Garrick, and so, after him, Mr. Maguire, can do no more than cast an expostulating look back on Tragedy, as if to argue the unreasonableness of expecting from him a resistance to the brighter fancy. We repeat our conviction that the serious advocates of woman's political rights, like Tragedy in the picture, will be malcontent at the wayward desertion of their truant advocate. He should have written more gravely, to escape the dilemma of being charged as a conscious, or else an unconscious, satirist.

The ladies, of course, when they obtain their rights, will have their reunions, and of a kind hitherto monopolized by the more tyrannous half of humanity.

> Next day it was known in all the Clubs that the Ministry had obtained a Whip, and Clara Carter a rival. The Women's Clubs were in a flutter of excitement; and for that evening the new appointment absorbed all other topics. The Minerva, which was then strongly Ministerial, was hopeful, without being too confident. The Mermaid, of which Miss Carter was a brilliant ornament, was rather disdainful. The Amazon was impartial, and suspended its judgment. . . . .
>
> The Minerva may be said to be one of the legitimate consequences of the Rights-of-Woman movement, which, some quarter of a century since, was the fruitful theme of popular ridicule and masculine contempt, but whose wonderful success has long since been accepted with a satisfaction almost universal. The Minerva may be said to be the temple raised to its triumph. In the sculpture that adorns its halls, in the painting that beautifies its principal apartments, the chiefs of the movement have their apotheosis or their memorial. In its list*—and its latest shows it is fast rising to 700 members

* That for 1893.

—are to be found many of the most eminent names, not only in Art, Literature, and Science, but in Law and Medicine, Commerce and Politics. Much of the intellectual energy of the present hour has its origin or its best support in the Minerva. . . . . The Mermaid, though some years younger than the Minerva, is quite as successful in its way, though, from its very nature, it does not appeal to so many interests and motives as its powerful rival. . . . . The Mermaid by no means disdains the cultivation of the higher faculties. On the contrary, very many of its members hold an enviable position in Literature and Art; and among the gayest and cheeriest of these were, at the time of which we write, two of the most eminent Professors of the Athena, the well-known Woman's University of London. . . . .

The building erected near the Minerva, on a portion of the ground sold by the Crown, is somewhat *bizarre* in its character—one of those strange conceptions of the younger Pringle, who may be said to compose a fantastical poem in stone and iron, of which, pillar, and cornice, and marvellous tracery, and rare colour, and gilding, and mosaic-work, are the embellishments. Fortunately for the success of the Club, it had some members on its committee who combined great wealth with fervid enthusiasm and large generosity. Three of these, the Duchess of Braganza, the Duchess of Wherryton, and Mrs. Bullion, the young widow of the old banker and capitalist, contributed splendidly towards the building fund. There was no lack of money, and no want of sympathy; and now, with its 580 members, from all parts of the Three Kingdoms, the Mermaid is one of the best circumstanced of the Clubs of London.

The Amazon was then, as it is now, the virtual head-quarters of the Lady Volunteer organization; and on every second Wednesday throughout the season—which is governed by the sitting of Parliament—the members dine together in full-dress uniform. (pp. 58–67.)

Before dismissing these Amazons, Mermaids, and the rest, we must not fail to record that what is, among ourselves, still a thing to come, is come already among our precocious cousins across the Atlantic. It is a difference of pace, or, as grammarians would say, of tense. With us, it is the paulo-post future, if Mr. Maguire is a prophet; and we are thankful for any reprieve which hinders its being actually present. For the present, then, it is on the Hudson, not on the Thames, that an achievement is witnessed, described in the "Echo" of November 9th, 1871:—

The ladies in America seem resolved not to leave "the tyrant, man," a vestige of his claim to superiority unchallenged. They have already invaded the college class-room and the laboratory, the lecturer's platform and the stump-orator's rostrum, the bar, the hospital, the pulpit, even the bench, and they are asserting their claim to a seat in Congress and to the Presidency. But, at least, he flattered himself they would not dare to compete with him in feats demanding physical strength. Vain boast! They not only dare do it, but they have actually done it. Women have lately rowed at a New

York Regatta. It is true, indeed, that the committee basely refused to allow them to compete against men, as these doughty heroines desired. But they compromised matters by offering prizes for two races to be rowed by women alone. And great was the interest excited by the event. The street cars, we are told, were packed almost up to the limits of human endurance by the crowds thronging to see the races, while the Harlam boats were loaded to an extent that made even veteran excursionists stare and gasp. The women's races were the third and the fifth, but the multitude came to see these alone, and, in their impatience, they scarcely deigned to look at the male rowers. The oarswomen are described as respectable girls, and all were dressed in the ordinary habiliments of the sex. The reporters ungallantly state that they did not pull in good form, but we must allow for male jealousy.

But why linger on such details, when a debate in the House of Commons awaits us? Not in the miserable, inconvenient rooms to which the last generation's lack of public taste has condemned our incarcerated lawgivers: for we are to inform our readers of "the accidental destruction, by fire, of that portion of the main building of which the House of Commons formed a principal feature."

We cannot refuse a smile to perhaps the most extravagant touch in this extravaganza; though, before parting company with the book, we shall return more seriously upon a kindred topic:—

There was another feature in the filling-in of the picture which enhanced the general effect—the variety and colour of ecclesiastical costume in the gallery reserved for members of the Upper House and the Diplomatic Body. The Papal Nuncio and the English Cardinal wore their robes of purple and scarlet; one or two Bishops were in episcopal dress, worn specially in honour of the day; and a number of the dignitaries of the Anglican Church in their traditional lawn. The Cardinal seemed—if one were to judge from the animation of their manner—in the happiest relations with the Archbishop of Canterbury; while the conversation between the Papal Nuncio and the venerable Marquis of Sidonia—the Nestor of the House of Peers—was grave and earnest, as if on matters of the highest import. The Irish Cardinal was not present, it was said from ill-health; but it was agreeable to observe the friendly interchange of compliments between the Prelates of Rome and Geneva. (pp. 99–100.)

The business of the House proceeds:

Mrs. Grimshaw announced her intention of bringing certain of the Standing Orders under the early notice of the House, with a view to their revision. It may be remarked that Mrs. Grimshaw had won the right of speaking with authority on all the matters of procedure, from her singular assiduity, clear good sense, and intuitive respect for order and regularity. It was well known that her judgment was much relied upon by the Speaker, by whom she was

treated with uniform courtesy. Indeed her luminous evidence before the Select Committee of the previous Session was much spoken of on both sides of the House. Nominally belonging to the Opposition, her sense of justice was so great, as very much to modify her political leanings, if she might be said to have any of a decided character.

Sir Hector Penguin gave notice that, on the first supply day, he would ask questions respecting our alleged Reserve Force, and as to the advisability of restricting the Volunteer organization to its legitimate and natural limits. This announcement was received with partial expressions of approval from certain old officers of Volunteers, and with ironical laughter from several of the younger members, including the more prominent of the Amazons.

Mr. Pride Calvin gave notice that he would ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as leader of the House, "If it were true that the Papal Nuncio assumed the right of leading the Diplomatic Body on all public occasions; and if so, and that there were no special provisions in the Act against such assumption, would the Government bring in a Bill with the view to amend the defective law?" Much laughter, which the hon. member rebuked with a solemn look of indignation, the weight of which rested principally on the Catholic members, who replied to it with a mocking "Hear, hear!"

"Your Excellency," said the Marquis of Sidonia * to the amused Nuncio, "we spoke a while ago of change and progress; but here, in this excellent gentleman—right-judging and sensible in ordinary matters of life—we have an instance of fixed and unalterable obstinacy of belief. Pity that a quarter of a century since he did not get rid of that incubus of his—the Papal Nightmare."

"Was he the sole victim of that malady, my lord?" asked the Archbishop of Orvieto, with a peculiar smile.

"Spare me, your Excellency! For a time, I may have exhibited symptoms of the disease; but the fever never went farther than the faintest maculation. With a good dose of self-administered ridicule, I purged myself of the pernicious folly," said the statesman.

---

* It would be unjust to this venerable and distinguished nobleman to allow him to fade from the dissolving view without recording the magnanimous *palinodia* which the Next Generation, according to Mr. Maguire, may expect from him. With a high degree of complimentary ability, the Nuncio addresses him; and with the noble disinterestedness, earnest purpose, and transparent candour which have illustrated his lordship's political career, the Marquis replies. "The life of a great Statesman—one who leaves his mark upon his age in the works he has accomplished (!)—is not worthless or without fruit. Yours, my lord, has surely not been all vanity, though it has not been without vexation of spirit. The privilege of sealing their convictions with their blood is given only to a few."

"True, your Excellency; but though I have striven with all my might to undo any mistakes of my earlier political life, or to compensate for tardy admission of error, still I not unfrequently, especially of late, think how precious is the privilege, and certainly the glory, of making the greatest human sacrifice we mortals can make for that which is so much beyond all those things for which we toil and wrangle here below."

"These are noble thoughts, my lord," said the Churchman, "come when they may." pp 113-14.)

"Then it was a noble instance of the physician curing himself."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer gave notice of bringing in the Budget on the following Monday week. Mrs. Bates was greeted with a loud cheer.

Then follows one of those passages which render it difficult to believe the writer otherwise than in earnest; making us regret, that if he intended satire, he did not make the satire more transparent, and, if serious advocacy, that he should have written at all. After the Chancelloress (we must be permitted so to call her, for sake of clearness) has given notice of her Budget, the Marquis of Sidonia continues to the Nuncio,

"There, your Excellency, is a proof of progress—nay, of revolution. A woman leading the House of Commons! the greatest and proudest public assembly of the world!"

"It is indeed. Fifteen years ago I should as soon have expected to witness what I do to-day, as to hope that the Arch of Titus would pay a visit to the Vatican. But, my lord, how do you really find it to work?—is it prejudicial or otherwise? I ask, because, though the reform has spread to other countries, I have not had time to observe its operations closely," said the Nuncio.

"Well, I must admit, that for a considerable time I gave no consideration, no serious thought to the movement; if anything, I rather regarded it with masculine superciliousness. But it grew with the force of its own inevitable logic, and forced the scoffers to resistance, and the careless or indifferent to adopt their sides. I may have been a somewhat late convert, but I certainly am now a firm believer—Indeed, I have been so for a considerable time. In the general management of the affairs of Parliament—of the Commons especially—we are indebted to women for many valuable reforms. And I have remarked that in Committees, where the work is more in detail, their assistance is most valuable. They see matters in a different light from what we do, and they make suggestions that never would have occurred to men. Hence, the Nation may now be said to see with all its eyes, and to avail itself of all its intellectual resources. In the more public duties, and in the treatment of great questions, particularly those which intimately affect the material and moral well-being of the masses, women not only hold their own with men, but their influence, in the more elevated tone of our legislation, and also of what I may call our public morals, has been extremely beneficial. This I am constrained, rather perhaps than willing, to admit."

"Very strange, very wonderful," said the Nuncio, who added—"Yet why strange or wonderful? Many of the most illustrious members of the Church were its daughters; and in the management of affairs, and in the governing of even great communities and vast institutions, women display extraordinary wisdom and sagacity."

"Order! order!' cried the Speaker; for a buzz of conversation had made itself rather too audible.

Mrs. Ditchley gave notice of a Bill to alter and amend the Law of Divorce, so as to place it more in harmony with modern civilization. This announcement occasioned a perceptible movement. (pp. 117–124.)

The Royal Speech, which follows, contains at least one clause over which we trust the Catholics of the Empire, in the next generation, will exercise a jealous vigilance. A Bill was promised, which was to provide further for the training of Destitute Children. Now, we would ask Mr. Maguire, with all earnestness, whether a writer holding Catholic principles has the right to sport with a topic which we all regard as involving the greatest and most pressing danger of the age? Still more we would ask, whether, if a grain of seriousness be supposed to mingle with the tints of the picture, an artist has the right, so far as his art extends, to smile upon the continuance and extension of that danger? Of what England, and of what Parliament, in the name of common sense, is Mr. Maguire here speaking? Are we to imagine that a scheme of State education for our poorest classes, to be propounded to Parliament, say thirty years hence, will be less secular, less imperial, and less godless, than now? Will "the Rev. Peter Carmody," who, together with Mrs. Rebecca Sturge, Miss Angelica Hamilton, and Sir Jacob Nathan, is to be decorated by Royal command (p. 127) with the Collar and Star of the Order of Merit, have the unreserved Catholic training of such destitute children as, spite of other privations, retain the inheritance of the faith? And will this courtly, this slightly latitudinarian Nuncio, whom we trust the Holy See in the Next Generation will send to any court, Timbuctoo inclusive, rather than to St. James's, will he find descendants and representatives of the Professors Huxley and Tyndall of to-day, as polite and pliant as himself? Will there be bowing exchanged between Noodle and Doodle, with mutual assurances, down to the ground, that they would not for the entire universe place the shadow of a restriction in the way of the religious beliefs of these poor waifs and strays? Does all this take place in Utopia, or on the banks of Father Thames? To us it appears "ower bad for bless ing," if it is "ower good for banning." It is a degree of provocation, if nothing more serious; and the tripudiations of a rollicking fancy raise the dust, and cast it in our eyes.

In truth, the inherent weakness of a political and secular *parable* like "The Next Generation," be it satire or be it

seriousness, is this: that it can hardly be sustained, except by endangering or running counter to the assertion of inflexible principle. And as Mr. Maguire is a man of high and undoubted principle, it follows that his parable here and there breaks down under that weight. This is one part of the vast disadvantage—in a merely human sense—under which Catholic writers, like Catholic artists, inevitably labour. They are restrained by conscience, which, as an inconvenient check-string, pulls them back in the very apogee of their airiest flights. Like young Romilly in his leap across the Strid, they are balked by this faithful attendant and companion, this sense of right, of truth, which cannot be disengaged from the perceptions of a practical Catholic. Thus, where Swift would have jumped without hesitation, as he has jumped in Laputa, and landed safely, at least consistently, on terra firma, because his Christianity was that of "A Christian unattached," Mr. Maguire falters under the restraints of a well-principled man, and goes plumb into a bathos of absurdity. That he must have so faltered, in his calmer moments of speculation as to what the coming generation of men and events is likely to be, we cannot doubt; for, like Ulysses, he has made acquaintance with the minds of men under many phases and climes. He cannot seriously imagine that the future relations of Church and State in England, or the cheek-by-jowl and mutual-admiration-attitude-association of Catholics and Protestants in his future Ireland, as given in this book, have a semblance of probability. Nor can he assert, that in view of faith in the eternal truths, and of the paramount and exclusive claims of the Holy See to be the evangelizer of nations and the depository of the divine oracles, such a proclamation of "Peace, peace, where there is no peace," is a result to be lauded or desired.

In taking leave of a book, the publication of which we heartily regret, we are glad to record one passage which we can as heartily endorse:—

"My dear good friend," continued the Rector, stopping on the highroad, and placing his hand impressively on the arm of his companion, "there is one influence, whether for good or for evil, to which I must allude, and which you must thoroughly appreciate, if you desire to form a right notion of one of the principal causes of the change of feeling on the part of our people towards England. That is *your Press*,—I would rather use the more comprehensive word, and say—*your Literature*. You cannot rightly appreciate either the strength and intensity of the former state of feeling in this country towards yours, or estimate the beneficent change of later years, unless you consider how the English Press—be it what it might,—daily, weekly, monthly,

quarterly,—be it history, or be it fiction, or be it so-called philosophical disquisition,—wrote and writes of Ireland, and of things Irish."

"I comprehend," said Sir Martin.

"Yes, Sir Martin; every intelligent man must comprehend the influence, for evil or for good, exercised by this enormous power,—a power perpetually appealing, on the one hand, to the prejudices, the interests, the passions of a people; or, on the other hand, to their higher feelings, their nobler impulses—to their sense of right and justice—to their wisdom and patriotism, their kindness and generosity. We know that water will wear away stone, that rust will eat into steel, that the moth will devour and destroy various substances; but what are all these to the incessant action of a hostile Press,—of a Press inspired by a feeling of hate, which it veils under an affectation of that pity which is in itself the worst form of contempt? The constant dripping of water will wear away the hardest rock. That we know. But what is to be said of a perpetual flood of abuse and vituperation?—of the grossest misrepresentations of the nature, character, and genius of Irishmen?—of never-ending taunt, and ridicule, and insult?—of systematic vilification? Why, Sir Martin, who can wonder that this enormous engine of evil,—coupled, mind you, with other evils, such as blundering and neglect,—filled the heart of this Island with hatred of England; and that so far from there being, as there ought to be—and as I say *there now is*—a feeling of pride and sympathy in her greatness or her glory, there was a sense of satisfaction at any reverse she met with, whether in arms or diplomacy? Of course, I am not speaking of what may be described as the privileged classes,—I speak of the Nation at large. Thank Heaven for it! all this is a thing of the past, and thus I can speak of it freely at this moment. But, believe me, Sir Martin, if this Press Evil, as I may term it, had not ceased, as it happily has done, not all the legislation, not all the wise and good measures that could be passed, could have reconciled this country to England."

"That, Moran, I can well believe."

"The evil done by the Newspaper Press was enormous. The more wicked or venomous the article, the more sure might its writer be of its wider diffusion, and the more certain were we to have it brought into our very midst. Printed in London, or in the Provinces, it was sure to find its way to our homes and our breakfast-tables, either as an object of attack or reprobation, or as a thing to be admired."

"Admired! Do I understand you rightly!—you said 'admired'?" inquired Sir Martin.

"Well, yes—at least ostensibly so; for in past times it was too much the habit with certain of our public writers to defame their own people, or those of their people to whom they were antagonistic, and seek to lower them in the esteem of the English public; and when they found ready to their hand the means of gratifying their political or sectarian feelings, they did not scruple to make free use of your blisters, Sir Martin,—and, I can answer for it, the Spanish flies made your English blisters rise,—aye, my friend, and *establish many a raw* too."

"*I will be bound they* did," said Sir Martin. "And a moral blister is a *tickler.*"

"Especially, Sir Martin, when applied to that most sensitive of all living organs—the heart of a nation quivering with nervous excitement, partly constitutional, partly the result of circumstances. Take my word, the feeling of scorn or contempt—call it what you wish—was returned by one of hate, of whose bitterness and intensity you can have no possible idea—nay, not the remotest. And yet it has not only died away—faded out of the heart and brain of this Irish nation; but it has been replaced by a feeling most grateful to witness,—simply because, for years past, your literature has had a better and wiser inspiration." (vol. iii. pp. 167–73.)

"Anno Domini 2071" is a translation from the Dutch, and comes therefore with a twofold disadvantage as a work of literature and fancy. The flats of Holland have produced, it is true, and now contain, much that is valuable in men and minds. Nevertheless, the first idea of their men of letters would rather suggest patient investigators, compilers, basing their productions on a substratum of facts, building up judicious and solid inferences. To think of a Dutchman as an airy visitor to the realms of fancy, is a new "sensation" in literature. To be sure, there was the Flying Dutchman; and —now we think of it—the Man with the Cork Leg was a Hollander. Perhaps it is his descendant who gives us, in "Anno Domini 2071," the

AGE OF ALUMINIUM,

The latter commenced or dates from the second half of the twentieth century, when it was first discovered how to produce aluminium in large quantities from common clay, old tiles, potsherds, china, and earthenware. (p. 14.)

But, upon the whole, we cannot speak very highly of this production, as a work of fancy, or as conveying any distinctly useful suggestions under its fantastic garb. "I love," says Old Touchstone in 'St. Ronan's Well,' "I love a quick and rattling fire in these vanities—Folly walking a funeral pace, and clinking her bells to the time of a passing knell, makes sad work indeed." Now, we are not accusing "the Dutch Original," nor Dr. Alex. Bikkers, his commentator, of folly, or anything akin to it; but we are charging "2071" with a defect in pace. The book is rather a slow one, though the dimensions are small. Moreover, the author labours under one disadvantage to an English reader, of which he could hardly be conscious, and which cannot therefore be laid to his charge. Selecting Roger Bacon, or his shade, as the exponent of the physical discoveries of two hundred years hence, he comes in collision—we cannot say competition—with Sir F. Palgrave's *charming* impersonation of the mediæval *philosopher in "The Merchant* and the Friar." The Bacon

of 2071 is as dull and matter-of-fact as a verger in Westminster Abbey, checking off the names of the tombs to visitors at the small charge of sixpence a head.

Here again, in the pages of the sober Dutchman as of the lively Celt, we come across the inevitable, the irrepressible and ubiquitous topic of—

Woman's Rights.*

"Male and female parties!" exclaimed I, in utter astonishment. "Have those then become the two contending parties in politics?"

"Naturally enough," replied [Bacon]. "Nothing else could have happened; it is the direct and natural consequence of the emancipation of women, whereby all rights have been granted them that were formerly exclusively accorded to men."

I could not help expressing my surprise at such a result, and added that I was afraid that it must have materially affected the relation between the sexes.

A sarcastic smile seemed for once to ruffle the placid features of Bacon as he laconically answered, "Perhaps so." But Miss Phantasia, who suddenly from a listener became a speaker, made the following oral affidavit: "I will just tell you the truth of the matter. . . . . The old feeling of chivalry has given way to the habit of rudeness. Politeness, though the word is not quite expunged from men's vocabulary, is seldom extended towards our sex. You must have noticed how, on going upstairs this morning, the men rudely pushed us aside so as to secure the best seats for themselves. This is a slight

---

* Almost as we are going to press we come across the new number of the "Woman's Suffrage Journal" for January, 1872. We had not previously had the advantage of seeing this periodical, which is edited by Miss Lydia E. Becker, and contains, *inter alia*, reports of that lady's speeches, with those of Miss Craigen, and of John Bright's niece, Miss Ashworth. One of Miss Becker's sentiments, delivered at the Wuerdle and Wardle Liberal Association, sets us thinking. We fear that, on the whole, the lady speaker overrates the magnanimity of the masculine portion of the human race, but we offer no comment or distinct view. "When nations got into the habit of thinking that they were nations of men and women, they would be less likely to go to war; a man who did not object to fight a man would not like to fight a woman." (Hear, hear.) We turn with some little curiosity to the table of contents (sent with this number) for volume II. of the same Journal, January to December, 1871, and should wish to see what was said, *e. g.*, about Mr. Maguire's "Next Generation," which is mentioned among the books reviewed. Other articles are:—Buckinghamshire Husbands—Legal Disabilities of Women in California—Chinese Women—Mr. Disraeli on the Health and Duties of the Queen—Grave Question for English Women—Lecture by a Hindu Lady—Lancashire Husbands—Daniel O'Connell on Women's Rights—Women's Right to enter a Church—Alfred the Great—Deaconess admitted by the Bishop of London into the Church of England—The *Echo on the Treatment of* Wives—The *Graphic* on the Sale of Wives—Heroines *of the Amazons*—*Lady* Students at Edinburgh University—Man putting his *Wife on the Fire*—"Old Catholic" Congress—"Sauce for the Gander," &c.

specimen of what happens and is tolerated in 'modern' society. Opposite man's violence is to be found woman's cunning, and the ultimate chances of success are pretty well balanced on both sides; but to whichsoever victory may fall, it can only be bought at the price of domestic peace and bliss, and of all those nobler qualities which then only will be properly developed when both sexes keep within the sphere allotted them by nature and disposition. Whatever we have gained in direct political influence we have lost in the indirect influence on the hearts of men, and it remains to be seen whether the gain has been greater than the loss. No, Stuart Mill, you who two hundred years ago were the first to put the dormant idea of female emancipation into the shape of words, and supported the agitation with all the weight of your name, you may have been a great philosopher, you may have known every possible thing about political economy, but you did not understand the human heart; and with regard to us women, you have played us a very bad trick."

That Miss Phantasia was earnest in her conviction was evinced by the unusual warmth with which she had spoken. Yet it appeared to me that she was a little to hard upon Mill. All that he and his followers undoubtedly intended to carry was that the right of voting should be extended to unmarried women, and to those that were possessed of some property. They could not be blamed for the extremes rushed into by their junior adherents. But there recurred to my mind the dreadful qualification scale, which had been lowered and lowered again, and I began to recognize that, here as elsewhere, all arguments have to give way before the so-called principles and logical consistency. (pp. 116–19.)

Roger Bacon, in the twenty-first century, will oppose no argument to confute the Darwinian theory. He will hear it stated in his presence, and not have a word to say. Now this, we think, without hypercriticism, is an abuse of the *magni nominis umbra*, and a violation of historical justice and truth. The "Genealogical Museum" (p. 43 *et seq.*) into which he ushers the author, and the author ushers us, is the scene of a lecture on the Genesis of Species from Miss Phantasia, while Bacon stands by in silence. What would be thought of a political fiction in which Lord John Manners should be represented as folding his arms and listening, without reply, to an oration of Sir Charles Dilke's? This, and the advocacy of the theory itself, especially in a note by the translator, is our only serious quarrel with the book, and we could not avoid stating it in few words.

Meanwhile, it is consoling to know that the London, on whose devoted inhabitants in this century our English rain, sleet, snow, and hail descend unchecked, will then have expanded into a Londinia, protected—as we care not to protect our present *metropolis*—from the inclemencies of the *national climate*.—

"Londinia? Is that the same as London?"

"Not quite; ancient London formed but a small portion of the present city of Londinia. The latter occupies a considerable part of the south-east of England, and has a population of something like twelve millions."

As we continued our tour, I chanced to hit upon the trivial remark that we had "very mild weather indeed, considering the time of the year."

"You are mistaken," Bacon said; "on the contrary, it is bitterly cold; only you forget that we are in town. Just feel the heat of the current of air which rises from the sieve-like plate on which you are walking, and you will doubtless agree with me that the

DISTRIBUTION-OF-WARM-AIR SOCIETY

is by no means unfaithful to its obligations. Then look above you. Had the distribution been insufficient, we should still see the glass roof over our heads covered with this morning's snow."

I looked up, and saw that the street was vaulted over with glass plates of considerable length and width, joined together by thin bars, with here and there an aperture as the means of ventilation.

"I apprehend, then, that we are in a so-called arcade?"

"Well, yes; if you mean to apply that name to the greater part of our city. That which in the nineteenth century was only to be found *occasionally* in the great towns of Europe, has become a *regular* institution in the twenty-first, owing to the manufacture of our inexpensive

VERRE SANS FIN,

or 'Endless Glass,' as our people generally call it."

"I have no doubt that this must be a considerable improvement on your town-life throughout winter; but in summer-time I should say this must be intolerably hot."

"Not at all; the same society which undertakes the supply of warm air in winter also provides for us during the summer months a cooling draught. Nothing can be easier than that. You are doubtless aware of ice having been manufactured in the middle of summer for at least a couple of centuries. During the warm season the air is made to pass over the glass vault above us before it reaches the pavement through the sieve-like plate, and if the warm-air inspectors properly attend to their duties, there is scarcely any difference in our temperature throughout the year."

"Then probably you warm your houses by a similar process, and you never use any stoves or fireplaces now?"

Neither of my companions could help smiling at these words, betraying again, as they did, my very old-fashioned notions. Bacon, however, gave me a kindly nod of assent as he proceeded to explain: "Just as a cold-water bath may be heated at pleasure by opening the hot-water tap, we can warm the air in our apartments by means of a valve, which when opened, not only *affords a supply of* warm air, but has the additional advantage of producing *a most delightful refreshing* of the atmosphere without any idea of draught."

"*I really cannot* understand," Miss Phantasia here remarked, "how the

people in those barbarous times managed to live amid the smoke and ashes and dust of their horrible fireplaces." (pp. 10-12.)

"The Coming Race" winds up our list, because in truth nothing in the way of fiction can go beyond it; few things in the way of fact. It reaches the *ne plus ultra* in the tremendous character of its vaticinations. This final race of unplumed though not wingless bipeds, who must from the nature of things stretch out to the crack of doom,—if the author contemplates any ultimatum of that kind,—are not such men and women as we have ever contemplated. They are not intensified Anglo-Americans, nor the last development of the Aryan race. They would despise locomotives and balloons, as we despise our defunct hackney-coaches. They would regard chassepots, needle-guns, and the giants of destruction at Shoeburyness much as Dalgetty regarded the bows and arrows of the Highland savages. It is a subterranean race of men with whom we have to deal. Or rather, of subterranean women, who are their chief intellects, and children, who are their chief destroyers. And here again comes in that element, the Woman's Right question, which so remarkably and with such unpleasantness, underlies these fictions. Formidable, nay resistless, are these Ana, or men; yet more formidable these Gyes, Gy-ei, or women. With the all-potent *vril*, their agent in destruction, they are one day, it seems, to arise out of their lower world, and take possession of this. Accordingly, it is below ground that the author goes to seek them.

The "Coming Race" appears to us to be a book of remarkable ability. Given its πρῶτον ψεῦδος—the extravagance of the assertion it starts with, and maintains—this description of subterranean life, and of the highly cultivated, indeed heroic, race of men and women who are supposed to live it, is worked out very consistently, and leaves a strong impression on the mind. We are happy to add another topic of praise, the possibility of which, it is mournful to realize, seems to grow more infrequent every day. A work of fiction, written in our nineteenth century, is written purely, notwithstanding. We have detected little or no offensiveness in the atmosphere in which we were moving through those strange realms below. In saying this, it is not to be denied that a topic so incongruous to our best notions of the fitness of things, and trenching in divers departments so closely on "all we hate," as the assertion of Woman's Rights, renders it difficult for an author to steer among the shoals without grating upon them here or there. When a world is turned topsy-turvy, the laws of gravitation become *easily confused.*

The author of the "Coming Race" is supposed to be a youth of good education, wandering over the face of the earth, with a taste for travel and adventure. We have no name for him, except that by which he was afterwards called by his subterranean friends; "Tish," a familiar term of endearment from a superior to an inferior, as we might call a kitten "pussikins."

In the year 18—, happening to be in ——, I was invited by a professional engineer, with whom I had made acquaintance, to visit the recesses of the —— mine, upon which he was employed. . . . .

Let me say, then, as briefly as possible, that I accompanied the engineer into the interior of the mine, and became so strangely fascinated by its gloomy wonders, and so interested in my friend's explorations, that I prolonged my stay in the neighbourhood, and descended daily, for some weeks, into the vaults and galleries hollowed by nature and art beneath the surface of the earth. The engineer was persuaded that far richer deposits of mineral wealth than had yet been detected, would be found in a new shaft that had been commenced under his operations. In piercing this shaft we came one day upon a chasm jagged and seemingly charred at the sides, as if burst asunder at some distant period by volcanic fires. Down this chasm my friend caused himself to be lowered in a 'cage,' having first tested the atmosphere by the safety-lamp. He remained nearly an hour in the abyss. When he returned he was very pale, and with an anxious, thoughtful expression of face, very different from its ordinary character, which was open, cheerful, and fearless.

Pressed by his companion, the author, to account for this :—

At last he said, "I will tell you all. When the cage stopped, I found myself on a ridge of rock; and below me, the chasm, taking a slanting direction, shot down to a considerable depth, the darkness of which my lamp could not have penetrated. But through it, to my infinite surprise, streamed upward a steady brilliant light. Could it be any volcanic fire? in that case, surely I should have felt the heat. Still, if on this there was doubt, it was of the utmost importance to our common safety to clear it up. I examined the sides of the descent, and found that I could venture to trust myself to the irregular projections or ledges, at least for some way. I left the cage and clambered down. As I drew nearer and nearer to the light, the chasm became wider, and at last I saw, to my unspeakable amaze, a broad level road at the bottom of the abyss, illumined as far as the eye could reach by what seemed artificial gas-lamps placed at regular intervals, as in the thoroughfare of a great city; and I heard confusedly at a distance a hum as of human voices. I know, of course, that no rival miners are at work in this district. Whose could be those voices? What human hands could have levelled that road and marshalled those lamps?

"The superstitious belief, common to miners, that gnomes or fiends dwell within the bowels of the earth, began to seize me. I shuddered at the thought of descending further and braving the inhabitants of this nether valley. Nor

indeed could I have done so without ropes, as from the spot I had reached to the bottom of the chasm the sides of the rock sank down abrupt, smooth and sheer. I retraced my steps with some difficulty. Now I have told you all." (pp. 2–6.)

The next day they descend together: the engineer is killed by a fall, and the author finds himself as much alone in the subterranean world as the renowned Captain Lemuel Gulliver in the flying island of Laputa. On his first arrival below, he encounters one of the inhabitants of the subterranean world, who turns out to be the "Tur," or chief magistrate of the city.

And now there came out of this building a form—human;—was it human? It stood on the broad way and looked round, beheld me, and approached. It came within a few yards of me, and at the sight and presence of it an indescribable awe and tremor seized me, rooting my feet to the ground. It reminded me of symbolical images of Genius or Demon that are seen on Etruscan vases or limned on the walls of Eastern sepulchres—images that borrow the outlines of man, and are yet of another race. It was tall, not gigantic, but tall as the tallest men below the height of giants.

Its chief covering seemed to me to be composed of large wings folded over its breast and reaching to its knees; the rest of its attire was composed of an under tunic and leggings of some thin fibrous material. It wore on its head a kind of tiara that shone with jewels, and carried in its right hand a slender staff of bright metal like polished steel. But the face! it was that which inspired my awe and my terror. It was the face of man, but yet of a type of man distinct from our known extant races. The nearest approach to it in outline and expression is the face of the sculptured sphinx—so regular in its calm, intellectual, mysterious beauty. Its colour was peculiar, more like that of the red man than any other variety of our species, and yet different from it—a richer and a softer hue, with large black eyes, deep and brilliant, and brows arched as a semicircle. The face was beardless; but a nameless something in the aspect, tranquil though the expression, and beauteous though the features, roused that instinct of danger which the sight of a tiger or serpent arouses. I felt that this manlike image was endowed with forces inimical to man. As it drew near, a cold shudder came over me. I fell on my knees and covered my face with my hands. (pp. 15–17.)

We will here cap this extract with a parallel passage towards the end of the volume, where the same formidable Memnon reappears. It has been decreed in the council of the subterranean race that the foreign and superterrestrial intruder is to be put to death, partly that the College of Sages may advance their science by dissecting him as a remarkable specimen, partly because a daughter of the Vril-ya seems to regard him with favour. The execution of this decree is intrusted to the child Taë with his vril-staff. Taë inwardly grieves, but of

course has no idea of disobedience; he invites the stranger forth to a walk, with the intention of *vrilling* him to a cinder.

Just at this moment a shadow fell on the space between me and the group; and, turning round, I beheld the chief magistrate coming close upon us, with the silent and stately pace peculiar to the Vril-ya. At the sight of his countenance, the same terror which had seized me when I first beheld it returned. On that brow, in those eyes, there was that same indefinable something which marked the being of a race fatal to our own—that strange expresson of serene exemption from our common cares and passions, of conscious superior power, compassionate and inflexible as that of a judge who pronounces doom. I shivered, and, inclining low, pressed the arm of my child-friend, and drew him onward silently. The Tur placed himself before our path, regarded me for a moment without speaking, then turned his eye quietly on his daughter's face, and, with a grave salutation to her and the other Gy-ei, went through the midst of the group,—still without a word.

When Taë and I found ourselves alone on the broad road that lay between the city and the chasm through which I had descended into this region beneath the light of the stars and sun, I said under my breath, "Child and friend, there is a look in your father's face which appals me. I feel as if, in its awful tranquillity, I gazed upon death."

Taë did not immediately reply. He seemed agitated, and as if debating with himself by what words to soften some unwelcome intelligence. At last he said, "None of the Vril-ya fear death: do you?" (pp. 278–280.)

Before we further notice his adventures, let it be said, he is not the first Transatlantic* writer of fiction who has led his readers into the subject of his volume through the deep shaft of a mine. There is an American extravaganza, entitled "Warwick," from the name of the favourite horse that figures as a chief character. The hero, a young *littérateur* of great promise, suffering an unjust family persecution, is resolved to explore, plumb-down, the deepest recess of the Mammoth Cave in Keutucky. Down he goes accordingly, leaving an old negro to pay out the rope by a windlass a-top. But, with all his go-ahead recklessness, he is a young man with one excellent quality, not characteristic, we fear, of his country or his time. He has a respectful estimate of his progenitors. With a filial piety truly uncommon, he descends on his venture,

* Such is the nationality which, with great internal probability, he claims. "I am a native of ——, in the United States of America. My ancestors migrated from England in the reign of Charles II.; and my grandfather was not undistinguished in the War of Independence. . . . . My father once ran for Congress, but was signally defeated by his tailor. . . . . Being left well *off, and having* a taste for travel and adventure, I resigned, for a time, all *pursuit of the almighty* dollar," &c. (Chap. i.)

accompanied by his grandfather's umbrella; an ancient gingham structure, ample and homespun, superior in frame and texture to the mere parasols carried in these degenerate days. When the rope breaks above his head, he shoots downward with a velocity that takes away his senses, still clutching in desperation this ancestral defence. The more than parasol expands into a parachute, retards his descent, and lands him safely in a mine of unsunned gold, by which he achieves his fortune.

Less happy than his compatriot, the discoverer of the "Coming Race" is well off when, after a sojourn among them sufficient to impress himself and his readers with the tremendous prospect of their future coming, he evades a sentence of death pronounced against him for his intrusion. He returns to the upper mine by means of the mechanical wings with which the Vril-ya, or vril-possessors, the inhabitants namely of this mysterious region, are provided.

But what is *vril?* Not to know vril is to be unable to appreciate the Coming Race. By means of vril they have raised themselves through progressive ages in the scale of being: nay, developed in power and intelligence from the aboriginal frog. For the author does himself injustice if he is wholly free from the Darwinian theory; or from a Batrachian theory that out-Darwins Darwin. There is a serio-comic passage, leaving us in as much doubt as Mr. Maguire's sketches do, as to whether it belongs to the sock or the buskin; but it decidedly looks that way.

Vril, then, is a subtle resistless force in nature, of which our present knowledge of electricity and magnetism is a mere rudimentary indication. Vril is more than any odic or psychic force dreamed of, as yet, in our philosophy. It has been subdued by this race, the Vril-ya, to be their powerful, destructive, yet obedient slave. Enclosed in a vril-staff, it becomes a weapon of offence, projected with a destructive power simply incalculable. It can shoot and kill, nay shatter and reduce to cinder, at a distance of six hundred miles. Even, without the weapon, it resides in the possessor, rendering him, at will, as perilous to touch as a gymnotus, or a highly-charged Leyden jar. The sublunary intruder into this vril-world becomes bewildered in his alarm at the majestic presence of Aph-Lin, one of its chief officials.

> As extreme fright often shows itself by extreme daring, I sprang at his throat like a wild beast. On an instant I was felled to the ground as by an electric shock, and the last confused images floating before my sight ere I became *wholly insensible*, were the form of my host kneeling beside me with

one hand on my forehead, and the beautiful calm face of his daughter, with large, deep, inscrutable eyes intently fixed upon my own. (p. 35.)

But steam, the poor, insufficient and perilous vril that has given immortality to Watt and Stephenson, can wield a ponderous Nasmyth hammer, or crack a nut. So, much more, can vril be concentrated upon mild beneficent ministries for the benefit of the race. The author is *vrilled* (if we may coin a verb out of it) into slumber at the will of Aph-Lin, and Zee his daughter, the latter being a member of the College of Sages, as a Vril-lady has every right to be. During his vril-sleep, his entertainers extract from his brain, by means of vril, a complete knowledge of the English language, which he finds them speaking, when he wakes, with perfect fluency, and probably with a slight nasal intonation. In short, vril lights their subterranean streets instead of oxy-hydrogen; vril yields a medicated bath that beats Schlangenbad to nothing; vril opens rocks or closes them again, sets their machinery in motion, jogs their wits, makes itself generally useful, and only does not roast the joints for their repasts, because they are strict vegetarians as well as teetotallers.

On the other hand, as an engine of destruction, a vril-staff in the hands of a child is so much more than a rifle in the deer-forest or the tiger-jungle, that we must leave the author to describe its effects.

This people have invented certain tubes by which the vril fluid can be conducted towards the object it is meant to destroy, throughout a distance almost indefinite; at least I put it modestly when I say from 500 to 600 miles. And their mathematical science as applied to such purpose is so nicely accurate, that on the report of some observer in an air-boat, any member of the vrill department can estimate unerringly the nature of intervening obstacles, the height to which the projectile instrument should be raised, and the extent to which it should be charged, so as to reduce to ashes within a space of time too short for me to venture to specify it, a capital twice as vast as London.

Certainly these Ana are wonderful mechanicians—wonderful for the adaptation of the inventive faculty to practical uses.

I went with my host and his daughter Zee over the great public museum, which occupies a wing in the College of Sages, and in which are hoarded, as curious specimens of the ignorant and blundering experiments of ancient times, many contrivances on which we pride ourselves as recent achievements. In one department, carelessly thrown aside as obsolete lumber, are tubes for destroying life by metallic balls and an inflammable powder, on the principle of our cannons and catapults, and even still more murderous than *our latest improvements.*

My host spoke of these with a smile of contempt, such as an artillery *officer might bestow* on the bows and arrows of the Chinese. In another

department there were models of vehicles and vessels worked by steam, and of a balloon which might have been constructed by Montgolfier. "Such," said Zee, with an air of meditative wisdom—"such were the feeble triflings with nature of our savage forefathers, ere they had even a glimmering perception of the properties of vril!" (pp. 127, 128.)

This book, it must be acknowledged, is worked out ably and consistently. We recognize in it a good deal of the naturalness and unforced description which so wonderfully keep up the illusions in Swift and Defoe. And it would be unjust to the author not again to notice, in contradistinction to the former writer, a refinement and total absence of any such offences as are rife in the Dean of St. Patrick's. *En revanche*, the religion of his Vril-ya, or people possessing vril, appears to be a mild, inexpressive, and very uninfluential materialism, in which the all-permeating vril plays its part, and "transmits (p. 97) to the well-spring of life and intelligence every thought that a living creature can conceive." The Darwinian theory is touched off with sublime ridicule, though not from the standpoint of faith, nor as we have already said, with a total freedom from its entanglements. The passage (chap. xvi.) is too long to quote, but of which we give the conclusion.

"An," it must be observed, is their word for *man*, and Koom-Posh means a republic, a form of government of which the subterraneans had some idea from books and tradition, even before their American visitor suddenly "dropped in" among them; and of which they always spoke to him with unimpassioned but decided contempt.

"And do no wranglers or philosophers now exist to revive the dispute; or do they all recognize the origin of your race in the tadpole?"

"Nay, such disputes," said Zee, with a lofty smile, "belong to the Pah-bodh of the dark ages, and now only serve for the amusement of infants. . . . The An in reality commenced to exist as An with the donation of that capacity, [*i. e.* to receive the idea of a Creator,] and, with that capacity, the sense to acknowledge that, however through the countless ages his race may improve in wisdom, it can never combine the elements at its command into the form of a tadpole."

"You speak well, Zee," said Aph-Lin; "and it is enough for us short-lived mortals to feel a reasonable assurance that whether the origin of the An was a tadpole or not, he is no more likely to become a tadpole again than the institutions of the Vril-ya are likely to relapse into the heaving quagmire and certain strife-rot of a Koom-Posh." (pp. 143-4.)

Here is a passage to please Mr. Maguire, who will find the prototype of his *Miss Elmsley* in this nether world:—

They have few professional and regular practitioners of medicine, and these are chiefly Gy-ei, who, especially if widowed and childless, find great delight in the healing art, and even undertake surgical operations in those cases required by accident, or, more rarely, by disease. (p. 150.)

If doctors would hardly be encouraged to emigrate to a new home there below, the lawyers would find still sorrier prospects:—

The supreme magistrate was not distinguished from the rest by superior habitation or revenue. On the other hand, the duties awarded to him were marvellously light and easy, requiring no preponderant degree of energy or intelligence. There being no apprehensions of war, there were no armies to maintain; being no government of force, there was no police to appoint and direct. What we call crime was utterly unknown to the Vril-ya; and there were no courts of criminal justice. The rare instances of civil disputes were referred for arbitration to friends chosen by either party, or decided by the Council of Sages, which will be described later. There were no professional lawyers; and indeed their laws were but amicable conventions, for there was no power to enforce laws against an offender who carried in his staff the power to destroy his judges. There were customs and regulations to compliance with which, for several ages, the people had tacitly habituated themselves; or if in any instance an individual felt such compliance hard, he quitted the community and went elsewhere. There was, in fact, quietly established amid this state, much the same compact that is found in our private families, in which we virtually say to any independent grown-up member of the family whom we receive and entertain, "Stay or go, according as our habits and regulations suit or displease you." But though there were no laws such as we call laws, no race above ground is so law-observing. Obedience to the rule adopted by the community has become as much an instinct as if it were implanted by nature. Even in every household the head of it makes a regulation for its guidance, which is never resisted nor even cavilled at by those who belong to the family. They have a proverb, the pithiness of which is much lost in this paraphrase, "No happiness without order, no order without authority, no authority without unity." The mildness of all government among them, civil or domestic, may be signalized by their idiomatic expressions for such terms as illegal or forbidden—viz., "It is requested not to do so-and-so." (pp. 62-3.)

Imagination is apt to play us strange vagaries: and not only "bodies forth the forms of things unknown," but represents collisions between bodies known, or read of. With Mr. Maguire and the nameless Tish before us, side by side, we cannot keep ourselves from speculating on the momentary struggle and inevitable result that would ensue, if the Coming Race should arise with their vril-staves, and invade the Next *Generation.* We say, the inevitable result; for, as Tish very *sensibly observes,*

If they ever emerged from these nether recesses into the light of day, they would, according to their own traditional persuasions of their ultimate destiny, destroy and replace our existent varieties of man. . . . . The Vril-ya, on emerging, induced by the charm of a sunlit heaven to form their settlements above ground, would commence at once the work of destruction, seize upon the territories already cultivated, and clear off, without scruple, all the inhabitants who resisted that invasion. And considering their contempt for the institutions of Koom-Posh or Popular Government, and the pugnacious valour of my beloved country, I believe that if the Vril-ya first appeared in free America—as, being the choicest portion of the habitable earth, they would doubtless be induced to do—and said, "This quarter of the globe we take; citizens of a Koom-Posh, make way for the development of species in the Vril-ya," my brave compatriots would show fight, and not a soul of them would be left in this life, to rally round the Stars and Stripes, at the end of a week. (pp. 271–3.)

But suppose that, instead of a Koom-Posh, they were to emerge within the territories of a constitutional monarchy. Say that some fissure in Kensington gravel-pits, or a deep crack in the London clay, should prove the destined avenue through which the Vril-ya shall arise,

Ad summas emergere opes, rerumque potiri.

A debate is going on in the House of Commons: Clara Carter and the Opposition whip, whatever her name, have used every persuasion to secure a full attendance. Distinguished strangers throng the gallery. The Marquis of Sidonia is there, with his curls and his eye-glass. Lord Lancaster is hob-nobbing with the ambassador from the (once) Cannibal Islands. There is a hush of expectation, for Mrs. Bates has risen to speak. The Chancelloress of the Exchequer never seemed in better plume. It is going to be one of her great efforts. Arachne Binks, the leader of the Opposition, sits a little uneasily, for it is a critical debate: she is conscious of a flaw, a weak point, in the argument she has just concluded —conscious, too, that Mrs. Bates' keen mental eye is fixed on it. The Chancelloress is going to take up that stitch in Arachne's embroidery. "Now, I would not," whispers Portia Jackson, a chancery barrister in high practice, to her confidential clerk, Nerissa Stokes, "I would not, for double the value of my next brief, be sitting opposite to Selina Bates at this moment." "Or-der, or-der," drawls the sonorous barytone of the Speaker, Boadicea Maddox, always so dignified in the chair.

Dead silence. Selina Bates raises her hand, fixes her eye. The Opposition trembles in its shoes. But what is that ominous *trampling, of many* feet, and heavy ones too, at

the door? "Or-der, or—" recommences the Speaker. Nay, but it is the new Order, about to replace the old. The door swings back—it is opened by *vril!*.

First, a skirmishing party of children with their vril-staves; the Zouaves and Turcos of the Coming Race. Over them, towering and terrible, a phalanx of Gy-ei. Their wings are folded; they have the statuesque calm, the deep unfathomable eyes, belonging to their race, and to their conscious resistless power. A grave compassion, lofty, emotionless, is theirs, as of the executioners of Destiny: Eumenides without the vehemence; unrepulsive, unattractive, unmoved. They brandish no snaky scourges; they do but bear the vril.

What can Selina avail, or Portia, or Boadicea herself? The Coming Race is come. The Next Generation simply has to go.

"Take away that bauble," says Zee, like a dozen Cromwells vrilled into one. She points her vril-staff towards the mace. The words are passionless, as though from the porphyry lips of a Memnon. You might have read them from a scroll of papyrus, or deciphered them on the Rosetta stone. The Gy-ei stand around, like a range of statues from Karnack.

But now the Speaker, recovering from her astonishment, thinks it time to assert the dignity of the House, and Woman's Rights. Woman's Rights, forsooth! what are they, matched against the Rights of Gy-ei?

"Madam,"—begins Boadicea, in her most approved manner.

It is enough. That first word of the super-terrestrial announces the moment of destiny. Tishes and Koom-Poshes are to be no more. A sheet of vril pours its lightning current through St. Stephen's. Little heaps of cinders mark the places where the members sat. The blackened roof reels, falls in; crushes the palace into a charred mass of ruin. But not where the Gy-ei have taken their stand, calm, resistless, inscrutable, with a marmorean compassion in their deep eyes. The clock tower remains, gaunt and desolate, solitary as the Monument on Fish-street Hill.

And now, when London shall have been rebuilt on Vrilyan principles, and the Ana and Gy-ei composing the "next generation" of that Coming Race shall assemble, on wings and in aërial boats, to hear a lecture on the extinct Tishes by Professor Zee, what will be the probable course of her observations? But we need exercise no imagination. Zee has furnished, in words to the author, one suggestive topic in such a discourse.

Wherever goes on that early process in the history of civilization, by which

life is made a struggle, in which the individual has to put forth all his powers to compete with his fellow, we invariably find this result—viz., since in the competition a vast number must perish, nature selects for preservation only the strongest specimens. With our race, therefore, even before the discovery of vril, only the highest organizations were preserved; and there is among our ancient books a legend, once popularly believed, that we were driven from a region that seems to denote the world you come from, in order to perfect our condition and attain to the purest elimination of our species by the severity of the struggles our forefathers underwent; and that, when our education shall become finally completed, we are destined to return to the upper world, and supplant all the inferior races now existing therein. (pp. 119, 120.)

But whether the civilized world, or what calls itself so, into the midst of which the Vril-ya will thus majestically stalk to destroy it, will be Koom-Posh or Glek-nas; or what progress it may have made towards the discovery of vril, so as to meet the Coming Race on equal terms, let him declare who knows.

Art. V.—IMPERIAL AND REPUBLICAN DIPLOMACY IN FRANCE, FROM 1866 TO 1870.

Ma Mission en Prusse. Par le Comte Benedetti. 2me Edition. Paris: Plon. 1871.

Rome et la République française. Par Jules Favre, de l'Académie française. Paris: Plon. 1871.

THE reader may remember the universal clamour which arose among our neighbours against the diplomatic agents of the Empire. Their negligence in not informing their Government of the silent, yet steady preparations of Prussia for the inevitable conflict; their total ignorance as to the Bismarckian intrigues, so warily laid for the accession of a Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain; finally, their utter incompetency to their task, were branded as one of the chief causes of the downfall of their country. For any man to stand up in defence of Count Benedetti or of Baron Stoffel, the French agents at Berlin, or for M. Mercier, ambassador at Madrid, would have been deemed the height of folly; too fortunate, indeed, if the poor man was not arrested as a Prussian spy by those Parisian wiseacres who, day after day, proved to *demonstration* before a gaping multitude how the

Germans might be annihilated, and France restored to her wonted supremacy, if Government would but listen to their sapient devices.

Well, time rolls on, and France is now paying dearly for the incapacity of her Imperial ruler, as well as for her own folly in provoking a deadly war, when so little prepared for its risks and hazards. No man who knows France will deny that, during the first half of 1870, no government whatsoever would have been able to withstand the torrent of public opinion, rushing forth with a sort of infuriated rapidity against the German nation, now likewise rising in arms.

It could hardly be expected that the men thus condemned, though unheard and undefended, should tamely sit down under their sentence, and submit patiently to this wrong verdict of public opinion. We say *wrong verdict*, for of late a flood of evidence has come forth, all tending to prove that, at any rate, the diplomatic agents of France were not in fault, and that if the Government which they served chose to shut its eyes to evidence, the men intrusted with the French interests at Berlin and Madrid are to be acquitted both of ignorance and dereliction of duty. The real onus of the late unparalleled disasters must fall on another head; but we have no taste for having our fling at fallen grandeur, and prefer to set aside the question as irrelevant to our present purpose. It is sufficient to observe, that of correct, precise, and constant information, Napoleon had a store, for which any government would have been thankful, and lavished, perhaps, upon its donor its choicest honours. This we are bound to assert at once, through a mere feeling of fair play.

As long as the war lasted, as well as its horrid concomitant, the Commune, it was next to impossible for the accused to raise their voices. All men in Paris and out of Paris were waiting in breathless anxiety to see whether Christian civilization would be able to stem the tide of atheistic barbarism, or whether God had doomed France to utter destruction by her own hands. But peace was hardly restored, when pamphlets and books of every description poured in from all sides. Some related the incidents of the late campaign; others the deeds of the mobocracy, that lorded paramount over Paris for two long months; others again endeavoured to vindicate their conduct during the latter days of the Second Empire. Among these, Baron Stoffel was the first to break silence. For several years he had been attached to the French embassy at Berlin as military agent, and it was thus his peculiar duty to report on the progress and organization of the Prussian army. Counts without number had been brought against this gallant officer:

—he knew nothing of his craft; he had been blindfold to what was going on under his own eyes; he did not even know one word of the German language; and as to new inventions and discoveries in tactics, ordnance, and drill, he was evidently incapable of forming any opinion on the subject. It so happened, however, that some of M. Stoffel's reports to the Emperor himself were found in the Tuileries, when it was sacked by the mob, and their contents proved so important, so pithy, so full of matter of fact, were so teeming with political observation of high interest, that people began to wonder how they had allowed themselves to be hurried away by the hasty conclusions of the daily papers. Encouraged doubtless by this fact, which turned public opinion in his favour, the ex-military "attaché" deemed it proper to publish the whole body of his successive reports, with a view of vindicating his own character. The undertaking was a decided success, and those reports are now considered as models of their kind, which are still quoted and discussed throughout all Europe.

It is, perhaps, no idle surmise to affirm that Count Benedetti has been induced by this example of his friend, Colonel Stoffel, to follow in his footsteps, and to publish his diplomatic correspondence whilst holding the difficult post of French ambassador at Berlin between the years 1864 and 1870. Such a publication is certainly contrary to the practice of all times. For reasons of evident utility and propriety, no government would allow its agents at foreign courts thus to disclose prematurely its most confidential communications, which are usually consigned to the Record Offices of State papers, and reserved for the study of future ministers or future historians. But we live in strange times, and no man can be assailed because, in order to maintain his own honour, he overleaps certain boundaries of political decorum. Such seems to have been M. Benedetti's opinion; and every intelligent reader will hesitate to complain of this breach of diplomatic rules.

Can M. Jules Favre appeal to the same necessity, when he prematurely lays before the public his official instructions to the French agents at Rome during the short period of his tenure of the Foreign Office? We were all was perfectly aware that the old leader of the Republican party in France was a sworn enemy to the temporal power of the Pope, and we expected, as a matter of course, that he would favour the sacrilegious designs of the Italians on Rome. But it is difficult to see the reason which could induce him to let the whole world into the intrigues at Florence, when, on the face of his own declarations,

he has been duped by the Italian Government. M. Favre owns that he hoped by so doing he might lead Victor Emmanuel to form an alliance with France, in her deplorable condition, against the Prussians. How the Italian king and Prince Bismarck must have laughed in the sleeve at such a preposterous idea! Whatever may be said of the Imperial diplomacy, its officials would never have fallen, and Count Benedetti least of all others, into such a gross error. It is really unfortunate for M. Jules Favre, that some confidential friend did not dissuade him from so useless a disclosure of his own haphazard diplomacy. It shows indeed that a first-rate democrat may thunder for years and years against a government, may denounce every institution on which rests the social fabric, and yet be totally ignorant of the very rudiments of international policy and statesmanship.

But the lesson tends likewise in another direction. It is easy to see from the very first pages of the former minister, that he is at once struck with the serene dignity and majesty of the supreme Pontiff. Throughout every despatch—nay, almost throughout every line—there breathes a tone of sympathetic interest, of respect for the sufferings and trials of Pius IX., which really takes us by surprise. In many a page we could almost fancy ourselves to be listening to a practical Catholic; and in such cases we can but lament that M. Jules Favre should have given himself up so totally to the vagaries of his party. But time and age bring their lessons with them, and M. Favre has himself lately undergone so many severe trials of a moral character, that it may induce him to advance a few steps farther, and to lay utterly down his prejudices of former days. He would certainly not be the first man brought back to truth through the mysterious and rugged path of domestic tribulation.

However indiscreet may be in the eyes of a statesman the premature publication of these pages, Catholics will thank the author for having revealed to them so many pathetic incidents previous to, and following on, the occupation of Rome by the Italians.

The publications of Count Benedetti may be divided into three distinct parts. The first is relative to the war of 1866 down to the battle of Sadowa and the treaty of Prague, which was its immediate consequence.

The second part includes the confidential and diplomatic intercourse of France and Prussia between the years 1866 and 1870.

The last shows us the plot laid by the Cabinet of Berlin for

the succession of a Hohenzollern to the Spanish crown, and closes with the declaration of war between both countries. Few books it must be allowed, could offer contents of more immediate and thrilling interest.

Count Benedetti was accredited to the Court of Berlin a few months after the close of the Danish war. According to the terms of the treaty concluded at Vienna, the King of Denmark gave up the disputed territories to the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns, who became their lawful possessors, but with collective rights. It would be useless to dwell on the shameful conditions, and still more shameful pretexts, on which the Danish duchies were invaded and conquered by the two great German powers. It is now an undisputed fact, that in the above undertaking Prussia had no other object in view but to appropriate those duchies to herself, whilst Austria aimed secretly at preventing the fulfilment of her plans.

When the new French ambassador arrived at Berlin, the Prussian Cabinet had already modified its attitude towards the Court of Vienna: it now was endeavouring to induce that court to give up to King William its rights over the duchies. And yet the war itself had taken place in the name of the German Confederation and in the interest—so was it affirmed at least—of the Duke of Augustenburg, who claimed by his own right the duchy of Holstein. This had been positively maintained at the London conference both by the Prussian and Austrian plenipotentiaries.

But the King of Denmark had scarcely made the sacrifice imposed upon him by sheer might, when Prussia trod underfoot the pretensions of the Duke of Augustenburg, maintained that the treaty had constituted the two powers sole possessors of the duchies, and formally rejected the competence of the German Diet to decide the case. On the part of the Cabinet of Berlin, this was directly cancelling its own previous declaration. At a time like ours, when right is so infamously repudiated, it is not amiss to recall its paramount supremacy, were it but for the sake of those Divine laws which are, after all, the corner-stone of human society. Such therefore was the conduct of Prussia, whilst Austria, acting with greater consistency and good faith, persisted in laying the question before the Diet of Frankfort. On this ground it was impossible for the two governments to meet, and consequently, waiving the question of sovereignty, both courts signed in 1865 the famous convention of Gastein. It was agreed that Prussia should govern Schleswig, and Austria Holstein, putting off till a later period all definitive arrangements.

Such an agreement could have but one object in the eyes of

M. de Bismarck:—to annex purely and simply both duchies to Prussia. If it could be done through diplomacy and persuasion, all good, but if not, well, let the worst come to the worst. In other words, the Prussian minister was disposed to fight out the matter at the head of a powerful army. To win for Prussia the ascendancy over Germany was well worth the trouble,—so he set about his work *per fas et nefas*.

Prince Bismarck is not a man troubled by many qualms of cônscience. He leaves scruples to men of a more vulgar clay. He knows equally well, when it serves a turn, how to parade the privileges of kingship by Divine right; but he is no less deep in the art of cajoling revolutionists and abetting their blackest crimes.

How, in fact, had he himself risen to the Premiership? The King of Prussia, at the very beginning of his reign, had been intent upon remodelling and strengthening his army. At present we all know his object in so doing. But such a plan was full of difficulty with a Parliament systematically refusing the subsidies necessary for the furtherance of that plan, and with a Liberal cabinet endeavouring to satisfy royalty without dissatisfying Parliament. This was indeed an invidious task, and could not last long. There was a clash between the two powers, and King William intrusted to M. de Bismarck the mission of forming a new ministry. He was certainly the right man in the right place for the king's purpose, and also for other purposes of his own. When, after the critical period of 1848, he first came forth as a public man, he attracted notice by his ultra-conservative principles. When afterwards he represented his country at Frankfort, at Petersburg, and at Paris, he was equally remarkable for the bitter hatred he bore to Austria. He made no secret of his firm determination to vindicate for Prussia the supremacy over Germany, and therefore he was brought to consider the Austrian Government as the real enemy of Prussia—as the sole obstacle to her designs of aggrandizement. In his mouth Austria was something like the *Delenda Carthago* of old Cato, and, like old Cato, M. de Bismarck was not over-scrupulous in point of morality. Such language was doubtless very singular in a diplomatist, but at any rate it won him the reputation of a stern and resolute statesman.

The King was well aware of this, and so was the Parliament, and so was the nation, and public opinion in Germany and out of Germany, on the day when M. de Bismarck became the Prussian Premier. That accession meant that the sovereign, being bent upon maintaining every tittle of his royal prerogative, and every part of the policy he deemed

necessary to the prosperity of his kingdom, had called to his help a strong will,—a man who would care neither for party ties, nor for long-standing relations of amity, nor for the complicated links which knit together the German states. The issue proved how sagacious were those forebodings, for in a short time arose between the new cabinet and the Chambers one of those fierce, obstinate struggles which must end in the downfall of one of the contending parties. Sadowa was the field of battle on which both effected their reconciliation, and the victorious campaign in France is the result of that reconciliation. "During four years," says M. Benedetti, "and until the war of 1866, no budget was voted regularly by the Chambers; on both sides, the constitution was interpreted in an opposite meaning; for whilst the Government professed to follow it strictly, an enormous majority in the House of Representatives accused it of a no less constant violation."

Such was the internal state of affairs in Prussia when the war against Denmark broke out, and after its easy conclusion it became a matter of necessity for M. de Bismarck to reap the fruits thereof. It became in fact his be-all and end-all, —the pledge of still greater achievements, or the signal of his utter ruin as a statesman. How could he face the Chambers, if the annexation of the duchies did not offer a sop for so many millions of thalers spent on the army in spite of parliamentary votes? Or how, again, continue the same policy, if Prussia did not assume the foremost rank in Germany, by remodelling its constitution, even at the cost of a war with Austria. Nay, it is highly probable that the Prussian Prime Minister enjoyed the prospect exceedingly, as leading on to his own complete triumph. So, as we said above, he went to work with a good will, and with the strenuous support of his royal master.

Contemplating as he did an aggressive policy, the Gastein convention was an obstacle in his way, which, at any cost, must be surmounted. As early as the month of January, 1867, all his endeavours were banded to the purpose of bringing out of it such complications as would force Austria either to yield to her rival her share in the supremacy over the duchies, or to run the risk of a war.

But at the same time that the Bismarckian policy was aggressive towards Vienna, it likewise threatened more or less other countries, and it became the immediate duty of their agents at Berlin to follow up with intense attention the underground manœuvres of the Prime Minister. That Count Benedetti fully understood this duty is evident by the numerous and pithy despatches he has published on this part of his mission, to which we must refer the reader. Day after

day, and almost hour by hour, he apprises his Government of every new scene in this highly interesting drama. We would fain give copious extracts of these despatches, were we not obliged to hurry on to still more absorbing matters. It will be sufficient to say that M. de Bismarck took hold of every opportunity to show that Austria administered Holstein in a way essentially inimical to Prussian interests. Why did she admit in any degree the pretensions of the Duke of Augustenburg,—pretensions which Berlin would by no means acknowledge? Why did she allow liberal manifestations of public opinion in the duchy? Why commit herself by certain acts of administration, denoting her resolution to retain a final and absolute possession of Holstein? Was not all this going against the rules mutually laid down at Gastein? To be sure, they had not bound themselves by any written engagement; but everything had been settled in an honest, friendly spirit, as was but proper between two such great sovereigns. All this might have been very well had not M. de Bismarck at that very moment ruled Schleswig with a sway, showing his firm determination never to lose his grasp over the poor little duchy; had he not been doing his best to create difficulties for Austria both in Holstein, Hungary, and elsewhere; had he not been stealthily, silently preparing his armaments for the inevitable struggle. In one word, Prince de Bismarck wanted nothing else but to pick a quarrel.

So not content with the above accusations, the Prussian Premier soon began to speak boldly of the armed preparations which Austria was making against his own poor countrymen, who, lamb-like, had everything to fear from the wolfish spirit of the Cabinet of Vienna. It is one of the great arts of M. de Bismarck to throw the odium of aggression upon his adversary, whilst underhand he does all in his power to evoke the demon of war. He played exactly the same part in regard to France, as we shall see hereafter, making Europe believe, or appear to believe, that the French were solely responsible for the unparalleled calamities of last year. In regard to Austria, that unprincipled man, who audaciously advocated the supremacy of might over right, goaded her on to such a pitch of exasperation, that in an evil hour she hurled down the gauntlet of defiance. The world knows the result. But previous to the contest itself, the Prussian minister did his utmost to secure the neutrality of the French emperor, by flattering his long-standing wish for an extension of territory on his eastern frontier. It was all very well for M. de Bismarck to send last summer to the *Times* the copy of a despatch in which M. Benedetti had drawn up a rough sketch of a treaty, by

which Belgium was to be annexed to France. The trick was just such a one as he was wont to use, and for the time being served his purpose most admirably. It turns out, however, from M. Benedetti's despatches, written when he could have certainly no interest in disguising the truth, that the plan was none of his own, but originated by M. de Bismarck himself. First of all, however, let us place before the public a brief statement of his affirmations.

According to the Prussian minister, France had never ceased to allure him by certain offers, all at the expense of Germany and Belgium. In his opinion, such offers could by no means be accepted.

> I indeed deemed it useful, for the sake of peace, to flatter in the French diplomatists certain illusions, which are peculiar to themselves, and as long as this became possible, without even committing myself to verbal promises. For that purpose I remained silent as to the demand thus put forth, and I negotiated on a dilatory plan, without ever making any promise. When the negotiations with the King of the Netherlands, relative to the acquisition of Luxemburg fell to the ground, France renewed her previous proposals concerning Belgium and Southern Germany. It was then that M. Benedetti communicated his manuscript. To suppose that the French ambassador should have drawn up those proposals with his own hand, delivered them over to myself and discussed them on several occasions, and all this without being authorized thereunto by his sovereign—such a supposition, I say, is totally improbable.
>
> . . . . . Relatively to the text of the above proposals, I must observe that the treaty is from one end to the other written in M. Benedetti's handwriting, and on paper belonging to the French Embassy, and that the ambassadors and ministers of Austria, England, Russia, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Hesse, Italy, Saxony, Turkey, and Wurtemberg, who saw the original, recognized M. Benedetti's handwriting. On reading Art. I. for the first time, he immediately gave up the final clause, and placed it between a parenthesis, as soon as I made him remark that it supposed on the part of France an interference in the internal affairs of Germany. M. Benedetti spontaneously made, in my presence, another correction of less importance on this second article.

The publication of the above statement took Europe by surprise, even among the astounding events of those days. For a short time every man seemed to hold his breath, and this moment of suspense was followed by a universal vote of censure against the unprincipled conduct of the Imperial Government and its agent in thus plotting underhand for the possession of unoffending Belgium. In the British Parliament, several members, and among others Sir Henry Bulwer, denounced the doings of the Tuileries, and nobody believed that our own Government had not been informed of the

fact. Of course, in France, every journal and every hand was lifted against the double-dealing of Napoleon III. So for a certain time M. de Bismarck had it all his own way. A few reflective minds alone had their misgivings; to them it seemed somewhat astonishing that the Prussian Chancellor should have appealed to a special jury of diplomatists in order to verify M. Benedetti's handwriting, which, at any rate, was only a secondary matter in the case. How, again, was it that an ambassador—nay, even "an adventurous ambassador"—should of his own accord have originated such a plan; and above all, have left it so carelessly in the hands of the wily minister? Here was certainly matter for doubt and suspicion. But again we say it, for a time M. de Bismarck had it all his own way, for M. Benedetti could not yet command his means of reply. The investment of Paris was an effective bar to every effort on his part.

We may now, however, study the other side of the question in a series of despatches, which challenge the closest scrutiny. Every reader will fully apprehend that, previous to the war of 1866, during that war, and after that war, M. de Bismarck had the greatest interest in securing the neutrality and even the favour of France in regard to his plans of aggrandisement. Of the connivance of Russia he was sure, of the indifference of England he was certain; but an armed neutrality, or simply a watchful coolness on the part of the French emperor, might baffle all his designs. Hence arose in his mind a feeling amounting almost to fear, and prompting him to spare no effort in order to secure, for a certain period at least, the latent support of his powerful neighbour. Of this feeling and tendency we may trace vestiges in almost every despatch sent by M. Benedetti to his court during the eventful year of 1866. Thus he writes to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 10th of May of that year:—

> Yesterday I found M. de Bismarck evidently in a great state of alarm. On every subject, M. de Goltz (the Prussian ambassador in Paris) gives rise in his mind to the greatest anxiety. Whilst, on the one hand, he informs him of efforts made in Paris to induce Austria to enter into arrangements with the Court of Florence about Venetia, on the other, he is constantly modifying, from one hour to another, his own opinions in regard to the Emperor's personal dispositions, so that the King and the President of the Council hardly know what to think of the value and exactitude of the information which he sends them. (p. 155.)

And, indeed, M. de Bismarck might well be alarmed, for had Napoleon succeeded in his endeavours, the secret treaty of alliance which the Prussian minister had concluded with

Italy would have come to naught, and Austria would have had 150,000 men more to concentrate in Bohemia. The result showed how sagacious in this respect were the views of the French Emperor. "Now while not concealing his apprehensions," continues M. Benedetti, "M. de Bismarck gave me to understand, that if Italy were to betray Prussia, the latter was not so far advanced as to be unable to retrace her steps,——an easy matter indeed, through a simple change of cabinet."

The subject is so truly interesting, that we shall offer no apology for making a few more extracts. In a despatch dated May 19th, the French ambassador writes:—

> If the Emperor (said M. de Bismarck) deserts us and refuses to combine with us, if he likewise facilitates the surrender of Venetia to Italy, Prussia will stand alone to cope with Austria and her allies, and we shall have nothing else to do but to disarm Austria by our submission, which she must boast of for a long time to come, or to fight out boldly a most formidable struggle, after which Prussia will cease to balance the ascendancy of the House of Hapsburg throughout Germany. If the king listens to my advice, we shall fight it out. Our army is splendid, it was never more numerous, never in a better state of organization, never better equipped. I am confident that it would overcome our enemies, or at least would obtain such successes as to allow us to conclude an honourable peace. After all, we might call into power the Liberal party, proclaim the constitution of 1849, and carry with us the national feeling from Hamburg to Munich.

After quoting these words, M. Benedetti may well add, by way of comment: "The above language shows the real state of mind of the Prussian premier"; for here we have doubtless the under-current of that powerful intellect at a moment when perhaps the very existence of his country as a first-rate power was in jeopardy. It is likewise no less apparent that M. de Bismarck was sincere in the above professions of his inmost thoughts;—no double-dealing here, no dilatory negotiation to flatter "the delusions peculiar to French diplomatists." Could he but know the real policy of the Emperor Napoleon! Could he but rely on his steadfast alliance! If the Emperor would but enter fully into Prussia's plans of aggrandisement, and take his share in them by an extension of the French territory towards the east! France and Prussia banded together might defy all Europe; for what power would be a match for them, placed at the head of the finest armies in the world?

That such were the thoughts which filled the mind of M. de Bismarck at this crisis of his career, is shown by almost every despatch of the French ambassador to his court but two months before Sadowa. Now it stands to reason that the

Prussian minister, intent upon his purpose of securing such a useful ally, would hardly scruple at any offer or combination which might tend to gain that end. At a certain moment, however, he cools all of a sudden, and shows ill-humour because the French Government is so reserved. "He observed in a peevish tone," writes M. Benedetti on the 22nd of May, "that Prussia was of all other countries the one towards whom we show the least confidence (*à laquelle nous mesurons notre confiance avec le plus de parsimonie*). Now he was perfectly disposed to advise the king to accept the plan of a congress after a *previous understanding* with ourselves; but we seemed to take such an overture into no account."

The French Government *did* turn a deaf ear to this overture, and in a later conversation M. de Bismarck was obliged to be more explicit.

> He would be most desirous, goes on M. Benedetti, of conferring again with yourself [Drouyn de Lhuys] and the Emperor. He told me yesterday, whilst professing anxiety as to our intentions, that he would wish to sound you before the war opens, more particularly as to the case when Prussia should obtain important successes, of which he feels confident. Here I reminded him of what he told me about the King refusing to admit of any cession of German territory. According to his Majesty's views, if I am to believe M. de Bismarck, the compensations to which France would be entitled *must be selected wherever the French language is spoken on her frontier.* The President of the Council himself observed to his sovereign that, in order to dispose of those territories, it would be first of all necessary to conquer them. However, the Premier allowed the following words to escape him:—"If France claims Cologne, Bonn, and even Mentz, I, for one, would prefer leaving the stage rather than consent to it." And though I by no means pressed him to enter into any further explanation, he told me he did not believe it impossible to determine the King to give up to us the banks of the Upper Moselle (the province of Treves, I suppose, though he did not name it), which, added to Luxemburg, where a reunion with France would be well received, might rectify our frontier, so as to afford us every sort of satisfaction. I confined myself to observing that Luxemburg, no more than Belgium, and certain Swiss cantons, was a property without a master. Besides, *as I did not wish to accept a discussion on such eventualities, nor allow him to suppose that his combinations had any chance of being examined in Paris, I broke off the conversation on this subject, so as to make him feel that I did not wish to continue it.* I cannot tell whether M. de Bismarck, by thus opening his views to me on these matters, *without the slightest pretext afforded by myself*, merely wanted to probe me, or give you to understand, through me, what concessions he would offer us, and what we ought not to ask for. But I should by no means be astonished at it, for he is accustomed to such expedients. (pp. 164–166.)

Evidently M. de Bismarck was playing his own game, and

endeavouring to satisfy the French Government by alluring it on gradually to unsafe ground. But whatever may have been his object, it is now clear that the idea of offering Belgium and Luxemburg as a compensation for France was a creation of his own brain, not of Napoleon's, still less of Benedetti's; for no one could foresee just at that juncture the complications which were to arise four years after. M. Benedetti stands out here, as well as elsewhere, as a faithful reporter of what he sees and hears around him; and this was exactly conformable to his instructions. But what are we to think of the minister who boldly endeavours to throw the odium of such proposals on the shoulders of a man positively refusing even to discuss them? Success justifies a good deal, but not dishonesty, and justice comes at last, though *claudo pede*.

Just at this juncture the Emperor seemed to take a bold step by addressing a public letter, in which he openly claimed territorial compensations for France, in case Prussia should be victorious in the impending struggle. In Germany, public opinion was greatly excited by this document; yet nobody for one moment imagined that those compensations should consist of such neighbouring countries as had no share in the war. It was an hour of breathless anxiety, for every man felt that the Emperor expected to acquire certain portions of German fatherland. The press was unanimous in denouncing any pretension of the kind, and even M. de Bismarck's friends were taken by surprise. They had fancied that France would remain benevolently neutral in any case; and lo! the fond delusion now faded before their eyes. As to the minister's enemies, they made the best of the hold he had given them; in fact, there was a general burst of indignation, and the notion of a transaction issuing in the loss of any portion whatever of German territory was scouted by all parties.

Now what was the Prime Minister's attitude at such a critical moment? If we are to believe M. Benedetti, he freely "acknowledged that the opinions expressed in the Imperial letter coincided exactly with those he had manifested when he [M. de Bismarck] had the honour of approaching him. Such," continued the President of the Council, "was likewise the sentiment of the King." The above lines were written on the 15th of June, just on the eve of the war, and yet we discover that even then the Prussian minister would have consented to give up Mayence, so intense was his wish to secure the alliance of France at any cost.*

* In a volume recently published, M. Jules Favre gives us an account of his first interview with M. de Bismarck at Ferrières, in September last. It is truly remarkable that, in the course of this interview, we find the German

After the conclusion of the war, his attitude was of course altered, and the wavering, irresolute policy of the French Emperor having allowed the golden opportunity to slip through his fingers, M. de Bismarck was not the man to lose any of his advantages. Yet, strange to say, he appears to have still entertained the plan of satisfying France at the expense of Belgium, if we may rely on the following despatch. Elated by his extraordinary success, the Prussian minister at first affected to claim the annexation of Hanover and Electoral Hesse, and Saxony, as a due compensation for the outlay of his country. To these pretensions the French ambassador strenuously demurred, so that,

Seeing that he could not bring me over to his opinion, the President of the Council made no difficulty of admitting, in another conversation, that the instructions forwarded to M. de Goltz were by no means of an absolute character, but aimed principally *at combining an agreement with the Emperor's Government.* Those instructions authorize him to bring about any transaction which might measure the pretensions of Prussia to the price that France would exact for an understanding with her, provided always that in Paris they will agree to certain clauses, from which the King will never depart. In another conversation, M. de Bismarck showed himself still more conciliatory as to the advantages accruing to Prussia, and insisted particularly on the utility for both countries to unite and to come to an agreement. Though I had repeatedly declared that on this subject I was provided neither with instructions nor powers, he offered to discuss and establish with myself the basis of an armistice, and, after settling its terms, he would propose to the King a suspension of hostilities, until the Emperor's Government should assent to it. Following up the same train of ideas, and pushing on still further, *though I refrained from encouraging him so to do,* he endeavoured to prove that the reverses of Austria allowed France and Prussia *to modify their territorial condition,* and to solve at present most of those difficulties which still threaten the peace of Europe. I reminded him that there were *existing treaties,* and that a war which he seemed desirous of preventing might be the very first result of such a policy. M. de Bismarck retorted that I *was mistaken.* France and Prussia united together, and determined to rectify their respective frontiers, *whilst binding each other to solemn engagements,* would be in a situation to solve such questions, without any fear of armed resistance, *either on the part of England or of Russia.*

---

chancellor uttering the following words:—"I have no particular reason for liking Napoleon III. Certainly it would have been more convenient to maintain him on the throne, and you have rendered no service to your country by overthrowing him: it might have been possible to negotiate with him, but for my own part, I was never indebted to him. *Had he willed it, we might have been two sincere allies, and have swayed over Europe both together; but he endeavoured to deceive every one, and I could never trust him.*" —"Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale," p. 176.)

Does not this language confirm the Benedetti despatches?

Now, we put it to any man of sense, does this look like France plotting secretly the annexation of Belgium? or does it not fall in admirably with M. de Bismarck's own designs? That he was merely holding out a bait to the French Government, is probable enough; but it is equally probable that he would have gone to any lengths in order to secure its support. We are perfectly aware that, at the beginning of the late war, the Prussian Chancellor endeavoured to throw the onus of the above proceedings on M. Benedetti, and the better to accomplish his purpose, he simply alters their date, assigning to 1867 what really happened in 1866. Now it so happened that towards the latter end of the last-mentioned year, M. de Bismarck retired for about six months to his country seat at Wartzin, whilst, in 1867, he himself accompanied his master to Paris, on a visit to the Universal Exhibition. Thus, on the one hand, the secret negotiations must have needs been suspended until the close of 1866, or, if resumed, it was in the capital of the French Empire, which even M. de Bismarck —not over-scrupulous in such matters—has not ventured to affirm.

The fact is that the policy of the Imperial Government lay in a contrary direction. Whatever might have been Napoleon's inmost leanings, he at the last hour resolved to obtain territorial compensations in the Rhenish provinces of Germany, and among others the fortress of Mayence; and this after the Prussian successes in Austria. But it was then too late; M. de Bismarck had changed his mind, and was no more the man disposed to give up even an inch of his Fatherland. Let us hear his own account of the matter. In the month of May, 1870, he spoke in the following terms before the German Reichstag:—

> A little after the 6th of August, 1866, I saw the French ambassador come into my study, holding in his hand an ultimatum, which demanded of us to give up Mentz, or to prepare for immediate war. I did not hesitate to reply: "Well, then, let us go to war." This was telegraphed to Paris, where it brought them to reason, and then they pretended that the instructions sent to the French ambassador were extorted from the Emperor during his illness.

This statement looks very like truth, for M. Benedetti, justly alarmed at the burst of anger provoked throughout all Germany by such a demand at such a time, started for Paris, where he expostulated on the subject with the Emperor himself. The latter was so impressed with his reasons, that he wrote to M. de la Valette: "From my conversation with Benedetti I perceive that we should have all Germany united

against us for a very insignificant advantage." Consequently, the question was dropped.

But it remained a festering sore in the mind of the Prussian statesman and of the whole nation, united to a man behind him. From that day one may easily see through M. Benedetti's despatches that his attitude was altered towards France, which he henceforward considered as a foe, after finding it impossible to cajole it into a close alliance. It is likewise easy to understand what an offence it must have been to Prussian pride, to see France interfering in the preliminaries of Nickolsburg in favour of Denmark, and even stipulating for the relative independence of Southern Germany. We can hardly be astonished at the fact, if we bear in mind that M. de Bismarck initiated several plans of an alliance with the French Court, when he defeated Hanover, Bavaria, and the other adherents to the Austrian cause. This alone would have induced him to make the most of his actual advantages, in order to band together all the forces of his country against any future enemy.

We all know how M. de Bismarck set to work with a wonderful ability, and how, in the course of four short years, he effected his great and—why not say?—patriotic purpose. It is doubtful, however, whether he would have been able to accomplish it, had not Napoleon himself, during that eventful period, evinced a degree of apathy and incapacity which surprised all Europe.

The treaty of Prague was hardly signed, when M. de Bismarck assumed a different attitude in regard to France. He had previously acknowledged her right of intervention in that treaty, but he now maintained, both in the German Parliament and elsewhere, that the two contracting powers had alone the right to superintend its execution. It appears even that in so doing he used language of an offensive character, and calculated to create difficulties between Paris and Berlin, had the French Government been so disposed.

The second grievance was Bismarck's refusal to enter into any conference for the settlement of the Roman question, on the ground that neither the Pope nor the Florence cabinet were disposed to make any concession. Here certainly he was in the right, and showed far more political wisdom than the Emperor Napoleon. However, it is not to the fact itself, but to the stiff, unbending tone of the Prussian minister, that we wish to draw attention—that tone being anything but conciliatory. This was the more striking that in 1867, when *in Paris* with his king, both personages had manifested the *most cordial disposition* to settle, together with France, both

the Roman and any other question. What were the reasons for this sudden change? M. de Bismarck was aiming at perplexing the French Government and surrounding it with obstacles, probably with a view of preventing its interference in his own German policy. Such is M. Benedetti's answer, and as his despatch on this subject throws great light on the actual attitude of the Prussian Cabinet in regard to Rome, we shall not hesitate to quote it copiously. He writes, on the 17th of November, 1867:—

> I must needs call your attention to the language of the Prussian press. Such papers as have no private connection with the Government are unanimous in maintaining that our proposal ought to be rejected firmly. Their main reason is that the Roman question is a constant source of difficulties for France, preventing her free action, and the interest of Germany requires that it shall in no way contribute to close that question. Those papers again, belonging to what is called here the Public Opinion Office, or which accept its directions when they happen to fall in with their own doctrines, affect to point out the obstacles to any meeting of the plenipotentiaries, and the utter uselessness of any effort on their part, if they do meet, to conciliate the pretensions of the contending parties.
>
> Some of these papers go even still farther, by manifesting for the temporal power of the Pope a downright tenderness; they insinuate, and the *Gazette of the Cross* ventures to affirm, that by putting forth the plan of a conference, France seeks for accomplices in dealing a last blow to the supreme authority of the Holy See. Such is the language of papers which, but a short time ago, encouraged the Italian Government, and even Garibaldi himself, without concerning themselves in any way whatsoever about the fate of the Papacy.
>
> I am sorry to add that the Berlin Cabinet seems to understand its duties exactly in the same manner. Your Excellency may remember that the King, in his closing speech before the Riechstag, addressed to Italy words showing excessive sympathy, at the very moment when our relations with the Court of Florence threatened an immediate rupture. In another speech, which he pronounced the day before yesterday, the King assured, on the contrary, his Catholic subjects of his sympathy for the dignity and independence of the head of their Church. (pp. 237–239.)

The object of M. de Bismarck is here evident:—to foster and increase every complication which might fetter the energies of France, in case of a future conflict with that country. He did not even deny the fact, if we are to believe another despatch sent by M. Benedetti to his own Government. It is easy to account for his conniving at, and probably for his bribing, the Garibaldian emissaries in Italy. It shows, at any rate, what German Catholics have to expect from the great Prussian statesman. Indeed, his late conduct in regard to the schismatic movement in Bavaria is sufficient evidence of

his real intent. After all, what else could be expected from any Protestant Government?

And as a superabundant proof of this two-handed policy of the Prussian Government, we may produce a most singular conversation reported by M. Benedetti to his Government. In an interview with the Chancellor he held the following language, which is significant enough.

> When Garibaldi was about to invade the Pontifical States, he wrote to him [M. de Bismarck] and intrusted his letter to one of his confidants, who started for Berlin, in order to deliver it directly into his own hands. In this letter Garibaldi sued for the moral and material support of Prussia, requesting both money and arms. "But," added M. de Bismarck, suspecting some Austrian intrigue, and knowing how very easy it was to counterfeit Garibaldi's handwriting, "I kept on the reserve with his agent, and offered to admit the Italian minister to our interview. To this he demurred, and I replied that I could not dispose of any sum for which I should not be accountable to the Chambers," &c.

What a singular mode of negotiation with a friendly power, and how little it sounds like the usual habits and customs of diplomacy. To listen coolly to Garibaldi's agent looked very like encouraging him in his freebooting plans, and to associate him with Victor Emmanuel's minister at Berlin was much about the same as putting him upon a level with the regular representative of a foreign power. We can easily understand that the French ambassador was not over satisfied with all these underground dealings—the more so indeed that he soon discovered other proofs of Bismarck's intrigues with the Italian revolutionists, and of his growing ill-will towards France.

That ill-will was grounded upon his close observation of what was going on in that country. When he visited Paris in 1867 with his royal master, he could not but remark the keen feeling of mistrust and humiliation which had taken hold of the French nation in regard to Prussia. The Government might be, or rather was, really averse to a war with the new German Confederation; the under-current of public opinion ran already in a contrary direction.

That M. de Bismarck was fast lapsing into a state of hostility towards France, soon became apparent to the mind of M. Benedetti, and consequently he wrote on the 19th of November, 1867:—

> Has he come to the conclusion that war is inevitable, and being once convinced of this, does he consider it necessary for Prussia to embroil still further the Italian affairs, instead of endeavouring to pacify them? That such is his main object at present I can hardly doubt after what I have

heard since my return to Berlin, and the language he has held to myself only serves to confirm me in this opinion. I cannot tell the reason of this change; but I assert, and I wish to draw your attention to the fact, that M. de Bismarck, instead of desiring, as he did but a few months ago, to fulfil his task by endeavouring to prevent any cause of dissent between us, instead of seeking for means of establishing our mutual relations on a still closer footing of intimacy, now prefers to secure other friendships.

Even the slightest doubt soon became impossible, and in a most luminous report the French Ambassador subsequently showed the energy and activity displayed by the Prussian minister in his preparations for the impending contest. The military treaties which bound the Southern States to join the Northern Confederation in case of war are made known to the German Parliament; General Manteuffel is sent to Petersburg to make sure of the Russian Tzar; King Wilhelm addresses "to all Germany, to the brethren nations, to the land limited by the Alps and the Baltic," certain allusions, which, according to the press of the day, made their hearts leap with joy. In the meanwhile, M. von Moltke was silently, but steadily, bringing up his battalions to the pitch of perfection in point of discipline and equipment, and Prussian officers were sent to every petty principality, to mould them, *nolens volens*, into the same form. This had been a labour of many years, and ever bearing in view a future war with France. And now the work was done and all was ready, and M. de Bismarck might go on with his own work of diplomacy, and surround France with traps and snares of every description, for the German army, amounting to nearly a million of well-drilled soldiers, was ready to march.

And in truth, he German statesman did fall to work with a wonderful good-will and activity. Little by little France was cut off from every sort of alliance. She had lost the friendship of England by her shuffling conduct in the Danish affair; Russia promised to stand and look on, notwithstanding the latent and genuine sympathy of the nation for France; Italy was bound up from head to foot with Prussian interests; and thanks to Bismarck's clever indiscretions, Belgium looked askant at its powerful neighbour. The web was complete, and now came the crowning piece—the nomination of Leopold von Hohenzollern for the Spanish throne.

It has been the fashion of late to lay the blame on France for having provoked the disastrous war of 1870, and certainly M. de Bismarck himself had a great interest in propagating, if not creating, this fallacious view. An attentive perusal of the Benedetti papers leads us, however, to a contrary conclusion. In our opinion, it was a plot deeply and warily con-

cocted for the extension of Prussian influence and dominion over Spain, and consequently for the diminution, if not for the utter annihilation, of France as a first-rate power.

Any one who is in the slightest degree familiar with the history of that country, knows that for the last two centuries, its main policy has been to prevent a power hostile to its interests from settling on its southern frontier. There was a time when the house of Hapsburg threatened France north, south, and east, and the memory of that time is imprinted in the French annals in bloody characters. Philip II. of Spain was well nigh establishing his arbitrary sway over the fair realm of the lilies: for that purpose he recoiled, neither before assassination, nor bribery, nor intimidation. For that purpose, his veteran bands invaded the country under the Duke of Parma; for that purpose, he garrisoned Paris itself; for that purpose he deluged the whole kingdom with blood, burnt its palaces no less than its most humble homesteads, made it in fact a hideous waste of smoking ruins. Not a nobleman was sure of holding his baronial castle, not a tradesman of his wares, not a cottier of his team of oxen. One hundred and twenty years after, the proud Louis XIV. fought out a long and disastrous war to prevent even a chance of the repetition of such deeds. He ended by securing the possession of Spain for a member of his own family. But if he satisfied, on the one hand, his own ambitious views, we are bound to remember, on the other, that a Bavarian prince and an Austrian archduke were both competitors to the splendid succession, and that the Spanish grandees still dreamt of conquering splendid palaces and fair demesnes on the banks of the Loire and of the Rhone.

The remembrance of such an awful period sinks deep into the memory of a nation, and rouses its passions to a state of frenzy, whenever it is threatened with a similar danger. That such was the case in 1870 is now beyond doubt, as the Benedetti papers lie there before us. Had France been victorious over her German rival, the world would have resounded with praises of her valour and energy; but as she is laid low through the incapacity of her rulers and the wild excesses of her cosmopolitan demagogues, a rampant press and an innate, but unhealthy, disposition in mankind to worship success, have both contributed to lead astray the public opinion of England, as well as of other countries. It is certainly no reason why we should follow in the crowd.

A most striking feature of the negotiations carried on by the Prussian Court in favour of Prince Hohenzollern is their *secret character.* Not a word is breathed about the overture

made by Marshal Prim—if an overture it really was. The matter could not, however, be kept so secret, but M. Benedetti got scent of it as early as March, 1869, and duly sent up to his own Government this extraordinary piece of information. He likewise applied immediately to the Prussian Cabinet for positive information on the subject, and received from the Under-Secretary of State, M. de Thile, a formal denial *upon his honour* of anything of the sort. But, adds the French ambassador, that answer did not at all satisfy me; for M. de Bismarck might have kept the plan to himself. Now this was exactly the case. A few days afterwards M. Benedetti was called to Paris, where he immediately communicated to the Emperor whatever intelligence he had collected on the spot. Napoleon summed up the conversation in the following words:—

> The canvassing of the Duke of Montpensier for the throne would be merely hostile to my own dynasty, and concerns but myself; that of Prince Hohenzollern would be anti-national; the country would not bear it, and we must prevent it.

Here we have the case, as it were, in a nutshell, and of course M. Benedetti received orders to act in consequence. And so he did on his return to Berlin. M. de Bismarck's answer to the honest and pointed questions of the ambassador is a model of shuffling, equivocating, vague, inconclusive language, and we doubt not that Macchiavelli would have been well satisfied with his German pupil. We must content ourselves, for want of space, with giving the substance of this diplomatic imbroglio.

The Prussian minister by no means declined a conversation on the subject. The sovereignty offered to Prince Leopold, he observed, was of a most ephemeral character; so the King would abstain from giving him any advice upon the matter. Besides, such an adventurous undertaking might cost a good deal of money, and the prince's father had already spent enough on his other son, Prince Charles of Roumania. And then, what a risk poor Leopold would run, should he accept the Spanish throne! By how many dangers would he be beset; and after all, *he* was not the man to cope with them. A very brave officer was he, to be sure, and of most polished manners, but not a grain of the politician in him,—no, not one single grain. And so he went on, the subtle minister; yet all the while not one word of reply to M. Benedetti's observation, that the King being the head of the royal family, had a right to require of the prince a formal renunciation to the throne. And well might the ambassador add: "As far as experience

has made me familiar with the meaning which M. de Bismarck attaches to his own words, I incline to believe that he did not tell me what was going on in his mind."

Here M. Benedetti was decidedly in the right, for it was soon discovered, both from the King's own admissions and through the information sent by the French agents in Spain, that the Prussian Cabinet had done anything but discountenance the offer made by Prim to Prince Leopold. According to all probabilities, Bismarck himself may have originated the idea. But is it not remarkable that at the very moment, when he was thus plotting the creation of a second Prussian monarchy against France, he feigned to be alarmed at the armaments and preparations for war? Another count against France was her seeking for new alliances, as if the German Chancellor had not already made sure of Russia and Italy; as if he was ever tardy in making the most of his own advantages.

Such being the case, it may be fairly doubted whether the Imperial Government could be satisfied with the simple renunciation of Prince Leopold, without any guarantee on the part of King William that his pretensions should never be revived. Is the Prussian statesman so over-scrupulous as to be bound merely by a verbal promise? Or is he so ignorant in diplomatic points and by-ways, as not to know how to elude even a formal treaty? The treaty of Prague was signed six years ago, and nevertheless the fifth article, stipulating certain conditions favourable to the population of Northern Schleswig, are still awaiting their fulfilment. Had France contented herself with what M. de Bismarck said, she would have made herself the laughing-stock of all Europe. God knows her ruler of that day has enough to account for, and it is useless, as well as ungenerous, to hold up as a fault what was simply an act of common prudence.

Before taking leave of M. Benedetti's despatches and account of his mission in Prussia, we wish to rectify an error which at the time went the round of Europe. The reader may remember how the Count was reported to have bullied the Prussian sovereign at Ems; how he tracked his footsteps from place to place, almost preventing, as it were, the poor king from making the most of his mineral waters. All these reports were nothing else but the offspring of sensation newsmongers; in reality, on both sides, the outward forms of courtesy and dignity were preserved to the very last. To the very last also, the French Government hoped to obtain some reliable guarantee for the future, and that King William would alter his mind. This fact is apparent in every telegram sent *by the* Duke de Gramont to his agent at Ems.

Upon the whole we think that M. Benedetti has been well advised in publishing his vindication; it bears upon it a stamp of truthfulness and honesty, as well as a display of keen observation and activity, which would do credit to any diplomatist. And again we must repeat it, Napoleon III. certainly did not fall from any dearth of official and secret information on the part of his agents.

From M. Benedetti, the Imperial ambassador, we must now turn to M. Jules Favre, the Republican Minister for Foreign Affairs. The *émeute* which overthrew Napoleon's government took place on the 4th of September, 1870; on the following day, M. Favre entered upon his self-assumed duties at the Foreign Office. The acknowledged spokesman of an implacable opposition, which had lasted for twenty years, found himself all of a sudden called upon to direct the external policy of his country, in one of its most trying and most disastrous periods. Well may he have recoiled from such a duty, when France could not reckon on one single ally in that gigantic struggle into which she had been hurried headlong. On this subject we can listen to no better witness than M. Favre himself.

When, on the 5th of September, 1870, I took possession of the Foreign Department, my first care was to ask for such despatches as might throw some light on the negotiations then going on. A hasty perusal was quite enough to show me, not only that we had no allies—that indeed I knew too well—but that our diplomacy had not even made serious endeavours to gain any. Seeing my astonishment, the director of the political branch of the service proposed that I should have an interview with the minister whom I superseded, Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, added he, being ready to meet me. I immediately assented; and I must here observe, to show how little usurpation and violence had to do with this concern, that the minister of the government just overthrown spontaneously offered his services to the factious tribune who came to replace him. On my arrival at the Quay d'Orsay, I did not enter the Prince's study, as he had left the office without knowing what had happened, and consequently without giving me permission to do so. In this I simply yielded to a feeling of propriety, which every gentleman will easily understand. M. de la Tour d'Auvergne was kind enough to be thankful for such a mode of proceeding, and I merely mention the fact because it has been distorted by passion and party-spirit. I shall even venture to add, that the two men thus brought together were not at liberty to act otherwise than they did. Perhaps the man whom the chance of events thus thrust aside felt himself relieved from a most heavy burden; but most positively the man who was just entering, in such an unexpected manner, upon these duties, was fully aware of his weighty responsibility and of his no less personal incompetency. Had he been free to choose his position

without forfeiting his duty, he would by far have preferred that of the fallen minister.*

Such were the feelings of M. Jules Favre on assuming his new functions, and well might he have entertained them. To say nothing of the isolated state of France in regard to foreign powers, nor of her unparalleled disasters, the republican minister had to encounter at once a most momentous question,—the Papacy, a question which, indeed, ultimately caused his downfall. From his very first appearance on the stage of politics, M. Jules Favre had constantly, had vehemently opposed the temporal power of the Pope. In so doing, he well knew that he was waging war against the public opinion of his own country, which no less constantly had run in an opposite direction. It was not to be expected, however, that he should now belie the convictions of his whole life; and yet his very first act as a Minister for Foreign Affairs must needs be to defend the Pope against Italian aggression. We must do him the justice to say that he did all in his power, but that power amounted to very little, as the sequel of events will show. Moreover, whilst negotiating with the Cabinet of Florence on the subject, the great republican leader had likewise another aim—that of bringing over the Italians to an alliance with France, as a check upon the German invasion. What the Empire, what the ties of close affinity, what the remembrance of past services had been unable to accomplish, he, the representative of an upstart government and of a mobocracy, expected to do in a few hours of friendly intercourse with such a wily diplomatist as the Cavaliere di Nigra. That a highly-gifted man like M. Jules Favre should have fostered so great a delusion, shows a degree of incapacity that almost baffles conception. However, we must admit the fact, since he himself admits it in his very first pages on "Rome and the French Republic." But, at the same time, this fact throws great light upon the wavering policy he was forced to adopt in dealing with a question that would have required, even in less awful times, a stern will for the maintenance of right, and a consummate politician for the overcoming of the more serious difficulties.

As early as the 5th of September, M. Nigra called upon the new minister, and began by professions of sympathy for France. This was all very well in its way, but both parties must have been equally aware of the treaties existing between Italy and Prussia for the furtherance of their mutual interests

* "*Gouvernement* de la Défense nationale." Par M. J. Favre. Paris, 1871.

in the present war. The Government of Florence was by no means tardy in taking advantage of its present opportunity; for an army of 60,000 soldiers was already assembled on the Roman frontier. Nevertheless, the Italian ambassador *mournfully* stated the reasons which, according to his opinion, prevented his own Government from coming forward,

And he more than once repeated, that if one of the two great powers now predominant in every question were to give us its support, Italy would be happy to join in its endeavours. I pressed him strongly to set the example. But no insistance of mine could produce any result. He was rising to take his leave, after a long conversation, when he said :—"I have to inform you officially that my Government can no longer bear with the *statu quo* in regard to Rome. They have sent to the Holy Father M. Ponza di San Martino, with a mission to obtain an amicable arrangement. If, as I fear it will happen, our offers be rejected, we shall be obliged to occupy Rome. Our interest and honour equally command that measure. The safety of the Papacy requires it no less imperiously. We might have guarded and respected every interest, but the extraordinary successes of the Prussians have altered everything. They have crushed the Conservatives, and exalted the violent. Our overtures would only add to the general confusion. The demagogues would soon be masters of Rome, and the storm which would overthrow the Papacy would likewise expose us to the greatest perils. So we can no longer delay a solution, which has, moreover, become inevitable. We will hurry it on through right or might. At any rate, we are happy, in such a crisis, to have the moral support of the new Government that France has just created. But why should you not go a step farther? Why not denounce the Convention of the 15th of September, 1864? You yourself constantly attacked it, and, as a fact, it does not exist any longer. To the verdict pronounced against it by fortune, please to add the consecration of your own authority. It would be the crowning act of your career, an act for which Italy would certainly be grateful."

"I am fully conscious," replied I, "that your arguments are irrefutable. The September Convention is a dead letter. However, I will not denounce it. Were France both victorious and prosperous, I would willingly acquiesce in your request. I should, as you very properly observe, be consistent with my whole life, since I always opposed the interference of France in favour of the Pope in Italian affairs. But my country is vanquished; I myself am too unhappy to afflict a venerable old man, who has undergone such painful trials, and who would suffer still more by such a useless mark of total desertion. I do not wish likewise to grieve those among my countrymen whom the misfortunes of the Popedom have thrown into a state of consternation. So I will not denounce the September Convention; but then I will not, on the other hand, enforce its fulfilment. As for myself, I could not do it; no other minister even could do it without lowering the dignity of France by a vain and impotent menace. I neither will nor can prevent anything you may do. I *am of your own opinion*; if you don't go to Rome, it will

fall into the hands of dangerous agitators. I much prefer that you should be there. But you must fully understand that France does not consent to it in any way whatsoever, and that you go through the whole undertaking on your own exclusive and sole responsibility."

In giving this answer, I had not consulted my own Government, who, however, approved of it. Two days afterwards I called on the Italian minister, and again insisted strongly, but uselessly, on obtaining from his country an earnest support. He once more returned to the Roman question. "You will not abide by your decision," said he; "it is by far too much in opposition with your former policy. It wounds the feelings of Italy without any profit to yourselves."

"Is this a condition which you are laying down?" replied I, looking M. Nigra in the face.

"By no means," retorted he, "but I am sorry to add that I must persevere in the line which I told you of."

"Well, do me the pleasure never to mention a subject which gives me pain, yet can never lead us to any conclusion." (pp. 5–8.)

The above quotation is so characteristic of both parties, that we shall offer no apology for its length. It fully contains the policy followed by M. Jules Favre on the Roman question, whilst it clearly shows the ardent desire of the Italian Government to obtain, on the part of France, a formal assent to its sacrilegious usurpations. It is probable that, fettered as he was by the perilous condition of his own country and by the strong opposition of the French Catholics, whom it was highly important not to irritate at such a juncture, the new minister dared not venture recklessly on a direct denunciation of the September Convention; for it is hardly admissible that he entertained for one moment the slightest hope of bringing over Italy to a coalition with France when France was at the lowest ebb of her fortunes. His policy consisted, therefore, in giving a tacit consent to this work of plunder and robbery, a policy which affords us full insight into the loose morality both of himself and of his party.

However, having at once struck out this line, M. Favre's next and immediate difficulty was, how to secure the personal safety of the Holy Father. He was too familiar with the practices and doings of the Italian Government to rely upon its assurances, and he lost no time in broaching the question. And here indeed we have before us a most singular and interesting spectacle:—the veteran revolutionist, the unflinching enemy of the temporal, and perhaps of the spiritual, power of the Pope; the abettor of the Italian Cabinet; the *man whose* scandalous life in private has been lately revealed *before a court of* justice, is little by little, and, as it were, *unconsciously,* won over to a feeling of awe, admiration, and

respect for the virtues, serenity, and fortitude of the Supreme Pontiff. In many of his despatches now before the public, there breathes even a spirit of tenderness, which takes us by surprise, and makes us stop to ask whether we are listening to the same man who, for years and years, put forth all his energies in thundering philippics against the iniquities of the Roman Court and the standing abuses of a theocratical government.

That there is no exaggeration in this statement we can immediately prove by referring to M. Favre's own words. The Italians had taken possession of Rome, Pius IX. had bade farewell to his valiant little army and to the representatives of foreign nations, and he might now fairly consider himself as a prisioner in his own palace. Every power in Europe looked on, assuming an attitude of dumb indifference, if not of silent satisfaction. Let us hear what M. Favre has to say on this woful subject.

> After upwards of ten centuries the Papacy has just undergone a transformation, and in order to give a character of sublimity to this transformation, God has selected the noblest figure which history ever had to portray. Himself a tender and sincere apostle of national independence and of freedom, endeavouring to infuse a new spirit into the antique authority of the tiara;—now flying before the murderer of his minister, now bearing up against the very principles he had anon glorified with so much enthusiasm; then again rising through Faith superior to every earthly interest, and becoming by the grandeur of his naïve simplicity the very personification of a sterile and dogmatic inflexibility, Pius IX. really appeared predestined to the part he has had to play in this world. I must even confess, that on reading in the above despatches, which I have just analyzed, the account of that pathetic scene of adieu to his army, he appeared before my eyes as if hallowed by Time, peering above ages, standing on the brink of two worlds, now parting asunder—the one doomed henceforward to dwell in the memory of the past, the other containing within its womb the mystery of our future, and the work of our own regeneration!

Such were the inmost feelings of the French minister on establishing official and confidential communications with Cardinal Antonelli. He, on the whole, held to his purpose of withholding any moral or material support of France to the temporal power, but of offering every sort of help and measure in his power to uphold the spiritual authority of the Pope, and to secure his own personal safety. If we are to believe the French *chargé d'affaires* at Rome, M. Lefebvre de Behaine, this open and candid behaviour pleased the Pope's prime minister far better than the truckling professions and hollow *promises of Napoleon's* Government.

At the Vatican (writes he on the 5th of October) I met with nothing else but marks of sympathy for France, and a feeling of absolute confidence in the sentiments which the French Catholics, when left to themselves, will spontaneously and efficaciously show to the Holy Father. Every conversation I have with Cardinal Antonelli confirms me in the opinion that he implicitly relies on the candid and precise declarations you instructed me to make on the 10th of September, and which are to supersede an armed protection, that neither our present circumstances nor the principles of the National Government allow us to afford to Pius IX. The Holy See fully appreciates the high value of the moral support now secured to it by the religious, chivalrous, and generous sentiments of France.

But however great might be the confidence of the Pope in the devotion of the French Catholics to his interests, his situation was daily becoming more critical, and he had to foresee the moment when he might be obliged to leave Rome. If, however, that dire necessity should once more take place, he was determined upon doing it in broad daylight, and not to abandon his capital in the garb of a clandestine fugitive. His minister consequently applied to the French Government to know whether the Holy Father could reckon upon a sure and respectful retreat in the realms of old Clovis. Surely there is something touching in this yearning of the Father of the Faithful towards his Gallic children, some of whom but lately had been among the foremost to oppose the great conciliary decree; but who were likewise among the foremost to bow to that memorable decision. France was then writhing under the unutterable woes of foreign invasion; she was no less writhing under the venomous bite of the demagogic dragon, even then preying upon her very vitals; and yet she flew instinctively into the arms of her Father, who forgot his own sorrows, and knocked at her threshold, and wept over those of his children. Kings and emperors might look askant, courtiers and statesmen might curl their lip with a smile of contempt at so much fallen grandeur; Europe, infirm, heartless, faithless, helpless, and selfish, might look on with supreme indifference,—but Heaven above must have let fall one of its choicest blessings on bleeding Gaul, thus beckoning to her shores the Vicar of Christ in this most cruel trial of his long chequered reign. For indeed the Republican government nobly responded to the call, though urging at the same time Pius IX. not to adopt any hasty resolution of this kind.

Days and days rolled on, the capitulation of Paris took place, the National Assembly met at Bordeaux, and M. Thiers was placed at the head of a regular government. In the little Papal court—we might almost say *circle*—these successive *vents were* followed with intense interest, as may be seen by

a despatch of the French agent at Rome, written on the 18th of February.

On different occasions, several persons who attend constantly on the Pope had lately expressed the opinion that I should endeavour to see His Holiness, who would really be glad to show his deep feeling of sympathy and anxiety for France, as well as his satisfaction on account of our deferential and respectful attitude towards the Holy See. As I was afraid, however, that such a simple step might give rise to many idle surmises, I thought it better to maintain a reserved attitude, which was duly appreciated by Cardinal Antonelli. I waited, therefore, to ask for an audience until the result of the elections should be known.

The Pope received me the day before yesterday, and as I told him that in such a solemn hour I could no longer withstand my wish to obtain his blessing for my country, he replied that not one single day passed without his praying for France, whose image was constantly before his mind.

Then alluding to the efforts he had made to help us, and to hasten the end of this horrid war, he told me that King William, "*now turned Emperor, it would appear,*" has not yet answered the letter which His Holiness wrote to him in the month of November.

Being thus forcibly excluded from the grave questions implied in the restoration of peace, he can only pray for its speedy conclusion on honourable conditions. He likewise seemed greatly pleased at the general character of our elections, telling me that all men devoted to our national grandeur must be delighted at seeing the French people bestow on M. Thiers so many striking marks of confidence. The Pope mentioned at the same time the feelings of interest for the Holy See which M. Thiers had often expressed, and which were grounded on a clear perception of true French interests.

That these professions of sympathy were not merely idle words, had been already shown by the Pope's letter to the King of Prussia: but this was not sufficient in the eyes of the noble-hearted Pontiff. Out of his scanty funds he took ten thousand francs, and sent it as his modest offering to the French victims of war. It touched them to the quick, coming at such a moment, and caused throughout the country a universal explosion of gratitude towards the Holy Father. Yet even this did not satisfy his tenderness for his suffering children; and we learn with emotion that he seriously thought of ordering that all the gold and silver vases or ornaments belonging to the churches should be sold for the benefit of the wounded. Well may M. Favre have written to his agent:—

You will tell the Cardinal, who must repeat it to the Holy Father, the deep gratitude I feel at his kindness. Yea, I am deeply touched by the share he takes in our misfortunes, and by the instructions he has sent to the clergy in favour of the National Assembly. From the bottom of my heart, I likewise thank His Holiness for the 10,000 francs he has been pleased to

send Mgr. Chigi for the victims of the war. The millions which the Cardinal would have fain added to them might have helped many a poor sufferer, but not have increased our feelings of gratitude and reverence. On reading in your despatch that the question was mooted whether the bishops should not be ordered to melt the sacred vases, I really thought myself brought back to the days of the primeval Church,—so rich in instances of virtue and devotion. To the same spirit of charity is likewise due the foundation of a benevolent society in our favour. I read its programme with heartfelt emotion, and I beg of you to lay before its worthy president, the Marchese di Cavaletti, the expression of my gratitude.

But the very repetition of these sundry marks of sympathy on the part of the Pontiff made it a more imperious duty for the French minister to ward off the degradation of submitting to the insolent offers of the Italian Government. Nevertheless M. Favre found himself here in a position doubly false. His hands were tied by his own policy and acts in regard to the temporal power; whilst his countrymen behind him now almost universally reprobated the burglarious usurpations of Victor Emmanuel. No one in France could bear with any degree of patience the cowardly policy which had hurried Italy into a close alliance with Prussia against her former benefactors,—an insult, which was rather increased than diminished by the appearance of Garibaldi and his predatory bands on the field of battle. By numberless Frenchmen this was considered as the greatest humiliation inflicted upon their nation, and contributed in no small degree to revive their latent reverence for the Holy Father. Petitions in favour of the Pope began to pour in from every part of France. The Roman question was openly discussed in the National Assembly, at Bordeaux in the very teeth of the Radicals of every hue. In this respect, as well as in many others, public opinion ran decidedly against them. This was the more remarkable that no manifestation of the same kind took place in Europe, and that the country where it did occur was bleeding at every pore, utterly crushed under the heel of a foreign invader.

At any rate M. Favre was bound to take it into serious account, since the provinces which shed their best blood for the national defence, were likewise the foremost in their earnest advocacy of a diplomatic interference in favour of the Pope. Consequently, as early as the month of March, we find the minister appointing a special ambassador to the Holy See, and he selected for that purpose Count d'Harcourt, the son of a man who had filled the same station at Rome in the troubled days of 1849. Count d'Harcourt is a stanch, unflinching Catholic,—a fact in itself telling volumes as to the pressure under which M. Favre was destined to succumb.

But the count is likewise a genuine diplomatist. Under most simple manners, he has an ample fund of *finesse* and sagacity, which make him capable of discerning and following up any intrigue without falling into it. Such is M. Favre's own sketch of his new agent, and he adds, by way of comment :—

> His opinions as to the temporal power were so well known, though he never made any display of them, that the Vatican Court must needs admit, that if he did not become its champion, no other man in his senses could think of doing it.

Previously even to this appointment, M. Jules Favre had tried negotiations with the Catholic powers of Europe relative to the Roman question. But Austria stood aloof, and contented herself with mere professions of sympathy for the Pope, and was not disposed to move one finger in his defence. M. de Bray, the minister of Bavaria, strange to say, followed in the wake of M. de Beust, and joined in proposing a European conference. To this the French minister pertinaciously demurred, and here the matter remained, for the Holy Father was no less adverse to the idea, which appears to have been first started by Mr. Gladstone. "A joint and almost continuous action," writes M. de Behaine to his superior, "ought to be exerted, according to the views of the Vatican, within certain limits, as I stated on another occasion. This alone would prevent it from leading to any conference, since the Holy See would in no case admit that its critical situation in regard to the Italian Government should become a matter of transaction."

Of course M. Favre saw this as well as any living man; but he seems to have been a victim to a most singular delusion in his belief that the Cabinet of Florence would ever offer any serious guarantee of independence to the Holy See. He is indeed startled at some of its exorbitant pretensions; yet still he fondly clings to his plan of conciliation. Another singular symptom of his ill-balanced mind is the fact, that he has not one word of censure against the audacious and uncalled-for aggression on the Papal territory in time of peace. He seems to take it for granted that the Italian Government was perfectly justified in such a breach of international law; and yet this is the man who upbraids Napoleon III. with his desertion of poor Denmark. We should like to know in what Victor Emmanuel had any right superior to that of King Wilhelm, when the latter annexed Holstein to his own dominions.

However, as time went on, it became impossible for M. Favre to hold his station. No one will dispute his honesty,

and however jejune may appear some of his notions concerning the Roman question, he must be allowed the benefit of straightforwardness. But in July last the matter came before the National Assembly in the form of a report on the petitions sent up to its bar, and at the head of which figured, we believe, every bishop of the land. On that occasion, Mgr. Dupanloup uttered a speech that made the whole Chamber thrill with wonder at so much eloquence and so much pathetic grandeur. M. Favre himself honestly acknowledges the deep impression produced by this noble effusion of Christian oratory. "His speech," says he, "though often sparkling with brilliancy, and reaching the highest flights of eloquence, did not throw new light on the question. The speaker was sublime when he brought face to face those insulters who revile the victim handed over to the stupid hatred of the mob, and the murderers who slaughter it. Thrice was he greeted by 'Hurrahs!' when he showed the social crime of those intolerant infidels, who, after rabidly vindicating for themselves a liberty of which they are but too unworthy, denounce persecution unto death against all believers in a God. 'You pretend,' exclaimed he, addressing them, 'you pretend to fear, you dare to say that Religion threatens you. No, you unfortunate beings, you only prove that you have none!' With the exception of certain exaggerations in point of language, and certain attacks bordering upon bad taste against King Victor Emmanuel, this speech well deserved the favour with which it was received. It certainly proved a triumph for the orator, but in no way brought any real strength to the cause of the Holy Father."

Such is M. Favre's opinion on the subject; but surely we may ask him whether an energetic and eloquent protest against spoliation and injustice does not always serve, and strengthen the cause of Truth? For years and years, the Republican leader of France went on denouncing in eloquent terms the internal and external policy of the Empire: would he accept his own verdict, and admit that all his denunciations were of no avail? We doubt it. As for the speech of the Bishop of Orleans, it did add new strength to the Papal cause; for it induced M. Thiers to make a solemn repudiation of the Imperial policy in regard to Italy and the Holy See. He positively asserted for France a right to protect against all aggressors the Church, as represented by the Supreme Pontiff. Such, he said, had been her noble policy for ages, and such it must continue to be henceforward. Surely, this was something; so much indeed, that on the very next day M. Favre *threw up* his post as Minister for Foreign Affairs. In so doing

he acted the part of an honest man, but he likewise acknowledged that the ambiguous line which he had cut out for himself was not adopted by his countrymen.

And if to this fact we add another no less significant, that is, the strong and pointed language used by the reporters on the petitions to reprobate the conduct of the Italian Government, together with the shuffling system of the Bonapartes, when they had to deal with the Roman question, we may well affirm that France, though crushed by unutterable woes, has freed herself from a great deal of iniquity, has asserted her own independence, has reserved the future,—having dearly learned by her latest experience, that actual grandeur and success is no security for enduring power and prosperity. Herein perhaps is a new source of strength added to the Papal cause.

Art. VI.—THE WORLD TURNED ATHEIST: HOW IT HAS BECOME SO.

De Matrimonio Christiano libri tres. Auctore Jo. Perrone, Soc. Jesu, &c. Romæ, 1858.

Les Doctrines Romaines sur le Libéralisme envisagées dans leur rapport avec le Dogme chrétien et avec les besoins des sociétés modernes. Par le P. H. Ramière, de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris, 1870.

L'Eglise et l'Etat. Par F. J. Moulart, de la Fac. de Théologie. *Revue Catholique*, Janvier, Février, Mai. Tome V., Nouvelle Série. Louvain, 1871.

"If any one shall deny one true God, Creator and Lord of all things visible and invisible; be he anathema.

"If any one shall not be ashamed to affirm that besides matter nothing exists; be he anathema.

"If any one shall assert that the substance or essence of God and of all things is one and the same; be he anathema," &c. &c.—Vatican Council, Session 3, Canons "Of God the Creator of all things," Canons 1, &c.

So this is the issue to which more than three centuries of vaunted reformation, working with its hundred eyes of intelligence and its hundred arms of power, has brought things at last. Many agencies in operation, some apparently discordant, but only apparently; Bibles circulated by millions, and thrust into every hand; physical progress unexampled in

its wide and flashing sweep; the fierce straining after that long-heralded, long-expected human perfection; license, called liberty, such as the world never saw before—liberty of thought and action, liberty of speech, liberty of the press; the people's will proclaimed as the supreme law, itself independent of all beside, and all beside dependent on it; the silent ignoring or open repudiation of the supernatural, and the severance of the social relations from all contact with its ideas and especially from all subjection to its influences; governments ruling and parliaments legislating without reference to God or to His law; from these and other kindred forces, growing up through the latter centuries, rapidly developed and all but matured in this our glorious nineteenth century, has come the hard, black issue—no God, no human soul; man, sprung originally from the beast, still a beast, to perish as a beast and be no more. It is enough to pierce the believing and loving heart with the icy chill of death; or rather to create in that heart a longing to be delivered from a world in which such mad and appalling blasphemies circulate as freely as the common news of the day. And this, too, not in Turkey, not in China, not in Hindostan, but in fair Christendom itself. Christendom, indeed! It is a common opinion among the Fathers and older theologians that the Garden of Eden still exists in all or much of its original bloom and splendour, guarded by a special providence against human access, or, as others think, transferred to some unapproachable region. If you should suppose God to lift His Church bodily from the midst of men, and transfer her, with all the gifts and treasures of which she is the sole depository, to some such region, the greater part of this very Christendom, save for the faint glimmering which might linger for a season after the departed luminary, would present to the eye of faith a vast moral chaos, Christendom no longer, but something very like Heathendom; if, owing to the past influence of the Church, in certain respects better than Heathendom, in others greatly worse—a vast chaos, the Spirit of God no longer moving over it, but darkness on the face of it, deepening ever more and more.

The General Councils hitherto assembled for the purpose of dogmatic definition (they were not all assembled for this purpose) uniformly addressed themselves to the leading errors of the time; though occasionally also to the settlement of controversies, the adjustment of which was more or less imperatively demanded for the actual welfare and peace of the Church. The Vatican Council in the preamble to the chapters and canons of the first Dogmatic Constitution expressly states its design *to con*demn errors which, owing their origin to the Reforma-

tion, have however come to their perfection only in more recent times. But we require no testimony of Pope or Council to assure us that the aforesaid batch of condemned doctrines *are* errors of our time, and that, within the period of a single generation, they have established an ascendancy almost incredible over the mind of the non-Catholic world. The literature of the day, light and popular, stately and philosophical, alike proclaims the fact aloud. You cannot open the advertising sheets of the leading periodicals without seeing evidences of it on every second page, in the very titles of the new publications announced there. It displays itself in every form of poetry and prose, in lectures, essays, histories, Biblical criticism,* and so forth. There it stands out palpable, like Milton's Death, black as night and terrible as hell, obstructing the light of heaven and overshadowing God's fair creation.

What is the cause of this terrible evil, this heavy curse? Is there a remedy for it, and, if so, what is that remedy? These indeed are questions of the deepest moment. Our present purpose is to answer them to the best of our feeble power. And here we wish to state, at the very outset, that we have nothing new to advance either in the way of principle or of argument. The substance of all we have to say in the present paper is taken from the writings of our old theologians, whom we deemed it unnecessary to name at the head of our article, and from the valuable works which we have named there. Selection, arrangement, much of the illustration may be ours: we lay claim to credit for little or nothing beyond.

To begin, then, with the first of the questions proposed above, there is one primary, as theologians would call it, remote cause, from which the others, the proximate causes, have sprung. This cause, this *original sin*, the parent of so many other sins, was the great Protestant revolt of the sixteenth century. There were great heresies before that revolt; some of them, with their rituals and congregations and churches, living down to the present day. There were the Arian, the Pelagian, the Nestorian, and many others. None of these heresies had a development like that which Protestantism has exhibited: birth and maturity were to them the same, they grew no more. But there are two characteristics of Protestantism, which from its

* The gentlemen of this department have agreed among themselves to dub their peculiar art by the name of the "higher criticism": and indeed high enough it is in point of impudence and arrogance, and, judging from the specimens we have seen of it, extreme shallowness. There is a German set: if you follow them, you are a high critic and a liberal Christian; if not, not, but a dogmatist and an old fogy—these same parties being themselves the most intolerable dogmatists in existence.

first existence stamped upon it features not to be found in any previous heresy; features which disclaim all special fellowship between it and them; features which clearly and broadly distinguish it from them all.

The first of these was, not that Protestantism was a revolt against authority—for such in fact all heresies necessarily are, however much the authors of them may profess the opposite—but that it made the rejection of all authority its primary and fundamental principle. For the first time, not only since the beginning of Christianity, but since the beginning of the world, it was proclaimed that, in forming his religious belief, every man is perfectly free from the controlling power of any authority whatsoever existing on this earth. We know not what may have happened in obscure corners, what may have been uttered by individuals, who had no following, or only a small one that soon died out. But we are not aware that, until the sixteenth century, the aforesaid principle had ever been proclaimed among men, as the broad and distinctive foundation of a religion; *and*, what is more, that a religion with many millions of votaries was actually built upon it, and has actually remained on it, clinging steadily to it, through all vicissitudes and variations, as to the one great principle of its life. Moreover, Protestantism based itself not only on the rejection of all living authority, but on the rejection of all authority in the past tradition of the Church, no matter how far back extending, even though touching the Apostolic age itself. This is a phenomenon which, before the rise of Protestantism, was utterly unknown in the world.

The second characteristic of Protestantism is the unbounded fury with which, typhoon like, it swept the whole garden of Catholic theology, leaving hardly a single plant of Paradise which it did not tear up by the roots, or break in its stem, or taint in its blossom. All preceding heresies confined themselves each to the negation of a single doctrine or a single class of doctrines. Thus, one erred on the divinity of Christ, another on His divine personality, another on His twofold nature, another on the necessity of grace, and so on. It is true that some of the heresies of the middle ages seem to have anticipated Protestantism in their sweeping assaults on the faith of the Church. But these heresies were only rude and inchoate attempts, half delirious utterances, for the most part without any theological system. Then, the faith of those ages was too strong for them, choked life out of them, or held them down *with* an overpowering pressure. Protestantism assailed the *Church on all sides*, at all points and at once, and succeeded—*by what unholy* and violent means it is beside our present pur-

pose to describe—in wresting from her imperial sway the greater part of Northern Europe.

Though such a host of heresies burst forth simultaneously and in one wide deluge, yet there were among them certain main principles, out of which others sprang; and it was indeed somewhat in this way that they at first arose in the brain of Luther himself. It is certain that his views on justification had taken strong possession of his mind for some time before he dreamed of separating from the Church:* and it is to this day generally maintained, as Luther himself maintained, that that doctrine is the keystone of genuine Protestantism. However this may be, a rapid glance at the mere general heads of doctrine and worship, on which the new religion broke with the old, will be quite enough to show how deep and wide was the chasm that yawned between them.

On the matter of divine grace there was asserted, on one hand, the utter corruption of human nature, man's utter inability to perform of himself the smallest good work, on the other hand, his utter inability to resist the influence of grace; the sinner justified not by sorrow for past sin but by simply believing that he is justified; that justification not real and internal, but a mere imputation to him of Christ's justice; no merit, no value whatever in good works however holy. Then, the whole seven sacraments swept clean away, the names of two of them retained as mere ceremonies: no regeneration in Baptism; no sacramental grace imparted in Confirmation; the Eucharist a mere sign or memorial, no Real Presence, no sacrifice of any kind, no confession of sins, no absolution from them, no penitential works to wash out the temporal punishment due to them; no anointing with oil or prayer of faith to strengthen the sick man in the last tremendous conflict; no priesthood, or a priesthood only in name, a mere "extrinsic denomination," like the title of Count or Captain; Matrimony, the "great sacrament" of the Apostle, degraded to the level of a civil contract, and its sacred bond rent asunder by virtue of an act of Parliament. Again, no veneration of the blessed angels and saints in heaven, no calling on them to pray for us. No special honour, no honour at all, to the great Mother of God; but, on the contrary, an elaborate anxiety to rob her of the glorious

---

* "Life of Luther, by Dr. J. Döllinger," English translation, p. 9. London: Richardson, 1853. Little did the biographer dream, when writing this sketch of Luther's life, that there were then maturing in his own breast errors of another kind that would in after-years draw him on to tread in the steps of the arch-*apostate; and that in* his old age his heart would be turned *away to follow strange gods.*

titles which are hers alone, to deny her divine maternity, to disprove her perpetual virginity, to lower her in every way down to the ordinary rank. As the Mother of Christ has been treated, so has been the Spouse of Christ, His holy Church. No visible head, no judge of controversies, no exemption from error in General Councils or in the whole Church together, unity in catholicity not essential, nor sanctity, nor apostolicity: the whole fabric, rock-foundation and superstructure, shivered to atoms, a hideous ruin, like the Prophet's desolation of Babylon. No purgatory, no prayers for the dead, no signing with the sign of the cross, no holy water, no consecration or sanctification of anything, no vows, no honour to celibacy—but thus much is enough, we need enumerate no more.

There are, however, two of the innumerable heresies, which Protestantism for the first time introduced into the world, that claim a brief special notice. The first is the rejection not only of the necessity but of the value and utility of mortification: not only no merit whatever, but no moral excellence whatever, in abstinence or fasting or any other penitential work; asceticism reviled as degrading and superstitious. The second is the division of doctrines into fundamental and non-fundamental, or, as it is commonly phrased in modern times, into essential and non-essential—non-essential, not because the revelation of the doctrines belonging to this category is not sufficiently certain to demand our assent, but because the doctrines are in themselves of minor importance, and such as may be rejected without peril to salvation or breach of Church unity. To this class has been consigned, in our time, the whole or nearly the whole body of purely revealed doctrine: and we see it constantly affirmed that what is called dogmatic religion is not essential; that to insist on its necessity or importance is mere bigotry; that the Gospel is a system rather of morals than of dogmas; and that our great aim should be not to square our belief in accordance with the latter, but to square our actions in accordance with the former. Then, this moral system has nothing in it of the supernatural. It is merely the development of our natural good qualities: to be honest and sober and especially to be kind and neighbourly, these make the perfect Christian man.

This is Protestantism, a system which in its principles virtually contains all the heresies that had previously existed from the foundation of Christianity, and, in the number of heresies which it actually introduced and actually contains, far surpasses them all taken together in one mass. What should from the first have been expected to come to pass has actually come to *pass;* what was once but theory, though theory sure to be

realized, is now a fact. It is a fact, attested by the highest authorities, stanch Protestants, that from England, the great stronghold of Protestantism, first issued that furious tide of deism and atheism which for the last hundred years has wrought such fearful havoc, physical and moral, over the whole continent of Europe. It is a fact that at this present day there is hardly any heresy, if there be any at all, which may not be openly professed even by members of the Established Church of England, still remaining members and even officers of that Church.

It is in the great Protestant revolt of the sixteenth century that the materialism and atheism of our time have had their original source. They are its offspring, not immediate but direct. They have been begotten of principles immediately begotten of it. And these, which we have called their proximate causes, we now proceed to review. We have already, in the introductory paragraph of this article, named the principal of these causes. In the enumeration and consideration of them it is not material what order we follow; nor does any arrangement occur to us that would not be altogether or to a great extent arbitrary.

1. The first is that which is expressed so clearly and distinctly in the very first proposition condemned in the ever-memorable Encyclical of December 8th, 1864, *Quantâ curâ*:—"You well know, venerable brethren, that at this time men are found not a few, who applying to civil society the impious and absurd principle of *naturalism*, as they call it, dare to teach that the best system of the state and [that also] civil progress absolutely require that human society should be constituted and governed, no more regard being paid to religion that if it did not exist; or, at least, without making any distinction between the true religion and the false ones." Of the hundred and one propositions condemned in the Encyclical and the accompanying Syllabus there is not one more insidious than this; and, when pushed in practice to its full meaning, there is perhaps none, next after those which deny the primary truths of natural religion, more pregnant with deadly evil to the souls of men and to society itself. It is so insidious, because that full meaning to which we have alluded would by no means strike, we will not say a careless, but even a careful and thoughtful, reader, at first sight: nay, it requires no small amount of calm reflection and keen scrutiny for a reader of the latter class to realize that meaning clearly and fully to himself. Hence the euphemistic, which in our day so dominates in the memoirs of eminent scoundrels, has been used with signal success to popularize this baleful heresy. More generally it is enunciated in a proposi-

tion affirming the total separation of Church and State as a thing desirable for the interests of both. It only means, they say, what we may call a division of labour, one of the principles of political economy. The hatter makes hats, the shoemaker makes shoes: if they desert their own craft, each turning to that of the other, we should have hats that no one could put on his head, and shoes that no one could put on his feet. So it is with Church and State. The spiritual and the temporal belong to two orders entirely distinct and different from each other—different in the ends they aim at, and in the means by which those ends are attainable. Let the Church take charge of her own order and confine herself to it: she is not qualified to manage temporal affairs, and has no business with them. Let the State act on the same principle: she is just as little qualified to manage spiritual concerns, and has as little business with them. And that is all—"only that and nothing more." The cant phrase of Count Cavour was "A free Church in a free State": they were the last words he uttered on this earth, and he uttered them after consummating his final sacrilege. We all know what that prince of lying and hypocritical villains meant by them—the robbery of religious houses and the violent expulsion of their inmates, the banishment or imprisonment of every ecclesiastic who dared to stand up for the laws of God and of the Church, the fomenting of rebellion in neighbouring states, the propagation of infidelity and impurity everywhere.* On the day before his death he said to Farina, one of his fellow-miscreants, "My mind is at ease, I have never done harm to any one."† As well might Robespierre have used such words when his neck lay under the knife of the guillotine. The truth is, that so plausible has this error been sometimes rendered by skilful sophistry and adroit manipulation of words, that some good, well-meaning and otherwise right-minded Catholics have been ensnared into the adoption of a principle,

---

* In writing the above sentence we quite forgot a passage which we had marked in F. Perrone's work in reading it full twelve years ago. On turning over the leaves for a quotation introduced into a subsequent part of this article, the passage struck our eye, and we give it here:—"Videntur igitur [principia quibus regitur novum Subalpinum gubernium] esse voluntas opprimendi utrumque clerum, secularem scilicet et regularem; expoliatio ac deprædatio bonorum ecclesiasticorum; cauta ac per gradus procedens abolitio primi constitutionis articuli, quo religio Catholica *sola* status religio declarata est; inductio Anglicanismi temperati; compressio bonorum et *erectio* pessimorum, ac demum *effrænis carnislicentia*." (L. 1, s. 2, c. 4, a. 1, *vol. i. p. 338.*)

† "*Reminiscences* of the Life and Character of Count Cavour," by William *de la Rive, p. 286.* London, 1862.

whose legitimate consequences they foresaw not, never dreamed of—consequences from which, when clearly recognized, they would shrink with horror. We now proceed to the examination of this principle.

In order to understand more clearly what they mean by the separation of Church and State, who hold not only the lawfulness but the absolute advantage of such a separation, it may be better first to explain what we mean by the union of Church and State, who maintain that this union is in strict accordance with God's revealed will, and is of the highest advantage to both Church and State, especially to the latter. We address ourselves only to Christians, and need not therefore insist on the very plain principle, which no one in any way deserving that name can question, that the members of a governing body or of any society whatever are in their private and individual capacity strictly bound by the Christian law and, if they be Catholics, by the laws of the Church. If a man is a king or a minister of state, he is not thereby the less bound by personal moral obligation: nay, men holding public influential offices are more strictly bound, inasmuch as their violations of duty are more apt to to draw others after them in the path of sin.*

The question, then, is not of the individuals who compose the State, but of the State itself, or rather of the Government which rules the State, and of this Government in its collective and governing capacity. Nor, again, can there be any doubt that this governing body is strictly bound to take care that it does not in its acts, legislative or executive, violate any admitted Christian law, natural or purely revealed, or deny any admitted dogma of Christian faith. This *negative* harmony of Church and State, or rather the duty of observing the divine and natural law, as a duty binding all human associations whatever, we suppose no Christian would deny.† As a private individual, merely because he has the physical power and is the

---

* See Lessius, "De Summo Bono," l. 1, c. 5, n. 25.

† "The distinctive principle of the book [Gladstone on Church and State] was supposed to be, that the State had a conscience. But the controversy really lies not in the existence of a conscience in the State so much as in the extent of its range. Few would deny the obligation of a State to follow the moral law. Every treaty, for example, proceeds upon it. The true issue was this: whether the State, in its best condition, has such a conscience as take cognizance of religious truth and error, and in particular whether State of the United Kingdom, at a period somewhat exceeding thirty s ago, was or was not so far in that condition as to be under an obligation ve an active and an exclusive *support* to the established religion of the ry."—"*A Chapter of Autobiography*," by the Right Hon. W. E. Glad-, *p. 14. London, 1868.*

stronger, is not justified in assaulting his neighbour's person or seizing his neighbour's property; so neither can one State invade another State or wage war against it, unless there coexist all the conditions required by the law of God for a just war; and every prince or minister who concurs in such invasion or such war is before God as really a robber and a murderer, as if he robbed and slew with his own hand. Governments are bound, even far more stringently than private individuals, to take care that each and every of their acts is in strict accordance with the eternal laws of right. They are bound to take care that no consideration of public utility, or power, or wealth, or dominion, or of any other so-called good whatever, shall induce them to depart one tittle from the golden rule; to take care that they draw not down upon their people and themselves one of those awful visitations which God has so often inflicted on nations for national sins—punishments rained down upon all in common, for crimes in which all in common have participated.* Only a heathen could question the truth of these principles: and yet how many princes and ministers have within the last twenty years openly set them at naught and trampled on them—princes and ministers not heathen, not Mahometan, but princes and ministers of Christian Europe. The earth groans under the mountain-loads of iniquity which the giant powers of wicked men in high places have piled upon it in that short span of time: and, but for the promise which we know can never fail, we should have no alternative but to throw ourselves into the arms of despair, and yield to the desolate and overwhelming pressure of

> That double-fronted sorrow,
> Which looks at once before and back,
> Beholds the yesterday, the morrow,
> And sees both comfortless, both black.

To return: the question is of the *positive*, operative, active union of the two powers. Is it the *duty* of Government to "defend the rights of God and of His Church against the attacks of impiety, as it defends the rights of its magistrates and private citizens against the attacks of injustice"?† Is the former not merely lawful and even laudable, but a strict duty, as all hold the latter to be? Undoubtedly, if there should be an active union between Church and Government, it would be expected that the duties should be reciprocal: and so they are.

---

* On the punishment of national sins see the above-cited Lessius, in his work "De Perfectionibus Divinis," l. 13, c. 11.

† Ramière, p. xxv.

But we need not inquire into the duties of the Church, because she not only admits and proclaims these duties, but discharges them every day, and to the utmost of her power,—discharges them even to Governments that ignore her, to Governments that calumniate and persecute her. For her ministrations all tend directly to one great end, to make men honest, pure, temperate, obedient to authority; in a word, to clothe them with every Christian virtue, that is, while making them holy before God and faithful servants of Him, to make them at the same time blameless before the State and faithful servants of it. So absolutely true is this, that, if she could accomplish her mission perfectly (which she never can, for the tares will be always mingled with the wheat), Government, which some have defined as "Police," might abdicate one of its most troublesome and engrossing functions, and be police no longer.

The only practical question therefore is that of the positive duty of the Government towards the Church. And here again we must further distinguish and further narrow the ground of inquiry. The question is not one of absolute and universal duty binding on all Governments, in all circumstances, at all times. There are duties not a few, not only of those imposed by human law, but also of those imposed by the divine law, both positive and natural, which do not bind in certain circumstances; for example, when, the observance of the duty would occasion serious injury to the individual on whom the duty lies, or to others; when the good end intended by the performance of the duty is sure, in this or that case, not to be attained; or even when the good end will be attained, but evil consequences greatly outweighing the good ones will certainly ensue. To this class belong some of the external duties of fraternal charity: and to it also belongs the duty now under consideration. Hence we do not contemplate the case of a nation of a mixed Catholic and non-Catholic population, with a governing body similarly mixed, and where, owing to the overwhelming opposition of what is called public opinion, the Government cannot at all lend the "secular arm" to that full and complete defence of the Church which we are now contemplating, or cannot do so without permanent irritation and tumult. Still less do we consider the case of a nation nearly all non-Catholic with a non-Catholic Government. We say nothing of a *radical* duty arising out of the obligation, by which all non-Catholics are bound, of embracing the Catholic religion when sufficiently proposed to them; this being a question entirely foreign to the matter of the present article.

There are cases, then, in which, all things considered, it were better that the Government should abstain entirely, or in a

degree, according to circumstances, from active co-operation with the Church. But, as we shall see by-and-by, these are cases not to be applauded but deplored; not to be put forward as models for imitation, but as anomalies tolerated because they cannot be helped. If I see a man going to commit a grievous sin, I am bound in charity to try to prevent him: but I am not bound, if I foresee that my admonition will be of no avail, or that it will entail a serious harm on myself. My withholding of counsel from either motive is not a rule but an exception to the rule: it is not a thing to be desired but to be lamented.

Our inquiry is not about the expedient and hypothetical, but about principle; not about what may be accepted as a lesser evil but about what is in itself desirable as simply good. And so we come at last to our thesis: and, to make it as unencumbered as possible of all extraneous and accidental appendages, we put it as follows. Suppose a nation purely Catholic with a purely Catholic Government, is that Government bound not only to profess itself a thoroughly Catholic Government, to act as a thoroughly Catholic Government, that is, on purely Catholic principles, but bound also to protect and defend the Catholic Church existing in its dominions against all hostile assaults whether of the tongue or of the pen or of the arm of flesh? We answer that the Government is so bound, and that the proposition affirming this obligation is not a matter of mere opinion but a sure and certain doctrine.

The argument by which we undertake to establish this doctrine is at once proof and disproof, κατασκευη and ανασκευη. While it evinces the truth of our proposition, it at the same time directly and formally refutes the main principle on which the opposite doctrine rests. That principle we shall state in the words of its most eloquent and, as far as we have seen, decidedly its most able and acute defender. Lord Macaulay has discussed the question in no less than three of his celebrated *Edinburgh Review* essays,—those namely entitled "Southey's Colloquies on Society" (January, 1830), "Civil Disabilities of the Jews" (January, 1831), and "Gladstone on Church and State" (April, 1839). In this latter and more matured essay, exclusively devoted to the subject, he seems to have put forth all his strength, and to have completely exhausted his whole store of argument. In it, too, he states his principle in a much more formal and precise shape: and from it therefore we shall quote.

> We consider the primary end of government as a purely temporal end, the protection of the persons and property of men.
>
> We think that government, like every other contrivance of human wisdom, *from the highest* to the lowest, is likely to answer its main end best when it

is constructed with a single view to that end. . . . . Take cutlery, for example. A blade which is designed both to shave and to carve will certainly not shave so well as a razor, or carve so well as a carving-knife. An academy of painting, which should also be a bank, would, in all probability, exhibit very bad pictures and discount very bad bills. A gas company which should also be an infant school society, would, we apprehend, light the streets ill, and teach the children ill. On this principle, we think that government should be organized solely with a view to its main end; and that no part of its efficiency for that end should be sacrificed in order to promote any other end, however excellent.

But does it follow from hence that governments ought never to pursue any end other than their main end? In no wise. Though it is desirable that every institution should have a main end, and should be so formed as to be in the highest degree efficient for that main end; yet if, without any sacrifice of its efficiency for that end, it can pursue any other good end, it ought to do so. . . . . If a government can, without any sacrifice of its main end, promote any other good work, it ought to do so. . . . .

Government is not an institution for the propagation of religion, any more than St. George's Hospital is an institution for the propagation of religion: and the most absurd and pernicious consequences would follow, if government should pursue, as its primary end, that which can never be more than its secondary end, though intrinsically more important than its primary end. But a government which considers the religious instruction of the people as a secondary end, and follows out that principle faithfully, will, we think be likely to do much good and little harm.*

It has been remarked that many, if not most, errors in reasoning may be traced to ambiguous terms, and are detected by distinguishing the different meanings. It is plain that by "primary" and "secondary" Macaulay does not understand intrinsically more important and less important: this meaning he expressly disclaims. What, then, does he mean? Is the primary end of Government, though in itself and intrinsically less important, yet extrinsically and in relation to the Government the more important? Or is the primary end that which the Government should look to in the first place, and, this being secured, then be bound or authorized to set about securing the other end? From the drift of the third paragraph, this would seem pretty clearly to be his meaning. But this admission, as we shall see hereafter, would go a great way to upset his theory and establish ours. Moreover, the propagation of religion would in such an hypothesis be really and truly an end of Government, though an end to be attained in the second place. But Macaulay denies that the propagation of religion

* Lord Macaulay's "Essays," vol. ii. p. 493-7. The edition we quote from is the ninth, in three vols., large octavo. London: 1858.

is in any way an end of Government, *as such*, any more than it is the end of an hospital. Besides, it must be conceded on all sides that the protection of persons and property should, in the order of time, precede the propagation of religion. For how can a community, where persons and property are insecure, engage in the propagation of religion or in any other beneficial work, until that insecurity is put an end to. If Macaulay had known something of the scholastic philosophy, which, in his Essay on Bacon, he so grossly misrepresents and so contemptuously flouts, his language on the present occasion would have been as luminous and precise as it is on almost every other. In order to put this matter clearly before our readers, we must have recourse to the terminology of that same philosophy: but we must first premise an explanation of the terms themselves, which we do through the medium of an illustration.

The same institution or the same action may have several distinct ends. For example, I am a young boy who feel a strong desire to become a priest. To attain this end I know that I must go through a certain course of study in an ecclesiastical college. To get admission into this college, and to be able to go through that course, I know that, besides other qualifications, I must have a certain knowledge of Greek and Latin. So, I go to school, and set about the study of these languages. What is the *immediate* end I propose to myself during this course of study? Exactly the same as that of the lad sitting next me in the schoolroom, and who has no idea of becoming a priest,—namely, to acquire a competent knowledge of Greek and Latin. I enter college, and, after concluding my philosophical, commence my theological, studies. A young married layman is permitted to attend the same public lectures. We have both exactly the same immediate end, to get a sound knowledge of theology; he from a mere love of the sacred science and of the intellectual and elevating pleasure which its investigations yield to the earnest student; I, perhaps not having much relish for the study in itself, with a view to qualify myself for the priesthood and for the duties of the priesthood. But why do I wish to become a priest? To perfect myself in sanctity, to save my own soul and the souls of many others. Here, then, is a series of acts, or of classes of continuous acts, commencing with the day on which I first took the Latin grammar in my hand, and ending on the morning on which I was clothed with the vesture of holiness: each of them having its own immediate end, the immediate end of the last *act being* the ultimate end of them all; the end to which *they are all directed*, to which they all subordinate, in which *they are all crowned* and consummated. When I commenced

and proceeded with my study of Latin, the immediate (proximate) end I had in view was to learn that language; but the ultimate end I had in view was to sanctify myself and others by the work of the priesthood. This ultimate end is as really and truly an end of the first act as is the immediate end of that act: nay, it is *the* end of that act; and, if this ultimate end had never existed, the first act and end and the other, the intermediate, acts and ends would never have existed. I was the son of a country shopkeeper, and had I not intended to become a priest, I would have never dreamed of learning Latin, but, content with the mother tongue, would have helped my father to keep his shop and succeeded him in business.

We might give a thousand similar illustrations: but every intelligent reader can make them for himself on the pattern given. Now, we entirely agree with Macaulay that the primary (immediate) end of Government is temporal—*purely* temporal, if you so choose to phrase it—the protection of the persons and property of men; the protection of individual rights against domestic aggression, the protection of State rights against foreign aggression. But is the protection of the rights of the Church in herself, in her ministers and members, *as such*, also an end of Government, *as such?* We answer, yes,—decidedly yes. Not the immediate but the ulterior end, to which, in the designs of God, the immediate end should be subordinated.

Macaulay, in the passage quoted above, uses rather incidentally a phrase, in which lies hid the unsound principle, or at least a part of the unsound principle, on which his theory rests. "We think," he says, "that Government, like every other contrivance of *human* wisdom, from the highest to the lowest," &c. Is it true that Government is a contrivance of human wisdom, that is, of *purely* human wisdom? Macaulay evidently thinks so; for he classes it with other purely human institutions, which range from highest to lowest; and in the paragraph from which the words are taken and in preceding and succeeding paragraphs, he expressly classes it with other institutions of purely human contrivance, such as academies of painting, gas companies, banks, clubs, &c. It may be as well to say here that by Government we mean throughout the supreme power in an independent state. Now, in such Government two things are to be considered and carefully distinguished from each other: and these are, first, the particular form of Government or the particular depository of the supreme power in any state; secondly, the supreme power itself. Some writers call the former the supreme power in the concrete and the latter the supreme power in the abstract. *But, however* they may be named, it is *evident that there is a real* distinction between them; for the

form of Government may be different in different kingdoms, or in the same kingdom at different periods,—pure monarchy, mixed monarchy, republican; while the supreme power, for example the power of life and death, the power of levying war, is in itself the same in all forms. Now, there is no doubt that the form of Government is a contrivance—whether of wisdom or of folly—purely human. On this point there is no disagreement at the present day; nor among approved theologians has there ever been any disagreement at any time.

But is the power itself a contrivance of human wisdom, is it derived from a human source? Most certainly not: it comes from God, and from God alone. Here again all Catholic theologians are agreed. Indeed the language of Scripture is so clear as to need no commentary, nor could any commentary render it clearer. We will quote but one well-known text, a text decisive indeed:—"Let every soul be subject to higher powers: for there is no power but from God: and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation. For princes are not a terror to the good work, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same. For he is God's minister to thee for good."—Rom. xiii. 1, &c.

This power, it is true, does not come directly through positive revelation from God, but through a law of our nature of which He is the author. Putting aside the peculiar and temporary polity of the chosen people, God has not formally invested with power any Government that now exists or that ever existed on earth. But He has created us with a natural and irresistible tendency to associate together. Moreover, He has so constituted us, that it is an absolute necessity of our nature for self-preservation that we should combine into civil society. That the society of the family has been established by God as a law of our nature is undoubted. But a number of families, say a thousand or a million or five million, inhabiting any country, each living isolated and independent of every other, and at the same time enjoying security of person and property, is a thing that never existed and never could exist. Moreover, we have so many wants, physical and intellectual and moral, if not for our simple being, at least for our well-being, which could not possibly be satisfied except in a state of civil society. Civil society is, then, a necessity of our nature, a law of our nature established by God. But if civil society be a necessity for the individual and for the family, not less necessary for society itself is the existence of some form of supreme Government.

This is so obvious and so universally admitted, that we need not set about proving it. As Macaulay himself says somewhere in one of these essays, the worst Government that ever existed is better than no Government at all: civil society without Government is simply anarchy.*

This doctrine, we need hardly add, is in perfect accordance with that of the Fathers. We will confine ourselves to the quotation of a single, but very clear and striking, testimony. S. John Chrysostom, in his twenty-third Homily on the Epistle to the Romans (§ 1), commenting on the first verse of the passage quoted above, has the following:—"'There is no power,' he [S. Paul] says, 'except from God.' What sayest thou? Is, then, every ruler appointed by God? I say not so, he replies: I am not now speaking of individual rulers but of the thing itself. For that there should be supreme authorities, and that some should govern and others be subject, and that all things should not be tossed about lawlessly and at random, the peoples like waves whirled hither and thither, this I say is the work of divine wisdom. Therefore he did not say, There is no *ruler* except from God, but he speaks of the thing itself, saying, 'There is no *power* except from God.'"†

The supreme power, then, comes from God. The only controversy is whether the rulers invested with that power originally received it immediately from God on being appointed by the community, or received it immediately from the community, in which it had resided until thus transferred. The question is indeed an open one;‡ but the latter opinion is far more common, and we think far more reasonable, we had almost said morally certain.§ The dispute is, however, of little prac-

---

* Dr. Moulart puts the argument pithily (p. 4):—"Tout ce qui est une nécessité de la nature est une loi de Dieu; or, la société est une nécessité de la nature, et le pouvoir est une nécessité de la société; donc, le pouvoir est une loi divine. Chaque membre de ce raisonnement est tellement évident par lui-même, qu'est à peine besoin d'en indiquer les preuves."

† *Ου γαρ εστιν εξουσια, φησιν, ει μη ὑπο του Θεου. Τί λεγεις; πας ουν αρχων απο του Θεου κεχειροτονηται; ου τουτο λεγω, φησιν· ουδε γαρ περι των καθ' ἑκαστον αρχοντων ὁ λογος μοι νυν, αλλα περι αυτου του πραγματος. Το γαρ αρχας ειναι, και τους μεν αρχειν, τους δε αρχεσθαι, και μηδε ἁπλως και ανεδην ἁπαντα φερισθαι, ὡσπερ κυματων τῆδε κακεισε των ἀνεμων περιαγομενων, της του Θεου σοφιας ἐργον ειναι φημι. Δια τουτο ουκ ειπεν· ου γαρ εστιν αρχων ει μη ὑπο Θεου, αλλα περι του πραγματος διαλεγεται λεγων· ου γαρ εστιν εξουσια ει μη ὑπο Θεου.*

‡ Suarez, "Defensio Fidei," l. 3, c. 2, n. 2.

§ "Suprema potestas civilis, per se spectata, immediate quidem data est a Deo hominibus in civitatem seu perfectam communitatem politicam congregatis, non quidem ex peculiari et quasi positiva institutione, vel donatione omnino distincta a productione talis naturæ, sed per naturalem consequentiam

tical value: for the writers on both sides agree in imposing the same rights and duties on the rulers and the ruled.

Civil society, then, is the work of God, and the authority by which it is governed comes from God. We must go back to our Catechism, to the very first questions put there—the answers to which we all learned long ago, in the days of that early innocence which will be renewed for us again only in heaven:—"Who created and placed you in this world? God. Why did God create you? To know Him, love Him, and serve Him in this life, and to be eternally happy with Him in the next." The words are few, the truths are simple: but these truths are a thousand times worth all that, without them, all the philosophers of all ages ever taught or ever could teach. The words are few; but the destiny, for all eternity, of the whole human race and of every individual of it depends on knowing and doing what they signify. It depends on this and on this alone: and everything else in the whole universe, but this or what is implied in this, is to us as worthless as the dust under our feet, should trouble or concern us as little, as the wind that blows over the buried dead troubles or concerns them. Do we exaggerate? Did S. Paul exaggerate when he exclaimed, "I count all things to be but loss, for the excellent knowledge of Jesus Christ my Lord: for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and count them but as dung that I may gain Christ"?

Yes, God created man for one only end—the perfect and everlasting happiness of heaven. And God placed us in this world, and gives to each of us our allotted term of life, for this one end *here*, that we might prepare and fit ourselves for the attainment of that end *hereafter*. For this He has given all that here He has given us, all that we are and have, and have power to do. God on creating Adam infused into his soul a perfect and clear knowledge of his exalted destiny, a perfect

---

ex vi primæ creationis ejus: ideoque ex vi talis donationis non est hæc potestas in una persona, neque in peculiari congregatione multarum, sed in toto perfecto populo seu corpore communitatis. Hæc resolutio quoad omnes partes communis est non solum Theologorum, &c. . . . .

"Ex quibus tandem concluditur nullum regem vel monarcham habere vel habuisse (secundum ordinariam legem) immediate a Deo, vel ex divina institutione, politicum principatum, sed mediante humana voluntate et institutione." (*Idem, ibid.*, n. 5, 10.)

"Quæ potestas [summa civilis] non confertur a Deo per aliquam actionem peculiarem a creatione distinctam, sed est veluti proprietas ipsam rectam rationem consequens, quatenus recta ratio præscribit ut homines in unum moraliter congregati expresso aut tacito consensu modum dirigendæ, conservandæ, propugnandæque societatis præscribant." (Concina, "de Jure Naturæ," &c., *l. 1, diss. 4, c. 2, n. 4.*)

and clear knowledge of all the divine truths it was fitting for a being so destined to know, of all sacred duties he was to discharge in order to secure that destiny. Adam was at the same time clothed with the royal robe of grace, and thereby lifted up to the supernatural order, to God's order, to be an adopted son of God and heir to His kingdom. Adam knowing God and worshipping God, the first of the body of the faithful that was afterwards to be, the beginning of God's Church on earth—after creation, this was his first phase, his first *state*. He was as yet alone. Eve was created, and on her creation she too was dowered, in fitting proportion, with the same supernatural gifts. She was brought to Adam and given him as his wife: the first marriage was celebrated, the first and last in Paradise. This was the germ out of which was to grow, according to God's ordinance, the society of the family (with its οικονομια). In due course of time the family came. Family grew out of family and multiplied, until the second and larger society, also ordained by God, came into existence—the State (with its πολιτεια). There was first man as a believer in God and a worshipper of God, then the family, then civil society or the State. God is really the author of these three, but not in the same way. He is the author of the first by positive revelation and by the operation of his grace (ut auctor gratiæ). He is the author of the second and third, inasmuch as they are demanded by the exigencies of our nature, of which He is the immediate author, and by the dictates of right reason, of which He is the immediate author (ut auctor naturæ).

The immediate end of the family is the propagation of the human race: the immediate end of civil society and its government is the security of person and property. But they have, in the designs of God, an ulterior end, that of contributing to man's last end, *according to their respective faculties* and *within the limits of these faculties*.* Evidently the family has. No Christian would venture to assert that a parent discharged his whole duty by rearing up his children with due care for bodily health and mental culture, and fitting them for a future suitable state in life. Surely the moral and religious training of children, the early instilling into their minds of the great truths and duties of religion, the assiduous formation of their hearts and actions to the love and practice of Christian virtue and Christian piety, the no less assiduous protection of them from the snares of vice and heresy—surely these constitute a strict parental duty; a duty not only immeasurably more important than the other duty, but to which that other duty

* Moulart, p. 164.

should be altogether subordinate; a duty to the neglect of which, the other duty being amply fulfilled, we firmly believe is to be mainly attributed the everlasting ruin of the great majority of the Christian souls that are lost for ever.

As surely it is the duty of Government to extend a similar protection, when necessary, to its subjects—carefully, however, keeping in view the limitation we have marked in the last paragraph. If Adam had conquered the great temptation, he and his posterity (probably not all, but many) would have lived "in justice and holiness of truth." Undoubtedly, as these innocent creatures grew up into the society of the State, it would have been the most solemn duty of the ruler of such state to protect them from assaults against their faith or their virtue made by their fallen brethren, if such assaults would have been permitted in such a supposition. Man sinning in Adam has been again raised to his former destiny and his former hopes. He is indeed shorn of many glorious gifts which were his in those golden days,—among them the complete subjection of his appetites to his reason and his will. Civil government is in consequence greatly changed in the qualities of its immediate end and in its mode and means of action in reference to that end; but its great ulterior end and function remain essentially the same.

Nay, in man's fallen condition the State protection of religion is infinitely more necessary, more necessary too for the immediate end of Government itself. Religion is necessary not only for the well-being but for the enduring existence of civil society. A state in which every man was a Huxley could not hold together for a single generation. Without religion there is no faith in moral principles, no respect for moral duties; and where these are not you may have numbers of human beings massed together in the same territory, but not constituting what we understand by civil society. In those countries where infidelity prevails to a great extent, it is the moral and religious sentiment of the sound part of the community that mainly contributes to the public and private security, so far as that security exists. Take away this sentiment, and, if there be a Government at all, it will be government only by the sword and the halter, a permanent reign of terror. So frail are we in our fallen condition, so weak to resist severe temptation, that even the firmest faith and the strongest moral conviction will not keep us from falling, unless there be joined with them a strong grace also; and there are thousands, within the Church as without, who believe in the eternal torments of hell, who *believe that mortal* sin deserves these torments, and who yet *commit mortal sin* every day of their lives. As it is the

duty of Government to protect person and property, so it is the duty of Government to protect the principles of religion and morals, these principles being such efficacious aids in securing the protection of person and property. But the argument, which has its weight more or less in every case, tells with peculiar, with resistless force in the case to the consideration of which we have purposed mainly, if not exclusively, to confine ourselves, the case, namely, of a Catholic Government ruling a Catholic people. Such a Government must believe and know that the influence of the Church in her teaching and other ministrations is so powerful in promoting the immediate end of government itself, that, as we have already observed, if this influence could have its full effect, Government would be relieved from one of its most onerous functions. For such a Government to withhold its protection from the Church would be simply to violate in the most flagrant manner its direct sacred and solemn duty.

From the nature of the case, and from a consideration of the universal law of charity, it seems on the very face of it altogether incredible that God should have given this vast supreme power to the State, and that those invested with it therein, while they have the ability, should not also have the strict duty, of securing and protecting for their subjects the means of attaining their one great end, the one thing necessary—the attainment of which is the ineffable and everlasting felicity, which eye hath not seen nor ear heard; the loss of which is the everlasting doom of hell, where the smoke of the torments ascends up for ever and ever.*

Hence, as F. Perrone remarks,† "the unanimous doctrine of the Fathers is . . . . that the end and means of civil society are of their own nature subordinate to the power of the Church, inasmuch as temporal felicity is directed to eternal felicity. Hence the Fathers teach that God established the civil power to protect the Church, and to assist her in attaining her own proper end." The authorities are very explicit; and, though well known, as they are brief, we will give the principal of them.

Pope S. Celestine the First, writing to the Emperor Theodosius, says:—"The cause of the faith ought to be to you

---

* The following curious declaration of the celebrated Charles James Fox is given in the "Recollections by Samuel Rogers," p. 49:—"The only foundation for toleration is a degree of scepticism; and without it there can be none. For if a man believes in the saving of souls, he must soon think about the means; and if, by cutting off one generation, he can save many future ones from hell-fire, it *is his* duty do it."

† *Loco supra cit.* § 4.

of more importance than that of your kingdom: and your clemency should be more solicitous for the peace of the churches than for the security of all your dominions. For all things turn out prosperous, if what are dearer to God are first taken care of." *

Pope S. Leo the Great, addressing another Roman Emperor, says:—"You ought resolutely to bear this in mind, that the royal power was conferred on you not for the mere government of the world [the State], but chiefly for the assistance of the Church." †

S. Isidore of Seville (Hispalensis) has the following:—"Let secular princes understand that they must render an account to God for the Church, the protection of which has been committed to them by Christ. For as the peace and discipline of the Church are consolidated or impaired by Christian princes, He will demand an account from them, who has intrusted the Church to their keeping." ‡

Everything in the way of argument to be found in Macaulay's two earlier essays is in substance reproduced, together with much additional, in his later essay, that on Mr. Gladstone's work. With the peculiar views and reasoning of that work we of course have nothing to do. We shall therefore notice only such passages in the critique on it as are applicable to the doctrine we hold and to the arguments by which we have tried to establish that doctrine.

We resume our examination of the passages quoted above. "A blade which is designed both to shave and to carve will certainly not shave so well as a razor, or carve so well as a carving-knife." The application of this illustration is obvious: a Government that undertakes at once the function of protecting life and property and the function of propagating religion, will discharge neither function so well, as if it confined itself to its own immediate duty, and left the other duty to the Church; just as a blade, &c. But suppose you had a blade that answered both purposes equally well; that, though used for both shaving

---

* "Major vobis fidei causa debet esse quam regni, ampliusque pro pace ecclesiarum clementia vestra debet esse sollicita, quam pro omnium securitate terrarum. Subsequuntur enim omnia prospera, si primitus quæ Deo sunt cariora serventur." (Apud Harduin, "Acta Conciliorum," tom. i. col. 1473.)

† "Debes incunctanter advertere, regiam potestatem tibi non ad solum mundi regimen, sed maxime ad Ecclesiæ præsidium esse collatam." (Epist. 156, c. 3.)

‡ "Cognoscant principes sæculi Deo debere se rationem reddere propter Ecclesiam, quam a Christo tuendam suscipiunt. Nam sive augeatur pax et disciplina Ecclesiæ per principes fideles sive solvatur, ille ab eis rationem exiget, qui eorum potestati suam Ecclesiam credidit." (Sententiæ, c. 51, n. 6.)

and carving, shaved as well as if it never carved, and carved as well as if it never shaved. Nay more, suppose you had a razor that shaved all the better for being occasionally used as a carving-knife; would you not say that it was highly fitting and desirable so to use the razor now and then? We make, you will reply, an absurd supposition: for never yet was razor improved by being used as a carving-knife, never yet was razor that, by being so used, was not rendered utterly unfit for its own proper use of shaving. Yes, the supposition is absurd, as are Æsop's fables, in which birds and beasts are represented as talking and reasoning like men. But it is only our imaginary razor, and not Macaulay's real one, that can be at all used as a just illustration: for, as our razor is not only not impaired but improved for its own immediate end, by being used as a carving-knife; so Government, by protecting the rights of the Church, not only does not in any way fail in attaining its own immediate end, but, as we have seen, more efficiently thereby promotes and secures that end. Our razor, in its own way, shaves and carves too; Macaulay's, like Peter Pindar's, was only made to sell—to pass off a sounding sophism.

The same vein of false analogy runs through the rest of Macaulay's illustrations, and vitiates them all. "An academy of painting, which should also be a bank, would, in all probability, exhibit very bad pictures and discount very bad bills." Yes, but why? Because, on account of our limited faculties, the studies and the routine of mental and manual exercises, which are necessary to make men eminent painters, are incompatible with those that are necessary to make men adepts in the art of banking; and because the constant pursuit of one profession is incompatible with the constant pursuit of the other. A good poet may be a good orator, and, as a general rule, good poets who cultivate prose composition are good prose writers; for there is not only a compatibility but a harmony, and even a certain affinity between these pursuits. Thus Suarez was at once a great dogmatic theologian, a great moral theologian, a great scholastic theologian, a great polemic theologian, a great patristic theologian, a great scripture theologian, and, considering the abstruseness and the technicalities of the matter, a clear and beautiful writer in all. But there are professions and lines of life which so absorb the faculties of those who aim at eminence in them, as to render eminence in other and uncongenial pursuits quite impossible. There may be rare exceptions, but this is the rule. A great captain is never a great lawyer, a great lawyer is never a great physician, a great physician is never a great navigator; and so on. On this principle is founded the homely saying, "Jack of all trades, master

of none." Indeed, so universally is the principle admitted and acted upon, that a man engaged in any laborious profession, and wishing to rise high therein, if he busies himself much in extraneous pursuits, must keep this carefully concealed from the public. A lawyer, who was known to be habitually given to novel-writing or verse-making would soon lose half his clients.

Macaulay seems to think that the Government duty of protecting the Church is somewhat as incompatible with the Government duty of protecting life and property, as is the function of a razor with that of a carving-knife, the function of an academy of painting with that of a bank, of a gas company with that of an infant-school society. But we have already shown that not only is this not true, but that the very contrary of it is true. To make our position still clearer, one word in addition to what we have said. Take, for example, the academy of painting and the bank. The former, while exercising the functions of the latter, must, for the time, first of all completely abandon its paints and pallets and brushes and everything else connected with the art: it must then betake itself into an entirely new mansion, to deal with an entirely different set of wares,—ledgers, drafts, bills, interest-tables, and so forth. Here indeed is the hatter making shoes, and the shoemaker manufacturing hats. But the analogy drawn between the double function of painter and banker, on one hand, and the double function we assign to Government, on the other, is not analogy at all, but perfect contrast, having not similitude, but complete dissimilitude. For Government in undertaking to protect the Church goes not one hair's breadth out of the sphere within which it acts in protecting life and property: the means and the whole means which it uses in discharging the latter duty, are precisely the same which it uses in discharging the former, namely, wise laws and due enforcement of these laws. It prevents and punishes violations of the rights of the Church by the very same machinery it uses in preventing and punishing robbery and murder. It is not, then, both painter and banker at once, but all painter and nothing else, or all banker and nothing else; painting two pictures in the same studio, discounting two bills over the same counter.

For a reason which will appear by-and-by, we defer the consideration of the concluding paragraph in the extracts given above, and go back to the earlier part of the essay.

Now here are two great objects: one is the protection of the persons and *estates of citizens from* injury; the other is the propagation of religious *truth. No two objects* more entirely distinct can well be imagined. The

former belongs wholly to the visible and tangible world in which we live; the latter belongs to that higher world which is beyond the reach of our senses. The former belongs to this life; the latter to that which is to come. Men who are perfectly agreed as to the importance of the former object, and as to the way of obtaining it, differ as widely as possible respecting the latter object. We must, therefore, pause before we admit that the persons, be they who they may, who are intrusted with power for the promotion of the former object, ought always to use that power for the promotion of the latter object. (pp. 438–9.)

Macaulay, in the introductory part of his essay, charges Mr. Gladstone with indulging occasionally in a certain vague and sweeping solemnity of style, by which the ideas are rendered hazy and indistinct. We think this charge not a little applicable to the passage we have just transcribed.

1. There is an ambiguity in the phrase "propagation of religious truth," which should have been noticed earlier in this article, and which must be cleared up now. It is one thing to engage in the propagation not merely of religious truth, but of other things comprised in the general term, religion, by the means established by God for this purpose, such as preaching and the administration of sacraments. This is not only the proper but the exclusive office of the Church. In this work the Government has no business to interfere, and, except in the way we are just going to mention, is bound not to interfere. It is quite another thing to protect the Church in the execution of this work, by taking care that she shall have full liberty in carrying it on, and by removing any obstacles that may be thrown in her way, so far as they can be removed or so far as it is expedient to remove them. This is to *aid*, by protecting, the Church in *her* work of propagating religion, and this is the proper duty of Government in reference to the propagation of religious truth. Whether a Government may be bound to go farther and give aid of another kind,—namely, in money or money's worth,—is a question to be determined by circumstances: and the rules for so determining are simply those to which we have already alluded,—the rules of fraternal charity, as laid down by all our theologians, in reference to our neighbour's spiritual necessities. We need not here open any inquiry as to a special duty incumbent on Government, distinct from that which lies on private individuals. In the good old Catholic times the question would have been of no practical value; for the piety of the faithful then supplied, or had already supplied, the Church with all that was necessary, and more than was necessary, to carry on her daily and never-ending war against the empire of *ignorance and* error and sin. In modern times *Governments calling themselves* Catholic have plundered the

Church of what those ages of faith had bequeathed to her; Governments—not even mere police, but open robber-gangs—adding horrible sacrilege to horrible injustice, and on these as a foundation building their synagogue of perdition, which they consecrate to the service of the devil and the doing of his works.

2. "No two objects more entirely distinct can well be imagined." The two objects are undoubtedly quite distinct. But it by no means follows that, especially one being subordinate to the other, both may not be fully attainable by the same agent and even by the same agency or the same kind of agency. If the objects be incompatible, or the means of gaining them be incompatible, the argument would hold. But so far is this from being the case with the two objects in question, that, as we have seen, the very opposite is true of them: they harmonize together with the most perfect adaptation towards the one great end. The principle involved in Macaulay's reasoning is utterly false, namely, that to secure objects entirely distinct it is necessary to employ actors or appliances entirely distinct. I am a solitary student, labouring hard every day at my desk and among my books. I have a garden, which I cultivate with my own hands, working there daily in the proper seasons for two or three hours. By this single piece of work I secure three objects entirely distinct: first, I grow my little crops; secondly, I exercise my body and unbend my mind, thus promoting the health of both; thirdly, I keep off the creeping in of lazy and idle habits, from which so much evil springs. Perhaps also I intend a trifle of mortification, and so accomplish a fourth object. Let us again take the example of the family. Parents are bound to their children by duties which have two objects not only entirely distinct, but to be secured by means entirely distinct,—the proper rearing of them as regards health of body and mind, and their moral and religious training. So distinct indeed are these duties in their objects and means, that there are thousands of parents who discharge the former duty with over-care and over-anxiety, and who, alas, utterly and absolutely neglect the latter. Good, pious parents discharge both duties; and, discharging them well, are blessed before God and man, blessed here and blessed for all eternity.

3. The object of government, Macaulay says, belongs wholly to this world and this life. No, not *wholly*. Its immediate object belongs to this life: but, as we have seen, it has an ulterior end which reaches far beyond. When he says that the propagation of religious truth belongs to the invisible world and to the life to come, of course he does not mean that the *work of propagating* truth is to be carried on, not in this world, *but in the next; he* means that it has reference to the future

life, that its ultimate end is the possession of the joys of heaven. But it has an end here, on the gaining of which the gaining of the ultimate end entirely and exclusively depends, and that end is the sanctification of men. When he contrasts the visible and tangible world with the invisible and intangible, he, of course, does not mean that the propagation of religious truth is an invisible and intangible work. The Church is visible and tangible, her work is visible and tangible: that work, too, has its end and reward here, pretty visible and tangible in the good lives and deaths of virtuous men. But (and this seems to be his reasoning), because that work has an ulterior end and reward in the future life and the invisible world, *therefore*, the greatest power, the only supreme power, which God established in civil society was not designed by Him to aid or protect the Church in the execution of her visible and tangible work in this world. Surely there is here a sad want of what logicians call the "vis consequentiæ": and we say to Macaulay what was once replied to a pompous gentleman, who was pressing too energetically a similarly inconclusive argument, "Sir, I deny your consequence."

4. "Men who are perfectly agreed as to the importance of the protection of person and property," and as to the way of obtaining it, differ as widely as possible respecting the "propagation of religious truth." Well, if men differ, they cannot agree, and there is an end. But suppose they do not differ: suppose a Catholic Government, among the members of which, if they be real Catholics, there cannot be a disagreement on the question. When doctors differ, we know how we are at liberty to act: but what if doctors are thoroughly agreed?

5. We cannot say whether Mr. Gladstone really holds the doctrine which Macaulay seems to impute to him, that Government "ought *always* to use," for the propagation of religious truth, the power intrusted to it for the protection of life and property. That *we* do not hold it is sufficiently evident from the preceding pages: nor do we know of any Catholic theologian who holds it. Macaulay himself tells us, in his History of England, that James II., when using his power in this way, found one of the most inflexible opponents to his rash proceedings in no less a personage than Pope Innocent XI., one of the holiest and most zealous Pontiffs who have sat in the chair of S. Peter for the last three hundred years.

Mr. Gladstone conceives that the duties of governments are paternal; a doctrine which we shall not believe till he can show us some government which loves its subjects as a father loves a child, and which is as superior in intelligence to its subjects *as a father is to a child*. (p. 439.)

We agree with Mr. Gladstone that the duties of Government ought to be paternal, at least in their idea and in their aim, so far as it is possible, in this world of universal imperfection and constant failure, to realize that idea and to reach that aim: and we think the criticism of Macaulay a piece of hypercriticism altogether unworthy of his keen and masculine intellect. For ages before these two eminent persons were born, men have talked and written of parental government, and of princes who were fathers to their people: and we doubt if any one before ever dreamed of uuderstanding these phrases in the sense of the definition implied in Macaulay's words.

In the first place, are the two characteristics given by him, strong affection and superior intelligence, those which constitute a really *good* father—for, of course, it is only such a father who is contemplated in the comparison? We decidedly think not. We have known a father superior in intelligence to any of his children, and who loved them so tenderly, that he could not bear to restrain or correct them, but let them have their own way, and ultimately go whither such training naturally and infallibly leads. We have known many such fathers. No man knew better than Macaulay principles, which are, as it were, part of the mere alphabet of the art in which he so much excelled; that all metaphors are but implied comparisons, and that in all comparisons, whether direct or analogical, whether used for embellishment or illustration, there need only be one point of resemblance between the two objects compared; and, with certain restrictions, the less like the objects are in other respects, the more striking the comparison will be.

In the second place, what is the characteristic of a good father, a corresponding resemblance to which in a government entitles the latter to be called parental? Not the sentiment of parental affection. For this is common to all fathers, not downright brutes, whether otherwise good or bad: besides, as we have said, no one ever dreamed of the existence of such a sentiment in the breasts of rulers towards their subjects. Not superior intelligence. For this also is common to all fathers, not downright fools, especially with reference to children in their earlier years: besides, superior intelligence, save as connected with the characteristic we are about to mention, is in no way specially parental, any more than superior strength or superior swiftness of foot. Who, then, is the good father, as such? He who governs his family uniformly on these two great principles. First, he governs, not with a view to any selfish or capricious ends of his own, but with a view to his *children's good,* their present good, their future good in this *life, and, if he be* a true Christian father, especially and above

all, their eternal happiness. Secondly, he governs with clemency, not sparing the rod when necessary; using it sharply and severely, when necessary, but not more than is necessary, not from passionate or cruel impulse, but for correction and prevention. Of course, a Government ruling a kingdom or a vast empire is very different from a father ruling a single household under one roof. There are therefore a thousand points of difference between the two: as there are between a brave man and a lion, though brave men are constantly called lions; as there are between a stupid man and an ass, between a cunning man and a fox, between a silly man and a goose, between a deluge of water and a deluge of vice, between the thunder of the clouds and the thunder of eloquence. But the points of analogy between a truly just and good Government and a good father of a family are, we think, sufficiently marked to justify the long-established usage of speech, to which Macaulay objects.

A parental Government is, we believe, universally understood as being the very opposite of a tyrannical government—these being the two extremes. Now, how does the true and genuine tyrant govern? He governs for himself, for his own enjoyment and aggrandisement; to these he sacrifices everything, as far as he can and as far as he dares. If in anything he means what is the public good, he means it not as the public good but as his own. He governs oppressively, by oppressive laws, oppressive taxes, oppressive penalties, oppressive police. A parental Government is the very opposite of all this: in what that opposite consists is so obvious, we need not waste words in describing it in its details. A Government may be paternal in heart and desire, and yet, owing to the opposition of an unprincipled faction and an atheist world, may not be able to realize its salutary designs or to realize them but imperfectly. Had Macaulay been permitted to reach the Psalmist's term of three score years and ten, he would have lived to witness, in the very person who was the youthful subject of his criticism, a statesman giving, to no small extent, an example of parental government in that part of the British Empire which had for so many generations groaned under the most atrocious and galling tyranny that was ever exercised by the Government of a civilized nation over a vanquished people and prostrate class. He would have lived to witness this, and would, we are quite sure, have been among the foremost in the foremost rank, cheering on that statesman in the prosecution of the good work, assisting him with all the fervid eloquence of that impassioned tongue *and of that* unrivalled pen.

Croker's notes to Boswell's "Johnson" did not more "abso-

lutely swarm with misstatements"* in Macaulay's eyes, than this essay of his swarms with sophisms in our eyes, sophisms as clearly refutable as those which we have already refuted. We shall confine ourselves to the consideration of one more: and we have reserved it for the last place, because it is his fundamental argument, or at least a prominent and essential part of that argument. It may be stated thus. The propagation of religion† is no more the business or duty of a Government than it is the business or duty of a hospital, a bank, a club, an insurance office, a canal company, a gas company, or any other society or institution whatever of purely human invention (pp. 445, 496). But surely the propagation of religion is not the business, still less the duty, of any such companies. It is not denied that individual members, as such, may have certain duties; but the companies themselves have nothing to do with the propagation of religion.

To the first or major propesition we reply by denying it simply and absolutely. 1. The supreme civil power was, as we have seen, established by God Himself: it is a law of the nature given by Him to us, a dictate of the reason given by Him to us. All the other associations enumerated by Macaulay are of purely human invention: not one of them was in any way established by God.

2. The society of the State with its supreme Government is what is called a *necessary* and essential society, and is so in two senses. First, it is not optional with men to belong to it or not to belong to it, as they please. There must be the society of the State, and men must live in that society. Of course, we speak of the universal law and the normal condition. A man may be cast on a desert island, and live there for fifty years, and die there without ever seeing a human face; but this is accidental ("per accidens"), as it is to be born without legs or without arms; his state is unnatural, he feels it to be so, and with the most earnest longings of his soul yearns to be released from it. An anchorite may build himself a cell in the desert and live there secluded from the *world*; but he is by no means altogether cut off from *society*, only he is not linked to it so closely as those who live in the bosom of it. If he be a true anchorite and called by God to this sort of life, his state is not unnatural because it is supernatural: it is rare and exceptional,

---

* Essays, vol. i. p. 353.

† *That is*, according to the distinction given a few pages back, the *protection of the Church* or aid given to her in her ministrations.

as are many things in the lives of the saints, which it would be not only rash but downright sinful to attempt an imitation of, without some special divine intimation.

Now, as to the other associations, which are called *voluntary* and accidental. In the first place, there is no necessity whatever that they should exist at all. For many long ages there were no banks or clubs or gas-companies or railway companies. They contribute to our comfort or profit or amusement: but, if they had never been invented to the end of the world, the world would, of course, have known nothing about them, and would have never felt a desire to have them—"ignoti nulla cupido." In the second place, now that they do exist, men may join them if they please, may decline joining them if they please, and having joined them may leave them if they please, and when they please and as they please: there is no more moral restraint, or restraint of any kind, on any one of these acts, than there is in taking snuff or giving up snuff.

3. Secondly, the State is called a necessary society, because, having authority to bind its members by law to the performance or omission of certain acts, and this under penalties varying up to the extreme penalty of death, the members are bound to obey these laws, and must obey them under threat of the penalties annexed. A bank or a club or a railway company has no such power. If, for example, a company of bank directors makes a code of laws binding its members to certain duties under certain penalties, I becoming a director am bound to discharge these duties, but bound solely by my own will freely undertaking, and impliedly promising, to discharge them. I am not bound by the laws, as such, of the directors: for they have no legislative or coercive power whatever, unless indeed they have received such from the supreme State power, from which it would then be all derived. Of course if my violation of the rules of a bank or a club or a card party, or any other company, should involve the violation of justice or of any other virtue, I am bound by the precept of justice or of that other virtue, bound so far and no farther. Again the supreme State power not only binds the subject, whether willing or unwilling, but can bind him in conscience and under pain of sin—how far or when it may intend so to bind is quite another question. But a bank or a club, or a railway company has, as such, no more power of binding any human being under pain of sin, than I have of binding under pain of sin the gentleman or lady whom I may next meet casually on the public highway.

4. The State lays hold on and encompasses and overshadows every member of *the community* from his birth to his death,

nay, before his birth and after his death.* It does this by its marriage laws, just or unjust, and by its burial laws, just or unjust, and by all the laws of police and of every other kind that regulate the period of existence intervening between the cradle and the grave. No man can, for a single day or a single hour, say to himself, Now I am free from all control of the State, and can do as I please, irrespective of its bans and its penalties. It is quite otherwise with a director of a bank or member of a club. Either can truly say, Whatever control I have freely given them over me during the few hours of business or of pleasure that associate me with them, I am for the rest of the week or the day absolutely free, so far as they are concerned, to do as I will for good or evil, to read a good book or make a row in the street, to visit the sick or to pick pockets; and, if I wish, I can leave my club or bank altogether.

5. If the Government does its duty towards the Church, the work is done, and there is nothing for the bank or the club to do, except to gild refined gold and paint the lily. If the Government neglects its duty, and permits assaults to be made on the Church unrepelled and unpunished; in such a case the bank or the club would, we think, make a very sorry figure in attempting to supply the place of Government; and would, no doubt, receive from the assailants of the Church the answer which the proprietor of the gambling booth got from Sir Mulberry Hawk, and be told to go to ——. But, whether Government does its duty or does not, the bank or the club has no authority to interfere, as the Government has; and such interference would, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, be of no effect. "Nemo tenetur ad inutile."

We have more to say, but we have said enough to enable our readers to pronounce on the soundness of Macaulay's principle —that to aid the Church in the propagation of religion is a duty not more incumbent on a Christian State under a Christian Government, than it is incumbent on the select convivial circle of the Glorious Apollers under Dick Swiveller, its Perpetual Grand. That, in giving this comparison, we may not incur the suspicion of having fallen into an imitation of that outlandish exaggeration in which Macaulay so frequently indulges, we present his description in his own words of one of the companies which he enumerates:—"Clubs of all ranks, from those which have lined Pall Mall and St. James's Street with their palaces, down to the free-and-easy which meets in the shabby parlour of a village inn." (p. 445.)

We have only a few words to say in reply to the second or

* Ramière, p. 72, c. 4, § 3.

minor proposition, which asserts that clubs, banks, and such companies have nothing to do with the propagation of religion. We admit the proposition as a general rule. But we must make one or two qualifying observations. 1. We should always hold fast to the sound principle, however much conflicting circumstances may justify us in departing from it, or even compel us to depart from it, in practice: and a sound principle is often best tested by an extreme and out-of-the-way case. Practically those minor companies cannot give any effective protection to the Church: but suppose that in a certain quarter of the country the cause of religion, and therefore the salvation of souls, is seriously imperilled by the machinations of a party of licentious and impious men; and suppose that there exists in that place a company, say a club, which, without any serious injury to its members, is able to protect the Church against these machinations; suppose also that, whether through the neglect of Government or through any other cause, the Church has no other means of protection; unquestionably the club is in such a case bound to protect the Church. If not, charity, which forms such an essential and distinctive part of Christian duty, is no part of it at all, but a mere invention of sentimental moralists.

And here we are reminded of an observation which should have come in earlier. It seems to us that Macaulay himself, in one of the sentences quoted above, maintains a principle, which is really a surrender of his whole position. "If," he says, "a Government can, without any sacrifice of its main end, promote any other good work, it ought to do so."

No doubt by "any sacrifice" he meant any serious sacrifice. If, in such a case, Government ought to promote any other good work, then "a fortiori" it ought to promote the best and highest of all good works, the "summum bonum" of every child of Adam. This is what we say, precisely what we say, all that we say. "It *ought* to do so": therefore there is an obligation of doing so. The protection of life and property is the main immediate end of government. Where life and property are insecure, there is, so far and in proportion to the extent of insecurity, anarchy, or civil war or rebellion. Now, as already intimated and for reasons already given, we hold that, where any of these evils ensue on the State's interference in the work of promoting religion, not only is the State not bound to interfere, but it is bound not to interfere. Interference would at once defeat its own end and do incalculable mischief.

2. But whatever may be said of the duty of minor communities in reference to those external to themselves, there is *one duty of an internal kind*, which every one would, we think,

admit to be binding on them all. Take again the example of a club: and suppose one consisting of a number of gentlemen, all sincere Christians. We are very far from saying that they are bound to introduce at their meetings any religious sign or practice whatever: but they are clearly bound to protect religion thus far, that they shall carefully exclude from these meetings everything of an anti-Christian character in language, writing, or act. How much more strictly is a Christian Government of a Christian kingdom bound so to act!

But we must come to a conclusion. We have considered but one of the sources of the atheism of our day, and that one not at all as completely as our own wishes and the importance of the subject would demand. To the examination of the others which yet remain to be considered we purpose returning at no distant day.

Art. VII.—THE POPE AND EUROPE IN 1872.

Discourses addressed to various Roman Deputations by the Holy Father.

A POLITICAL survey of Europe at the commencement of the year 1872 does not offer pleasing results or encourage buoyant expectations. Certainly peace prevails; but it may be doubted whether so much of the world was ever, within the period of the present generation, so ill at ease, so sick, and yet not sorry. It is now some seventeen or eighteen years since Prince Albert, disgusted at the slight effect which the first Exhibition had had in weaning the world from war, emphatically declared that "representative institutions were on their trial." Representative institutions have been on their trial ever since, and it must be admitted that they have had singularly little influence on the larger movements of mankind, which have been actuated to quite as great a degree as in any previous period of history by the traditional passions of nations, urged and controlled by the ambitious volition of a very few men. Germany itself, the country of the Prince's predilection, has become to a degree which the first French Empire even was not, a vast stratocracy, in which drill is regarded as the business of life, and a campaign as its occasional relaxation, and in which the first duty of the citizen is to be

able to march many miles without fatigue and to kill many men without compunction. The German mind has always had a great influence on Europe, and that influence was never more manifest than in the present age, when the whole Continent is painfully following the last fashion in weapons and manœuvres at Berlin, while even here Mr. Cardwell is obliged at his advanced age to master the whole mystery of the drill-sergeant. That Germany should ever be visibly impersonated by such a trio as Emperor William, Prince Bismarck, and Marshal Moltke, was a vision that never, we may be tolerably certain, dawned on Prince Albert's mind, even when in melancholy hours he may have doubted the stability of representative institutions and the peace-producing effects of Crystal Palaces. But what part had representative institutions, had the Prussian Parliament, the French Legislative Corps, the Austrian Reichsrath, in the events which within five years have transformed Europe? They acted as safety-valves to some of the more volatile humours of the body politic, and it is hard to see what other end they served. France was not the only country in which personal government prevailed; but it is undoubtedly the country which, after all its disasters, least trusts to the efficacy of representative institutions, and most closely clings to the principle of Cæsarism. For is not M. Thiers as absolute in 1872 as Louis Napoleon was in 1852? As absolute as the Emperor Napoleon and Vice-Emperor Rouher combined were in 1868? And is it not possible that the successor of M. Thiers may be still more absolute than he? If all France were at this moment polled as to who he should be, would not the man believed to be able to measure swords with Moltke and, if possible, wits with Bismarck also, be the man of men to all Frenchmen? As for "representative institutions," who cares enough for them to heed whether he casts his vote for Vautrain or for Victor Hugo?

Deposed though she be from her place of pride, dismembered, beaten as never nation was beaten by another nation since Prussia was conquered by her in 1806, overwhelmed with the weight of her prodigious debt, France is still the capital and cynosure of nations, whose thoughts and acts most intimately affect all others. Her moral aspect nevertheless is not at this moment such as to afford much hope to the world. In her history, which in this respect resembles that of the Jews more than that of any other nation, representative acts of direct revolt against God stand out with an atrocious dramatic effect now and then, as if openly challenging *the Almighty wrath*. So while the Prussians were

already hurling Frossard's and MacMahon's armies back on the Vosges, Paris was celebrating the inauguration of the statue of Voltaire, the statue not merely of a great enemy of God and of the human race, but of the only Frenchman who ever said that it was the natural destiny of Prussians to teach and to thrash Frenchmen. The new year has been inaugurated with a somewhat similar scene. In the Academy of the Forty Immortals, a learned fool who has said in his heart, and not merely in his heart but in the literary highway of an Encyclopædia, that there is no God, has been elected to sit in the seat once occupied by Montalembert, and finds himself supported to that place not merely by the influence of M. Thiers, from whom as a Liberal Catholic, if indeed he can be called a Catholic at all, we cannot expect any better, but even by a conscientious and austere Protestant like M. Guizot. Alas and alas, touched to the quick, as we cannot but be, by the noble and passionate protest of the Bishop of Orleans, how can we fail to remember that the last occasion on which M. de Montalembert was carried, not reluctant, from his death-bed to vote at the Academy, he voted for M. Jules Favre, a man of whose faith it could just be said that he was not an Atheist, of whose morals the less said the better, but of whose learning, literary gifts, academic qualities and qualifications, there was nothing at all to be said. And against whom? Against Count de Champagny, the author of "Les Césars" and "Les Antonins," the most erudite, the most philosophic, the most Christian of living French historians. We do not know who voted with M. de Montalembert that day on the broad base party ground that M. de Champagny was, in so far as he was a politician at all, an Imperialist, while M. Favre, though he had as yet written no book, and was not reputed to have even read many, was an energetic and eloquent enemy of the Empire. But we do venture to think that on the day M. Favre was elected one of the Forty, it may be fairly said it became an object of not utterly unreasonable ambition on M. Littre's part to aspire to the next vacant chair? The gates of the Academy are now not less open than certain other gates. M. Littre sits there Immortal to testify before all mocking Paris that the man who says there is no God is by no means a fool, but, on the contrary a sage, and the sage of latest lights, admitted by the Forty sages of France as worthiest to sit among them. The statue of Voltaire was an act of blasphemy on the part of the mob, but the election of M. Littre shows how the spirit of apostasy has penetrated and saturated the scribes.

It is a capital instance of the pervading and profound demoralization of the mind of the nation; and as the result of an election by electors supposed to represent the highest culture and wisdom of France, is a most notable index to the condition of the country. This election took place in a building which was, itself unscathed, the very centre of the conflagrations of the Commune. Its members, from whatever side they approached its hall, passed through the ruins of historic Paris. On either hand they saw the doctrine of Atheism and Materialism manifested in all its devastation and fury; and then they proceeded to do homage to its prophet and apostle. Who can wonder, when so terrible a lesson has had so little effect on the venerable and instructed Forty, that it has had none at all on the ignorant and passionate masses? The state of the populace of Paris is said by those who ought to know, to be more malignant and disaffected than it ever was before within living memory. Fifteen thousand men have been killed and hid under the pavements and parks, and thirty thousand rot in prisons and hulks or have fled; but the spirit of the Commune is by no means laid. Between class and class there is a war, whose hatred is deadlier than that which has ever divided nation and nation, or sect and sect. To murder and plunder the rich and respectable on the first opportunity is the one article of faith of the patriot proletaire. To this simple dogma have all the principles of '89 and '93 and '48 become concentrated, or, as it were, inspissated. It is the final formula of the Rights of Man.

And as yet there is not the slightest sign of a deliverer for the unhappy land. The political situation remains inscrutably and inexorably provisional. There can be little doubt that the mass of the French nation abhors a Republic, as nature is said to abhor a vacuum; but as a vacuum can be produced and maintained despite nature, so the Republic lives in a land devoid of Republicanism; and it may so continue to exist as long as M. Thiers lives, or at least as long as he retains his governing faculty. Such a result would be unintelligible in any other country enjoying representative institutions; and in France there is no end to representative institutions. There is not merely the National Assembly, but a Council-General to every department, and a Municipal Council to every commune, all elected by universal suffrage under the protection of the ballot. But it is a remarkable fact that it is only when a *plebiscitum* is to be taken in favour of some tolerably absolute authority that the French nation votes with anything like enthusiasm or unanimity. The reason is obvious enough. The latest result of Parisian politics is, as we see, the party of

the poor against the rich, the party of plunder, arson, and massacre against the party of Order. After all, there is a vast, and, in certain circumstances, solid though ordinarily incongruous party, whose object is simply Order, and to which, taking into account the whole extent of the population, perhaps not less than ninety-five per cent. of living Frenchmen belong. It is an awful thing that a country should be so circumstanced that the primary division of its political parties should be into the Party of Order and the Party of Destruction. But so it is in France; and the fact gives, for the time, an unusual stability to that which exists, whatever its name may be, from the terror which is connected with the danger of any change in the form of the constitution, which seems to secure even a temporary success in preserving the public peace. So long, therefore, as M. Thiers fulfils the function of Chief Constable with effect, he may, it would seem, retain the rank of President of the Republic.

But M. Thiers is in the seventy-fourth year of his age. After a prolonged absence from official life, he has had the whole weight of government imposed upon him in a time when its tasks are a hundred-fold more onerous and difficult than in the gaudy, jaunty, prosperous days when Palmerston was bogey and Louis Philippe Citizen King. To have lived through six months of such a tremendous time, with his faculties and energies apparently unimpaired, proves his possession of a titanic vitality; but nevertheless he cannot live for ever, nor is it likely that he can even live long. When the Emperor Napoleon was still in full vigour of mind and body, and not yet past the period of middle age, the world was now and then weak enough to be racked by an agony of apprehension as to what would become of France if his career were to come to a sudden end. Yet it was known that the Emperor had made careful provision for a Council of Regency; it was admitted that the army was faithful not merely to his person but to the dynasty; and Europe had only a vague suspicion of the diabolical energy and capacity of the dangerous classes in Paris. France survives the Emperor Napoleon, and will no doubt survive M. Thiers. But the *apres moi* may well suggest to him grave reflections. He leaves no dynasty, no regency behind him, and has no right to nominate a successor. The army is said to be in sentiment Bonapartist, save in so far as it is in regard to some of the later levies Gambettaist. The International and the Commune have come into being since the days when the Emperor was supposed to *keep a Red Revolution* at bay by his mere gaze; and M. *Thiers has so little* hold on the heart of Paris that he is

glad to extend all the honours and helps of official candidature to a man who was one of the mayors of the city under Delescluze. The Assembly is apparently the most irresolute, incapable, discordant, and disorderly assembly of which there is record in the history of representative institutions. It has not even force enough of character to insist on M. Thiers's observance of his compact not to speak in debate, unless on extraordinary occasions and after previous formal notice. He descends upon it when he wills, speaks a dozen times a day, and even speaks now and then, when the humour seizes him, against the policy of his own ministers. And no one has sense or spirit enough to call him to order. In such an assembly there would seem to be little hope for France. It has not simply and specifically the courage of its convictions. The entry of the Orleanist princes, which it was hoped would give the whole monarchical party an impulse, if not a head, has had no apparent effect on the character of the Assembly. A doubt indeed begins to pervade the minds of men as to whether the political capacity of the Duke d'Aumale has not been hitherto rather over-rated. Of literary talent, that popular prince has given distinguished proofs, and the honours of the Academy, which he received on the same occasion with M. Littre, are not unworthily bestowed on the historian of the House of Condé. But in these days, when France emphatically needs that the charge and conduct of her affairs should engage the best abilities and the anxious zeal of men of capacity and energy, the Duke d'Aumale does not, it seems to us, make his mark. He appears, in the first place, to be over desirous of dispelling alarm as to his own intentions and those of his family; but may we not hope that there is an end of Egalité? And for the rest does he dream or conspire? There was once a prince, who returned to France from England under somewhat similar circumstances, and who was known to spend some of his time in dreaming, and more in conspiring, but he also knew how to make himself felt in action, and so he first made himself head of the Republic and then turned the Republic into an Empire. We should be sorry to see the Duke d'Aumale become a mere imitator of Prince Louis Napoleon. But the question burns towards a white heat, Has he really got a policy of his own? What he ought to do, if he really has capacity and spirit to do it, is obvious, only he as yet shows no sign of doing it. He might, proclaiming frankly the fusion of the royal family and recognizing the legitimate sovereignty of Henry V., place himself at the head of *the party of the Right*, and call upon it to organize itself

on its professed monarchical, constitutional, and Catholic principles. Admitting even that until the country is evacuated by the Germans, the present interregnum and the authority of M. Thiers must be permitted to continue, politic preparation might meantime be made for the specific appeal to the country, which may, perhaps must, precede its return to its ancient constitution. There is only one objection to this simple and straightforward policy, and that is in a name,—the name "French Republic"—a name which, as it happens to be identified with his own autocracy, M. Thiers is as eager as M. Gambetta to maintain. But what other sanction attaches to that Government, the abortion of a mob, which did not even venture to give itself the name of Republic when it came into existence, but only that of Government of National Defence? As a simple matter of fact, are the majority of the Assembly Republicans, and did their constituencies elect them as Republicans, or rather in order expressly that, after making peace with Prussia, they might make an end of the pretence of a republic? Is the Republic, in fine, a form of government under which it is to be understood that the minority governs the majority? This is the case of France, and it is at best a very elaborately organized hypocrisy—and as such only too likely to end in some quite unprecedentedly tremendous explosion.

There is a certain difficulty in criticising the conduct of a Prince, who is a Prince indeed, and a faithful Son of the Church, as we may well call the Count de Chambord—for "the heart of a true king is in the hand of God," and it is difficult to even imagine the lights he may receive, his instinctive sense of what is due to the principles he represents, the contending pressure of the influences under which he acts. But with much respect, we would say of the policy of Henry V., that at the present moment he seems to us to wait over much upon Providence. In troubled times, Providence will apparently only open opportunities. It is for those to whom a great mission has been given, to be urgent in using them; not merely to be patient and to pray, but in the spirit of a Jesuit maxim, to "pray as if everything depended on prayer, and act as if everything depended on action," and while knowing how to wait, knowing also when to strike. The apprehension of being thought to tout and canvas for support, after the fashion of Louis Napoleon, may become a grave cause of weakness in the policy of a prince who knows that he is no pretender. There is one among the ancestors of His Most Christian Majesty to whom he often refers with a pardonable pride, though in other matters than those of policy the example of that great king is little imitable

—the last French sovereign who bore the name of Henry. If Henry IV. were nowadays contemplating the state of France, with no suspicion of his orthodoxy in the mind of the Church, with the mass of the nation yearning for a firm and just ruler, with the faith of good men and the fears of bad men alike pointing to his person, with, after all, for his most dangerous enemies only the furibund rabble of two or three towns suffering from the congestion and corruption of modern civilization, led by a crew of black-leg barristers, lewd public writers, and cosmopolitan conspirators—can it be doubted that Henry IV. would make every man who was willing to serve his cause feel that it was a cause to be fought for in every possible way, until it was won? When the Count de Chambord issued last autumn the manifesto in which he declared that he must come back with the White Flag or not at all, we were not of those who thought the words were words which he had no right to address to the French nation. The French nation is a nation which still interprets causes to itself through symbols. It differs strangely in this from the English nation, which has got half a dozen different official flags, of which an ordinary Englishman hardly knows one from the other. Though we think, then, that the Count de Chambord, if obliged to speak on the subject, could only speak in one sense, the question obtrudes itself, was he obliged to speak on that particular point at that particular moment at all? If what he said was uncalled for, or even premature, then it was impolitic; and to be politic is part of the grace of state of a king. Possibly this question of the flag is a question that might have solved itself at the end without the least difficulty. The example of England and other nations might in this regard be followed without degradation. Over our Queen's Palace floats the Royal standard, bearing the arms of her family and her kingdom. But the Union Jack is a different and a national flag, in somewhat the same sense as the tricolor has become in France. The Count de Chambord has often declared that the victories won by French genius and valour, under whatever dynasty or form of government, are part of the glory of France, and appeal to his pride as a Frenchman. He need not adopt for his own house the standard which drooped over the scaffold of Louis XVI., but he might well leave to his army the flag under which it conquered at Jena and Sebastopol.

We live in a time when the spirit of armies is all-important. It has been said by an eccentric thinker, that "the future of the world depends in a great degree on pious armies." Even the French army, which was honeycombed before the war *by Masonic societies*, and enfeebled by the lax habits

which had grown up in the latter years of the Empire, has in its great adversity learned that there is indeed a God of Battles, that a sceptic is usually a poltroon, that a good conscience is the grand source of good courage, and can alone make it joy to die the bloody and sudden death of battle in the cause of one's country. The terrific casualties of modern wars, and the very slight degree in which individual vigilance or strength can guard against them (it being often now the fate of a whole regiment to be destroyed in the course of a few minutes through some slight neglect or error of judgment on the part of a general), tend to make the soldier's mind more sober, even solemn, but surely not less fitted for his arduous career thereby. It is well for its own honour, and not less well for its future efficiency, that the new army of France is being formed under a Commander-in-Chief and a Minister of War who are zealous and scrupulous Catholics, and that very many of the officers distinguished in the late war bear the same character. An army with the Napoleonic spirit would be little less dangerous to France now than one with the revolutionary spirit. The former will soon evaporate, as the military incapacity of Napoleon III., the primary cause of the late fall of France, becomes more and more manifest; and the conduct of the Commune under the eyes of the Prussians has, we hope and believe, destroyed for ever that dangerous sympathy between the army and the populace of Paris which has been the constant cause of anarchy in that country. Instead of the Napoleonic or the revolutionary spirit, we hope to see a national and a Catholic spirit animating the French army of the future; and if with that spirit which is his own, Marshal MacMahon succeeds in imbuing his soldiers, he will have achieved a truer glory than if he had entered Berlin last year. Seldom has a mere soldier occupied so critical a position or exercised so strong though silent an influence as the Duke de Magenta does at this moment. He is the one general whom every French soldier honestly respects and willingly obeys. He is the one soldier who, though most unhappily placed during the war, mainly by the heroic courage and devotion of his character, saw his fame and authority augmented at its end. Even the stern measures necessary for the suppression of the Commune have not diminished his popularity in Paris. Such is the native force of a character simple, modest, brave, devoted to duty. It is in strict keeping with this character that he again and again refuses to engage in politics, or even to allow his name to be proposed for the National Assembly. *Certainly political generals have been the curse of the Latin race, and specially* the source of the ruin of Spain and the

Spanish republics; nor during its republican periods has France hitherto been free from the tendency to give military chiefs an ascendancy in affairs which their civil talents did not warrant. Were Marshal MacMahon now in the Assembly, a party would inevitably group itself round him, with a view either to vesting supreme authority in his hands, or of making him the chief agent in a restoration. He prefers to be simply the first soldier of France, and the servant of the constituted civil power; and so long as he does so, the army is the guaranteed guardian of order, and the country is safe from any disgraceful surprise. We cannot but believe, however, and indeed hope, that in the ultimate decision of the destiny of France as a state—a decision which cannot be long deferred—the influence of so wise and loyal a character may be felt. Sure we are that he will never make an 18th Brumaire on his own account, nor yet play the part of Monk to Napoleon, if even to Henry V.; still a restoration, with which his cordial sympathies concurred, would, we believe, also be loyally accepted by the French army. Certain links, undoubtedly, bind MacMahon to the Imperial dynasty. He is a Duke and a Marshal because he saved the Emperor from being defeated, perhaps taken captive, in the first battle in which His Majesty commanded an army. But the relations between the sovereign and the great soldier were never very cordial; and in the late war, MacMahon, summoned at the last moment from Algeria, and so never consulted on the ways and means of the war, detached to an inadequate and exposed command, afterwards forced to undertake the fatuous march on Metz against his own judgment, was doomed to see his military character risked in every way by the wanton incapacity of others. A man may forgive all this, but he can hardly forget it, or see in the ignominious *débâcle* in which it fell, mainly the result of its innate demoralization, any reason for restoring the Empire.

France has suffered for now nearly a century from the attempt to assimilate into its body politic, and to reconcile with its historic character as a Christian nation, the principles of its great Revolution. It is this confusion and conflict of principles which has demoralized the nation, and deprived its successive governments of all reverence and weight. As an able French writer has lately said—"For eighty years past France has become more and more ungovernable, and if she is governed, it is clear that it is by her passions, not by her reason. The Frenchman, individually considered, may be thoughtful, firm, intelligent, conscientious—the Frenchman *in society* obeys movements instantaneous, *unconscious. Matter dominates* mind. It is its lower part

which gives the impulse to French society. The *policy of the appetites* threatens to invade all. And how we are fallen! A man governed by his passions is only an infant throughout his life—it is the same even with a great nation. We are the nation of levity and frivolity, *la nation enfant;* no one stretches a hand to us in our disasters. Hardly does diplomacy count us in what it calls, with reason, the European concert. And in truth what alliances are possible with a people which makes of authority and of law, by turns, a sport and a prey, delivered to what is lowest in its ranks, and to its vulgarest and most evil passions. Great policies once made the grandeur of France; absurd principles, or rather the absence of principles, unmake it."*

Yet there is surely a true France within this false France, yet capable of asserting itself, yet capable of remoulding Christian Gaul on its ancient principles. To that France the Sovereign Pontiff appealed last summer in memorable words:—

I cannot say (he said) how many feelings are blended at this moment in my heart. I remember the great benefits I have received from France. I remember what France suffers. I have no need to recall what I suffer myself. Poor France! I love France, she is always imprinted on my heart. I pray for her every day, chiefly at the great holy sacrifice of Mass; she is always present to my thoughts. I have always loved and shall ever love her. I know well how she has always presented the spectacle of the most tender devotion; how widespread is her charity, and how she sympathizes with the misery of the poor and of the Church; how many charitable institutions she has founded, and chiefly what great ardour for good works animates the women; men also, but specially the women of France.

But then referring with evident pain to the confusion of principles, which had infected the minds of many even otherwise good men and tended to weaken the force of the Church in that country, His Holiness continued:—

My dear children, my words must tell you what I have in my heart. What afflicts your country, and prevents her from deserving the blessings of God, is this confusion of principles. I will utter the word, and I will not keep it silent. What I fear is not those wretches of the Paris Commune, real demons from hell abiding in the world. No, it is not that. What I fear is that unfortunate policy of Catholic Liberalism which is the true scourge. I have said it more than forty times, I repeat it to you on account of the love I bear you. Yes, it is this game ——. How do you call it in French? In Italian we say *altalena*. Yes, exactly, this game of see-saw which tends to

* *J. Paixhans*, "L'Armement National." Paris: Dounio.

destroy religion. Doubtless, one should practise charity, and do what is possible to bring back those who go astray, but that does not imply partaking of their opinions. But I will not prolong my discourse: my strength and my age will not permit of it.

I thank you, I thank you, and I charge you to thank all good French people for what they have done in every way to relieve me; for France gave me her children who shed their blood for the Holy See; she gave me her money and she performed so many works of charity! May they all be blessed singly, and after them I bless all the nation; I bless all, even the wicked, that they may have sufficient light to walk in the path of truth.

Frederick the Great said that were he king of France not a shot should be fired in Europe without his leave, and Napoleon III. declared that when France was content all other nations were bound to feel at ease. During the Emperor's reign, the map of Europe was so considerably changed with his complicity that it is not quite certain whether this special supremacy still attaches to the policy of M. Thiers. The frontier of France fits her like a strait-waistcoat. Conglomerated Germany mounts guard at Metz; Italy, fused by the Revolution, is now much more under the influence of Germany, perhaps even of Russia, than of France; an Italian prince sits on the throne of Spain. The German army is a million and a quarter, the Italian half a million strong. It is an altered time since Austria's heel could be pierced in Lombardy; since Bourbons reigned at Madrid, Naples, and Parma; since French strategists, though regarding Belfort with anxious eye, and often bewailing the loss of Landau, still felt that, when the day came to seize the line of the Rhine, the salient angle with which their frontier sprang into the flank of the Germanic Confederation, would give a new grand army a great gate from which to deploy. France formerly had satellites; she has not even an ally now. Already there are signs in the East of Europe that Russia is profiting by the example, and indeed relies on the benevolent neutrality of Germany to attempt for the Sclavonic populations what has been done for the Germanic and the Italian. If, as Napoleon said, "the agglomeration and confederation of great nations" is to be the grand characteristic of the future history of Europe, why should the process pause at the Danube? The position of Austria at this moment is, for totally different reasons, hardly less difficult than that of France. She preserves towards Russia in Poland a policy exasperating, yet apparently effective for no purpose except provocation. She can hardly hope to wrest Posen from Prussia *and* Warsaw from Russia, and yet she allows *Gallicia to act as if it* were, at no distant day, to be the nucleus

of a revived Polish monarchy. As the strength and influence of Hungary become more and more developed, as Pesth becomes more and more, in Prince Bismarck's phrase, "the centre of gravity" of the empire of the Hapsburgs, that empire itself becomes a formidable barrier in the way of the Czars to Constantinople. The system of self-government now prevalent throughout her provinces has somewhat the same disturbing effect on the internal system of the great autocrat that thefree constitution of Belgium had in regard to France during the more arbitrary years of Louis Napoleon's reign. In Austria representative institutions are, in a very serious sense, on their trial, and as yet they can hardly be said to have fortified the powers of the monarchy. The prospect that Austria may possibly be exposed to the same sort of assault on the part of Russia as that in which France succumbed to Prussia, is simply appalling. France has been crushed andlamed, but Austria might be, in a similar case, dismembered and destroyed. The standing army of Russia on its peace footing is 730,000 strong, nearly double that of Germany, more than three times that of Austria; and the war establishment of the Czar is a million and a quarter, said to be now as well armed and as easily mobilized, though not of as refined fighting quality, as the million and a quarter of "thinking bayonets," who, within a week, become battalions when the word of war is uttered at Berlin.

If Russia and Germany chose to combine, Austria might simply be partitioned as Poland was partitioned a hundred years ago. Would such a combination be any more shocking to our sense of political propriety than that of Austria and Prussia against Denmark was? Or than the Benedetti-Bismarck treaty about Belgium? If Germany were merely to accord to Russia the same benevolent neutrality that characterized the Czar's policy during the French war, all the valour, conduct, and discipline of the Austrian army might not save it from disasters as terrible as Sedan and Gravelotte. But the French nation is a nation of Frenchmen—the Austrian empire is an empire in which there is no Austrian nation. It is an arch in which the stones do not even now too well wedge each other together. It may fall. Its fall would not be like that of France. Some of its vast fragments would doubtless retain independent life; but its ten millions of German subjects would probably follow the law of national agglomeration and gravitate towards Berlin, while there are some twelve or thirteen millions of Czechs, Moravians, Ruthenians, Poles, whom the Czar already claims the right to protect as the common *father* of all Sclavonic tribes. In the Austrian empire there

was one principle of unity, which in all her history, full indeed as it is of disasters, has hitherto given a rallying impulse and a cohesive tenacity to her polyglot people. She represented the grand tradition of a Catholic state; her sovereign bore the august and time-honoured title of the Holy Roman Empire. Bohemian and Tyrolean, Pole and Croat, had therein common ground and a common bond. Between heresy in the West and schism in the North, and the paynim in the South, she stood orthodox—not always obedient, and not seldom discovering that a mysterious law connected her interference with the liberties of the Church with the causes of grave disasters to her polity: after which she sometimes, it must be admitted, frankly repented and retraced her steps. But never until now did she adopt religious indifferentism as a rule of policy, or regard a Concordat with Rome as the least rather than the most binding of all human treaties. The spirit of apostasy has entered Austria, and her state tends to become as that of Babel and of the house that is divided against itself.

The Holy Father, lately addressing a deputation from the Foreign Colleges at Rome, headed by Father Semenenko, the Rector of the Polish College, spoke of the peculiar character of apostasy which is, as it were, the note of the persecution of the Church which prevails in this age. These are his words:—

> The Church has been persecuted since her birth. She found society incredulous, ignorant, full of vice, and she brought it back to the road of justice, of truth, and of holiness. But that was not achieved without resistance, and therefore the persecutions began forthwith. A little time ago, reading the work of a scholar, who is not an Italian, I became convinced that the present persecution is far more terrible than any of those which the Church has sustained in the past. Do you seek to know the reason? *Filioli mei, levate oculos vestros in circuitu.* Lift your eyes, my dear children, and look around you. Contemplate society, see what it is, and you will find that it is not *blind*, like the ancient society, but *apostate*. And this is the reason why it is more difficult for it to give ear to the voice of God and of the Church, since of all sinners the apostate is the most reprobate in the eyes of God. But if it be so, if those who govern society are in the hand of Satan, if they are animated with hate of Jesus Christ Himself, what force, what vigour, what zeal, what an exemplary life, and what solidity of doctrine it is necessary to show in order to convert those who allow themselves to be deceived by the perfidious illusions which such a state of society produces.

Most unhappily for the world and the Church, it is in the Catholic States, and especially in the governing classes of the Catholic States, that this apostate spirit most prevails, so that a passion not merely to despoil the Church of its means, to limit the number of those who devote themselves to a strict

religious life, to replace sacraments by civil contracts, is generally characteristic of those states, and their statesmen, but also an eager zeal animates many of them to deprive the children of the coming time of the opportunity of acquiring the knowledge of the law of God while they are yet young. And this in an age in which the cupidity of all classes, and their mutual distrust and animosity, everywhere tend to increase; in which crimes become more atrocious, criminals more numerous, and, especially, juvenile crime more common every day; in which loyalty in many lands is a dead virtue; in which society suffers everywhere from a morbid growth of pauperism, in some countries from dangerous congestion of population, in others from criminal attempts to restrain its natural increase. If ever there was an age in which it was the absolute interest of sovereigns and statesmen to aid and favour in every way the action of the Church of Christ, from the assurance that its system alone can cope with the awful evils with which civil society is menaced, surely it is this age. But the spirit that prevails in high places is blind, and, as the Holy Father has well said, worse than blind—it is apostate.

Our hearts may well wax faint with fear as we see into what a state of wreck Christendom is falling. Who can contemplate the terrible ruin and impenetrable prospect of France, the vast looming dangers that threaten Austria, the unceasing volcanic agony of Spain, the heart-hardened hypocritical iniquities of Italy, without tribulation? To one alone is it given to see the whole vast scene in its full misery and malice, and yet to speak of it without a tone of dismay. The present Pontificate has been one in many ways of marvels—of marvels more astonishing than miracles. It has enlarged the boundaries of the Church by hundreds of Sees. It has set the keystone in the grand arch of Catholic doctrine. The government of the Church has never been more vigilantly, more carefully conducted. Yet the time has been one of curiously complicated difficulties, dangers, and crosses. But most marvellous of all, after twenty-five years of a Pontificate so glorious, so laborious, so troubled, the Holy Father finds himself a prisoner in his palace, knows not from day to day when he may have to change the state of a prisoner for that of an exile, knows well what a world it is into which he may have to go forth—and yet speaking so often as he has done of late, always speaks with cheerful courage and confident hope. All else may fail, but the faith of Peter fails not.

Nor will he modify his language to suit modern ideas, even in their most specious forms. There are those who dream of a Holy Roman Democracy as likely to take the place in the

far future of the Holy Roman Empire, but such is not the Pope's view, apparently. He still believes, in spite of the Revolution, in the old order of society, in nobility, even in legitimist rights; and so in receiving a deputation of the Roman nobles, he lately said to them:—

A cardinal, a Roman prince, presented one day his nephew to one of my predecessors, who declared justly that thrones are sustained chiefly by the action of nobility and clergy.

Nobility is indeed also, it cannot be denied, a gift of God, and although our Lord willed to be born humbly in a stable, we nevertheless read at the beginning of two of the Gospels a long genealogy of Him, which gives His descent from princes and kings.

You then worthily employ the privileges which come of your nobility in guarding the sacred principles of legitimate right, and I have the proof in the choice you make of the Senator of Rome to be your spokesman to-day. Certainly that choice will not be agreeable to those who have come hither to exercise authority without right or reason.

Words of solemn warning the Holy Father has more than once addressed to the unhappy king, whom the Revolution has now pushed so far as the Capitol, and only waits for its opportunity to cast from the Tarpeian Rock—words of warning that always, however, end in the call to repentance and the promise of pardon. And so he spoke to the College of Cardinals:—

In seeing you, my dear brethren, in pondering over the times in which we are living, I look back in thought upon David, who was, by a rebellious son, deprived of his throne and of his own palace. In order to avoid falling into the hands of the rebels, he was obliged to pass into exile, suffering the outrages and the blasphemies of this vile child, who insulted his misfortunes. His faithful soldiers fled with him, defending him, and sharing and soothing his trials. Now, in those soldiers I see the type of your conduct, as, in those outrages and blasphemies, I see the outrages, blasphemies, and hypocrisies of the organs of opinion which disgrace our Rome.

You are aware of the fate of the rebellious son, and how he perished miserably, struck with three blows.

I desire for, and call down upon him who has so unjustly despoiled and persecuted me, those three strokes, not three material blows, but three strokes of divine grace.

May those three strokes be the thought of the past, and of the injustices and violences committed upon us; the thought of the present, enabling him to understand the unfortunate condition to which he has reduced the Church, even in its principal See; the thought of the future, warning him that he will have to appear before the throne of God, there to render a severe account of all that he has done.

As for us, we wish neither harm nor death to any enemy, but that he be converted and live.

And throughout the whole marvellous series of the Sovereign Pontiff's discourses, there runs the steady fibre of a clear conviction that this persecution, grievous and intense as it is, will pass, perhaps speedily and suddenly, but at all events will not be permitted to seat and establish itself at Rome. So in his words there is not a note of surrender or compromise. Though he cannot look from the windows of the Vatican without seeing the usurper's flag bask in the air over edifices which the munificent zeal of great Pontiffs, or the pious charity of Christendom, raised in ages of faith as testimonies to the great dominion of the See of Rome; yet the insolent symbol is to him as though it were not—not an "accomplished fact," only an evanescent accident—a thing as sure to pass as the rainbow; but, alas! with "red rain" falling fast before and after. Through the turmoil and confusion which fill the air of Europe, the grand, solitary voice rings clear as a minster bell over storm and rain and mist. And so to the Roman women he says:—

You ask me when the hour of our deliverance will come. It does not belong to us, my daughters, but to God alone, to determine that. What we know is, that prayer will hasten the coming of the day when we shall be again free, because prayer has always access to God. Pray, therefore, my daughters, that God may shorten the time of our tribulations; the Lord will know how to bring them to an end when the hour marked by His merciful Providence shall have come. Meanwhile, I bless you with all my heart; I bless your bodies, that God may keep them in health and strength; I bless your souls, that God may fill them with His grace and His supernatural gifts; I bless your temporal concerns and your commerce, that the Lord may make them thrive; I bless your children and your families, that you may find nothing but consolation in your homes. May this blessing accompany you during your life, and open to you, after death, the gates of heaven.

At the fountain of the unfailing faith of the Vicar of Christ let us too replenish ours, and from his serene and devoted courage receive the augury, the assurance of the ultimate, and not far distant triumph of His Holy See.

Notices of Books.

Sermons on Ecclesiastical Subjects. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. Second Volume. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS important volume reaches us at the very end of the quarter ; and we can do it therefore no kind of justice, but must postpone all notice to our April number. We must not however delay to reprint the Archbishop's final note, concerning Oxford University. We direct special attention to his Grace's last sentence, which we print in italics.

"I hope that I have not used a word in this sermon respecting the University of Oxford which cannot be justified by abundant evidence, beyond the reach of all objection. The present state of Oxford, both for its own sake, and for the sake of the country at large, cannot fail to be a cause of sorrow and anxiety, in which, for manifold reasons, I heartily share. The authorities on which I have relied are, Dr. Pattison, the Rector of Lincoln College, in his 'Suggestions on Academical Organization, with especial reference to Oxford'; and Mr. Goldwin Smith, in his 'Reorganization of the University of Oxford,' together with the evidence of Mr. Appleton and Canon Liddon, before the Lords' Committee on University Tests, in February last.

"The Rector of Lincoln states, that fully seventy per cent. of the so-called 'students' at Oxford are in no sense, even in profession, students at all. He adds, that the degrees gained by such men denote no grade of intellectual cultivation. He describes them as 'the wealthy, luxurious, indolent, and uninterested tenants of college rooms.' 'If any proof could convince the advocates of intramural residence of the futility of college discipline, such a proof might be found in the mastery which the athletic *furor* has established over all minds in this place. So entirely are the tutors beaten by it, that to cover the disgrace of defeat, they are obliged to affect to patronize and encourage the evil. I know, therefore, that on this head I must look for no sympathy from college tutors. . . . . They [*i. e.* cricket, boating, and athletics] have ceased to be amusements : they are organized into a system of serious occupation. What we call incapacity in young men is often no more than an incapacity of attention to learning, because the mind is preoccupied with a more urgent and all-absorbing call upon its energies. As soon as the summer weather sets in, the colleges are disorganized. Study, even the pretence of it, is at an end. Play is thenceforward the only thought. They are playing all day, preparing for it, or refreshing themselves after its fatigues.' (p. 316.)

"I willingly pass over graver moral subjects, on which Dr. Pattison and Mr. Goldwin Smith enlarge. The latter says : 'To revive the faculty of theology, though of the utmost importance in what may be truly called a

fearful crisis of religious faith, would at the same time be most difficult. Anglicanism, as I have said before, has developed no theology in the proper sense of the term. . . . . The difficulty would cease, if either the world would consent to receive back the authoritative theology of Suarez and the other Catholic doctors, or decide that theological inquiry shall be free.'

"The Rector of Lincoln also says: 'The faculty of theology must be considered in abeyance at present. There is indeed a scientific theology, and in the Christian records of the early and later ages the amplest material for various learning and critical investigation. But theology has not yet begun to exist as a science among us.' (p. 319.)

"As to the results of the Oxford system of study on those who may be regarded as students, Dr. Pattison says: 'As mental training, it is surely most unsound. It cannot be called philosophical. It is rhetoric expended upon philosophical subjects. It is the reappearance in education of the σοφιστικὴ of the schools of Greece, condemned by all the wise. . . . . In the schools of Oxford is now taught in perfection the art of writing leading articles.' (p. 295.) Again, he says: 'For my own part, I think the fears of the Catholic party, whether within or without the national Establishment, are substantially well-founded.' . . . . 'To the Catholic youth, the conclusions he is taught come recommended by the "authority" of the teachers, and of the Church. To our students, the conclusions taught come recommended for adoption by the authority of fashion, or the current turn of thinking living philosophical minds, and of the prevailing philosophical literature.' He goes on to say nevertheless, that they do not sufficiently require of the student to place himself in a position of absolute scepticism about everything. But he affirms that the examination must 'come into conflict with any system which proposes to provide à priori conclusions in any branch of knowledge relating to the nature of man and society. Any system or corporation which supposes itself to be in possession of such propositions, may propose them to its pupils as true, and require their acceptance on the authority of the teacher. The Roman Catholic Church does suppose and profess this.' (p. 300.)

"Mr. Appleton, before the Lords' Committee, spoke as follows. After saying that there are, at any given moment, in the University 'three hundred men who are brought under the influence of the philosophy of modern times, which might, and which does,' as he thinks, 'materially undermine all existing beliefs,' adds: 'I think it quite impossible for any man to throw himself into the system of education for the final classical school at Oxford, at the present time, not as so much knowledge, but really to assimilate it—I mean not only to study it ab extra—without having the whole edifice of belief shaken to the very foundation.' Qu. 490.—'He returns to a new construction of belief after he has gone through the period of criticism and scepticism.' 'I should say Hegel's "Philosophy of History" is read as carefully as Aristotle.' 'At this moment there are lectures being given, or about to be, in Oxford, on Hegel's logic, which is one of the most revolutionary instruments that has ever been invented.' Qu. 506.—'As a matter of fact, a man who has criticised all ideas for several years, and then is called upon to sign a test, and state his bonâ-fide adhesion to certain propositions, is led naturally to avert his mind from any consideration of those questions at all, because they now involve a contradiction; and by instinctively making both terms of the contradiction vague, he is able to reconcile them better. There is no set purpose in all this; it takes place almost unconsciously.' Qu. 524.—'I believe the upsetting of his beliefs, and the entire loosening of them from all their moorings, is an inevitable consequence of the system of education which now exists in Oxford.' Qu. 527.—Being asked, 'Do you attribute this tone of thought, which has risen up so prominently in Oxford, to the

study of Aristotle?' he answers: 'Scarcely at all. It arises mainly from a closer connection between England and the Continent. It is really a wave of thought which has come over from Germany.' Qu. 561.

"It is therefore not surprising to read: 'No theology of any school is much read at Oxford. The study has been entirely uprooted by the action of tests.' Qu. 559.

"We may sum up this evidence with the personal testimony of Canon Liddon, who said: 'Cases have come within my own experience of men who have come up from school as Christians, and have been earnest Christians up to the time of beginning to read philosophy for the final school, but who, during the year and a half or two years employed in this study, have surrendered, first their Christianity, and next their belief in God, and have left the University not believing in a Supreme Being.' Qu. 706.

"The intellectual and moral agencies which caused the mournful anarchy of the last Oxford Commemoration are here abundantly revealed. It is time that all to whom our national name and fame and character are dear should return upon their steps, 'et antiquam exquirere Matrem.'

"The Holy See and the Bishops of England have warned all Catholic parents, that to send their sons to Oxford and Cambridge is to expose them to the loss of their faith. The parents who so act *are guilty of grave sin before God.*" (pp. 425–430.)

The Four-fold Sovereignty of God. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1871.

THESE four sermons are supplementary to those on the "Four Great Evils of the Day," which we reviewed with some care in our last number; and they go over ground substantially the same, from a positive stand-point instead of a negative. In no other way can we so forcibly exhibit their value, as by extracting several of the well-balanced, weighty, and (occasionally) profound remarks which are to be found throughout. We italicise a sentence here and there.

"The intellectual powers of mankind are to be found in their highest perfection in Christendom. It is no objection whatsoever for men of the present day, who believe nothing and who profess to have rejected even the existence of God, to say, 'Look at our men of science—are they in intellectual dignity or power inferior to those whom you call your doctors?' The answer is this: Their intellectual dignity is derived from the culture of the Christian world. They would never be what they are, if they had not been nurtured and ripened upon that same mystical vine from which they have fallen. They retain after their fall the savour and the quality of the tree from which they fell. But can they reproduce it? let them try: and how long will they transmit it? Those who have fallen from the knowledge of God and of His revelation, have fallen from the tradition of intellectual culture. 'If any one abide not in Me, he shall be cast forth as a branch, and shall wither.' This is true, both spiritually and intellectually. The intellectual standard of sceptics and infidels has no perpetuity. They die out as individuals, and their few disciples are scattered.

On the other hand, I would ask, is there in the history of mankind anything, for intellectual power, precision, amplitude, fertility, to be compared with Saint Thomas Aquinas or Suarez, to mention two only out of a multitude? The profound and pretentious ignorance of this day will no doubt think that these two examples belong to the middle ages, or that the latter was only emerging from those times of obscurity; but the man who so speaks cannot know the books on which he passes judgment. The intellectual system of the world, in its refinement and culture, will be found passing through the unbroken tradition of such minds; and the philosophers and men of science of this day, who tell us that we can know nothing with certainty but that which is within the reach of sense, have not dignified the human intellect, but have degraded it. They reject the intellectual system of the whole world, and the highest truths which it proclaims." (pp. 20—22.)

"It is certain that deists lose much of the light of the knowledge of God when they reject revelation, because even nature ceases to testify as luminously, and to speak as articulately, of the existence of God, His eternal power and Divinity, to those in whom the sceptical spirit is at work." (p. 24.)

"The Church possessed, in the time of S. Gregory the Great, three-and-twenty provinces. The possessions over which the Vicar of Jesus Christ ruled, until sacrilege robbed him ths other day, were called the Patrimony of the Church; and some twenty-three like to it were possessed by S. Gregory the Great. They extended over the greater part of Italy, the south of France, along the shores of the Adriatic, the north of Africa, Sicily, the islands of the Mediterranean. Divine Providence so ordered that these patrimonies, being committed to the patriarchal care and government of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, should become the first portions of human society which were reduced to obedience to the Christian law. *In these patrimonies the germs of Christian civilization were planted.* They first received the Christian law of marriage, the abolition of slavery, Christian education of children, just arbitration of Christian judges, mutual respect, fair dealing between man and man. They became the first provinces of that Christian world which has now grown up into the maturity of Christendom. There is not to be found in history anything more beautiful, more patriarchal, or reflecting more brightly the peaceful and majestic justice of our Divine Lord in the Mountain, legislating in the eight beatitudes, than the paternal sway of S. Gregory the Great, the Apostle of England. Those twenty-three patrimonies of the Church, as I have said elsewhere, wrought as the leaven in the meal; and the Christian civilization ripened in them, became the germ of the Christian civilization which afterwards formed the nations of Christian Europe. Where, then, were Spain, France, Germany, and England? They were races, divided in conflict. Some were wild in their ferocity; others had sunk again into Paganism; some had not yet emerged from it. There was then no Christian Europe, such as we now know it. S. Gregory the Great ruled over those patrimonies, and ripened the first spring of the Christian world. He sowed broadcast in the furrows of Europe those seeds of Christian progress and order of which men at this day are so proud, though they are trampling them down. Then the nations began to spring—Lombardy, Spain, France, Germany, and England. It was the action of the Vicar of Jesus Christ which made them what they are." (pp. 73—75.)

"What has the world, then, gained by the sovereignty of Jesus Christ? The extinction of slavery,—and let any man weigh what those words mean, remembering what slavery was in the ancient world. Secondly, the sanctification of Christian households, by the laws of domestic purity and the laws of marriage. Thirdly, the Christian education of children. Fourthly, the redemption of woman; the raising her from the degradation in which she was before her regeneration in Christ, to be the handmaid of the Immaculate

Mother of God, and to be respected by men, as being the image of the Mother of their Redeemer. Once more, the restraining of warfare, which before was the lawless and brute violence of men and nations without recognition of mercy and justice. War itself was tempered with mercy under the legislation of the Church and the supreme arbitrament of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. Again, the civil code of every country, which still retained, even in its Christianity, the severity and sanguinary rigour of its past, was gradually mitigated from age to age, until the severities of the old world were in great measure effaced." (pp. 76, 77.)

"Again, mutual respect among all classes and ranks of men. When I say respect, I do not mean only or chiefly the respect of the lower for those above them, but I mean emphatically *the respect of those in authority for those who are beneath them*, because they see in them the image of God, and the purchase of the Precious Blood of Jesus Christ." (p. 78.)

"In these eighteen hundred years, during which the restless activity of the human intellect has been perpetually devising for itself new modes of conception and of expression—thereby perpetually either going beyond the truth or falling short of it, thus producing heresies—never yet in the Catholic Church has a heresy been able to establish itself or to effect a lodgment. Always and invariably has it been expelled. *As a morbid humour of the body is expelled by the vigour of life, so everything contrary to the perfect life of thebody and the perfect purity of truth has been sooner or later cast out* —so completely eliminated, that not a taint remains behind."* (p. 123.)

"In the fifteenth century, the study and cultivation of classical literature excited in the minds of the leading men of European countries a sort of admiration, which I may call a worship, of the models of pagan antiquity, of its philosophy and its policy, of its patriots, and of its public morality. That which is styled the Renaissance, or the New Birth of the Christian world, profoundly infected the men of that day. This antichristian reaction has spread down to the present time. People were deceived into thinking that the Renaissance was the measure of all that is cultivated and civilized. *This was the first step, as I will show, to the rejection of Christian civilization.*

"It introduced paganism into books, into language, into art, into education. On the testimony of multitudes of men, in which I bear my own part, the education of Christian nations has been based and formed upon what is called classical literature. The examples, maxims, principles, the deeds, the crimes, personal, private, and public, even to the assassination of princes and revolt of peoples, glorified in classical literature, have been taken in unconsciously by boys in their early education for these three hundred years. In Italy and France this is already bearing its fruit." (pp. 135, 136.)

"I have already spoken of what are called the principles of 1789. I will not say more of them now, than to add that they are the legitimate application of the principles of the Reformation to states. *They are Lutheranism in politics, and they have done for the civil order that which the Reformation did for the ecclesiastical.* The Reformation broke up the religious unity, and the principles of 1789 broke up the political unity, of Christian Europe. From that day a perpetual dissolution, crumbling, and decay in the foundations of society has undermined every country where these principles have taken root." (p. 137.)

"Next, the same usurpation by the civil powers manifested itself in the north

---

* This beautifully and at the same time carefully expressed remark of the Archbishop's will remind our readers forcibly of the long and very impressive passage, concerning Monophysism and Jansenism, which we have quoted from F. Newman in the first article of our present number.

and in the west of Europe. It would be against my will to go into any detail of matters nearer home; but for clearness it must be said that for the last three hundred years, in Germany and in these countries, the relation of the two societies, civil and spiritual, and the order which God had instituted, have been inverted. Religion has been made a part of legislation and of government. Religion and State Churches have been, as it is called, 'established.' But this is the inversion of the whole Divine order. *It is the State that needs to be established by the Church, not the Church by the State;* the inferior cannot sustain the superior. It is not the order of nature that upholds the order of grace; it is the order of grace that upholds and perfects the order of nature. All human power, human authority, human legislation, human society, depends, as I have shown, for its perfection, its perpetuity, its progress, its welfare, its peace, upon the sovereignty of God, by and through His Church. The Church may hold and use temporal power, but it will not be established by it. In other countries, which profess to remain within the unity of the Catholic Church, has appeared *a pernicious illusion, which has blinded and seduced many better minds. It is called the 'Free Church in the Free State.'* This imagination rests on the assumption that the two societies are perfectly free and independent one of another, which is absolutely true of the Church, but absolutely false of the State; that they are two societies upon a perfect equality. This again is absolutely false, because the supernatural or Divine order is higher than the natural and human. Lastly, it assumes that they may go each their way without reciprocal duties and mutual co-operation; which is contrary to the law of God, both in nature and in grace. We have seen that the supernatural society elevates and perfects the natural, even in the order of civilization. The separation of these two works of God is the loss and fall of the civil and political society of the world. But in the east, the north, the west, and now in the south of Christendom, there are not only theories and principles, but actual policies and systems of legislation, the ultimate object of which is to divorce and to separate the two societies which God has created to be united together. You are aware that, in the Syllabus, the Holy See has condemned the following proposition: 'That the Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church.'" (pp. 152–4.)

"There is not a heresy, so far as I can remember, in the history of the Church, which has not begun in some bishop or priest. Some man, ordained to be a witness of truth and a preacher of justice, has fallen from the Church which is divinely guided to teach the faithful, as Satan fell like lightning from Heaven. They who should have been as a light to guide the intellect of men became a wildfire to blast and wither the soul. And whence came these heresies? From intellectual pride; that is, from the revolt of the intellect against the sovereignty of faith, springing from a perverse will and confirming its perversion." (p. 157.)

A Dogmatic Catechism, from the Italian of Frassinetti. Revised and Edited by the Oblate Fathers of S. Charles. London: Washbourne.

THERE are no publications which we receive for notice with more pleasure, than good Catholic catechisms; for there are none (to our mind) more pressingly needed. One urgent desideratum is an exposition of Catholic

doctrine, which shall be suitable for lay students receiving a higher education. Such exposition indeed would be a work of considerable labour, and would require unusual qualifications for its successful accomplishment. It would contain of course, in the first place, a treatment of the great Catholic dogmata, sufficiently full and scientific to meet the requirements of highly-trained intellects. It would state with accuracy and precision all those special parts of Catholic doctrine, whether intrinsically more or less prominent, which are assailed or imperilled by current speculative errors. It would set forth clearly and copiously those great truths on the due relation of Church and State and on other cognate matters, which the Holy See has of late been so constantly and energetically enforcing ex cathedrâ. And these are but samples of what might fairly be expected from such a work.

The Catechism before us has no pretension of this kind, though admirably suitable for the purpose at which it aims. The Archbishop in his Preface speaks of it most truly, as "singularly well adapted to the needs of our middle class, for whom as yet a sufficient provision has hardly been made." And there is another object for which it will perhaps be found almost equally useful; viz., that of instruction for *teachers of poor children*. Present circumstances should make Catholics expend especial pains on this vitally important work. Much has been done by recent legislation to hamper the Church's task of educating poor children in the truths of their religion. But we shall be gainers rather than losers by these events, if they fix our thoughts more earnestly on the enterprise, of imbuing the teachers of these children with methodical and systematic knowledge of Catholic truth. When such truth is apprehended, not fragmentarily and bit by bit but as a large and connected whole, each individual portion thereof is imparted with a vigour and freshness, which take men by surprise.

We will now give a few extracts from Frassinetti's work, as samples of its excellent execution. The dogma of the Blessed Trinity has been by some catechetical writers set forth so vaguely — the numerical unity of God's nature has been so kept in the background—as almost to suggest tritheism. But the following exposition leaves nothing to be desired.

"Have the Persons of the most Holy Trinity the same Perfections, the same Understanding, and the same Will?

"*A.* They have the same Wisdom and the same Goodness. They live with the same Life, know with the same Understanding, will with the same Will, and work with the same Power. The reason of this is always the same, that they have the same Divine Nature and Substance.

"May we then say that the Person of the Father is the Person of the Son, and the Person of the Holy Ghost?

"*A.* You must not say so, for it is an article of the Faith that They are Three Persons, really distinct (Athanasian Creed); and therefore the Person of the Father is not the Person of the Son, nor of the Holy Ghost; the Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father, nor of the Holy Ghost; the Person of the Holy Ghost is not the Person of the Father, nor of the Son. They are Three Persons really distinct one from another, although They have the same Substance.

"Can we say that God is distinct in Three Persons?

"*A.* The expression that God is distinct in Three Persons is condemned by the dogmatic Bull 'Auctorem Fidei'; hence you must say that in God

there are Three distinct Persons, and not that God is distinct in Three Persons.

"May we not say, in any sense whatever, that there are Three Gods?

"*A.* No, in no sense whatever; whoever should say so would be a heretic.

"May we say that God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost?

"You should say so, as appears from the definition of the 4th Lateran Council.*

"Give me some comparison which may render this less obscure to me.

"*A.* Picture to yourself three persons called Peter, Paul, and John, who, nevertheless, had one and the same soul, and one and the same body. We should call them three persons, because one would be Peter, the other Paul, and the third John; they would, however, be one man only, and not three men, *not having three bodies or three souls, but only one body and one soul.* This would be impossible amongst men, because man's substance is little and limited, and therefore cannot be one and the same in more than one person; but the Substance of God, that is the Divinity, is infinite, and therefore can be found, and in fact, is found, in several persons. The Substance, therefore, that is to say, the Divinity of the Father, is found also in the Son and in the Holy Ghost." (pp. 68–70.)

The distinction between actual and habitual grace is thus felicitously illustrated:—

"Could you, by some comparison, explain to me more clearly the difference which exists between Actual grace and Sanctifying grace?

"*A.* Picture to yourself a little child who has fallen down in the mire. This child has not the power to get up again of himself, and he has need of dry, clean clothes, because his clothes are all wet and soiled with mud. His mother hastens to his assistance, and first gives him her hand to help him up, and then dresses him again, as there is need. Here you have a twofold aid from the mother, corresponding to the twofold necessity of the child; but the first is a passing, transitory, momentary aid, since when the mother helps him up, she does nothing which remains on him, to use a material expression; the second, however, is a permanent aid, since the fresh clothes, with which she covers him, remain on the child. In the help which the mother gives her child to get up again, you have a similitude of Actual grace; in the clothes which she puts upon him, you have a similitude of Habitual grace. The first is transitory; the second is permanent, remaining with a man." (pp. 122–3.)

The following statement on efficacious and sufficient grace seems to us a model, both as to what *is* said and what is *not*:—

"Can you explain the efficacy and sufficiency of grace in any other way?

"*A.* Theologians have framed various systems, and have explained, some in one way, some in another, the efficacy and sufficiency of grace; but, in this most difficult matter, it will suffice for us to know what is certain and beyond possibility of doubt. It is certain, that there are *efficacious* graces—that is to say, graces which obtain their effect. It is certain, that there are graces which are only *sufficient*, and which, being resisted, do not obtain their effect. This is a truth of the Faith, defined against Jansenius. This sufficient grace must be capable of obtaining—that is, sufficient to obtain—the effect for which it is given. If it did not suffice to its end it would be insuf-

---

* "We believe and confess that there is one Supreme, Incomprehensible and Ineffable Reality, which is truly Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Persons together, and each of them distinct."

ficient, and sufficient grace which is not enough—that is to say, which is not sufficient, is a contradiction. It is certain, that God sincerely wills the salvation of all men ; it is certain, that without His interior and actual grace no adults can be saved ; it is certain, that God will not allow them to want the true aids of grace, as means absolutely necessary for the attainment of their end—that is, of their salvation ; and so we all have grace sufficient to save us, and, if we co-operate with this grace, our salvation is secure. 'To every one is given light and grace, that, doing what is in him, he may save himself by giving only his consent.' This is the doctrine, and these are the words of St. Catherine of Genoa, whose authority, as all know, is certainly as good as that of a theologian. Precisely, and in the full rigour of the expression, this is the belief of the whole Christian people. I confess, however, that I prefer the beautiful words of the Council of Trent before all the systems :—'God does not command what is impossible ; but commanding He warns thee to do what thou art able, and to ask for what thou art not able to do. In the meanwhile He helps thee in order that thou mayst be able. His commandments are not grievous, His yoke is sweet, His burden is light. . . . . Those whom He has once justified He does not abandon, unless they first abandon Him." This is the consoling doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and all the more consoling because it is infallible." (pp. 126–7.)

Here again are clear expressions on a matter of vital importance and of some difficulty. The italics in the first paragraph are our own :—

"In how many ways can we love God above all things ?

"*A.* In two ways, 'appreciatively' and 'intensely.' God is loved above all things appreciatively, when *the will is so united to God* that it is ready to suffer anything whatever, rather than offend Him by any mortal sin ; He is loved intensely, above all things, when, to the firmness and attachment of the will, is united a lively transport and ardent affection, so that nothing makes so *great impression on the feelings of our heart*, as the pleasure or displeasure of Almighty God.

"In which of these two ways are we obliged to love God ?

"*A.* In the first, that is to say, appreciatively ; and he who should be without this love could not be saved.

"Does this appreciative love oblige us only to abstain from mortal sin ?

"*A.* Appreciative love obliges us to prefer Almighty God and His good pleasure before all things, and therefore to abstain even from venial sin ; nevertheless, since venial sin does not extinguish charity in us, appreciative love would suffice for our salvation, although it might not attain to making us avoid venial sin.

"For what reason are we not obliged to love God intensely above all things ?

"*A.* Because this intense love is not in our own power ; it is an extraordinary gift of God, most precious and greatly to be desired. The purest souls possess it, generally speaking, even in this life ; still, even they have not the fulness of the intensity of the Divine love, this fulness of love being reserved for the Saints in Heaven.

"How can it be that a soul should prefer God and His good pleasure before all things, whilst some other object may make greater impression on the feelings of the heart ?

"*A.* The *act* of giving preference to one thing before all others is an act of the *will*, which is free ; *feeling* the impression of one thing more than another belongs to the *sensitive* faculty, which in us is not free, but of necessity. For example, I may determine to give preference to bitter food instead of sweet, but I cannot prevent myself *feeling* the bitterness when I eat it. From the same sensitive faculty it arises that even pious mothers feel more

lively joy in seeing their children restored to health after a dangerous illness, than in seeing them penitent after the commission of some sin; and yet their *will* would prefer rather to see them sick than sinners.

"When a man prefers God before all things because He is an infinite good, and would lose anything whatever rather than offend Him grievously, has he the perfect love of God?

"*A.* It is certain that such an one then possesses the perfect love of God; perfect in its nature, though capable of becoming more and more perfect, as is clearly seen in the case of a man who would be ready to lose anything whatever rather than offend God by even a venial sin." (pp. 159–61.)

And again on a kindred matter, the "imperfect contrition" or "attrition" absolutely required for a valid absolution. The italics again are our own:—

"What conditions ought Contrition, that is, sorrow for sin, to have?

"*A.* It must be 'internal,' that is to say, it must come from the heart: it must be supreme, that is to say, it must cause us to detest sin above every other evil; it must be 'universal,' making us abhor all mortal sins whatsoever; it must be 'supernatural,' that is to say, it must spring from a motive revealed by the Holy Faith.

"Is a sorrow which has these conditions necessary in Confession, when we have only to accuse ourselves of venial sins?

"*A.* There is no doubt of it, except in regard to the third condition; for it is not necessary that the penitent should have an universal sorrow for all his venial sins; it is sufficient that, when confessing only venial sins, he should repent of some one of them. He must, however, have an internal, supreme, supernatural sorrow on account of that of which he repents, *so that he may be disposed to suffer anything whatever, rather than commit it any more.*

"Could a person who had only venial sins to confess, and who did not feel this sorrow, go to Confession?

"*A.* Such an one could not receive Absolution, otherwise the Sacrament would be void, as wanting an essential part. On this account Theologians advise persons who frequent Holy Confession and who accuse themselves only of habitual venial sins, to add to their confession some graver sin of their past life for which they have a more certain sorrow, in order that the matter of the Sacrament may not be wanting. *For want such of caution it is possible that not a few persons who frequent Holy Confession receive Absolution in vain.* But we leave this to be discussed by Moral Theologians." (pp. 211–12.)

We will conclude with the author's remarks on Catholic worship of the Most Holy Virgin:—

"The Church has always promoted, with singular earnestness, devotion to the Blessed Virgin, and this devotion consists in venerating Her, and in praying to Her to intercede for us. The Saints who have been most eminent for knowledge and piety, were ever distinguished by a most special devotion to Mary. The authors who enjoy the reputation of the soundest and most stainless doctrine, have ever written great things of devotion to Mary; Her worship is disapproved only by heretics; and those who have little devotion to Her are those only who are not good Christians. I ask pardon of Mary, I ask pardon of her devout clients, when I say merely, that devotion to her is most *useful;* for more than this might be said without fear of error.

"Do those who say that Mary bestows graces express themselves *correctly?*

"*A. They express themselves* well, because the Church asks Mary to *bestow graces,* 'Solve vincla reis, profer lumen cæcis,' &c. Break the

bonds of the captive, give light to the darkened, &c. Understand, however, that Mary *impetrates* these graces for us, it being certain that the *Author* of all grace, as the Author of all good, is God alone." (p. 119.)

The Oblate Fathers have conferred on English Catholics signal benefit by this publication.

The Contemporary Review for November, 1871, *and January*, 1872. Papers by Mr. HUXLEY and Mr. ST. GEORGE MIVART.

A CONTROVERSY has just taken place under the eyes of the public which has great interest for Catholics. So far it has not been a long one; there has been the attack and the reply, and nothing more. Whether it will go on we cannot say; but what has been already said on both sides is sufficient to afford ample matter for comment. During the last few months Professor Huxley seems to have taken his place in the ranks of the bigots. His speech at the London School Board, a few weeks ago, against fees to Catholic schools, was remarkable, not so much for its conclusions, as for its avowed premisses. Professor Huxley declared it to be his opinion that the Catholic religion was such that no good citizen could justly allow it the usual rights of citizenship. This is persecution. Right or wrong, Professor Huxley has declared himself a persecutor; and, seeing that he is a person of great accomplishments in a certain line, a ready speaker, and in possession of the ear of the public, it is just as well that Catholics should recognize the fact. The paper in the "Contemporary Review" for November last, to which we at present direct attention, seems almost intended as a scientific justification of his outbreak at the School Board. If it is, nobody need any longer wonder at what he may say against the Catholic Church. Perhaps our readers have read the article. Whether they have or not matters little, for we can epitomize it in a single quotation.

"And until responsible authority—say, for example, the Archbishop of Westminster—formally declares that Suarez was wrong, and that Catholic priests are free to teach their flocks that the world was *not* made in six natural days, and that plants and animals were *not* created in their perfect and complete state, but have been evolved by natural processes through long ages from certain germs in which they were potentially contained, I, for one, shall feel bound to believe that the doctrines of Suarez are the only ones which are sanctioned by Infallible authority, as represented by the Holy Father and the Catholic Church." (p. 456.)

Professor Huxley speaks very severely, in the same page, of men who propagate "what they may easily know, and, *therefore are bound to know*, to be falsities." We cannot see how he can escape from his own sentence. He might easily have known, and he therefore was bound to know, that the description he implicitly gives of what is Catholic doctrine, on the subject of the "six days" at least, was false. He must have heard of Cardinal Wiseman's *Lectures on the "Connection* between Science and Revealed Religion"—to

mention no other Catholic books, for we waive what we might very justly claim, namely, that he should have examined a considerable number of Catholic authorities before he presumed to lay down what was Catholic doctrine. Catholic doctrine! Mr. Huxley has not a distant idea of what the phrase means. Nothing is "Catholic doctrine" which is not taught and believed by the Church *as Catholic doctrine.* What Professor Huxley, therefore, should have ascertained, had he acted with ordinary intelligence and straightforwardness, was, not whether this or that Catholic writer, or whether a number of Catholic writers, *held* the opinion that he is concerned with, but, 1. whether they affirmed it to be "*Catholic doctrine*"; 2. whether they were of sufficient weight to make such an affirmation on their parts authoritative.

We are not going to take the trouble, in this place, to prove that Catholics *are* free to adopt the teachings of modern science. If our antagonists will not read our books before they write against us, they will hardly do so afterwards. But we may observe that Mr. Mivart, in his answer to Professor Huxley ("Contemporary Review," January, 1872) gives a lengthy list of Catholic authorities, both ancient and recent, who distinctly assert, either that the "six days" of Genesis are not to be taken in the literal sense, or that the question is an open one. Among other names Mr. Mivart cites Father Pianciani's "Cosmogonia Naturale comparata col Genesi" (Roma, 1862); Rev. Professor Molloy's "Geology and Revelation" (London 1869); Gousset, "Théol. Dogmatique;" Frayssinous, "Défense du Christianisme;" Father Perrone, "Prælect. Theologicæ," and Cardinal Wiseman's work already mentioned.

Passing from this unpardonable carelessness or want of candour on the part of an eminent popular writer (and let it be observed it is all the more unpardonable because it occurs in a place where all the world will read it), we must congratulate Mr. Mivart on the very complete answer he has given to his antagonist. His first point is, that Professor Huxley has shirked his *arguments* against pure Darwinism, and not only shirked his arguments but misrepresented his view. He thus states the points in which he differs from Mr. Darwin:—

"The very essence of Mr. Darwin's theory as to the 'origin of species' was, the paramount action of the destructive powers of nature over any *direct* tendency to vary in any certain and definite line, whether such direct tendency resulted mainly from internal predisposing or external exciting causes.

"The benefit of the individual in the struggle for life was announced as the one determining agent, fixing slight beneficial variations into enduring characters, and the evolution of species by such agency is justly and properly to be termed formation by natural selection. . . . . Such being the case, my first object, as I have before said, was to show not only that 'natural selection' is inadequate to the task assigned it, but that there is much positive evidence of the action both of external influences sufficient to dominate and overpower in certain instances any process of 'natural selection,' and also of still more influential internal powers; moreover, that these powers are so efficient as to present themselves as probably the main determining agent in specific evolution, although I admitted that a certain subordinate action of natural selection plainly obtained."

Mr. Mivart then briefly recapitulates the arguments he put forward in his "Genesis of Species"; they will be found epitomised in the DUBLIN REVIEW for April 1871, pp. 482–6. He concludes as follows :—

"The hypothesis which I ventured to offer as my view of the evolutionary process was and is, that just as all admit the universe to have been so ordered—or so to exist—that on the mixing of chemical substances under certain conditions, new and perfectly definite species of minerals are suddenly evolved from potentiality to existence, and as by the juxtaposition of inorganic matters under certain influences a new form of force—'vitality'—appears upon the scene; so also in animals, the concurrence of certain external exciting causes acts in such a manner on internal predisposing tendencies as to determine by a direct seminal modification the evolution of a new specific form. The action of 'natural selection,' I admitted, and admit, to be real and necessary, but I ascribe to it an altogether subordinate *rôle*. This view may be true or false, but it is a very different one from that advocated by the author of the 'Origin of Species,' and I am at a loss to understand how Professor Huxley can consider it identical with Mr. Darwin's." (p. 172.)

So are we. But Mr. Darwin, just now, seems to be in a state of transition. In his fifth edition he makes admissions which are decisive against the hypothesis that "natural selection" is the sole agent of development, and yet (as Mr. Mivart also observes) he nowhere seems to state distinctly that it is quite a *subordinate* agent. Perhaps he will come to this in his sixth edition, which we understand to be now in preparation.

But if Professor Huxley did not see his way to answer Mr. Mivart's scientific objections to Darwinism, he was more at home in another line of answer. He first of all (quite gratuitously) assumes that Mr. Mivart is arguing from the point of view of a Catholic, and then, as we have already noticed, makes the monstrous and impudent assertion that no Catholic can hold either successive creation or evolution in any sense whatever. Perhaps it was skilful in Professor Huxley to make friends of orthodox Protestants by pretending to be exposing the bigotry of Ultramontanes, and perhaps this is the reason why his Essay seems to have been received so silently by their organs. But in reality his premisses bear as hardly upon all believers in the inspiration of the Bible as upon the strictest Ultramontane. He tells the Protestant clergy that they are propagating, Sunday after Sunday, what they may easily know, and therefore what they are bound to know, are falsities; or else they are using words in a non-natural sense, and are worse than Jesuits. He considers that if Almighty God is really the author of Genesis, He must have used language "studiously calculated to deceive His creatures and worshippers" (p. 458); and he talks with contempt of the "preposterous fable respecting the fabrication" of woman, according to the literal interpretation of the sacred record (p. 456). Professor Huxley seems to labour under the impression that Moses wrote in the English of the A.V.; otherwise he would not talk such foolish nonsense about "days" and "creative acts." But this theological outbreak (in which the distinguished physiologist, in spite of an affected disclaimer, has taken as much delight as a man usually takes in a new and fresh enterprise where everything is novel), will do little harm to any but its author. Its *animus* is so bitter, and its hostility so spiteful, that it must lower the man who has indulged in it to the

level of the mere declaiming bigots that lose their heads and gnash with their teeth when they come into the presence of Catholic truth. Mr. Huxley has made a great deal of Suarez; and we are glad to see that, as regards Suarez, Mr. Mivart has answered him most completely. No one (least of all Mr. Mivart) ever said that Suarez was an advocate of "evolution." What Mr. Mivart quoted Suarez for, in his "Genesis of Species," was to show that the great Spanish Jesuit held principles in philosophy which were quite in accordance with the theory of evolution; it fact, that he admitted the possibility of "derivative creation" (that is, the possibility that new forms and even new species might be "educed" out of the potentiality of matter), whilst holding, as regards actual *fact*, that the history of creation had not been by development, and that, with a few exceptions, no fresh species, but only fresh individuals, had been "educed" out of potentiality since the *fiat* of creation. Professor Huxley has hunted up a "Suarez"; he has muddled himself by attempting to understand the technicalities of scholastic philosophy; and he has announced, with an imposing flourish of trumpets, that Suarez "directly opposes the opinions" of Mr. Mivart as to evolution! As no one ever doubted this, it is not difficult to see how far Professor Huxley's painful studies in matter and form have benefited his cause. Suarez, whatever else he was, is not claimed by Catholics as a prophet. He had not the most distant notion, in all probability, of "evolution," as a theory; and he simply stated his belief that the literal interpretation of Genesis was to be followed, in opposition to the "Augustinian" school, who thought the account was figurative, but who generally agreed with their antagonists as to the *fact* that little or nothing had taken place which could properly be called Evolution. What Mr. Mivart maintains is that Suarez "asserts the *principle* that those kinds of animals which are potentially contained in nature need not be supposed to be directly and immediately created. In determining what kinds were or were not so contained, he followed the scientific notions of his time as he understood them. He would have written according to the exigences of science now." (p. 179.)

We think Mr. Mivart has conclusively answered his antagonist in regard to this notable discovery of the opinions of Suarez. But Mr. Mivart here raises, or rather reverts to, a point on which we must say a word or two. In his "Genesis of Species" (p. 277), he discussed the origin of the *body* of man, and implied that it was perfectly orthodox to hold that it was "created" in a way similar to that in which all other animals were (on the hypothesis of evolution) created, viz. by development, the soul being subsequently infused. In our article on "Evolution and Faith," in July, 1871, we maintained that to deny the instantaneousness, or quasi-instantaneousness, of the formation of the body of the first man was at least rash, and perhaps proximate to heresy. In saying this, we did not at all insist upon the Scripture formulary, taken by itself. If the author of Genesis says that Adam was formed of the slime of the earth, other passages of Scripture assert the same thing of all men whatsoever; and it is clear that in the case of all Adam's children the expression is not literally true. But we thought that the voice of the Fathers was so unanimous on the point that it could hardly be rejected by a Catholic. We confess that we speak on the subject with diffidence, because there are *difficulties* on both sides; but we will recapitulate our reasons for what was *said.*

1. In the first place, no one will deny that the Fathers, and the general voice of the Church, interpret the history of the formation of Adam's body as designed to convey, *at least* the idea, that God formed it in a more special way than He formed other things. In other words, God certainly formed Adam's body by extra-natural co-operation. This would be admitted even by many scientific men who are not Catholics, such as Mr. Wallace.

2. But if God did interfere in an extra-natural way to make Adam's body, the question is reduced to a choice of miracles. On the one hand, we have the hypothesis that He formed it out of pre-existing materials, by one act of His will, infusing at the same moment the spiritual soul. On the other, we have the theory that Adam's body was that of an anthropomorphous ape; that this animal was specially developed, watched over, and protected, and that, after a quasi-miraculous existence for a number of years, it received the rational soul, not by addition (which would have made Adam merely an ape added to a spirit), but by the change of the animal and vegetative principle into the rational or human. Of the two theories, looking at them merely from the point of view of reason, we prefer the former, as involving fewer miracles. We admit that the latter receives a certain support from the statements of Catholic authorities in regard to what takes place in the case of the human fœtus. It is admitted that what is afterwards the human infant is at first mere matter, hardly organized at all, afterwards sentient, and finally animated by the rational soul. And in this process it is evident that there is a substitution of principles or souls, such as we have just objected to in the case of Adam. But we are not objecting to the possibility of the view we reject. We only say that it is too miraculous. The process of conception and birth, however wonderful, is natural. But Adam could not have been *born* (that is, as a human being). We never heard of any one who maintained that Adam received the rational soul whilst yet in the womb of a brute-mother; at any rate, it is expressly rejected by all authority that he came into human existence as an infant. What is natural, therefore, in the process of birth, becomes highly miraculous in any other view of Adam's formation. We do not deny the miraculous to have intervened; we postulate it; but, in accordance with all Catholic authority, we diminish it as far as we can. Nor is this argument a merely *à priori* or presumptive one, which must cease to operate if science is against it. Miracles are vouched for either by sensible experience or by revelation; therefore scientific evolution, which is entirely deductive, cannot testify anything at all about the presumed intervention of the miraculous.

3. There is a peculiar *consensus* of authority on the questions of Adam's body. Even S. Augustine, who makes so little of the "letter" of Genesis, distinctly admits and asserts, with the word "creditur," that it was instantaneously formed.* F. Perrone goes so far as to say that the "immediate formation" of man, *body* and *soul*, by Almighty God is a matter of faith (*spectat ad fidem*).† No one can deny that Catholic theologians, though knowing nothing of evolution, speak of Adam's body in a different way from

* "De Genesi ad Litteram," l. vi. 14.
† "Prælect. Theol.," i. 702.

that in which they speak of all other beings. The reason is, it seems to us, that man is part of the supernatural order. He is the subject of that order, and the object of it; and as all material creation was for him, so his formation stands on a different plane from that of all the other lower beings. Therefore it would seem that his creation becomes a thing "belonging to faith and morality," such as would properly fall within the scope of what the Council of Trent has declared to be the authority of patristic interpretation of Scripture. This is why we said it seemed "proximate to heresy" to reject the usual opinion. At any rate we are clear that, at present, it would be rash. It is rash to contradict the words of the Fathers, the theologians, and the *consensus fidelium* without reason amounting to evidence, and this even in things only distantly connected with Catholic faith.

4. With respect to the formation of the body of Eve, Catholic teaching seems clearly to reject the view that the first man was androgynous, and (as a consequence) that woman was formed or developed by natural process. At the same time, we would not be understood to maintain that the text of the sacred narrative distinctly states the *mode* in which Eve was made out of the body of Adam. The word "rib," as far as we know, need not necessarily mean the exact bony structure that it means in modern English. But we think it must be held, at present at least, that Eve was "built up" by an instantaneous act of Almighty God, from some portion of Adam's body which was taken from him.

Mr. Mivart admits the miraculous, or the extra-natural, action of Almighty God in the body of man; he cannot, therefore, have any insuperable difficulty in assenting to our view, if we are correct in asserting that is the only one that is orthodox. Inductions from structure, variation, reversion, &c., must always be checked by revelation; and when we come to a conclusion, in a matter like this, different from what mere sensible phenomena would warrant, it is not that the sensible phenomena are deceptive, but that they are in this case corrected by the word of God. As for Professor Huxley, since he denies the miraculous altogether, it cannot matter to him at what precise point we insist upon its necessary intervention.

We will not enlarge on the rest of Mr. Mivart's paper. He has many admirable remarks against his antagonist's sheer materialism and his crude speculations in religion and psychology. It is gratifying to Catholics, and it ought to be gratifying to all believers in the Bible, to see a man whose high scientific attainments no one can dispute, writing so well and so loyally in the interests of the truth of revelation.

The Condition of Catholics under James I. Father Gerard's Narrative of the Gunpowder Plot. Edited by JOHN MORRIS, Priest of the Society of Jesus. Longmans. 1871.

FATHER MORRIS has done excellent service by this volume. Sir Walter Scott somewhere says, speaking of Pepys, that the best edition of an author is that which merely "bastes him with his own sauce," and this is emphatically what Father Morris has done. Opening his work with the one dictum that "the life and character of a witness are the grounds on which we base our estimate of his credibility," he gives excellent translations, by Father Kingdon, from Father Gerard's autobiography, with its history, and that of the "Plot of Powder," confining his editorship, beyond this, to very careful and accurate notes, which clear up instead of encumbering the narratives. The Gerards of Bryn, in Lancashire, date from the reign of Edward III. (1352), when they became possessed, by marriage, of Bryn, Ashton, and other Lancashire property. The family has outlived three dwelling-houses; Old Bryn, New Bryn, and Garswood, and their present residence, the New Hall, dates only from 1692. Father John was the second son of Sir Thomas Gerard, Knight (made a baronet of the first creation in 1611), and was born in 1564. When he was five years old his father was imprisoned in the Tower for conspiring to set Queen Mary of Scotland free. He regained his own liberty by one of those "free offers" which "recusant" Catholics were then forced to make to their cruel and rapacious sovereign Elizabeth, "of glorious memory." At fifteen years old John Gerard was sent to Exeter College, Oxford, but remained there only a year, as Catholics were obliged not only to attend chapel, but to receive the bread and wine of the "counterfeit sacrament." He pursued his studies at home under a tutor, Mr. Sutton, who afterwards became a Jesuit. Young Gerard next spent three years at Rheims, where he made the acquaintance of a young Jesuit, who gave him such an account of the mode of life, that Gerard says: "I heard the call of God's infinite mercy and loving-kindness, inviting me from the crooked ways of the world to the straight path, to the perfect following of Christ in His holy society." From Rheims he went to Clermont College, in Paris, and thence to Rouen, for an interview with the celebrated Jesuit Father Persons, who wisely directed him to go back to England to recover his strength and settle all his worldly affairs. Having done this, Gerard, with several other Catholics, re-embarked at Dover for France; but they were forced back by contrary winds, seized by the custom-house officers, and finally committed to the Marshalsea prison, where eleven priests were then confined, and among them Bishop, afterwards the first Vicar Apostolic in this country. Here, as usual, finding in this loathsome captivity the "school of Christ," the imprisoned priests found means to hide "church-stuff" and all the requisites for Mass, and with that remarkable recurrence which *characterizes persecutions* of the Church in all times, Gerard's neighbour, a

priest, found means of opening some communication with the next cell, and Mass was celebrated very early every morning. On account of his family, much interest seems to have been made for Gerard, and after about a year's imprisonment he was set free, and returned to Paris, whence, with Father Holt, he went to Rome. His companion afterwards became rector of the English College there. As the Spanish Armada was just then starting for the invasion of England, Cardinal Allen resolved to send Gerard, with others, on the English mission, well knowing that Catholics would there be exposed to a redoubled fury of persecution from Walsingham. The Pope's dispensation was accordingly obtained, that Gerard might receive priest's orders before the due time. This being granted, Gerard so earnestly besought his admission to the Society before starting for England, that Father Persons interceded for him, and the Father-General, then Acquaviva, received him and F. Ouldcorne on the Sunday, the Feast of the Assumption, 1588.

On reaching England, the vessel crossed the Channel, coasting eastwards, and the missionaries landed here and there, as they found it prudent. Fathers Ouldcorne and Gerard then cast lots which of them should first leave his shelter and make his venture across the country. The lot fell on Father Ouldcorne, and, after many adventures, he reached London in safety. Father Gerard met with more difficulties; but, having found means of communicating with a Catholic in Norwich, he also arrived in London, and made his way to Father Garnett, then Provincial in this country, in place of Father Weston, who was in prison.

Father Gerard, in the ordinary guise of a gentleman, soon visited his own neighbourhood, and once in the hunting-field, while the hounds were at fault, began a conversation with a gentleman he had gone to seek, and upon whom he had made such an impression that, after a few interviews, he was received into the Church. He also comforted many sorrowing and depressed Catholics, who had been long deprived of a priest and the strength of the sacraments to sustain their drooping courage. During his visits in the north he found women acting with the most heroic courage, and sustaining the neighbouring families by their example. Among them were the two noble daughters of Percy, Earl of Northumberland, who, after their father's execution, became "pillars of support" to the neighbouring persecuted and afflicted Catholics. One of these, a married woman, had often six or seven priests sheltered in her house, and continued to do this until her husband's fears obliged her to leave the neighbourhood, and to go to live near London. This is by no means a singular instance at that time in which the man's cowardice and human respect neutralized or put an end to a great work carried on by women for God. One of the most extraordinary facts in this narrative is the way in which the necessaries for saying Mass were carried about and concealed. Nearly everywhere the vestments, &c., were got ready for Father Gerard's coming, Mass was said, and he was so passed from house to house by faithful Catholics, that he scarcely ever slept at an inn. Another fact worthy of note to us—who must continually face the truth, that persecution, though it may sleep, is undying—is that persistence in acting up to the highest duty is possible under the most unfavourable conditions, if

men are heroically disposed. In spite of the fury of Elizabeth and her ministers, raised by Spanish interference to its height at that time; when Lord Arundel was languishing in prison, and the wretched Topcliffe was hunting the country north and south with his bloodhounds, Father Garnett gathered his Jesuits about him for consultation and half-yearly manifestation of conscience, exactly as if profound peace reigned on all sides. On one of these occasions, as many as nine or ten Jesuits, with several priests and lay Catholics, were assembled in Worcestershire, and the Jesuits were preparing to renew their vows. Father Garnett, with a kind of inspiration, quietly said that he would assure their safety till after the renovation, as they were met together in the service of God; but as soon as the ceremony was over he advised each one to provide for himself as quickly as possible. The greater number then rode away in different directions, and the very next morning, as Father Southwell was going to say Mass, the priest-catchers came to the house, and the five Fathers and two other priests, and several gentlemen, remained hidden for four hours. Father Ouldcorne was one of the five, three of whom afterwards laid down their lives for the faith. Father Gerard, later on, went to London, where he was sheltered by the Countess of Arundel, whose noble husband, Philip Howard, was then in the Tower (1594). He had scarcely left her, and settled himself in a house, when he was betrayed, and carried before the Commissioners. The following is a good example of both the captious questioning and the admirable answers of that time :—

"'Who sent you to England?' they asked.

"'The Superiors of the Society.'

"'To what end?'

"'To bring back stray souls to their Creator.'

"'No, no,' said they. 'You were sent for matters of State, and to turn people from the obedience of the Queen to the obedience of the Pope.'

"'As for matters of State,' I replied, 'we are forbidden to have anything to say to them, as they do not belong to our Institute. This prohibition, indeed, extends to all the members of the Society; but on us missioners it is particularly enjoined in a special instruction. As for the obedience due to the Queen and the Pope, each is to be obeyed in that wherein they have jurisdiction, and one obedience does not clash with the other, as England and all Christian realms have hitherto experienced.'"

Father Gerard was sent to one of the Counter prisons, and, after a few days, was examined by Topcliffe himself, then "an old man, grown grey in wickedness," "a man of cruelty, athirst for the blood of the Catholics." He showed Father Gerard a paper, which he had written himself, saying that "the examinate was sent by the Pope and the Jesuit Persons, and coming through Belgium, there had interviews with the Jesuits Holt and Sir William Stanley; thence he came to England on a political errand, to beguile the Queen's subjects, and lure them from their obedience to their Sovereign," &c. Father Gerard wrote his denial of all these falsehoods, and, while he was writing, says :—

"'The old man waxed wrath, shook with passion, and would fain have snatched the paper from me.'

"'If you don't want me to write the truth,' said I, 'I'll not write at all.'

"'Nay,' quoth he, 'write so and so, and I'll copy out what you have written.'

"'I shall write what *I* please,' I answered, 'and not what *you* please. Show what I have written to the Council, for I shall add nothing but my name.'"

And he signed so close to the writing that nothing could be interpolated by Topcliffe, who then became furious, and exclaimed :—

"'I'll get you put into my power, and hang you in the air, and show you no mercy, and then I shall see *what God* will rescue you out of my hands.'"

Father Gerard was sent back to his cell heavily ironed, for which he rewarded the jailer with some money. He was in prison three months, the first of which he spent in retreat, following the spiritual exercises from memory. He was next shut up in the "Clink," in Southwark, which he says was "a change from Purgatory to Paradise"; for, as many Catholics were shut up there, he could confess, communicate, and, later on, say Mass. In the cell next to him was that holy lay brother of the Society, Ralph Emerson, whom Father Campion calls his "little man." In the Clink Father Gerard finally obtained such freedom of action that he was able to fit up a room as a chapel, to preach the Exercises to several prisoners, and even to receive such alms as to hire a house with a garden, where Catholic priests and laymen could lodge, and which he gave in charge to a very noble woman, Mrs. Line, who was afterwards martyred for "harbouring a priest." The whole account of her seizure and death is exceedingly beautiful. Besides the exercise of his priestly functions, and giving continual instructions and exhortations to the many applicants who came to visit him in prison, Father Gerard sent a great number of young men and boys to the seminaries on the Continent, some of whom became secular priests, some Jesuits, and others teachers in the various colleges.

In 1597 Father Gerard was examined before the Commissioners of the Privy Council, and, for the first time, cruelly tortured. He was hung up three times by the hands, till he fainted with the horrible agony, which he bore with unshaken courage; but he was denied the glory of martyrdom, and afterwards made his escape in the most extraordinary manner from the Tower, and fled to Father Garnett, who was probably living at White Webbs, in Enfield Chase. Subsequently Father Gerard took up his abode in the house of Mrs. Vaux, which probably saved him from being sent out of England by his Superiors, who seem to have thought that his zeal endangered himself, and perhaps also other necessary members of the Society. It is certainly scarcely matter of wonder that courage should have been pushed to audacity in his case, for his escapes and adventures are even romantic in their marvellousness. Once, when Father Gerard was at the house of a Catholic lady in Oxfordshire, playing at cards with some other Catholics, to sustain his character of a country gentleman, but at safe intervals discussing matters of religion, Dr. Abbot, the Dean of Winchester (afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury), came in from Oxford, and sat down with the party. Father Gerard, on this occasion, daringly took on himself the chief burden of the

conversation, and foiled Abbot on all the points he advanced. He continued to visit or reside in various gentlemen's houses, converting and receiving into the Church a great number of converts, preaching, instructing, and giving retreats on the spiritual exercises, and reaping a vast harvest of souls; but until the outbreak of the miserable conspiracy of the Gunpowder Plot, which, as he says, upset everything that was prospering, and "hindered all good." How far religion had again begun to take root and flourish may be partially gauged by externals, for hitherto the barest necessaries for the altar had been difficult to obtain or preserve. Now he says :—

"We had two sets for each colour which the Church uses ; one for ordinary use, the other for feast-days. Some of these latter were embroidered with gold and pearls, and figured by well-skilled hands. We had six massive siver candlesticks on the altar, besides those at the side for the Elevation. The cruets were of silver also, as were the basin for the lavates, the bell, and the thurible. There were, moreover, lamps hanging from silver chains, and a silver crucifix on the altar. For greater festivals, however, I had a crucifix of gold, a foot in height, on the top of which was represented a pelican, while on the right arm of the cross was an eagle with expanded wings, carrying on its back its young ones, who were also attempting to fly ; on the left arm a phœnix expiring in flames, that it might have an offspring after it ; and at the foot was a hen, with her chickens gathering heat under her wings. All this was made of wrought gold by a celebrated artist."

The Powder Plot made it necessary for Father Gerard to leave England, and he relates two occurrences, which he ascribes to the special intercession of Father Garnett. On reaching the ship, where he was to join the Spanish ambassadors, and to pass out of the country as if in their suite, they seemed afraid to take him ; but just at the time when Father Garnett's martyrdom was accomplished in London (it was on May the 3rd) they changed their minds, and even lent him clothes to pass as a Spaniard, and he got safely out of the country. Three years afterwards, again on the 3rd of May, Father Gerard was allowed to take his solemn vows, though his acquirements fell short of what is due for profession ; and this "greatest and most signal favour" he also ascribes to Father Garnett's prayers. Father Gerard laboured in the Society for thirty-one years after his escape from England. The following description, in, even for that time, extraordinary spelling, was put out by Topcliffe, of Father Gerard, after his escape from the Tower in 1597 :—

"Jhon Gerrarde, y^e^ Jhezew^t^ is about 30 years oulde Of a good stature sumwhat highe^r^ than S^r^ Tho Layton & upright in his paysse and countenance sum what staying in his look or Eyes Currilde heire by Nature & blackyshe & not apt to have much heire of his bearde. I thincke his noase sum what wide and turninge Upp Blubarde Lipps turninge outwards Especially the over Lipps most uppwards toword the Noase Kewryoos in speetche If he do now contynewe his custome. And in his speetche he flourrethe & smyles much & a falteringe or Lispinge, or dooblinge of his Tonge in his speeche.

"Yor honor^s^ as you will comãde me

"Ric Topclyffe alias ~ ~ ~ ~ ~"

He was next sent to the Novitiate at Louvain, founded by that admirable woman, Donna Luisa de Carvajal, for English Jesuits. The Novitiate was afterwards transferred to Liége, where he became rector. Two or three beautiful letters to him are given out of the Stonyhurst MSS. from Cardinal Bellarmine (an autograph) and Father Luis de la Puente (de Ponte), one of which we must transcribe entire.

"May the Almighty and most pitiful Lord accompany you in the journey that you begin, for with such a guide and companion you will be everywhere safe and cheerful, and making true progress. Let Him ever dwell in your memory, understanding, and will, for His most sweet providence especially protects those who make their journeys from obedience to superiors, as Jacob did, who at his father's bidding journeyed through the desert into Mesopotamia, where he heard the voice of the Lord, which said to him, 'I will be thy keeper whithersoever thou goest.' Trusting to this hope, and protected by this guardianship, you will happily fulfil what you have begun.

"I commend myself to your reverence's sacrifices and prayers, for my weakness oppresses us much; but may the will of God be done in and about me in all things and by all things, to Whom concerning all things be glory for ever.—Amen.

✠ "Ludovicus de la Puente. ✠

"Valladolid, Feb. 2, 1622."

Father Gerard laboured afterwards in Spain and then in Rome, where he was confessor to the English College till he died in 1637, at the age of seventy-three years. The one single complaint made of him by his superiors was a quality which much enhances the interest of his life and character to outsiders, *i.e.* a certain imprudent audacity and generous zeal.'

We sincerely hope that Father Morris will continue his editorship of the valuable materials the Stonyhurst MSS. and other records of the society must be able to furnish; and especially that we may look for some detailed account of Father Arrowsmith and the "Holy Hand" which is closely connected with the Gerard family, and the object of a very interesting local veneration.

We are not without hope that on a future occasion we may return, and at greater length, to this valuable and most interesting biography.

Essays Critical and Historical. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. London: Pickering.

WE had hoped to make these very interesting volumes an occasion for narrating the events belonging to the successive portions of the Tractarian movement with which these various essays are connected. And it is still indeed very possible that we may do this in an early number; but for the present we must confine ourselves within a far briefer limit.

F. Newman speaks very touchingly in his Preface of his past position, in that "from various circumstances he has been obliged through so many years to think aloud." We believe he is one of the extremely few men recorded in history, to whose reputation this circumstance will prove beneficial rather than injurious. Nothing will more impress every candid reader of these essays, whatever his school of thought, than the singular unity of principle pervading them all, and the steady and equable growth of opinion on the *basis* of such principle. F. Newman fears indeed that "the spectacle of two sides of a great ecclesiastical question, advocated with equal earnestness by one and the same author," may tend to create "a despondent or liberalistic or sceptical habit of mind on the subject of religious truth altogether." But for our own part we strongly think that the more hopeful view of this question, which was expressed by him in a letter of April 3, 1844 (Apologia, p. 331), is also the true one. Change of opinion, he there says, "is *necessary*, if truth be a *real objective thing*, and be made to confront a person *who has been brought up in a system short of truth*." And the whole of the letter should be read in this connection.

The present essays, with one exception, were written when he was an Anglican; and he purports to show in the notes, why the anti-Catholic arguments therein contained "have ceased to approve themselves to his own judgment." Those arguments may be referred to four principal classes, two aggressive and two defensive. The first class comprises those, which assail the Roman Church as having made additions to the One Faith. His direct answer to those arguments was of course contained in his Essay on Development; though there are many little supplements to that work in the volumes before us. It is most remarkable that a writer, as yet external to the Church, should have been the first (as far as we know) to treat expressly and systematically a great theological principle, which beyond question has been implicitly acted on by the Church from the first, and which is now explicitly recognized, not only by all theologians but in the official utterances of a Pope.*

The second class of aggressive anti-Catholic arguments comprises those, which assail the Roman See as guilty of usurpation in her claim to be the one divinely appointed centre of unity. F. Newman, when an Anglican, appealed loudly to the case of S. Meletius of Antioch and to other events of ecclesiastical history, in which persons more or less separated from Roman communion were accounted Catholics. See these instances recapitulated in

* See the sentences from Pius IX's "Ineffabilis" and "Æterni Patris," *quoted in our number for January, 1869, p. 28, note.*

vol. ii. pp. 101-2. He now replies (p. 102) that much depends on length of time and inveteracy; that there may be many separations, which are "threatenings and beginnings of schism," but not "perfected schisms." Our strong impression is (though we have no right to speak with confidence) that such a view of the case will command the acceptance of theologians; that there really is a difference not less than essential, between those two ecclesiastical conditions which F. Newman mutually contrasts. After a certain period, incipient separatists come to *acquiesce* in their state of separation; they fall back on some heretical theory to defend it; they assume the aggressive; they become active assailants of Rome. This state of things does seem essentially different from the earlier stage, in which they are bewildered by press of circumstances, perplexed by mutually opposing principles which they have hitherto held in union, and unable for a period to discern the true and Catholic course. At the same time we wish F. Newman had given his mind to Mr. Rhodes's admirable work on the "Visible Unity of the Church," in which these very questions are so carefully and fully considered; and that he had expressed an opinion on the value of that writer's labours.

Those of F. Newman's Anglican arguments which we have called "defensive," are again mainly two. Firstly he maintained, that the Anglican orders are indisputably valid. Secondly he argued, that where there are a bishop and priests validly ordained, there is no strict obligation of Catholic communion; that each separate diocese is a perfect Church; that no diocese is "bound to union with others by any law of its being or condition of its prerogatives, but all free from all except as regards the duty of mutual love" (vol. ii. p. 91). We will begin with this latter proposition.

F. Newman has reasoned against it in this volume, far more energetically and successfully (we think) than on any former occasion; and no more crushing refutation of an opponent can well be imagined. He begins with the language of Scripture (pp. 91—97), and sums up this part of the matter with an undeniable and most conclusive statement. Whatever else, he says, may be left uncertain by the naked text of the New Testament, one thing is therein declared beyond the possibility of doubt; viz. that the Apostolic Church was one organized whole, under a central and supreme authority. He next (pp. 97—101) exhibits the utter absurdity of the Anglican theory in speculation, and its hopeless inoperativeness in practice. "It is a sure and easy way of not effecting those very ends, which ecclesiastical organization is intended to subserve." It cannot move one step—it cannot so much as "be attempted and break down"—it cannot be "brought into the region of fact" at all—except by State agency. There has been much Erastianism in many shapes, in many times, in many countries; but never and nowhere has there been or could there be "episcopal autonomy."

But now (2) as to Anglican ordinations. F. Newman touches powerfully on many other objections against their validity.* But he lays his chief stress on the argument of Chillingworth and Macaulay (p. 86), that such validity depends on the question whether, during that long period which has

* *We are a good deal* surprised however, that he calls "the validity of *heretical ordination*," a matter "enveloped in such doubtfulness." (p. 83.)

elapsed since Apostolic times "some thousands of events took place, any one of which may without any gross impropriety be supposed not to have taken place"; whereas moreover "there is not a tittle of evidence for any one of those events." To this Anglicans reply, that the same consideration tells equally against the validity of *Catholic* ordinations. No, rejoins F. Newman, not at all. The argument for Anglicanism entirely rests, the argument for Catholicity does not even partially rest, on some allegation concerning the validity of ordination. "Catholics believe their orders are valid, because they are members of the true Church; and Anglicans believe they belong to the true Church, because their orders are valid." (p. 87.) Because Catholics, on other grounds altogether, know that theirs is the true Church, *therefore* they know that God will "have prevented or remedied in His own way any faults which may have occurred in past centuries in the administration of His own ordinance, and will prevent or remedy them still" (p. 90). This argument was hinted at in a most able article of F. Coleridge's on Anglican ordinations, which appeared in the "Month" two or three years ago; but we are not aware that it has ever been distinctly put forth, till now by F. Newman. We are very confident that it is sound; yet we wish he had developed it at somewhat greater length. In particular we wish he had adverted to the fact, that Photian priests, on their conversion, are accounted by the Church as certainly priests, and receive no further ordination.

There is but one essay—the third—of which we regret the republication in its present shape; but in regard to this we certainly do wish, that it had been either withholden or accompanied by much fuller corrective comment. It was among the most anti-Roman which F. Newman ever wrote. He said therein that Lammenais was "the true disciple of the Gregories or Innocents of past times," in "not seeming to recognize, nay to contemplate the idea, that *rebellion is a sin*." (vol. i. p. 121.) He said that Gregory XVI.'s temporal sovereignty was "the immediate cause of his pusillanimous conduct" towards Lamennais (p. 120); that so long as the Pope has temporal dominion, "he cannot aspire to" spiritual sovereignty (ib.); that Lamennais "understood" the "interests and duties of the Roman Church" "better than the Pope" (p. 126); that Gregory XVI. "engaged in certain diplomatic transactions with the schismatical court of St. Petersburg, which indisposed, if not incapacitated him from exercising impartially" his "high spiritual functions" (p. 130); that, in issuing the "Mirari vos," "Rome" took up "a position, which goes far towards involving a reductio ad absurdum of her claim to infallibility" (p. 136).[*] Surely there should have been some reply to all this, from the Catholic point of view.

However this is but a small part of the two volumes. The study of these as a whole is indispensable to any Catholic, who would successfully engage in the Anglican controversy; and they will be read eagerly in after-times by all who desire to understand that remarkable movement, of which F. Newman was not only the true originator, but for many years the one animating and guiding master spirit. With several of the essays as they originally

[*] The Essay said that its author "agrees with" Lamennais in this opinion.

stood—and these among the best—Catholics will be in perfect agreement; and will recognize signal service as having been done to the Catholic cause. As an Anglican controversialist, F. Newman stood absolutely alone, whether in his hearty resolve to understand his opponents' strength, or in the thorough honesty and real force of his arguments. And as no one ever so ably defended the Anglican theory, so (to our mind) no one has ever more ably and conclusively demolished it.

Spiritual Works of Louis of Blois, Abbot of Liesse. Edited by JOHN EDWARD BOWDEN, Priest of the Oratory. London: R. Washbourne, 1871.

NO more important or welcome addition could have been made to our English ascetical literature than this little book. It is strange, considering the great fame of Blosius as a spiritual writer, that his writings should not sooner have been brought within reach of English readers. Reverenced and praised as a master in the spiritual life by Rodriguez, De Ponte, Thomas of Jesus, S. Francis of Sales, and many others whose writings are familiar to us, he himself has remained accessible only to those who could read him in Latin; for even in French, if a translation of his works has existed, it does not seem to have been generally known. Yet the writings of Blosius are especially suited for popular reading. The late Cardinal, in the beautiful preface which he wrote for Monsignor Newsham's Latin edition, speaks of the "clearness and simplicity of style, united with a certain fervour and vehemence of devotion, which is peculiar to Blosius." His works "show in an equal degree acquaintance with the interior life and that clear and perspicacious knowledge of the human heart by which its secrets are discovered, its vices laid bare, remedies are found and courage stimulated." Again: "All that is to be found in the later Alphonsus, not of lax but of moderate guidance, or in Quadrupani of Consolation for timorous souls (a subject on which Blosius himself wrote a treatise) in fine whatever is to found in our own Faber, of the ardent love of Jesus, of the tenderest devotion towards the most Holy Sacrament, and of firm confidence in Mary, is here to be seen anticipated in the Venerable Blosius."

The volume edited by Father Bowden does not contain all the treatises included in Dr. Newsham's edition. It omits the "Institutio Spiritualis" with its appendix, which form 100 pages out of 367 of the Latin volume. There exist also various treatises, not edited by Dr. Newsham, quite as valuable, probably, as those he selected. It is to be hoped, therefore, that this volume may meet with such a reception as will tempt the translator and editor to undertake a second selection from the author's works.

The present volume is a model of good translation. Conscientiously faithful to the original, it is at the same time excellent English. The translator has succeeded even in transfusing the sweet, earnest style of the author into

our own language, without any trace of Latinism. With regard to the appearance and typographical merits of the book, the old tradition of ugly, ill-printed religious books, has been for some time happily so thoroughly broken through, that it is hardly necessary to say that it is a well-printed, good-looking little volume.

It is singular that when at length a translation of some of the treatises of Blosius has appeared, it should have been almost simultaneously accompanied by two Protestant editions of portions of his works in English. The "Mirror for Monks" (Stewart) is a reprint of a translation published in Paris in 1676 for the use, no doubt, of the many English Catholic exiles driven abroad by persecution. It is edited without any alteration by the Attorney-General, Sir John Duke Coleridge, with a very kindly and appreciative preface, in which he says, "It may soften prejudice and enlarge sympathy to find, as in the much higher example of the *Imitation of Christ*, how pure, how simple, how scriptural, how devout, how intensely and essentially Christian was the religion taught and practised by such a man at such a time."

The Attorney-General has every right to our best thanks for his publication. We cannot say the same of the "Manual of the Spiritual Life" (Hodges), translated it appears from some French edition of Blosius. A long list of passages might be given, in which, as has been pointed out by Father Bowden in the Catholic newspapers, the translator has permitted himself the liberty of changing and suppressing, with an obvious drift and intention. We shall content ourselves with quoting against this most mischievous and reprehensible practice the manly words of Sir John Coleridge in the preface to his own reprint. "It is hardly necessary to say that I do not agree with every theological doctrine which Blosius assumes or inculcates in his book. But I think the book in itself a good and beautiful book; I believe the writer of it to have been a holy man; and I do not think it right, in spite of high authority to the contrary, to mutilate or adapt such works as these. To do so appears to me unmanly and unfair."

Probably the writer of these words would inflict a still severer censure where such mutilation of an author has been made without the least warning or intimation, as in the present case.

The Passion Play at Ober-Ammergau in the Summer of 1871. By the Rev. Gerald Molloy, D.D., Professor of Theology in Maynooth College. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1872.

MANY writers of most widely different stamp and of various qualifications have wished to give to the world an account of their impressions of the wonderful representation which drew so many thousands of spectators to the mountain village of Ober-Ammergau in the last and the previous summer. Artists, theologians, cultivated women, Catholics, Protestants, unbelievers, *men of the world*,—it is one of the most singular things in this

age of singular things to note their extraordinary uniformity of wonder delight, and praise.

Dr. Molloy joins in the general verdict. His book, however, is chiefly meant as a description of the Passion Play for those who were not fortunate enough to see it. As such it does not differ much from many of the well-written and carefully-drawn descriptions which appeared in the course of the summer in the correspondence of the daily papers. The feature of the book is the beautiful series of photographs with which it is illustrated, and which render it for those who have seen the play a pretty memorial of their visit, and give those who were less fortunate a life-like idea of some of its scenes.

We note with interest that Dr. Molloy, like so many others, both Catholics and non-Catholics, went to Ammergau with a prejudice against the play; but like most of those who went with the same fears, he says,—"No sooner had the play commenced than my prejudices were dispelled. It became at once manifest that a spirit of deep religious reverence pervaded the performance, and that with this was combined a degree of artistic taste which could not fail to win the respect and admiration of every cultivated mind. I was more sensibly impressed than ever I had been by any sermon, however eloquent; and when I left the theatre, I felt that the history of our Lord's Passion had been stamped on my mind in a series of vivid pictures which could not be easily effaced."

Like most of those also who have at heart the preservation of the simple, and religious character of the villagers of Ober-Ammergau, Dr. Molloy dreads the effects which would follow from any frequent contact with the motley multitude whom curiosity attracted, and no doubt would attract in still greater numbers, from the ends of the earth.

Before taking leave of this very pretty book, we should like te ask whether Dr. Molloy is not mistaken in supposing that the Passion Play of Ober-Ammergau "now remains . . . a solitary example of the ancient Christian drama"? (p. 6.) Certainly, within not many years the representation of the Passion was common in Spain; and we have been informed by an English gentleman, an eye-witness, and far from likely to be prepossessed in favour of such spectacles, that they were acted and witnessed in a religious and reverent spirit, though not equalling that of Ober-Ammergau, as he supposed from the published descriptions of it, in artistic and dramatic power.

Acts of the Captivity and Death of the Fathers Olivaint and four others of the Society of Jesus. Translated from the French of FATHER DE PONLEVOY. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. (pp. 106.)

THIS most interesting little book, which may be truly so characterized from its mode of treatment as well as from the subject itself, gives us, in details which would be painfully vivid were we not reading of martyrdom,

the deaths of five Jesuit Fathers, shot in Paris during the last hours of the Commune. Père de Ponlevoy writes as might be expected from him, of these his brethren in many a long year of religious obedience and apostolic labour. There is, throughout, both in the narrator and in those of whom he writes, the union of two qualities, each of them an enigma to the world, and in their conjunction absolutely incomprehensible. We see the mortified equanimity of one who has long since resigned his will into the hands of his Lord, together with the fervent brotherly charity of a heart detached and spiritualized, and therefore the seat of a supernatural ardent love for all, "especially for those who are of the household of the faith." We should therefore greatly desire to see this little book in the hands of all who remain under the misconception of supposing that a priest, and especially a Jesuit, must needs be a heartless and soulless automaton, who having surrendered his will once for all, has parted thereby with every feeling of affectionate regard for his brother-man. It is no such "smooth savage," to use an expression of the poet Coleridge's, who indites these feeling, breathing lines; who, while he records the trials, sufferings, triumphs of his brethren in religion, rejoices and weeps by turns. We must deny ourselves the pleasure of making extracts that solicit us at every point as we turn over the pages; and merely say that the "Acts" consist of seven chapters; viz.—Biographical Notices—Preliminary Movements—The Arrests—The Conciergerie—Mazas—La Roquette and the Executions—Epilogue.

One of the most thrilling parts of this narrative is the account given of the entrance of our Lord in the Most Holy Eucharist into the prison of Mazas. This greatest of consolations for the captives preparing for their martyrdom was planned, and successfully accomplished, notwithstanding manifold difficulties. How ardently it had been longed and waited for we are not left to imagine. "Six Sundays," wrote P. Olivaint, "passed in darkness. How many days without going up to the altar! Ah, when we are deprived of a blessing, how much better we feel its value." (p. 59.) Again:—

"How manifest it is to me that the Lord has conducted all! I am at the forty-first day of my retreat. After to-day, I shall only meditate on the Eucharist. Is not that the best way of consoling myself for not being able to say Mass? If I was a little bird, I would go every morning to hear Mass somewhere, and would afterwards return willingly into my cage. Say many things for me to all. A word particularly to Armand. How I think of him! He suffers more than I do, I am sure, and his friends also.

"It was only towards the middle of the day that the little pots and little boxes, so long expected, arrived at Mazas. There was one each for Father Olivaint, Father Ducoudray, and Father Clerc, but none, alas! this time for Father Caubert and Father de Bengy; it had not been possible to make arrangements on their side. Each of the three privileged Fathers received four hosts, and each of them could thus preserve and carry on his heart, as upon a living altar, *the God of his heart and his portion for eternity.*

"The prisoners had been forewarned of this ingenuous and daring attempt, and were to give notice at once of its success. Father Olivaint hastens to send this note on the evening of the 15th:—'I did not expect anything more to-day. My surprise, and I will say, my consolation, was all the greater. *Thank you again and again,* a thousand thanks! I have been occupied a long

time on the Holy Ghost in my retreat; now I will only meditate on the Eucharist." (pp. 61, 62.)

We will record a sentence from the words spoken by one of their own pupils over the martyred bodies of these Fathers, when they were found and honourably interred, on the entrance of the troops and the extinction of the Commune. And then we take a reluctant leave of this little volume, with the single unfavourable remark, as regards the translation, that it might have preserved a substantial fidelity to the original, and yet have been less constrainedly French. There are expressions of true good English, all but literal synonyms to words here employed, but missed (as it seems to us) by the translator, which would have rescued his—or perhaps her—work from this friendly criticism, and rendered it a more scholarly production. But the gift of really good translation, especially from the French, is almost as rare as that of really good poetry; with this favourable difference between the two departments of literature, that mediocrity is not intolerable in the one as in the other. Let us be thankful for what we get: only, it is a pity, as far as it goes, if we might have had better with a little more pains.

Over their bodies, then,—may we not say their relics, as Père de Ponlevoy entitles his narrative their "Acts"?—the following most true words were uttered:—

"What these poor Fathers desired, the end they pursued, was to form for France a Christian youth. They knew that, if in the heart of a child is found, innate, so to say, the love of family, and the love of country, all that is very weak, very capricious, very frail, without the love of God; and then, in the morning of our lives, they received us from the hands of our parents, to strengthen that which in us was only instinct, by principles which would render us one day capable of devotedness, by teaching us the law of sacrifice, so severe, and yet so consoling. But in opposition to our masters, in the midst of the rending of our unhappy country, men have been found capable of every crime. These men have said to themselves—'In order that society may become an easy prey to us, we must have a society without God;' and finding themselves the strongest for several hours, they have killed those who were preparing a race of Christians for France." (p. 101.)

The Book of the Visions and Instructions of Blessed Angela of Foligno, &c. Translated by a Secular Priest. London: Richardson. 1871.

THIS is a book which, as the translator truly says, is most thoroughly Franciscan. It breathes throughout that mingled simplicity and lofty fervour which, first gushing forth from Assisi, has thence flowed in countless minor rills through all Christendom. Blessed Angela, the great "Mother of Foligno," was called by one of the early Jesuit Fathers "the mistress of *theologians*"—a very high testimony for a Jesuit to pay—referring, of course, *to her spiritual and mystical* teaching. The communications now translated *were taken down from* her own mouth by her Franciscan confessor, Brother

Arnold, and give a full and clear idea of the spiritual knowledge of the middle ages. The translator has ably performed his task, and preserved the simplicity and fervour of the original, while putting it into thoroughly vigorous, clear English. It is a great and, we must add, an unusual pleasure to read a devotional book unspoilt by the foreign idioms and turns of expression which disfigure so many of our Catholic translations. We are glad to learn that one apparently so well fitted to execute the task proposes to give shortly, prefixed to a forthcoming book, a sketch of medieval sanctity, as we think it would help many into whose hands these books may fall, to interpret much that might surprise or mislead them in the mystical teaching of some of the Saints. And it becomes more and more urgent when the tone of our own times tends so entirely to natural and instinctive teaching, setting aside as absurd the elevation of the purely supernatural influences, to direct the minds of Catholics, swept by a strong opposing current, to those sublime depths and heights of the mystical science to which prayer and self-renouncement only can give the key. The three chapters on the three companions of our Lord, Poverty, Contempt, and Suffering, are full of the most eloquent and lofty Scriptural teaching, containing food for continual meditation and furnishing admirable groundwork for sermons.

"This, then, is the highest and continual, and most perfect poverty of the God-Man Jesus Christ, the Saviour of all, Who, although He was the Lord of riches, yet chose to be most poor amongst us, that He might provoke us unto the love of poverty. For He was poor indeed, in will, and in spirit, above all estimate of creation, for the sake of the infinite and most sweet love wherewith He loved us; poor, I say, and needy, and a beggar. Poor in temporal things, and poor in friends, poor in power, poor in worldly wisdom, poor in fame of sanctity, poor in state of dignity, poor in all things. He preached poverty, and declared that the poor are blessed, and that one day they would be the judges of the world. The rich He condemned, and that riches and abundance were to be despised, He preached with all His strength, by deed and word, by conversation and example. But oh, alas the shame! oh, alas the shame! This poverty of spirit is nowadays driven away, and fled from by almost all, and (what is still more hateful) even by those who read in this Book of Life, and understand and preach and glorify this poverty, which in effect and will and desire and deed is wholly exterminated. For the world hateth this poverty, but Christ loved it, and chose it for Himself and for His own, by declaring it to be the most blessed. . . . . Blessed is that man who in his penance in this world, by the example of Christ, hath chosen it." (pp. 224, 225.)

The Book of the Foundations of S. Teresa of Jesus, written by herself. Translated from the Spanish by DAVID LEWIS. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1871.

MR. LEWIS has followed up his excellent translation of the Autobiography of S. Teresa, published about eighteen months ago, by an *equally excellent translation* of her Book of Foundations. The style of the

Book of Foundations does not differ from that of the Life, and therefore any one who objects to the translation being a little stiff and disjointed may console himself by the reflection that he has S. Teresa's own construction reproduced. The great Saint has not much literary style. She writes sraight on, qualifying, explaining, adding, correcting, as the thoughts crowd upon her mind, clear in sentiment except when describing things that baffle description, and with frequent bursts of impassioned eloquence. And the subject-matter of the Book of Foundations does not differ materially from that of the Life. It is true that it does not deal so much with the soul of the Saint herself; it tells the story of the monasteries which she, *inops virgo*, as the Lessons of her festival call her, was enabled to establish under her reformation of the Order of Carmel. But it is full of warm prayer and wise advice: in complying with the order of her confessor to set down the history of her foundations, she has contrived to leave to the world one of those undying spiritual books that contribute to form the inward character of all who aspire to serve God.

Mr. Lewis contributes a useful Preface, in which he traces the fortunes of the great Carmelite reform during the lifetime of the Saint. It is not an easy chronicle to master. What with the unwillingness of the tepid, the fear of the cowardly and the zeal of the good, who were often none the less zealous because they were lamentably in the wrong, it is a wonder that S. Teresa did not live and die in that convent of the Incarnation at Avila in which she was professed. Provincials overruled by generals, generals superseded by apostolic visitors, these again called to account by the Nuncio; lordly bishops maintaining their own rights, royalty interfering to make the confusion worse, all the strife and heat that always attend great changes, made a hard time of the last twenty years of the life of the holy foundress. But the most interesting of all her foundations was the first—that of the poor little house of S. Joseph at Avila, for which she went through so much; and the history of this first foundation is not contained in the Book of the Foundations. The religious life of Spain in 1560 and thereabouts, under Philip II., is not easy to realize in our own days. A munificently-endowed Church, firmly established, without the shadow of a rival, with the secular power always ready to carry out its laws, and too ready, perhaps, to carry them out with violence; bishops who were at the same time great temporal lords; a priesthood numerous and well-provided, with abundant leisure and perfect freedom; great abbeys scattered over every province, quiet—too quiet—retreats for the studious or the weak; the religious orders preaching and teaching, full of energy, though not always as full of their primitive spirit; the Society of Jesus, young and fervent, carrying away the favour of princes and people; great universities spread over the land, in which calm and powerful minds devoted themselves for a whole lifetime to the search for the hidden treasures of revelation; a luxurious court, a rich and proud, but enterprising aristocracy; middle classes full of worldly energy yet perfect Catholics; the whole of the people simply devoted to the Catholic faith; such was Spain in the days when Charles V. had abdicated his crowns, when *the Escurial was* building, when Elizabeth succeeded Mary in England, when *S. Pius V. was keeping the* Turk out of Christendom. In the Church there

was no lack of the ambition, the intrigue, and the scandal that human nature will bring with it in times of peace and prosperity even into the sanctuary.

On the other hand, because there was a deep and vivid faith, the phenomena of heroic sanctity were frequent in every class of society. But if the presence of a pervading faith facilitated such an enterprise as the reform of S. Teresa, the very fixedness of things, and the multitude of interests that were concerned in the existing order, made it all the more difficult. S. Teresa was opposed at one time or another by the Inquisition, by town councils, by bishops, by her own brethren and sisters, and, most serious of all, by her own superiors, whom she had vowed to obey. It seems to us a mistake to say, as some of her Lives do, that she would not have been justified in doing certain things connected with her first foundation without a direct revelation on the part of Almighty God. On the contrary, although she had constant spiritual visions and revelations to help her and console her in her hard enterprise, she did not by them justify her conduct. She says :—

"I did nothing without the advice of learned men, in order that I might not break, in a single point, my vow of obedience. . . . . If they had told me there was the slightest imperfection in the whole matter, I would have given up the founding of a thousand monasteries." *

But it often happened that there was a conflict of jurisdiction, the superiors of the Order wanting her to do one thing, and some higher authority, such as a visitor-apostolic, directing her to do what God had already signified to be His will. She thus describes this situation, so hard to bear for the sensitive conscience of heroic obedience :—

"Now, because I had helped therein (the reform) he (the Father-General) was made to show his displeasure against me, and that was the greatest trouble I had to bear whilst making these foundations, and I had to bear many ; for, to give up helping in the furtherance of this work, which I saw clearly was for the service of our Lord and the advancement of our Order, men of the highest learning, to whom I confessed, and by whom I was advised, would not permit me ; and then to go against what I saw was the will of my superior was *a very death*, for, beside my obligation as his subject, I had a most tender affection for him, and it was justly due to him. The truth is, I wished to please him herein, but I could not, because I was under visitors-apostolic, whom I was bound to obey." †

Before the Saint died she had seen established seventeen monasteries of nuns and fifteen of friars. There was never, perhaps, a more miraculous reform, if we consider all the circumstances. The instrument was a woman, the order she wished to reform was not bad, but only mitigated, and that by express bulls of the Holy See, and the work was carried in a country where ecclesiastical law, which, like all law, is a labyrinth in which good purposes are often exhausted, patience tired out and energy brought to a stand-still, was in full and serene possession, wielded by men who lived upon its difficulties and delays. Yet by the help of God, our Lady, and S. Joseph,

* "Life," translated by Lewis, p. 306.
† "*Book* of the Foundations," p. 205.

she lived to accomplish so much, and only died when it was firmly established. This new translation of an immortal book will be welcome to many—to religious of all orders, to inferiors and superiors, to confessors, to all Christians who love to hear a Saint (and such a Saint) speak out of the fulness of the gifts of the Spirit, and to all educated people, even if they are not fellow-citizens in the Church of S. Teress, who are fond of studying the "confessions" of one of the acutest minds and most magnanimous hearts the world has seen. Mr. Lewis has enriched his edition with very full notes, with marginal headings and with a good index. He has also added, for the first time in an English version, the missing chapter and a half relating to the story of Doña Casilda de Padilla, which was at first omitted, apparently for prudential reasons, from the original issues of the Foundations.

Mr. Lewis has also given us, at the end of the volume, the Carmelite Rule, and three of S. Teresa's *opuscula;* namely, the *Visitation of the Nunneries*, the *Maxims*, and the *Constitutions*. The Constitutions have never before appeared in English. They are short and practical. The Maxims have been printed in Canon Dalton's translation of the "Way of Perfection." The "Visitation of the Nunneries," which is full of the wisest advice for those who govern religious houses, is almost unknown in England, since it has only appeared in Woodhead's edition. We hope that Mr. Lewis will continue his labour, and give to the world all the writings of S. Teresa with his clear and critical editing.

The "Spectator" of October 28, 1871.

A WRITER in this number of the "Spectator" has expressed a most favourable judgment, for which we are extremely grateful, on our October article against Mr. Mill. He has added however the following criticism :—

"The only point on which we differ from the reviewer,—evidently, and indeed avowedly, the editor, Mr. Ward,—is the curious assumption he seems to make that any judgment which is derived by simple 'analysis' of the subject of a proposition is necessarily tautological. We understand by a tautological judgment a judgment which really affirms nothing, except (if you please) the persistency and continuity of human thought and language, like 'man is man,' 'right is right.' By an *analytical* judgment we mean a good deal more than this,—the evolution, through attentive consideration given to any subject, of a predicate really contained in it, but not by any means necessarily present to the thought of the speaker when naming that subject. Thus we should entirely deny that 'a good man is sincere' is a purely tautological judgment, even if coming from one who readily admits that sincerity is included within his idea of goodness. There is so much else included within that idea, that it requires an attentive act of self-analysis to *draw out the separate* elements of the conception. To some extent even *connotative words*, as Mr. Mill calls them, are necessarily used *denotatively*

(*i.e.*, partly in the way in which mere proper names are used, and as nicknames *come* to be used as they gradually lose their primitive weight of significance) by ordinary minds, and we understand an analytical judgment to mean a judgment which draws attention to one of the notes in the connotation, and insists on it as really essential. Thus 'a good man is good' is tautological, but 'a good man is sincere' is not tautological, but analytical, to anyone who really holds sincerity to be essentially implied in goodness. The distinction is important as applied to mathematical judgments. Mr. Ward asserts very justly that $3 + 8 = 2 + 9$ is a necessary judgment, and is not tautological. But is it analytical? Is it of the type 'a good man is sincere'? (analytical) or of the type 'a good man deserves happiness'? (synthetical). Clearly the former is of a very different kind from the latter, and Mr. Ward will find it of the utmost importance to distinguish the two, for it is his object to show that there are necessary truths enforced by the very constitution of the intellect which are not merely analytical,—necessary truths which differ as much from each other in kind as the truth 'that flower is a plant' (a mere analysis of the meaning of 'flower') from 'that flower is beautiful' (a synthetical judgment). We should hold that $3 + 8 = 2 + 9$ is simply an analytical, though not a tautological truth, just a new arrangement of parts of the same whole. If Britain were defined to be an extended geographical kingdom, with North, South, East, and West in it,—the judgments, North Britain+South Britain=Britain=East Britain+West Britain, would be to our mind an analytical judgment, though not tautological."

We are by no means sorry that this question has been raised, and raised so ably; for it is of much philosophical importance. Nor have we any kind of wish to dogmatize on the matter, but on the contrary shall be very glad to receive any new lights. We will discuss the *real* question before saying anything on the *verbal*; and it will be best to begin by stating in full the doctrine we implied in October, held with express reference to the point raised by our kind critic.

A "tautologous" proposition, we said (p. 288), is one "which declares no more than has already been expressed by its subject." Thus "all hard substances as such resist pressure" is a tautologous proposition; because the word "hard" *means nothing else* than "resisting pressure." On the other hand, to those propositions which are not "tautologous," we gave the name "significant." Propositions however may be "objectively" tautologous, which are not "subjectively" so; and this truth at starting requires distinct elucidation, because of its bearing on what is urged in the "Spectator."

Take some term, which expresses a very complex idea: for instance, "the poetical temperament." Let it be assumed, that there is such an amount of agreement among intelligent thinkers as to what the idea expressed by that term precisely *is*, that such idea may be called its legitimate objective sense. This complex idea, we will further assume, is made up of the more simple ideas, A, B, C, D, and E. If I say then that "every person of poetical temperament possesses quality D," I am affirming a proposition "objectively tautologous"; because that idea, which the subject of said proposition in its legitimate objective sense expresses, includes the idea expressed by the predicate. Nevertheless it may most easily happen, that when I individually used the term "poetical temperament," I did not use it in its full legitimate objective sense; I did not, either explicitly or implicitly, include under it quality D. *No part, we say,—either* explicit or implicit—of what I intended to express by

the term "poetical temperament," was the possession of quality D. In that case, "subjectively" my proposition was by no means "tautologous," but on the contrary "significant." *

Now it appears to us, that the question, whether some given proposition be "objectively tautologous," — may indeed be of high linguistic and even psychological interest—but can never be of any *metaphysical* importance whatever. In the case we have instanced, the question is primarily one of linguistic convention; whether so preponderating a majority of intelligent thinkers include quality D under the term "poetical temperament," that that idea is included in the term's legitimate objective sense. And the question secondarily is one of psychological interest; because if there *be* such a consent of intelligent thinkers in the use of the term, there must be some close affinity between the idea D and the ideas A, B, C, and E. But we are quite unable to see, that under any circumstances such a question can be of the slightest *metaphysical* importance; concerning as it does exclusively the current use of language. On the other hand, the question, whether some given proposition be "*subjectively* tautologous," is often metaphysically of absolutely vital moment. Mr. Mill and all phenomenists admit that every proposition, "subjectively tautologous," is cognizable by the individual as intrinsically evident: and their reason for this admission will be presently seen. It is not therefore sufficient, in controversy against them, to show that some given proposition is intrinsically evident; but we are obliged further to show, that it is not "subjectively tautologous." Whereas were it ever so undeniable that some proposition, intrinsically evident to me, is "*objectively* tautologous,"—such a circumstance by itself would not forward Mr. Mill's cause one single step; as a moment's consideration will show. Accordingly, by the word "tautologous," in our last number, we meant "subjectively tautologous"; and in what here follows also, we shall use the word in the same sense.

Tautologous propositions are divisible into those "obviously" and "latently" tautologous. If I say e.g. that "this apple is this apple," or "this apple is an apple,"—such a dictum exemplifies that "obvious" kind of tautology which is called a "truism." But very frequently it happens that some proposition introduces indeed no other idea than has already been expressed by its subject; but declares it in a different shape: for instance it may declare distinctly and articulately, what its subject does but express complexly and confusedly. Such propositions are often of high psychological value; because, as our kind critic points out, "it requires an attentive act of self-analysis to draw out," and express by the predicate, "the separate elements of that general conception," which is expressed by the subject. It is impossible however to mistake a "latently tautologous" for a "significant" proposition, if attention is given to the essential characteristic of the former class. An "obviously tautologous" proposition gives no information at all. A "latently tautologous" proposition, when first cognized, gives information of a certain

* This distinction is by no means an afterthought suggested by the "*Spectator*" *criticism*, but is very distinctly expressed in Dr. Ward's "*Philosophical Introduction*," pp. 51–54.

purely psychical character; viz. that some given idea is or is not * identical with, or included in, some *other* given idea. Any proposition which, when first cognized, gives information of a different kind from this, is "significant." And here we see why a phenomenist will admit, that "latently tautologous" propositions can be known as intrinsically evident; for they do but state a matter of psychical experience, and are therefore within the purely phenomenal order.

Let us take, in illustration of our doctrine, the particular examples adduced by our critic. (1) "A good man is sincere": is this proposition "tautologous" or "significant"? We reply, in some cases one and in some the other. I may be meaning to express, by the word "good," "possessing the complex of those qualities, which I admire in the devout Christians by whom I am surrounded": and in that case, the proposition is "latently tautologous." On the other hand—to suggest one of fifty possibilities—I may be devising plans for diffusing Catholicity; and one may occur to me, which in real truth involves insincerity: then I check myself, and say "all good men are sincere." In this case I mean, by "good" men, men "who are truly labouring in the cause of that God, Whom the Church testifies": and my proposition accordingly is "significant." (2) We should give a similar answer, in regard to the proposition "North Britain + South Britain = Britain." Very likely, when I make this remark, I am mentally looking at the two combined as if in a map: in that case my proposition is even "*obviously* tautologous"; for I mean to express, *by the very term* "North Britain + South Britain," the union of those two parts which together make up Britain. But suppose I am reflecting in November, on my summer trips of this year and last. "Last year I travelled over North Britain; this year I have travelled over South Britain." All of a sudden it strikes me, that "North Britain + South Britain = Britain," and that I have accordingly travelled over the whole of Britain. In this case the proposition is "significant": for by "North Britain" I meant only to express "such and such counties over which I travelled last year"; and by "South Britain" "such and such other counties over which I travelled this year." No possible amount of self-analysis will here find an idea of the predicate to have been contained in my idea of the subject, for it was evidently *not* therein contained. We proceed then (3) to our critic's next example. Under no circumstances, we think, can "North Britain + South Britain = East Britain + West Britain" be "tautologous." This is in fact a particular case of the proposition, "Things equal to the same equal each other"; or "B equalling A = C equalling A." Undeniably the equality of B with C. is no part of what I expressed by the term "B equalling A." Lastly (4)

---

* We readily admit, that our inclusion of certain *negative* propositions under the class of "latently tautologous," is due to that more careful consideration of the matter, which has been induced by the "Spectator" notice. And we further admit, that this extension of statement renders this word "tautological" much less suitable for expressing the class of propositions which we are here considering. We reserve however all consideration of *terminology, for the conclusion* of our present notice.

as to arithmetical axioms : these seem to us undeniably "significant." For instance, "3 + 8 pebbles = 4 + 7." In thinking "3 + 8 pebbles," I conceive in my mind a group of 3 pebbles and another group of 8 pebbles ; but neither explicitly nor implicitly, consciously or unconsciously, do I think in the slightest degree about a group of 4, or a group of 7 pebbles. And the axiom itself accordingly—"3 + 8 = 4 + 7"—does not express a *fact* appertaining to *the mind*, but a *truth* appertaining to all *numerable things*.

Our meaning will be made still clearer, if we add one or two further illustrations. What are sometimes called the three fundamental laws of thought, are in our opinion, when expressed, "tautologous propositions." The principle of identity of course—"A is A"—"obviously" so : the principles of contradiction and of excluded middle, "latently." These two latter may in fact be expressed as follows. Principle of contradiction ; "Anything which is not-A, is-not A" ; principle of excluded middle ; "Anything which is-not A, is not-A."* Then again, those affirmations, which underlie the logical rules for converting propositions, are "tautologous." For instance : "the judgment that all As are Bs, does not include the judgment that all Bs are As" : here is a psychical fact, of the precise kind mentioned above, as the object-matter of "latently tautologous" propositions.

We will sum up then what we have said. We put aside "objectively tautologous" propositions, as a classification metaphysically irrelevant : and we divide propositions into "obviously tautologous," "latently tautologous," and "significant" ; "tautologous" meaning in either case "*subjectively* tautologous." We are very far from certain, that this is not the very division which our critic in the "Spectator" would adopt ; only he would *call* them respectively "tautologous," "analytical," and "synthetical."† It will be seen, that if by "analytical" he means what we have called "latently tautologous," he and we are of the same mind ; otherwise not : and there is one expression of his such, that its true interpretation will decide this issue. "By an analytical judgment," he says, "we mean the evolution, through attentive consideration given to any subject, of a predicate really contained in it, but *not by any means necessarily present to the mind of the speaker who is naming that subject.*" When he says "not present to the speaker's mind," —does he mean "*explicitly* present" or "*at all* present"? If he means the former—he and we are entirely accordant on the general principle. But if he means the latter—if he means that the proposition is only what we have called "objectively tautologous"—then (as we have said) we are unable with our present light to see any metaphysical importance whatever in the classification ; and we shall be very glad of such further elucidation, as he may be disposed to afford us. Supposing however that he and we are of one mind

---

* We dissent earnestly therefore from Mr. Mill's opinion ("On Hamilton," p. 475)—which is also Mr. Herbert Spencer's—that these truths are only known with certitude as predicable of phenomena and not as predicable of every possible entity. We think that, even on his own phenomenistic principles, Mr. Mill cannot defend this position.

† *This was Dr. Ward's* terminology, in his "Philosophical Introduction" ; *and also in our own* article of July 1869 on "Philosophical Axioms."

on the general principle, we still differ from him (with all diffidence) on its application to particular cases; as in the very important instance, above mentioned, of arithmetical axioms.

So much on the question of things. As to the question of words—since the distinction between "latently tautologous" and "significant" propositions is of vital importance in the controversy against phenomenists—it is a matter of great moment, to avoid all verbal confusion in drawing that distinction. We are clear, with this end in view, that we must avoid altogether the word "analytical," with its correlative "synthetical." On the one hand Catholic philosophers use the former word in a very intelligible sense, as denoting any proposition cognizable by a purely mental process; cognizable by merely fixing my mind on the idea expressed in its subject. Accordingly, in the language of these philosophers, "analytical" propositions include, not only those which we have called "latently tautologous,"—but such also, of those which we have called "significant," as are cognizable à priori. On the other hand non-Catholic philosophers have used the word "analytical" so vaguely, as to have thereby introduced no small amount of confusion into mental science. The late Dean Mansel has, we think, been a special offender in this respect; but our impression is, that our friendly critic in the "Spectator" has not entirely escaped the prevalent infection. The word "analytical" then is inadmissible; and yet on the other hand we must not be understood, as at all satisfied with our own way of expressing the distinction. It may be worth while therefore hereafter to consider, whether it will not be more convenient to use Sir W. Hamilton's words "explicative" and "ampliative," as expressing respectively what we have here called "latently tautologous" and "significant." But it is premature to discuss further the question of terminology, until we shall have securely ascertained the true philsophical *doctrine*.

A Letter, signed "F.," to the Author of an Article in the DUBLIN REVIEW *for April*, 1871. ("Fraser's Magazine," Jan. 1872.) London: Longmans.

THE article, to which this letter refers, by no means purported to be an exhaustive treatment of the vital question which it discussed: on the contrary we concluded by saying, that therein we had "not unfrequently verged on the confines of various delicate philosophical questions, which we had thought it better to avoid." We are very confident however, that its doctrines are substantially true so far as they go; and that they are of extreme practical importance. "F" writes as their "antagonist"; and on two fundamental questions we are doubtless earnestly at issue with him. But as to the other supposed differences between his theory and ours, his supposition of their existence arises from a misconception of our successive

statements, for which we can really find no justification in any obscurity of expression on our own side.*

To begin with the foundation. Our whole argument was concerned with the legitimate conditions of what we called "absolute assent"; and we explained with unmistakeable clearness the sense in which we used that expression. "By 'absolute assent,'" we said (p. 256), "we understand an assent, which is not only *unaccompanied* by doubt, but which is so firm as to *expel* doubt; to be *incompatible* with the presence of doubt." "F." prefers the word "belief" to the word "assent" (p. 24); and so far of course we have no quarrel with him, though for various reasons we think our own terminology better. But then he defines "*absolute* belief" (p. 26) as "belief *unaccompanied* by *present* doubt"; and assumes throughout, that his "absolute belief" is equivalent to our "absolute assent." As one instance of this confusion—we entirely agree with what he says in the paragraph of pp. 26–7; the chief apparent difference resulting from this equivocal use of the phrase "absolute assent."

In fact, as far as we can gather from his paper, "F." holds that what we have called "absolute assent" can never be legitimately yielded to any proposition whatever; unless indeed he would except the region of pure mathematics. This doctrine, we must say, as a purely philosophical one, seems to us not less than extravagantly false. And on theological ground it constitutes a most vital difference between him and every Catholic; because, if it were admitted, that highest and most certain of all convictions, which Catholics call "divine faith," would be under all circumstances an unreasonable act or state of mind. He has given us however no opportunity of arguing against this doctrine; because he has not even expressly stated it, and still less has he adduced one single *reason* in its behalf. We hope that at some future period, when the course of philosophical articles with which we are now engaged shall have brought us to that point, we may have an opportunity of discussing worthily this all-important question. Here of course we are only concerned with our present critic.

We must further remind our readers of the sense we gave to the correlative term "certitude." "Certitude" we said (p. 256) "exists in my mind as to any truth, whenever I" absolutely† "assent to that truth on grounds which legitimately generate such" absolute assent: "on grounds, we mean, which *conclusively establish* that truth." What then can "F." possibly mean, when he says (p. 38) that we ought to have seen "what a *very treacherous guide* certitude *is*"?

---

* As will be seen by a subsequent note, we admit one inaccuracy of expression. But we cannot admit that this, taken in its context, was open to reasonable misapprehension; and we corrected it in our following number.

† The word we used was "undoubtingly": but we immediately proceeded to explain, that we used that word as synonymous with "absolutely." In our next number (p. 53, note) we expressed regret for having used this word "undoubtingly," considering it an inadequate word for our purpose. "*The mere* undoubtingness of an assent" we added "does not at all imply *any particular firmness*, but arises from mere accident."

One of our illustrations was the following :—

"My father is a man of singularly spotless integrity ; and I have lived continually with him, from my infancy down to the prime of life in which I now am. It is very long since I acquired a complete certitude of such being his character. Five years ago, a heavy charge was brought against his morals ; and he frankly told me that he was wholly unable for the moment to explain those suspicions which pressed against him so heavily. Indubitably there was at that time one argument of weight on the adverse side ; and equationists must in consistency maintain, that my only reasonable course was to diminish pro tanto my confidence in his character. But though they are bound *in consistency* to maintain it, we do not dream that they *will* maintain it. On the contrary, the common voice of mankind declares that, had I so acted, I should have done what is no less intellectually unreasonable than morally detestable. It is intellectually unreasonable cause if I possess certitude of any truth, I thereby *also* possess certitude that apparent objections against it are worthless." (p. 257.)

"F." replies (p. 29, see also p. 26) that "a degree of evidence is easily conceivable, which might convince the most affectionate son that his father is a hypocrite and a liar." Doubtless "easily *conceivable*." But then, as we expressly argued, if I have legitimate grounds for certitude that my father is "a man of singular and spotless integrity," I have inclusively legitimate grounds of certitude, that no evidence will ever be *forthcoming*, which shall prove him to have been at this time a hypocrite and a liar. We will retort upon "F." Suppose you counted with your own hands and eyes that a number of pebbles, placed in 16 rows of 16 each, amounted to no more than 250—what would you then think of the proposition that $16 \times 16 = 256$? "F." will of course reply, that as he is absolutely certain of this latter proposition, he is inclusively certain that no accurate counting will ever be found to contradict it. This is precisely our reply to *him*.

Our second point of difference with our critic is on the doctrine, which he from time to time implies (see pp. 24, 33, 42), that there is no valid logical process, except that of induction and deduction, proceeding on the exclusive basis of experienced facts. He has given no reason whatever for this opinion. For ourselves, we admit heartily that this is a valid logical process, but confidently deny that it is the *only* one. It is evidently no valid process at all, unless *the uniformity of nature* be preliminarily established ; and we argued in our last number (pp. 311-317) that this truth cannot possibly *be* established on the mere basis of experienced facts. All this however is entirely external to the scope of our April article ; and we only mention it, to avoid being misunderstood in what next follows.

There were two theses which together occupied a large portion of our article. Firstly, as a matter of fact, it happens very frequently indeed, that a person moves by valid logical process from known premisses to their legitimate conclusion, without being at all able to analyze his course of thought. Secondly, as a matter of doctrine, if he knew the premisses with absolute certainty, his knowledge of the conclusion is no less absolutely certain. "F." admits the first of these theses ; and adds indeed (p. 31) an excellent illustration, drawn from "the power which a savage possesses of finding his way through an apparently pathless forest." Again as to our

second thesis—not only he has not said a word in reply to it—he has not so much as observed what our thesis was; though our words throughout were very distinct. Our whole purpose was to maintain, that the conclusions to which we referred are held by the *individual* with absolute certitude; that the savage e.g. may at times be absolutely certain, that he is on his right track through an apparently pathless forest. But "F." (pp. 31, 32) understands us as having urged, that such conclusions of the individual ought to exercise a powerful weight on the opinion of *others*: a matter to which we did not refer in our article at all, from one end to the other.

"F." understands us (p. 28) as having denied that "all belief is susceptible of degrees of stability"; but we implied the very reverse. We said indeed that, so far as by "certitude" is merely meant *the reasonable exclusion of doubt* it evidently admits of no degrees: and from this statement our critic, if he admitted the existence of what we have called certitude at all, would assuredly not dissent. But we *also* said that by "certitude" may be meant "a certain *degree*"—which plainly may be more or less—"of positive adhesion to the truth embraced" (pp. 255–6.) This simple explanation removes a large number of apparent differences between him and ourselves.

He ascribes to us (p. 38) the theory, "that a certain feeling in your own mind can produce an effect upon facts outside of you; that your certitude can convert a probability into a certainty; that is, can cause a given set of facts to fulfil conditions, which they would not otherwise fulfil." "It seems to me," he adds—and we heartily agree with him—"just as rational to say, that if you saw an object through a mist, which might be either a man or a bush, your conviction that it was a man could make it into a man." Such nevertheless is our theory, he says, "if he understands it correctly." We challenge him to point out one single sentence in our whole article, which has the remotest *resemblance* to the expression of such a theory.

We believe in fact, as we have already said, that there are no differences whatever between our critic and ourselves, except the two already mentioned; and on these (it will have been seen) he has not so much expressed, as implied or taken for granted his own doctrine. He has given us no means of reply; because he has adduced against us not only no argument, but not even a distinct statement.

L'Infallibilità Pontificia. Par P. Alessandro Gallerani, D.C., D.G. Roma.

THIS pamphlet consists of three lectures delivered on occasion of Pius IX.'s Pontifical Jubilee. They do not at all profess therefore to be profound or exhaustive, but on the contrary are mere summaries of what has been said by other theologians. On the "subject" of infallibility, they *contain in fact no* more than a brief and pointed analysis of the arguments *used in time past by Orsi* and Muzzarelli. But we will say of these argu-

ments, that their absolute conclusiveness is more conspicuously evident now than ever before ; because during the recent controversy Gallicans attempted in vain to contest them with so much as any appearance of plausibility.

F. Gallerani however shows himself alive to the exigencies of the time, by laying no less urgent stress on the "object" than the "subject" of infallibility. "Of what use would it be" he asks (p. 33) "to know that the Pontiff is infallible, unless we knew *in what matters* he is infallible?" On this head he professes(p. 38) to follow in every respect that "illustrious theologian" F. Knox, of the London Oratory. We need hardly add therefore how heartily we recommend his doctrine to our readers' best attention. "Infallibility" he says (p. 38) "is not restricted to those points which appertain *immediately* to faith and morals"—i. e. which are integral parts of revealed dogma—"but extends to everything which concerns the Church's general good, her rights, her discipline."

The Revival of Christianity in Syria: its Miracles and Martyrdoms. Related by P. Stanford, Charing Cross. pp. 24.

THIS is a highly interesting pamphlet, written by one who evidently, from residence if not from official position, has means of being well acquainted with his subject. He has strong Oriental sympathies, and gives testimony to the wonderful fascination which Eastern life seems always to exercise on the Frankish stranger, when he takes to it in any degree. He gives us, incidentally, a curious abstract of the divisions and subdivisions into which both the Mahomedan misbelief and the schismatical or self-styled "orthodox" Christianity of the East are split ; and shows good cause to say that "Syria has always been cursed with races, tribes, and faiths enough to split up the country, and to cause all manner of confusion." This, however, is beside the chief object of his pamphlet ; which is to claim adequate European protection for some recent cases of conversion to Christianity ; some, indeed, to Protestantism, but mostly to the Church. Still more, perhaps, is the author anxious to give an account, though but too briefly, of the miraculous circumstances attending the conversion of the Catholic neophytes among this number. Both the miracles and the conversions are of a nature to recall those in the Acts of the Holy Apostles (e.g. the occurrences in the prison at Philippi) and the records of the early centuries of persecution. One soldier, converted—after such *preambula fidei* as earnest prayer and meditation—by the sudden appearance of our Lord to him, repeatedly broke his chains and bonds, at our Lord's command and that of His Blessed Mother ; so that, after his unexpected and indeed miraculous release, he was known among the Turks as "the soldier who broke four chains." Altogether, we should greatly desire to see the facts, barely enumerated in this pamphlet, increased by the addition of others which must be well known on the spot. It would be a labour of love, well worthy the zeal of some good Catholic layman, emulating the pious task of the protonotaries of old. Is the anonymous

author in the way of doing this? We cannot but think it might prove a powerful instrument towards the conversion of some nearer home; if only as showing how earnest prayer, and seeking the Lord, is rewarded by the light of faith. "Behold, he prayeth," are words that rise to the reader's mind, and of which these conversions furnish a commentary,—most interesting. as far as it goes, but leaving us to desire more and fuller details.

Cistercian Legends. By HENRY COLLINS. London: Washbourne. 1872.

IT is remarkable how much the taste for the lives and legends of holy persons is spreading, not only among ourselves, but on that non-Catholic side which has hitherto looked upon them as purely mythical or revolting to common sense. Mrs. Oliphant and Mrs. Lear, to say nothing of a tribe of less-known writers, are making a sort of Highland raid upon our special treasuries of hagiography, and while dressing up the saints to some extent in fancy costumes, and carefully eliminating the supernatural, have at the same time rendered good service to themselves and their readers by making the actual facts of their daily lives known to hundreds who would never have accepted them from Catholic sources. There is something also specially interesting to ourselves in the narrative of those who are as it were foreigners travelling in our own country and presenting us with a picture of ourselves in a strange tongue. Their surmises and speculations, and singularly naïve and ignorant yet honest representations, have a special force and piquancy which we generally miss in our own lives, and which materially serve to stamp the facts upon the mind. Mr. Collins has thrown together in his volume of translations a number of interesting records of Cistercian sanctity and cloistral experience, which remind us forcibly of the illustrations in the "Christian Perfection" of Rodriguez. It is perhaps a pity that some explanation should not have been given of the kind of belief to be lent to such stories as these, some of which spring out of local habits and circumstances, some roughly teach a certain moral, while others are exceedingly beautiful evidences of a high state of sanctity in their subject or relation. Of the latter class the vision of a paralyzed lady (p. 109), who appears to have been almost an *estatica*, is a beautiful example. She lived, like Maria Mörl, upon grapes, and fell often into trances, when glorious representations (if not the realities) of the spiritual world were brought before her. One Feast of the Purification she was deprived of all spiritual comfort and ministration, and, overcome with sadness, complained that she could not pay the usual honour to the Blessed Virgin, when suddenly she was "led out of the body by an Angel" to be present at a Mass said by our Lord Himself, as the High Priest of the New Law. "the blessed Martyr Stephen read the Epistle from the book of Malachi the Prophet, S. John the Evangelist, clad in *a dalmatic, read the Gospel* according to S. Luke." Our Lord, as the great *High Priest, was represented* to her as wearing the mitre, gloves, ring, pastoral

staff, and other ornaments of a bishop. It is remarkable that nearly all these legends speak of "conversion" as leaving the world and entering the religious state; and on this and some other accounts, we should say that some introductory explanation of the state of society at that time would have been well prefixed to the legends.

The Monks of Iona. By Dr. STEWART M'CORRY. London: Washbourne.

WE are sorry to speak in terms of very qualified praise of a book published with so good a title as Dr. Stewart M'Corry's "Monks of Iona." It is a reply to the Duke of Argyll's "Iona," and, more incidentally, to the Protestant bishop of Argyll's "Cathedral and Abbey Church of Iona." His Grace has certainly laid himself open to well-merited castigation, by importing into his account of a spot so instinct with the early Catholic life of the Celtic race, the narrow Presbyterian bigotry which, if not his personal fault, is eminently his personal misfortune. But he receives no real castigation at the hands of Dr. M'Corry, by reason of the vehement, intemperate tone of the reverend champion's animadversions. There is little force of argument, or element of persuasion, when the style of handling either a view of history or its advocate is foreign to that simple dignity and measured calmness of phrase which befits the pen of a Catholic, and more than all, of a priest. We have never enlarged our experience of polemics by reading the "Pope and Maguire" controversy, or any similar series of rejoinders; but we imagine the usual run of platform rhetoric would not be very unlike the method adopted by Dr. M'Corry in dealing with the Duke and his assertions. Wherever we must needs be polemical—and the need is daily—let us, in the name of that righteous cause we undertake, select an armoury worthy of the contest—*Nec cauponantes bellum, sed belligerentes.* The great conflict of the day is one of first principles: to state those principles clearly, and to apply them patiently, seems the most effective method of convincing those who are open to the demonstration, and of convicting such as are not.

The Duke of Argyll, as we find from Dr. M'Corry's book (p. 61), has allowed himself to use the following terms of Montalembert's notice of the great Saint of Iona, S. Columba:—

"The most recent description of Iona, and perhaps also one of the most eloquent, is altogether misleading, and gives the traveller a very imperfect idea both of what he ought to remember and of what he may expect to find. And yet no one perhaps ever visited the island who was in some respects better qualified to rejoice in its associations than the distinguished author of the 'Monks of the West.' But an indiscriminate admiration of *mediæval superstition*, and the absence of all endeavour to sift fact from fiction, in the narrative we possess of Columba's life, mar the reality of the picture which Montalembert gives us of the past. Nor does the present fare better in his hands. *His disposition* to extol the self-sacrifice of his hero, coupled with

the incapacity of every Frenchman to understand any form of natural beauty, except those to which he has been accustomed, combine to make his description of Columba's adopted home in the highest degree fanciful and erroneous."

There is here a sufficient want of wisdom, in all conscience. But, in reply to this, as to other passages, Dr. M'Corry, we must repeat, does not strike us as happy in his tone as a controversialist. Nor can we defend his questionable taste in dedicating a violent philippic against the father to the Duke's eldest son. Unless he had previously received the acquiescence, at least, the Marquis of Lorne, and of this there is no indication, it strikes as an approach (*mutatis mutandis*) to seething a kid in its mother's milk. This Dedication is followed by a formidable list of no less than thirty other publications "by the same author." We trust the present volume is not the foot by which we are to measure Hercules. Altogether, as we turn over his pages, the words come irresistibly before us, in which a rash enterprise and its results were long ago described: "In that day some priests fell in battle, while, desiring to do manfully, they went out unadvisedly to fight." (1 Mach. v. 67.) Certainly "they"—if we may paraphrase the text, and apply it to controversialists of the cut-and-thrust school, whose weapons are sarcasm, invective, and blades and barbs of that stithy—"they are not of the seed of those men by whom salvation was brought to Israel."

Insula Sanctorum, the Island of Saints; a Title applied exclusively to Ireland. (pp. 96.) London: Washbourne.

OF the two islands, so close together in geographical position, so widely diverse in national character, as England and Ireland, the one has been, throughout history, the insulting invader and oppressor of the other. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that an Irish heart should cling with an intense jealousy to the possession, even sole and exclusive, of any of Erin's glories of old. And it is with such allowance, and with many grains of it, that we take up this spirited little *Noli me tangere*, whose title is here given. The author will not have it, no—absolutely will not—that England should share in a title so sacred as that of *Insula Sanctorum*. We think that in his zeal he has forgotten his scholarship. As the Latin stands, there seems nothing in a title which Church history and hagiology so abundantly vindicate for the land of Saint Patrick and his countless disciples, to bar out other lands from sharing in the same blessed inheritance. "Hast thou only one blessing, Father? I beseech thee, bless me also." The ancient British martyrs, whose Acta still *carent vate sacro*—the Anglo-Saxon Church, of which no adequate collective history yet exists—S. Thomas of Canterbury, a local martyr to whom long centuries have paid a devotion equalled by few in other provinces of *the kingdom of God*—constitute a catena of evidence to make a thoughtful *man pause before delivering* a trenchant verdict. So much for the past.

For the future, let us see nothing but a generous rivalry between the two islands, which of the two shall herein prove the more fertile soil. It will tend to the Divine glory, to the good of the Church and of souls, when the Catholics of England and Ireland shall run *pari passu* on a race of sanctity and benediction, in which is nothing "exclusive," while all tends to mutual encouragement and mutual charity.

The Tradition of the Syriac Church of Antioch concerning the Primacy and the Prerogatives of S. Peter and his Successors the Roman Pontiffs. By the Most Rev. CYRIL BEHNAM BENNI, Syriac Archbishop of Mossul, &c. Burns & Oates. 1871.

IT would be merely absurd, without the necessary learning, to attempt a detailed notice of Monsignor Benni's modest volume, written under much discouragement of inherent difficulty and faint support. With his mind full of the overwhelming evidences he had drawn from the Vatican Library and an intense desire, not only for the long-prayed-for re-union of Eastern and Western Christendom, but also for a termination to the divergences of Oriental Catholics,—the Archbishop of Mossul sought in England an enlightened appreciation of his labours and means for their fulfilment. English sympathies, unfortunately, are too much restricted by our own fulness of work and narrowness of means, to secure foreigners from disappointment on this point; and probably Monsignor Benni failed to find that general interest in the momentous questions of the East for which he looked. To those who have the capacity and leisure for liturgical studies, nothing could be more attractive than the extracts and notes of the volume before us, which are richly suggestive even to a moderately thoughtful mind. Of the four families of the Syriac Church—the Syrian, Maronite, Chaldean (Nestorian), and Melchite,—the Archbishop is chief of the first-named flock, and his see is Mossul,* the site of ancient Ninivé. The traditions collected regarding S. Peter's Primacy are drawn from about 200 documents in the Vatican and Propaganda, and others (probably the Nitrian MSS.) consulted in the British Museum, and are divided into three parts,—the first on S. Peter, the second, which is very short, on the Roman Church, and the third on the Roman Pontiffs. That on S. Peter is exceedingly curious and full of beauty, beginning with its motto from the *Synodalia Chaldæorum*: "The lands of the people and the realms of the nations were promised to Abraham, but the promise to Peter is over cities of souls, and a seat upon heavenly thrones." The very first quotations are good examples of the flood of light both extracts

---

* When Mr. Layard first went to Mossul with the intention of excavating its vast mounds, he reaped a harvest of suggestions from Monsignor Benni, of which *no mention* is made in his book.

and notes cast upon this momentous question, and suggest to our English clergy the vast results to be gained from Biblical studies.

I.

"Simon, the chief of the Apostles, who ruled over all powers,* that he might bind and loose without obstacle."—*Syriac Liturgy.*

II.

"Blessed art thou, whom the Son of God hath chosen ; sit at the head of His disciples, and gifted with a godlike † power of loosing and binding."—*Syriac Liturgy.*

We give one more extract, a sort of Prose of S. James, Bishop of Batna-Serugi, though we imagine that the conciseness and extraordinarily manifold meaning of the Syriac is lost by translation.

"Thou art Kippo :" (*cephas*, a stone) "down in the foundations of the great house
I will set thee : upon thee I will build My elected Church.
The wholeness of thy frame shall bear her weight: she shall not sink.
I will place thee first in my building, thou being hardy ;
Be thou the basis to the Holy Temple which I am to inhabit.
On thee I will expand all the superstructures of the Daughter of day ‡
(Christ) entered upon the house, chose a stone, and set the foundation :
(Gave the bride) an earnest to overcome death and Satan.
The Great Apostle was the foundation of the Great House—
Which the bride was to enter (as) a stronghold undefiled.
(Christ) raised her a Chamber, § and lest she might be affrighted, warranted her
That miscreants should never prevail against her Surety.
He began to build her, and upon the Great Stone He had found,
Set her building, whose height was to transcend the clouds.
Two-and-ten stones He had laid in the Palace of Light ;
But *one* was singled out to support the great building.
He dressed, marked, and carved the main stone He had found,
And set it deep in the great building He was raising.
The Bridegroom chose it, His Father carved it in that revelation,
And the Holy Ghost had it finished and settled in the foundation of the Church."—*S. James of Serug.*

There is a beautiful remark of the translator, Mr. Gagliardi, which is surely worth further development and illustration at some future time.

---

* Powers—*Shultonin* (Sultan, Soldano), from *shalt* (from which our shall shalt) *ak msa!to*, "As one having authority."

† Godlike, *alôhoith*, Divinitus, reminding of the Arabic *Allah*, and the *Hebrew Elôim.*

‡ *Bath-imomo*, the Church. § ποιμήν.

Speaking of his hope of future Syriac students, he says they will "first wonder at the apparent deficiency . . . of the *present* tense. But they will soon understand that the religious children of Sem hardly esteemed any *present* thing worth noticing—nay the *past* too, in their mysterious language, is but lightly touched . . . whilst all the machinery and rich economy of their verbs aims at that *future* in which the shadowy, unreal things of this time will have ceased."

The Joys of a Consecrated Church. A Sermon preached at the Consecration of the Church of the Benedictine Monastery at Stanbrook. By the V. Rev. Dom. NORBERT SWEENEY, O.S.B., D.D., Cathedral Prior of Gloucester. Burns & Oates. 1871.

THIS is a note of joy, struck and prolonged on a joyful occasion. The solemn consecration of a church must be always a theme of true gladness to those who witness it, and to all, throughout a neighbourhood and a diocese, who share, by sympathy and from a distance, in the rejoicings of those who are present. Faithful to the title he has prefixed to his sermon, Prior Sweeney offers to his readers nineteen pages of continuous jubilation. Yet we must not coldly criticise an effusion uttered on a special occasion of joy. It would be as heartless as Michal, the daughter of Saul, who looked out at the window while David danced from the very overflow of his religious feelings. That the sermon was preached at the request of the Lady Abbess of Stanbrook, and published in obedience to the order of the V. R. Prior's Superior, are motives amply sufficient for his imparting his sermon in print to those who were unable to hear him. We cannot doubt, moreover, that the style, which we should otherwise have thought a little rhetorical, was adopted as suitable to the occasion. Prior Sweeney's ordinary paces (to borrow a phrase from Di Vernon) are better—it is not to be questioned—than this particular amble; which is only saying that we shall value his next gift in proportion as the tone of it is as much *ad rem*, when the subject is of a more ordinary character; and as much ad hominem, when the audience may not be confined to the partakers of that consecration gladness. The "Catholic pulpit," to use the old term, has so long groaned under utterances of the school of Archer and Peach, those Jortins and Blairs of the true faith, that we may be excused for a slightly jealous feeling in favour of simplicity of style. *Denique, sit quod vis,* SIMPLEX *duntaxat, et unum.* Meanwhile, we have pleasure in noticing one of the Very Reverend author's passages (pp. 13–15), in which the lessons of religious perfection, as taught by the Blessed Sacrament from the tabernacle, to the consecrated nuns who surround it, is strikingly brought out. And we give the conclusion of the sermon entire, as being to our minds the best passage of the whole, because, again, the simplest.

"Yet one thought, and I am silent.

"Has it ever occurred to you, especially on some of these beautiful autumnal nights, as *you* may be looking up to the heavens, and see the joyous

stars glistening, like angels' eyes, above you, to think how angels themselves may, when they are looking down upon this earth of ours, see it dotted all over with similar bright spots, shining brilliantly below them? And if one of the blessed spirits, in a lower order of the heavenly Hierarchy, might be imagined as asking one of the cherubim, the angels of knowledge (for the Angelic Doctor tells us that the higher orders there enlighten the lower). 'What are those bright lights which are ever shining upon earth, and differ from each other, as star differs from star in glory?' he might be answered. Each of those is a house of our great God, and our own King is residing within. Each is a dwelling-place of the Blessed Sacrament. Some shine more brightly, and are of greater magnitude: those are consecrated churches, and the holy oil is glistening on their walls. Some are more brilliant still, and are of the first magnitude: those are conventual churches. There the Blessed Sacrament is never abandoned, and songs and hymns of praise, and loving aspirations are ever streaming forth from those faithful homes. But each is bright and sends forth its brilliant rays, 'because the glory of God hath enlightened it, and the Lamb is the lamp thereof.'"

Tyborne, and Who went thither in the days of Queen Elizabeth: a Sketch. By the Author of "Eastern Hospitals," etc. etc. New and revised edition. Burns, Oates, &c. 1871.

A WELCOME is due to this new edition of a suggestive little book. Any contribution to the history and hagiology of a period too little known by the mass of our countrymen, and not always dwelt on with sufficient remembrance by Catholics, can never be other than well-timed. And at this moment, from very opposite quarters, such contributions have been made. While Father Morris is editing his two interesting Stonyhurst MSS., which tell of the condition of Catholics under James I., and sketch so vivid a portrait of Father Gerard in his apostolic sufferings, an Anglican hand has given us notices of the "Martyrs omitted by Foxe." It may be hoped that these currents of thought and interest will further swell and become confluent. Historians have often selected periods of time, marked within definite limits and distinguished by predominant influences:—"waves," as it has become the usage to call them. We hope the writer is yet to arise who, from the abundant materials that lie ready to his hand, will work out an adequate realization of the days of persecution, from the ruthless monster Henry to the indolent sensualist Charles. As the author of "Tyborne" justly says:—

"So fruitful a field has English history proved to the novel-writer, that there is hardly an incident or a period that has not been painted. But *one* there is passed over in significant silence—the sufferings of Catholics under *the Penal Laws.* And this silence is the more strange, because it has ever *been found that the* cry of religious persecution has, in itself, a power of

drawing out the sympathy of men, and enlisting their *hearts* on the side of the oppressed, even if their *heads* did not follow. Was not this sympathy poured out on the Albigenses as 'victims of the Inquisition'? and how few knew the deadly tendencies of their doctrines, striking at the root of all that men hold in common as pure and holy?—How many tales of youth borrowed their interest from the woes of Huguenots—with how slight a knowledge of their real intentions?—and how bright a halo did not imagination cast around the struggles of the Covenanters of Scotland—forgetting that, to the full, they equalled their oppressors in deeds of ferocious and bigoted cruelty? Is it not, then, wonderful, that when the persecutions under Mary Tudor have been written indelibly on the page of history, the long, the terrible, the patient sufferings of Catholics in the succeeding reign should remain unnoticed."

The book, as our readers probably know from the previous edition, is cast in the form of a tale. Perhaps this will insure a wider circulation, and present the subject under a form more adapted to the public at large. Yet we confess to a feeling that truth is not only stranger, but is more interesting and attractive, than fiction: than any fiction, at least, short of the most powerful. And the facts of the martyrdoms of these our English sufferers for the Faith are such as only need to be detailed, in order to absorb the reader. We trust some day to see their names and relics raised to our altars; and the details given in Challoner, Stonyhurst MSS., and other sources, consolidated into some *Acta Sanctorum*. We would therefore fain dispense with Lord Beauville (from what place, unknown to Priscian, did he get his title?) and the other novel-like ingredients of this little book, on the condition of supplying his room with more particulars of the life and death of Father de Lisle. However, we heartily wish success to "Tyborne" on its mission; and cannot doubt that it will turn more than one earnest thought in a direction most wholesome to our present race of Catholics, endangered as they are by softness of living and scanty of the spirit of self-sacrifice for the faith.

The Christian Æsop. By W. H. Anderdon, D.D. London: Burns, Oates, & Co. 1871.

THIS is eminently a Christmas book, and accordingly presents attractions outside as well as inside. Bright colours and pretty designs are in keeping with that which is, *par excellence*, a season of joy and merriment. But Dr. Anderdon's modest offering requires no recommendation such as these to make it generally acceptable. His name alone is a sufficient guarantee to secure it an *entrée* into every household. His wide sympathies, earnest piety, playful humour, and graceful style have long since won for him a reputation and a welcome that is not confined to the limits of the United Kingdom, but that stretches across the great Atlantic into Catholic America. Whilst his "*Tales of Mount Saint Bernard*" have reached a third edition,

the "Catholic Crusoe" a sixth, and "Afternoons with the Saints" a seventh edition, his little pamphlet, "Confessions to a Priest," has actually attained the twenty-sixth thousand. We have, therefore, every reason to feel grateful to Dr. Anderdon for having turned his attention to popular Catholic literature. There is a growing want of this class of book, which every day is making itself more felt. The masses are being educated. Every day, active minds and nimble fingers are added to their number, and are being taught to read and write. It behoves those who are blessed with the necessary gifts and leisure to provide for these young people such works as may at once entertain, instruct, and edify. "The Christian Æsop" will do its share in this good work. That the Fable is well calculated to teach and educate, was acknowledged so far back as twelve hundred years before Christ. Few methods are better fit to train the faculties of the youthful mind, than exercising it in detecting analogies. David Hume, in his "Political Discourses," divides mankind into two classes; that of *shallow* thinkers, who fall short of the truth, and that of *abstruse* thinkers, who go beyond it. With children the grand difficulty is to get them to think at all. Tell a boy to think, and either he will not understand you, or, if he should, he will not be one whit the better able to do your bidding. The fables of "The Christian Æsop" will, we expect, tax his ingenuity, and not only force him to reflect, but perhaps even give him a habit of thinking.

That Dr. Anderdon's volume is without blemish is more than we need maintain. In applying the Æsopic Fables to matters which they were never meant to elucidate, they have necessarily suffered somewhat from the overstrain. The Fable, to speak strictly, is, and always must be, inadequate as an exponent of the higher truths which belong to man's spiritual life. It may serve to exhibit the relations between man and man—especially in matters pertaining to his lower nature, e. g., his pride, indolence, cunning, and the like; but it inevitably fails to indicate the relations between God and man. To do this is the office of the *Parable*. Hence some may feel inclined to question the taste and expediency of the present volume. Our Lord frequently made use of the *Parable*, but of the *Fable* never. Between the two there is a strict difference, which authorities such as Lessing, Herder, Olshausen, and Trench have elaborately drawn out. Still, nowhere in the New Testament is the Fable condemned, either as a vehicle of Christian teaching, or otherwise. As the pagan temples were at length converted to the use of Catholic worship, so there is no reason why old Æsop should not be made, as far as lies in him, subservient to the cause of Christian education. We may therefore safely, and do heartily, recommend Dr. Anderdon's latest work, especially to all that are interested in the young. It bears the *imprimatur* of the Archbishop. This alone will secure it respect. We wish it every success, and trust that the polished author will prosecute with fresh energy his labours in the sphere of popular Catholic literature.

Two Years in the Pontifical Zouaves, &c. By Joseph Powell, Z.P. London : Washbourne. 1871.

REGARDING this volume as the story of a Zouave's experience in the Papal Corps, we cannot but feel a regret that more space is given to such accounts of the various objects of interest in Rome as any guide-book could furnish than to the origin and general history of the Pontifical Corps itself. The greater bulk of the Zouaves so distinguished themselves in the late French-German war, and—many of them—made so brilliant a personal impression as Christian soldiers, that a full account of the body by one of themselves might have been made exceptionally interesting. And, having in view the general non-Catholic public, it would have been well to have given some special details of such lives of a few of these brave young soldiers as are now scattered, and we may say generally, lost, in small memorials with but a slender circulation. And we regret this the more as the whole tone of Mr. Powell's volume is so excellent.

For instance (as critics are bound to fault-finding), after the foundation of the corps in 1860 by de Lamoricière, and its reorganization by Count de Becdelièvre in 1861, with a special uniform as "Zouaves Pontificaux," we should have liked fuller details of the guerilla warfare which continued—often at great odds and with romantic success—with the Garibaldians until 1867, when the Zouaves numbered twelve companies under the French Colonels Allet and de Charette. Apparently this year also was the first in which British volunteers offered themselves for the service. Several of our countrymen were present at the retaking of Bagnorea, when the Garibaldians had scattered sacred relics, broken up the altars, and even stabbed the Saints' images with their bayonets. In the sharp fighting at Monte Libretti Arthur Guillemin, well known and beloved by his Zouave brethren, was killed, and Alfred Collingridge, after fighting desperately singlehanded against a crowd of Garbaldian soldiers, was mortally wounded. He was taken prisoner, and died of his wounds after the engagement at Nerola, where Menotti Garibaldi gave permission to Monsignor Stonor to visit him. Two other well-remembered Zouaves, de Yonghe, a Dutchman, and de Quelen, fell at Monte Libretti, where it is said that 90 Zouaves held their own against above 1,000 Garibaldians. Urbain de Quelen, of Kerhoan, in Brittany, was of a family for centuries illustrious for its courage and loyal service to France. To mention no others, it is recorded that one of the family was killed beside S. Louis at Massoura, in 1249, and another died with S. Louis before Tunis, in 1270. Their legend motto, which we hope to see verified, is in Breton, "*There are always Quelens.*" After Monte Libretti came Nerola, where we hear of another countryman, Mr. Delahoyd, who took part also at the great fight of Mentana. At Monte Rotondo he and his comrades found the Garibaldians carrying off broken chalices and monstrances with Sacred Particles in them, and everywhere the studied destruction of holy objects caused these brave young men to shed tears. At Mentana Julian Watts Russell offered his life for the cause. General Kauzler's despatch is given entire by Mr. Powell, who also mentions the touching visit of the Pope to the imprisoned Garibaldian daggermen in the

Castle of S. Angelo, and his memorable words: "Here I am, my friends. You now see the *Vampire* of Italy that your General spoke of. So! you took up arms to attack me, and you find me only a poor old man."

Mr. Powell did not join the corps till early in 1868, when about 1,100 recruits arrived in Rome. By that time the heroic incidents of the struggle and its hopeful aspect were nearly over, and the duties of the Zouaves were chiefly confined to "guard, picket, and patrol," with rifle-practice, reviews, and sham-fights in the neighbourhood of Rome. During his two years' engagement Mr. Powell visited the chief objects of interest in and about the Holy City, and returned to England in 1870. He closes his volume appropriately with an account of the magnificent conduct of the Zouaves under Colonel de Charette, when they threw themselves before the Prussian forces at Patay, near Orleans, in the French-German war.

The Works of Alexander Pope. New Edition, including several hundred unpublished Letters, and other new materials. Collected in part by the late Right Hon. JOHN WILSON CROKER. With Introduction and Notes by the Rev. WHITWELL ELWIN. Vols. I., II. (Poetry, I., II.), and VI., VII. (Letters, I., II.)

THE publication of a new edition of the works of Pope, in ten volumes, of which four have already appeared, is an important event in itself, but it is rendered still more so by the somewhat daring and innovating line which the new editor has taken up. When we say the new editor, we mean Mr. Whitwell Elwin, for it is he who has contributed the *animus*, good or bad, to the present edition, Mr. Croker not having lived to complete an enterprise in which he is known to have been for a long time engaged. The new edition is handsomely got up and clearly printed; but it is by no means an *edition de luxe*. Perhaps the publishers are wise in not sending Pope forth to the present generation in the sumptuous quartos and with the broad margins of the Lintots of his own day; but we doubt whether Mr. Elwin's annotated "Pope" will ever be popular in its present form. Pope requires a commentary, sometimes to render him intelligible, at other times to point out beauties or faults. "A commentary," in Dr. Johnson's well-known words, "must arise from the fortuitous discoveries of many men in devious walks of literature." Pope has been unfortunate in having had for commentators several very incompetent and foolish people. To read him through the glasses of Warburton, for instance, is to struggle with a continuous succession of conceit, bad taste, and paradox. And yet Warburton was the friend of Pope, and possessed advantages that no one else can ever command. Perhaps, however, to be the friend of one's author is about the worst *possible* preparation for an impartial annotator. The edition of Warton *appeared in 1797.* Though Warton is far too long and too ready to talk

about everything except his author, yet his notes are often pleasant reading and really illustrate the text. Bowles, whose edition appeared in 1806, and was bitterly ridiculed by Byron, had the advantage of being a real poet himself, and a poet of a far truer school than Pope. To any one who cares to read the works of a poet under the guidance of a poet, and without being troubled much by facts, explanations, or dates, we should recommend the edition of Bowles. Roscoe's edition, which came out in 1824, is considered by Mr. Croker to be the worst of all, for platitudes and blunders. Perhaps the only valuable result of Roscoe's labours (besides that which affected his own pocket) was that it prompted the well-known critical essay of De Quincey. To show how doctors can disagree, it is curious to observe that De Quincey thought Roscoe's edition certainly the most agreeable of all we possess. He thought that another complete edition of Pope would never be printed. At any rate he was loud in calling attention to the necessity for "compressing" the annotations. He might well feel this in using the voluminous edition of Roscoe. What would De Quincey have said had he foreseen that there were critics then at school who were to find out that Pope had never yet been properly criticised at all? Yet to read what Mr. Elwin has given us, in the shape of history, biography, new matter, poetical criticism, and moral appreciation, it would hardly be granting too much to admit that these critics are right. Bowles was severe, and weighed his author rigorously. But Mr. Elwin claims to have thoroughly exposed Pope, both in his literary defects and his moral shortcomings. The result of his criticisms, from a literary point of view, is that Pope comes out to our minds a greater poet than ever, but that his great reputation rests on a smaller number of his compositions.

We have said that Mr. Elwin's edition is not likely to be popular. This is his own account of his way of working :—

> "I have borrowed whatever I met with in previous writers that threw light upon his meaning, faults, and beauties, have cast aside what was plainly inapplicable and erroneous, and have done what I could to fill up deficiencies.' (Introduction, p. xxv.)

We are quite sure that most readers would have preferred that the whole commentary should have been in Mr. Elwin's own words. It will no doubt be replied that this would not be possible in a critical and scholarly edition, for, in the first place, the thoughts of previous commentators have grown to be part of the literature of the subject, and therefore must be reproduced, just as parallel passages are reproduced; and in the second, some commentaries have an authority of their own, like Warburton's, which was in great measure adopted and sanctioned by Pope himself. Perhaps this is true; but at all events such a farrago of comment as we have here, even after all Mr. Elwin's sifting and selecting, is very hard reading, and therefore will never be popular. Take, for instance, the notes to the "Rape of the Lock." The first note is the editor's own, the second is one of Gilbert Wakefield's *loca parallela;* so is the third. Then we have a sneer from Dennis, gravely "improved" by the editor; then some identification of names by Warton, with supplement by Croker; and all this occurs in the first eight lines. So the various names succeed one another throughout. And the matter becomes

worse when Mr. Elwin quotes his predecessors and then upsets them all round. In regard to "Introductions," which are the favourite-tilting grounds of able editors, the reader is not quite so bandied about; but he only escapes confusion at the peril of exhaustion. An "Introduction" in the present edition generally presents features something like these; a few lines of Pope, half a page of Warburton, half a page of Warton, two sentences of Roscoe, and then, perhaps thirty pages of Elwin. When we add that the reader, after he has mastered the Introduction and digested the notes, sometimes finds at the end the whole of Warburton's commentary printed as an appendix, we have said enough to make him doubtful, we fear, whether he will be able to find Pope's own text at all in the midst of such a thicket of guide-posts and sign-boards.

We must not do Mr. Elwin injustice. In many respects he (and we include Mr. Croker's labours in his) has given us immeasurably the best, nay, we may say the only, commentary on Pope. His researches have been immense, and his criticism, even when small and erroneous, is always earnest and free from conventionalities; whilst his estimate of Pope as a philosopher is certainly a genuine addition to the literature of the subject. (*See* "Introduction to the Essay on Man.") Antiquarian research has, of course, made great strides since Roscoe's time, even if Roscoe had made researches in Pope-literature, which he did not. "Fortuitous discoveries" have also multiplied during the last thirty years. To this we must add, that our literary men now bring a wider culture and broader principles to their task of criticism than they did half a century ago, a result partly owing to the pressure of the modern scientific spirit of systematic labour and thoroughness, and partly to acquaintance with foreign literature and foreign criticisms of their own literature. M. Taine's remarks do not always please Mr. Elwin, but they have evidently had their effect. We dare not say that modern critics have a truer appreciation of poetry than the men of two generations ago. Yet, with the exception of Bowles, no commentator of Pope has been distinguished for poetic taste; and Bowles's work is too spasmodic and unsystematic to be anything more than clever talk. But perhaps the quality which most of all distinguishes modern criticism from what passed for such in the eyes of our forefathers, is earnestness. There never was an age in which intellectual men had such an impatience of mere wit. Just as poets and artists must have, or must feign, the deepest and truest ethical motives in their work, so critics have learnt to look out for such motives and to measure work by them. They demand that a poem or an essay shall exhibit what Aristotle would call a certain προαίρεσις—fixed principle, and not mere constructive skill. Works of art are looked on as something more than the amusements of the drawing-room; they are the revelation of mind. Pope fares but badly when the canons of universal ethics, or even of universal art, are applied to the brilliant bits of effect that make up the greater portion of his claim to the title of poet. Mr. Elwin is very much in earnest. He has demolished a very pantheon of idols connected with the worship of Pope. He has shown small respect for former commentators; he has thrown cold *water* on their fervent admiration; he has reproved their raptures, corrected *their taste, exposed their* inaccuracy, and supplemented their ignorance in

matters of fact. Pope comes forth from his judicial questioning rather a shrunken and sorry sort of a figure; and yet, as we have said, all that i really great in him shows greater than ever under the analysis of true criticism. But where there is so much fault-finding to be done, the result is sure to be unpleasant in tone. Mr. Elwin is an uncommonly "sour-complexioned" critic, as Izaak Walton would have called him. He scolds so incessantly, and doles out his rare praise, generally to the full measure indeed, but so coldly and unsympathizingly, that the reader almost loses patience with him, and cries out for a touch of Warburton's enthusiasm or Roscoe's appreciative commonplace. He has performed a necessary but an ungrateful task. Some future day will see a successor, without perhaps a tithe of his industry or research, but with more warmth and geniality, produce a really good popular annotated edition of Pope.

We must give a few specimens of Mr. Elwin's manner; and they shall be chiefly from his notes on the "Essay on Man." Here is half a page from his Introduction:—

"The ethics in his [Bowles's] eyes were only the groundwork for poetica embroidery. 'We hardly,' he said, 'think of the philosophy, whether it is good or bad,' and he represented the reader hurried away by the finished and touching pictures of the Indian and the lamb, which are exceptions to the didactic tenor of the poem, and speak to the sympathies of mankind. . . . . The eulogy, or apology, put forward by Bowles was really censure. The happy episodes are but a fragment of the four epistles. The rest is designed for philosophical reasoning; and if we hardly think of the philosophy, there is little left except sound. The philosophy is not dimmed by the blaze of poetry. There is no splendour of imagery, no brilliancy of idea to overshadow the argument, and the sole reason the philosophy fails to take hold of the mind is because it is vague and disconnected, because the whole, as De Quincey says, 'is the realization of anarchy.' The want of philosophic unity might have been largely compensated by the personal unity of strong conviction; the earnest faith and feelings of the man might have stood in the place of the scientific completeness of the subject. In nothing was Pope more deficient. For personal conviction he substituted any discordant notions which he fancied would look well in verse, and the Essay is no more bound together by the pervading spirit of individual sentiment than by logical connection. The languid inattention which the poem invites is seen in the statement of Bowles, that there is 'a nice precision in every word.' No one could attempt to get at Pope's meaning without being frequently tormented by the difficulty, and sometimes the impossibility, of interpreting his lax, indeterminate language. . . . . Loose and ambiguous phraseology was not the only fault of style. The use of inversions, and of unlicensed, elliptical modes of speech, was a cardinal blemish of Pope's poetry. The failing reached its height in the 'Essay on Man.' . . . . They [the deformities of vicious construction] arose from defect of literary power; from the incapacity to reconcile the requirements of verse with the rules of English." (vol. ii. p. 338.)

Pope's "Essay on Man" is such a favourite "portion" at competitive examinations that it is perhaps hardly necessary to quote any lines referred to. Still, as some of our readers may not have tried to "pass" anything, we give the famous lines in the first epistle:—

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole
Whose body nature is, and God the soul;

That, changed through all, and yet in all the same,
Great in the earth, as in th' ethereal frame,
Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,
Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent;
Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part,
As full, as perfect in a hair as heart;
As full, as perfect in vile man that mourns,
As the rapt seraph that adores and burns;
To him no high, no low, no great, no small;
He fills, he bounds, connects and equals all."

On this passage Warton's comment is, "These are lines of a marvellous energy and closeness of expression." Mr. Elwin immediately subjoins :—

"The concluding lines appear to be a false jingle of words, which neutralize the whole of Pope's argument. If there is to Providence 'no high, no low, no great, no small,' the gradation of beings is a delusion. What things are in the sight of God, that they are in reality, and since no one thing in creation is superior or inferior to any other thing, Pope's language throughout this epistle is unmeaning."

We advise Mr. Elwin's successor to criticise Mr. Elwin. This is surely "sour" criticism run to delusion. The Poet, as every one can see, only means that *in comparison with the Infinite* nothing is either great or small, which is a sublime truth. But Mr. Elwin goes on :—

"The final phrase of the couplet is bathos. God is not only the 'equal' of 'all' His works, He is immeasurably beyond them."

Mr. Elwin does not understand Pope; and this is partly Pope's own fault. When God is said to bound, connect, and *equal* all, the context demands that "equal" should mean "equalize," or "make equal," which is undoubtedly what Pope meant.

Let us pass on to another specimen. Pope is saying that the "wants, frailties, and passions" of life enhance the "joys and loves" of social existence; he continues :—

"Yet from these same we learn, in [life's] decline,
Those joys, those loves, those int'rests to resign;
Taught half by reason, half by mere decay,
To welcome death and calmly pass away." (257—260.)

"The observation," says Warburton, "is new, and would in any place be extremely beautiful, but has here an *infinite* grace and propriety." Mr. Elwin takes him up, not very unjustly in this case.

"This is one of the stock forms of Warburton's adulation. Pope's remark was stale, and from the nature of the case would not be new, if, as he asserted, it was generally true, since all men in their declining years could *not, through all time,* have left unexpressed the feeling that made them all *willing to die. What all* men think many men will say." (ii. 296.)

We cannot help thinking that the general effect of Mr. Elwin's criticism does injustice to Pope. We do not mean that in the great pieces, such as the "Rape of the Lock," and the "Eloisa to Abelard," the discriminating reader is not assisted to a better and truer estimate of their greatness; but that in the mere ordinary compositions, in which Pope has no doubt partly failed, such as the "Essay on Man," he displays too much of the special pleader in picking small holes; a consequence of which is, that he pays the penalty of special pleaders, and is frequently caught tripping himself by any one who takes the trouble to try.

We have not space at present to go into the case of Pope's letters. Certainly no one who has not read Mr. Elwin's Introduction can have any idea of the new evidence that has come to light—evidence generally very damaging to Pope's character. But we reserve the point until all the letters have appeared. Mr. Elwin claims to have added to the list of letters already published more than 354 new ones, many of which are most important. We shall look for the remaining volumes with much interest.

Lays of Killarney Lakes, Descriptive Sonnets, and Occasional Pieces. By Thomas Gallwey, A.M. Dublin: Hodges, Foster, & Co.

MR. GALLWEY'S contributions to the poetic literature of the country will not attain the highest rank, but they have one merit for which his minor contemporaries are not invariably remarkable,—the merit of simplicity and originality. The poems in the little volume before us extend over a long range of subjects, most of which are Irish, or pertinent to Irish topics. They are very graceful in form, and very carefully worked out, whilst great pains appear to have been taken to guard the phraseology from those barbaric inroads of compound expletives so fatally dear to the ease and lucidity of the modern muse. The "Lays" dedicated to Killarney are seven in number, and are so thoroughly good as to make one regret that Mr. Gallwey did not draw with greater liberality on the infinite resources of that enchanted land. His treatment of the wonderful legends which haunt the depths and atmosphere of the lakes and mountains is fresh and direct, and is sustained, moreover, by an enthusiasm at once hearty and controlled. The lines on "Innisfallen" are a fair example of these qualities:—

"In the old, old days of Erin, when her life was in its prime,
(For the youngest days of nations are the eldest-born of time,)
When the forest and the covert, for the wild deer, reach'd the line
Where the mountains' lofty summits into liquid light refine,
Innisfallen rested queen-like on her marble-founded throne,
Crown'd with light from emerald bowers, cinctured by her crystal zone.
There, whilst over half the nations feebly glimmer'd twilight wan,
Shone, matured to noontide brilliance, light—the quickening life of man.
There, too, workers, meek and holy, bending o'er the deathless page,

Garner'd up for future story fruit from each successive age.
Vain, alas! the hope the promise,—soon, too soon the vernal bloom,
Rudely dash'd by soiling fingers, sought the dark and silent tomb.
Brief, loved isle, thy taste of glory! ebbing once, it ceased to flow;
Crushing pile and mouldering ruin, mark thy thousand years of woe.
Still men say that phantom-spirits haunt thy crystal-cinctured shore,
Midnight strains of music mingling with the distant torrent's roar."

There is a class of readers, of course, whose tastes have been so debauched by the highly-spiced condiments wherewith their favourite bards are wont to regale them, that it is possible they will perceive neither music nor beauty in those smooth-flowing, suggestive stanzas. Mr. Gallwey, however, is certain to find more appreciative listeners in that portion of the great public who have still a healthy appetite for clear, natural, and unembarrassed verse, with a nerve of thoughtfulness to brace and strengthen its substance. Every one who has attempted the feat of constructing a sonnet will remember the often hopeless, or at least dispiriting, difficulties which beset him. Perhaps since the death of Wordsworth, in whose hands this inelastic form of composition became as flexible as potter's clay, the language has not been enriched by a really noble and melodious effort in that direction. Mr. Gallwey, undeterred by repeated failures, has attacked the sonnet courageously, and we quote one of his average essays on a subject which had all his sympathies.

SISTER AGNES.

"Her eyes are lit with calm, unconscious light,
Such radiance as illumes the burnish'd west
When sunset brings to toil the hour of rest;
From her close hood no tress escapes to view,
Tho' fancy deems it silken, whatso'er the hue;
Her smile sheds sunshine on the stricken breast,
Her voice seems melody itself comprest
To its prime essence—such the being bright,
By strength invisible, who walks secure
Through courts, and crowded camps, and lowly haunts
Of fever'd misery, intent to pour
The oil and wine for whoso solace wants—
'Tis Sister Agnes! friend of sick and poor,
The bride of heaven, *la sœur de bon secours.*"

The rest of Mr. Gallwey's book is taken up with some half-dozen ballads on the Irish land question, and two or three poems of sentiment. We are glad to be able to write a concluding word of praise of a volume whose modesty of pretension is only exceeded by its truly Catholic tone, and its tender sympathy with the wants and sufferings of the neglected poor of Christ.

The Catholic Directory, 1872. London: Burns, Oates & Co.

THIS useful manual of ecclesiastical information maintains the well-earned character for fulness and accuracy which has long rendered it *so valuable to the Catholic* body.

The Fate and Fortunes of Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone, and Rory O'Donel, Earl of Tyrconnel: their Flight from Ireland, their Vicissitudes abroad, and their Death in Exile. By the Rev. C. P. MEEHAN, M.R.I.A. Dublin and London: Duffy.

MR. MEEHAN'S work is directed to an investigation of those events in the history of Ireland which helped to perplex the latter years of the reign of Elizabeth, and to leave a considerable bequest of embarrassments to her successor. The condition of Ireland for a long time before Burleigh or Cecil was called upon to study the vexatious problem of Celtic discontent, had been a thorn in the side of English statesmen; and when the difficulties raised by the vehement resistance of the natives to a form of government, alien in more senses than one, were complicated by flatteries or substantial aids from Spain, often at the instance of the Pope, it became a question in London, as it is a question now, Who shall dispose of this Irish difficulty? The head of the insurrection—any other name would lend it a morbid dignity—which tasked the best resources of Elizabeth's councillors and soldiers, was a man of no common experience and calibre. A shrewd, painstaking, cautious man, Hugh O'Neill, in any country but Ireland, might have climbed to the highest post open to a subject's legitimate ambition. Something of a scholar, by nature and breed a diplomatist, and endowed, moreover, with that rare fighting talent which exacted the admiration of his military contemporaries, O'Neill, under any other system than the vicious and intolerable system which it was the policy of the Queen to maintain in Ireland, might have become a great feudatory, rejoicing in his allegiance to the Crown, and holding "a fretful realm in awe," for the general good. The man, on the contrary, was a rebel, and a maker of rebels. His excessive ambition led him to dream of an independent sovereignty,—the kingship of Ireland—with a few vassal princes administering his behests in their respective territories. Everything concurred to favour this view, and to tempt his countrymen to share in it. The reign of Elizabeth in Ireland was a reign of murder and confiscation, when the most solemn engagements were sacrificed at a hand's turn, to state reasons, or to greed, or, as often was the case, to personal vindictiveness. The old war between the Pale and the Irishrie was in full blast; the Catholics were despised or crushed by laws of so extreme a character that for all civilized purposes it may be said that they ceased to exist. The west, the south, the east, were terrorized into sulky submission, for in these parts Elizabeth's functionaries had done their work with complete vengeance. From the north alone a ray of light streamed over the dispirited island; and as leader of all that was sympathetic and hopeful, in sullen, mutinous Ulster stood Hugh O'Neill. Mr. Meehan gives us a portrait of his hero, which is unfortunately not free from blemishes. Nothing is to be gained by varnishing the cracks in a faulty picture only to expose the botching to the eye of the connoisseur. O'Neill's morality was worse than doubtful, however much it may have harmonized with the tone and associations of his time. His duplicity was perfect; and it must be admitted that he had every need to exercise it constantly. Elizabeth had but few scruples, and no man had a juster appreciation of her character than the turbulent Earl of Tyrone. A

reverse always brought him to his knees before his "sovereign mistress,' whilst a piece of good luck would so elate him that he assumed towards her Majesty the airs and language of a dictator. Mr. Meehan implies that the Queen was afraid of him. "In February, 1602," he says, "she commanded Secretary Cecil to charge Mountjoy to entrap Tyrone into a submission or diminished title, such as Baron of Dungannon, and with lessened territory, or, if possible, to have his head before engaging the royal word." It would seem that nothing but the fidelity and watchfulness of O'Neill's retainers prevented this bad instruction from being carried into effect. We cannot follow Mr Meehan's narrative of the events which precipitated the flight of the Ulster earls. James eyed O'Neill with no favour, and was apparently resolved to make Ireland too hot to hold him. That there was any foundation of truth in the reported plot to upset the King's authority, massacre the nobility of the Pale, and reinstate the Irish families in the lands of which they had been unjustly deprived, our author emphatically denies; and we are free to confess that all the evidence in its favour rests only upon the hearsay authority. In the meantime it is impossible not to see that the hurried departure of the princes lent an air of veracity to the charges levelled against them; and there are few readers of this volume who will not regret that O'Neill did not throw his last cast at home, instead of flying beyond the seas to die blind, hopeless, and brokenhearted at Rome. To the bitter end he trusted in Philip's assistance; but it never came, that monarch having something else to do besides succouring distressed nationalities. Perhaps in the misfortunes that gathered round his head in his declining years, O'Neill found no such comfort as in the pitying sympathy of the Pope. "He lived," says Mr. Meehan, "like a ruler, and was buried like a king." Our author is painstaking and minute almost to wearisomeness; but it would be desirable if he had taken greater care to classify and arrange the materials at his disposal. State papers, letters, depositions, &c., are scattered through the book with embarrassing incoherency. The bone and muscle of history are there, but it is not history lucid and intelligible, as history should be written. We have only to say concerning Mr. Meehan's style, that it sometimes rises to the level of bad picturesque—a level to which serious history seldom descends.

Voyage autour du Monde. Océanie, les Iles des Pins, Loyalty, et Tahiti. Par JULES GARNIER, Ingénieur chargé par la Ministère de la Marine d'une Mission d'Exploration en Océanie, Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur, Secrétaire de la Société de Géographie de Paris, commandant le bataillon auxiliaire du génie de la Loire en 1870–1871. Paris: Henri Plon.

M. GARNIER'S present volume is chiefly occupied with the very interesting details of his adventurous exploration of the western coast of the island of New Caledonia, a French possession, which has

acquired of late a new, stern, and sombre importance. M. Garnier and his companions were, indeed, the pioneers of exploration in this direction, for until they ventured to encounter the whirlpools on the coast and the hostile tribes of ferocious savages who dwell in the interior, especially in the north-west portion of the island, no attempt had been made to investigate its condition or resources. The narrative is extremely interesting, and is given with vivacity and picturesqueness, too often wanting in books of travel, the writer bearing in mind the absolute novelty of his subject to his readers, and not taking for granted geographical and topographical knowledge on their part; while at the same time, he does not go into wearisome detail. The personal adventures and experiences are sufficiently dangerous, exciting, and in some instances horrible, to furnish forth a score of romances, and the accounts given of the appalling condition of the tribes suggests a most striking and effective contrast with the exquisite, brilliant, specially sunny and peaceful beauty of the country,—a sparkling gem set in the bosom of the Pacific Ocean. It may be that M. Garnier's description is overdrawn, in order to offer something that superficial readers might accept as an excuse for the atrocious cruelties practised on the wretched creatures by French sailors and soldiers, who murdered them wholesale, burning entire villages and their inhabitants,—men, women, and children,—in order to avenge an act of cannibalism. An atrocious act no doubt; but still, the deed of heathen savages, and in which only a few had any share. The wholesale destruction of the guilty and the innocent is much more like judicious colonization, than judicial retribution. It is impossible to read those stories without pain; but their interest is very vivid, and one indulges visions of the splendid future there may be in store for these islands, so wonderfully endowed by nature, when they shall have gone through the trying process to which penal settlements must necessarily be subjected: as it is, some of the celebrities of the Commune of Paris will find congenial associates among the Kanaks, and one only regrets M. Ferré was not suffered by an impatient nation to cultivate the acquaintance of Smango and his tribe. We do not remember to have read accounts of any such hideously degraded and irredeemable savages as the tribes who inhabit the wildest portions of New Caledonia, and they produce a more painful effect upon the reader's mind, because they are more intelligent than the average savages anywhere else. In the "Island of Pines," civilization, which introduced vice and disease in the first instance, and then thinned the native population as usual, has since made progress. The Church lent her beneficent irresistible aid, and now the natives are all converted. They have begun to wear clothes, they have a church, built of stone, and a school under the direction of some Sisters. This is the brightest picture which M. Garneir gives us in all his sketches of the little archipelagoes of the South, where, as in New Caledonia, the natives were all cannibals. His revelations on this dreadful subject are as surprising as they are disheartening, and support the assertion made some time ago by the *Pall Mall Gazette*, that cannibalism still flourishes to an extraordinary and unrecognized extent. A native guide, who served M. Garnier very faithfully, and who was remarkable for his good looks and intelligence, who spoke very comprehensible French, and was a

clever and indefatigable hunter and fisher, discussed the matter as follows :—

"'Why,' asked M. Garnier, 'do you eat the Kanaks, your enemies?' (His own tribe.)

"'Because,' he replied, 'a Kanak is good, as good as sow or pig.'

"I then tried to make him understand how our nation revolted against such food ; but my eloquence made no impression whatever, and I convinced myself that the sentiment of horror which we experience at the idea of eating man's flesh is entirely absent in the case of the Kanak. This chord, like many others, is wanting to his moral sense, and the only way in which he could be prevented from eating his neighbour would be by making a religious question of it, like the abstaining from meat on Friday among Catholics. A long series of objections on the part of my friend, and reasonings on my part, led to this conclusion :—

"'I understand ; you have a great deal of meat ; you make war, and you let the dead rot.'

"The people of the Isle of Pines and of Owen, my savage informed me, never ate the great personages of their tribe, even when they killed them because of old age, but he said his ancestors had always eaten those who had been slain by a chief for any misconduct ; and they also ate the children when they were ill-formed, or when the family were too numerous, or the father incapacitated by illness from fishing. When it had been decided that a child was to die, the father and mother, immediately after its birth, would carry the little creature to the edge of the sea, wash it well, and then cook it in the earth as gipsies cook hedgehogs.

"'And that did the mother a great deal of good,' added the savage, in conclusion."

To read this book is to increase the longing which reading of this kind always inspires for the time when the promise shall be fulfilled, when the heathen shall have become the inheritance of our Divine Lord, and the uttermost parts of the earth His possession.

We have not space to dwell upon the nature, extent, and result of M. Garnier's explorations. We can but indicate to readers whose tastes lie in that direction the abundant information, the varied subjects of interest, the important social facts, considerations, and suggestions, and the delightful pictures of the beauty of the earth to which M. Garnier's pages will give them access.

WE are able to inform our readers, that the "Études" will henceforth be published, not at Paris, but at Lyons ; and that one of its new editors will be F. Ramière, S.J. Our readers will remember the Holy Father's eulogistic letter to this eminent religious, of which we published a translation in April, 1870, p. 497 ; and his name is a sure guarantee, that the periodical will be unreservedly loyal in every particular to the full teaching of the Holy See. We look forward with keen interest to its new career, and anticipate from it invaluable service to the good cause.

MALTA

THE

DUBLIN REVIEW.

APRIL, 1872.

ART. I.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE RELIGION.*

The Origin and Development of Religious Belief. By S. BARING-GOULD, M.A. Part I. Heathenism and Mosaism; Part II. Christianity. London: Rivingtons.

THESE two stout octavo volumes are a contribution to the philosophy of religion by a writer previously known to the public chiefly by works of an historical or archæological character, but more or less bearing on and in a manner leading up to the subject he has here taken in hand. The application of philosophy—of a scientific method, and a reasoned knowledge of the world, God, the soul, and the phenomena of the human mind—to religion, is both the most natural outgrowth and the noblest fruit of that science. But by religion true or false we may mean either subjective religion, religiousness, or a real or supposed objective religion, a system of dogmas existing or supposed to exist objectively. Every religious system tends by its practical action to produce some corresponding form of true or false religiousness, and every conceivable form of religiousness logically requires an objective counterpart; so that as the two are necessarily connected together we must have a philosophy of both to constitute a complete philosophy of religion. The philosophy of objective religion in a Christian sense is in substance the scholastic theology, as distinguished from the historical or positive theology mingled with it in the writings of the schoolmen; the philosophy of subjective religion is an analogous application of philosophy to the religious consciousness.

By the religious consciousness of any man or set of men we mean their subjective condition with respect to religion. The

* To prevent possible misconception, it should be explained that the following article is not by the contributor of the series on Mr. Mill; and that there may be found differences between the two writers in incidental expressions, though *none* (we believe) in substantial doctrine.

religious consciousness, therefore, consists of religious feelings, religious instincts, and religious beliefs; to these may be added religious actions, including merely subjective actions—volitions—and those imperfect movements of the will which are called velleities. "Religious belief" is taken in a large sense. It will include superstitions on the one hand, things piously believed and theological opinions on the other; revealed doctrines of faith and morals, taking morals largely, so as to comprehend the counsels of perfection and whatever is necessary for the direction of the spiritual life; philosophical conclusions bound up with the framework of religion, and moral principles established through the examination of the practical reason, the ethical part of psychology. Under the head of beliefs must also be included the mental affirmation of negative propositions, and whatever stands in the stead of religious truth to those who believe in a false religion or in no religion at all. To take an example of the first case: the persistent affirmation by infidels and Protestants that certain characteristics of the Saints are not in reality features of a truly holy character will necessarily tend to have a very marked influence on their religious dispositions, while mere ignorance that they are parts of holiness would imply merely the absence of an influence in the contrary direction. To take an example of the second: a comparison of the Christian with the Manichæan account of the origin of evil will show the ethical superiority of the former. The religious beliefs present in any minds are therefore to be examined, with a view to ascertain what influence they naturally tend to exercise on each other and on the production of new beliefs, on feelings and natural or acquired instinctive predispositions, and so on the development of the faculties of the individual and the race, on social *status*, and on civilization. Do they, for instance, incline to produce what is bad, or are they in contradiction and conflict one with another, either in themselves or as to their mental effects? The tone of thought and feeling which accompanies them will also be scrutinized to discover in what manner and to what extent it is attributable to the beliefs or to other causes, such as imperfect or perfect civilization, local circumstances, and other things. The arguments by which they were successfully or unsuccessfully supported or opposed will be sifted to show what was the character of those who could accept or reject such arguments. And not only will their mutual action and natural consequences be investigated; their causes will likewise be inquired into. Are they in harmony with and therefore favoured by human nature? Are they the natural results only of an imperfect or degraded condition of *man, or are they the* symptoms and the outcome of his progress

and development? Beliefs, if we abstract from the effects of positive teaching, are generally produced by religious instincts. And by religious instincts—and mental dispositions are acquired instincts—is meant propensions, inclinations to think or act or feel in a particular way about religious matters, and therefore longings and aspirations of human nature, yearnings which it seeks to satisfy, and which being in any case unsatisfied it falls back into an abnormal condition. So that they are not the same as those moral or intellectual first principles which are sometimes called instincts. Nor are they the same as religious beliefs. To say that a religious instinct points to the existence of God is not the same thing as to say that we have an intuition that God exists; it is equivalent to the assertion that the human heart and mind seek after this, that the human conscience requires it; that therefore men have in all ages believed in the existence of God; that with this belief human nature is so far satisfied, while without it a want is left unsupplied. If such an instinct exists, the belief in God would tend to continue even though all power of reasoning on the subject were taken away from among mankind. Religious instincts may be original or acquired; they may be produced by beliefs, by habitual conduct, by other instincts, by the operation of the emotional or sensitive part of our nature, by necessities of thought or feeling; their most common and nearly always their immediate cause is to be found not in the purely intellectual part of our nature, but in the vaguer regions of sentiment, feeling, emotion. Just as there are healthy religious instincts which are the results of healthy mental action, and point to truth, so there are, e.g. in heresies, spurious religious instincts which are the result of unhealthy mental action, and point to half-truths and so to error. Religious feelings, the third element of the religious consciousness, may be produced by or eventuate in any of the other elements, and are, like instincts, examined in a manner analogous to that which has been indicated in speaking of religious beliefs. Individual actions are of no importance in the investigation; it is the motives, principles, or dispositions which they imply that are of consequence. The habitual course of action of the majority of those who have submitted themselves to any religious system is however of importance as indicating the power which that religion has over them; and the line of action countenanced by a religion is likewise of consequence on account of the tendency it will have by example to form the consciences of believers in a way conformable or the reverse with morality. Thus the presence in Catholicism of persons bound to perpetual celibacy leads to a higher *standard* of chastity. Then the course of action which

a religion tends to produce has to be examined to see whether it is beneficial or the contrary to mankind. Again, every religion except positivism and pantheism supposes the existence of beings beyond the world of sense, e.g. of God, and of human spirits in a world which is still to us future; and teaches something about their actions and their character. Is then what is taught about their actions conformable to what is taught about their character, and is it conformable to what should be taught about it? Is the denial of the intercession of those who are in heaven conformable to what is taught about their mental dispositions, and is the denial of answers to prayer conformable with what is taught about the character of God?

Such is the subject-matter of the philosophy of subjective religion; we are naturally led to speak of its methods of investigation. They are two; and the first is psychological. Religious feelings are simply the natural feelings put to a religious use and employed about a real or supposed supernatural object. But it is precisely with beliefs, feelings, instincts, that the psychologist has to do. How hope is conjoined with love, how contrition is attendant on fear, how humility is necessary to worship, and mystery accessory to religion: are psychological problems. The fear of punishment in another life is simply the ordinary passion of fear, excited by a new cause; and if we would by natural reason determine subjectively the effect on character which holding this doctrine produces, we must go to the psychologist, who has analyzed this passion, and studied the modifications it exhibits and the varying manner in which it acts under different conditions. And so in other cases; so that a psychological investigation will be indispensable to the examination of religious feelings, instincts, and beliefs; and if on referring to the writers on the phenomena of the human mind we do not find all that we might expect, this is because what Bacon calls the "axiomata media' of psychology have not as yet been adequately worked out. We must work them out for ourselves, and here a psychological training will be an advantage to us: even if we do not find in our books the exact thing we want, our books will help us to see how to find it. But even so it would be extremely unsafe to trust the whole matter to mere brain-spinning. There is, therefore, a second and historical method of investigation, the materials for which are supplied by the history of the various religions which have found a place among men. This branch of study has been of late pursued with far greater vigour and far more abundant sources of information; it has been endeavoured, by anatomizing the *religions* which have at different times been held by different *bodies of men*, to see of what elements they are composed, to

contemplate each in the light of the others, and so to form a science of comparative theology, after the analogy of such sciences as comparative anatomy and comparative psychology. Thus the philosophy of subjective religion is not merely mental and internal, it also assumes another and an historical aspect: finds out from history what forms of religion have actually been built up by human beings, how they were built up, and how they fared; and uses the knowledge thence acquired to correct or to confirm its speculations. We look without and within, and perceive that such and such religious feelings, instincts, doctrines, really exist or existed; by an examination of the laws of mental action we see how they may, and perhaps how they must, have originated; a similar examination reveals their natural tendency. We then turn to the history of religions; we ascertain how and under what circumstances these or analogous doctrines, instincts, or feelings have at various times and in various countries become prominent; we learn the course they historically took and the manner in which as a matter of fact they ended: and according to the information thus received our previous conclusions are strengthened or modified. Thus the two methods of investigation are correlative.

But what, it may be asked, is the object of this investigation? Of what use is it? What does it lead to? In the first place it is supplementary to the philosophy of objective religion. Its business is, as we have seen, to examine, analyze, and coördain, the subjective condition which any religious system tends to produce. Thus it will break up that subjective condition into its constituent parts, and then by ascertaining the laws of the parts seek synthetically to ascertain those of the formation and development of the *complexus*. It may do this from either of two points of view. It may take its stand on the truth of the Christian Revelation and investigate what is the character of the religious consciousness, or, in other words, of the subjective religious condition, which that Revelation logically implies: it will thus in great part confound itself with mystical and ascetical theology, and contribute nothing to the proof of Revelation. This first function is therefore only supplementary. But it will be scientifically more fruitful if, without assuming the truth of Christianity, it cautiously endeavours to ascertain what form of religious consciousness is the highest and the purest, and tends the most to the development of the human faculties; and correlatively with this compares with this ideal religious consciousness the subjective condition which any religion tends to produce. Thus we have a second and a critical function; for if that subjective condition is *in any particular* opposed to the ideal religious consciousness,

then in the corresponding particular that religion is false. In the same way if it falls short of that ideal, then the religion is either in development or in organic structure imperfect. And a religion must be consistent not only with the ideal religious consciousness but also with itself; for although what is self-consistent may possibly be false, what is inconsistent cannot possibly be true. The subjective condition, therefore, which a religion represents to its adherents to be the type to which they are to conform must be at once the very type to which its doctrines and its morals of themselves point, and the form of character which would be most capable of enjoying the kind of happiness which it teaches to be that of the life to come. And this type must contain in itself no contradiction. The different elements of the religious consciousness which is proper to the religion—the doctrines and the moral principles, the instincts and the feelings,—must not be subjectively antagonistic one to another, but be of such a nature as harmoniously to combine, not to warp and distort, but to purify and elevate human nature. The form of the religious consciousness must be congruous with its matter; that is to say, the beliefs and feelings which a person is required to have respecting the rule of faith must not be such that any mental or moral inconsistency is implied by his holding the doctrines and being penetrated by the spirit of the rest of the religion. Again, if a religion has but little hold on those who really submit themselves to its influence, or if it be so constituted as to gain a footing only with the refined or only with the coarse, only with men or only with women, only with the barbarian or only with the child of civilization or with a certain race, it is deficient in power; it is not adapted for humanity. It may be put on one side; it will not work. Here we have so many canons of criticism; examples of the employment of most of them will be given in the following pages. And if it can be proved that the religious consciousness harmoniously developed points only to what is objectively good and true—as it can be proved under certain limitations—the philosophy of subjective religion will assume also a third and constructive function.—It will therefore analyze heresies and false religions subjectively as scholasticism analyzes them objectively: and its object will be to perfect, to confirm, and if need be to correct the philosophy of objective religion, by which it will be in turn supplemented and confirmed or corrected. Thus each side of the philosophy of religion will be complementary to the other, while both will be subordinate to and will confirm the teachings of the Church, which receive also an independent *verification* from the researches of positive or historical *theology.*

Before examining the evidence for the fundamental principle of what we have called the constructive function—the principle that the religious consciousness harmoniously developed points only to what is true—it will be convenient to explain what is the idea and general execution of the volumes before us. And after the preceding elucidations our meaning will be perfectly understood when we say that they are exclusively devoted to the subjective side of the philosophy of religion, by an appeal to which the author hopes to give new strength to Christianity; for he holds the opinion, which is sufficiently common among Protestants, and will no doubt become more common as time goes on, that the historical evidences are insufficient to prove the Christian religion.* He begins by telling us that he does not assume the truth of any form of religion, but the conclusion of his labours will be found to prove that of Christianity.† The conclusion of his labours, however, is a curious mixture of Catholic doctrine with German philosophy and the peculiar notions of the extreme High Church party.‡ That he employs the philosophy of subjective religion not only critically but constructively, is implied in the very object of his work, which is to prove thereby the truth of Christianity. He consequently maintains that the religious consciousness properly developed cannot lead astray, and the first two chapters § are devoted to an attempt to establish this principle on a basis of physical science. He exaggerates the sphere of its application, for in the next chapter ‖ he applies it to prove the existence of a Deity; and he also exaggerates its power, for he imagines it to be of itself adequate to support the fabric of religion. Hitherto, he informs us,¶ Christianity has at least professed to lean on the authority of an infallible text or an infallible Church. These props have fallen to the ground, but we need not for that reason despair, for we possess a revelation in our own nature, and to be guided aright have but to follow the religious instincts of humanity.** They are to be investigated historically and psychologically, and according to the Hegelian method.†† In

* He devotes a chapter to an endeavour to show this by means of the usual infidel arguments (vol. ii. pp. 128–147); he also denies that reason can give any proof of the existence of God (vol. ii. p. 14). This is to dig up the foundations.

† Vol. i. p. xv.

‡ Catholicism alone is capable of reformation, but it must first rid itself of the spiritual autocracy of the Roman Pontiff (vol. ii. p. 382). It is our only hope that some Pontiff will lead the Church of Rome under Caudine Forks, whence there is no escape but by humiliation (vol. ii. p. 386). Then reunion will take place (vol. ii. p. 385).

§ Vol. i. pp. 1–54. ‖ Vol. i. pp. 55-69. ¶ Vol. ii. pp. vii.–x.

** Vol. ii. p. xi. †† Vol. ii. p. 375.

the first volume, then, he hopes, by thus discussing Mosaism and heathenism—the first volume is by far the better of the two, and its excellence lies chiefly in the treatment of heathenism, for about Mosaism * there is very little, and that little not of much account—to show what are the religious instincts of humanity; and in the second to prove that Christianity by its universal postulate—the Incarnation, from which he asserts that every Christian doctrine must be proved, otherwise it is not a Christian doctrine †—assumes to meet, and does meet all these instincts; and how failure is due to accidental counteracting causes.‡ But § in anticipation of hostile criticism from certain religious publications, which have agreed to denounce him as a gross materialist, a thorough rationalist, and an undisguised infidel, he protests that he has not undertaken, especially with regard to the atonement and immortality, to give an exhaustive account of religious dogma; he has only opened out a new path which others more able may follow. He in no way denies the inspiration of Holy Scripture when he disputes the cogency of the evidence it affords, and where heterodoxy has been suspected by superficial critics the fact merely is, that through necessary imperfection of treatment certain aspects of truth have been brought into special prominence, while others have been—not contradicted, but—left untouched, and to be drawn out by future writers.

This naturally leads us to speak of the general manner in which he has treated the subject he has thus conceived. One of the characteristics of an antiquarian turn of mind—and not an unnatural one, seeing that antiquarianism is mostly curiosity—appears to be a tendency to be run away with by details, and to expatiate on and heap up quotations regarding them, to an extent out of all proportion to limits. This disposition, with a love of excursus and illustration and a habit of recapitulating what has been said before and announcing what will be said hereafter, is continually manifested in the volumes before us: it is necessarily detrimental to the unity of the book, and diminishes the pleasure, and the facility, with which we follow the thread of the argument. These defects might have been obviated by a little self-denial and a more liberal use of footnotes. However, the extent and variety of his reading are thus shown the more by the out-of-the-way facts adduced, and the multitude of very different writers quoted or referred to. To take a few examples: we have the lives of the saints, voyages and travels and accounts of barbarous nations in abundance;

---

* *The theological* side of Jewish history.
† *Vol. ii. p. 374*, &c. ‡ Vol. i. p. xvi. § Vol. ii. p. ix.

periodicals, as the "Church Times," and, *e converso*, the "Westminster Review"; the Fathers, the Vedas, the Bible, the Koran, and the Northern Sagas; S. Augustine, Feuerbach, Balmez, Comte, Hamilton, and Dr. Carpenter's "Introduction to the Study of the Foraminifera"; but—not the schoolmen, although the earlier ones especially would have given him some excellent hints. In this way he not unfrequently groups together valuable facts, or introduces us to very strange neighbourhoods, where we may hear, if not what is to edification, at least what may serve to enlighten us as to the real character of the inhabitants.* So that the book is very interesting read-

* We may some of us be thus enlightened about the character of a certain form of modern infidelity—which will spread as infidelity descends among the masses—by the citations from the writings of divers infidels collected in the following passage. Mr. Baring-Gould had previously been showing that Protestantism is a principle of contradiction, setting up one truth in opposition to another, and so a principle of negation:—"The successors of these schismatics—the word exactly expresses their character of dividers—are those who elevate schism or opposition into the only realities. We know nothing to be true," says Bruno Bauer, "but that negation is universal."* "Negation is eternal," says Proudhon,† as the fundamental principle and conclusion of his philosophy. "The grandeur of human nature," observes M. Renan, "consists in contradiction."‡ "Contradiction is the sign of truth."§ This doctrine has been applied to every branch of science, to history, politics, and social economy. It has been applied to God Himself. "God," says M. Vacherot, "is man's shadow projected into heaven." "We adore the great, the all-powerful Negation," is the religion of Feuerbach.‖ This negation in its concrete form is evil, impiety, hatred of God, horror of men. It is what the Christian calls Satan, the personification and principle of division, that "spirit of contradiction" which Faust bids "lead the way" to utter ruin and annihilation. "Adversary of the eternal," exclaims M. Proudhon, "be on my side, Satan, whoever you may be, I will take your word and ask for nothing more."¶ "Come, Satan, come,** the calumniated of priests and kings, that I may embrace you, that I may clasp you to my breast. I have known you for long, and you have known me. Your works, O blessed of my heart! are not always beautiful and good, but they alone give us a knowledge of the universe, and prevent it from being an absurdity. Without you, what would justice be?—an instinct; reason?—a routine; man?—a beast. You alone animate and fecundate toil; you ennoble wealth, you excuse authority, you place the seal on virtue. Hope on, proscribed one! I have only my pen to place at your service, but it is worth millions of bulletins." (Vol. ii. pp. 181, 182.) Similar demoniacal ravings may be found quoted in the succeeding pages; e.g. "Let us drive the Eternal Father back into His own heaven; His presence among us hangs on a thread"; "the Revolution does not mince matters with the Deity," &c.

* Bauer, "Critique des Evangiles Synoptiques" (Preface).
† Proudhon, "Révolution Sociale."
‡ Renan, "Études sur le Poëme de Job," p. 62.
§ *Ib.* p. 67.
‖ Feuerbach, "Das Wesen der Religion."
¶ "La Révolution au 17^me^ Siècle."
** "De la Justice dans la Révolution," étude 8, c. 5, sect. 42.

ing after all; the more so that the information thus made to converge from sources so various is presented and commented on in a clear, graphic, and incisive style, and enlivened here and there by a more than usually striking anecdote. But occasionally the apparent lucidity of the style itself, which is often French and even epigrammatic in its character, appears, as is not unfrequently the case, to have persuaded even the author himself that he has said something very acute or very profound, when in reality he has only lost himself in the vague, or enunciated a fallacy or a truism. We say, the *apparent* lucidity; for an undercurrent of figured language well adapted for popular but very ill for scientific purposes, is perceptible throughout; and while the clauses are brief, the syntax clear, the words such as are in common use, and the meaning brought out by illustrations, we not unfrequently find, on endeavouring to combine one passage with another, that there is a vacillation in the meaning itself, and a shiftiness and uncertainty in the signification attached to the words by which it is sought to convey it. A poetical and metaphorical colouring, which is supported by great command of language and happiness of expression, sometimes tempts us to believe that the metaphor is taken for the letter, poetry for science. From the number and very diverse nature of the books which our author has published, some idea may be formed of his fertility of conception and facility of composition, while we find also a certain crudeness and want of combination of ideas which tend to accompany these admirable qualities. Those who have read his "Curious Myths of the Middle Ages" will also have remarked that along with great analytical power and large and varied reading, a certain hardiness and rashness of thought was from time to time evinced by the explanations of legends there given. And he has almost a habit of putting things in an odd way, and using words in unaccustomed senses: which is certainly sufficiently startling to the reader, but will not facilitate the reception of what is true in what he enunciates.

No one will be astonished to learn that the dogmatic license shown respecting the evidences of Christianity is manifested also in the religious conclusions arrived at in the course of the book. To judge even from his devotional works, Mr. Baring-Gould permits himself a very large amount of dogmatic license; and this doubtless arises in part from imperfectly controlled originality, and the love of novelty which so often accompanies, flatters, and stimulates originality; in part from a very varied reading, and in part from his having been guided in many of his conclusions by an influence which has naturally tinged, and *tainted, the conclusions* themselves—the influence of the Hege-

lian philosophy. Another circumstance deserves also to be noticed. When any one engages in the study of a science in which differences of opinion exist, it often happens that he is asked, and very judiciously, to confine himself at first to some one set of opinions and get them well into his head. If he does not do so, his knowledge will in all probability always remain sketchy and incomplete; he will never know what precisely he possesses and what he needs; he will be unstable and eccentric; though he will probably be clever, for those who are not so do not usually attempt eclecticism. But if he does take up even a defective system, he will at least get to know the advantage of a system as such; he will gain a general view of the science, and be possessed of a framework on which he may build, or which, as the result of more mature investigation, he may modify. This is especially important in a research so delicate and intricate as that which our author has undertaken; and scholasticism is the most reasoned form into which any religion has ever been thrown. In examining what doctrines are pointed to by the religious instincts of humanity, it was therefore, we conceive, incumbent on him thus to take up the scholastic theology—e.g. in the form in which it is found in the later writers, who give a conspectus and analysis of the opinions of the rest. But he only four or five times refers to the schoolmen, and it is evident on the face of the book that he has made no serious study of their system: by which much of the license and eccentricity displayed may be accounted for.

Instances of these features in the treatment of the subject will come before us as we proceed; we have now to examine the evidence for the fundamental principle that the religious consciousness properly developed cannot lead wrong. In the first place, then, Mr. Baring-Gould shall state that principle in his own words:—

> The religious sentiment is the feeling of man after an aim other than that of his individual nature. That such a feeling should exist is a fairly presumable proof that it is not illusive. What we call instinct is a desire to follow out a law of our being, and the object of all law is the happiness of the creature. In tracing the religious instincts of humanity we are tracing the working out of the law of its well-being. Whenever a religious instinct appears it must be noted, for it is the voice of the spiritual nature clamouring for food necessary to its life and perfection. Wherever a religious instinct leads awrong, it is not that the instinct is wrong, but that it runs counter to or overrides correlative instincts. When man has pursued one instinct across and athwart other instincts, which it tramples down in its fanaticism, he errs through exaggeration.
>
> When a religious instinct produces error—that is, when religion becomes superstition—there is something wrong in its organization. There is an

undue preponderance given to this truth, and there is a forgetfulness of that truth. Every phase of religion the world has yet seen has broken down through exaggeration of one truth at the expense of another.

The history of religious experiments [i. e. false religions] is exceedingly instructive, for it shows us, first, what are the religious instincts of humanity, and secondly, failure, through imperfect co-ordination of these instincts. A review of the religions of the world will show us of what nature that religion must be which alone will satisfy humanity—a religion in which those inherent tendencies of the mind and soul which produced Fetishism, anthropomorphism, polytheism, monotheism, spiritualism, idealism, positivism, will find their co-ordinate expression; a religion in which all the sacred systems of humanity may meet, as in a Field of the Cloth of Gold, to adorn it with their piety, their mysticism, their mythology [!], their subtlety of thought, their splendour of ceremonial, their adaptability to progress, their elasticity of organization—and meeting may exhaust their own resources—

> "By this to sicken their estates, that never
> They shall abound as formerly." *

Fundamentally, then, the principle is simply this:—If there is a religious longing, a yearning in human nature, which has

---

* The passage is very incautiously worded; and the statement that all religions have doctrinally failed is simply heterodox. "The history of Mosaism," he says in another place (i. 227) "is one of utter failure. It never took firm hold of the Jew till it was resolved into a complicated network of ceremonial." But it may well seem to a Tractarian that all religions have failed. A religion, again, *resolved into* ceremonial would simply be no religion at all, so that the *expression* is obviously inaccurate. But the ceremonial was added to the theistic basis only in the desert, and so after the Exodus, before which the Jews had evidently been given over to idolatry (Lev. xvii. 7, Ezek. xx. etc.) The assertion that Mosaism was an utter failure reposes on a false conception of the object of Mosaism, which was, to be our schoolmaster to lead us to Christ. The latter part of the passage quoted in the text is to be understood of eclecticism, not of syncretism; for the meaning of the writer is only, as we learn from other passages, that the scattered rays of truth contained by heresies and false religions, rays which have grown together into errors through the absence of other truths with which they ought to have been combined, may be fused into a higher unity which will express what the true religion teaches; and he consequently has a chapter (Catholicism, ii. 148–166) in which he shows that Catholicism is such a synthesis, succeeded by another (Protestantism, ii. 167–190) in which he shows that Protestantism is a mere setting up of one half-truth in opposition to another—a systematization of contradiction. It is objected to the Church that her images are like idols, and her saints like the gods of the heathen; but it is a capital error in the philosophy of religion to suppose that the true religion must be utterly diverse from all that the natural instincts of men have suggested in religion; it must on the contrary present the type at which they have aimed. This is well brought out in Newman's article on Milman's "Church History," reprinted in his recent volume of "Essays." *An isolated* religion, as deism and to a large extent Protestantism is isolated, *carries on its forehead the* stamp of its falsehood.

always shown itself, which is continually showing itself, which is bound up as it were with our being, is clouded by evil but grows with the growth of goodness in a man, rises with his rise, falls with his fall: then, if rightly interpreted, it points not to falsehood but to truth. The foundation of religious knowledge is not only the mere intelligence, but likewise the "understanding heart" so beautifully spoken of by Holy Scripture. Hence it is that we attach to the utterances of good men respecting religion a weight disproportioned to their learning; hence the Church regards the holding of false doctrine as a bar to canonization. "Impossibile est," says S. Thomas, "naturæ desiderium esse inane"; in virtue of the same principle alone can we reason to the immortality of the soul from the instinct of immortality, and in the same way Scotus argues that God is infinite because no finite good can satisfy the capacity of the human heart.* It is more to the purpose, therefore, to bring forward testimonies respecting the "anima naturaliter Christiana" borne by those who are not Catholics. Auguste Comte's "Traité de Politique Positive" and his "Catéchisme du Positivisme" are neither more nor less than an elaborate confession of the fact that it is necessary to enlist the whole man in favour of a scheme which embraces all nature. So sober-minded a writer as Moses Stuart† adheres also to this position, fanciful though it may be deemed by some :—

> Why should reason undertake to deny that there is an order of angelic beings? I have a claim to ask the question with an open face, because almost all nations, certainly all the leading ones of the heathen world, have fallen upon the belief of intermediate beings between man and the Great Supreme. The Dii Minores among the Latins and Greeks, the multitudes of inferior gods among the Egyptians, the Amshashpands and Izeds and Defs among the Persians, the innumerable subordinate deities among the Hindoos and other nations, all prove the proneness of the human mind to receive the doctrine of intermediate beings between man and the Supreme Divinity. I cannot easily be brought to believe that the original wants, or longings, or desires of the human mind, thus manifested, have not some ultimate object in view which is substantial and real. Men may make a thousand mistakes

* "Contra Gentes," l. ii. c. 55, arg. 12; Liberatore, "Psychologia," § 78; Scotus, in i. sent. d. 3, q. 2, § *Tertia via.* Cf. Wadding's note. The *appetitus naturalis beatitudinis* of Scotus will in its full sense have to be restricted to those *in via* and capable of sin, in whom it may be regarded as a *præparatio positiva ad beatitudinem*, in order to apply to the common opinion as to the abstractive vision of infants dying without baptism. In them, if the opinion of Scotus, which the present writer personally believes to be true, is to stand, it will have to be held, according to that opinion, that this *appetitus*, which is obviously developed by the life *in via*, is in these infants undeveloped fully.

† Article on Angelology, in the "Bibliotheca Sacra" for 1843.

about manner and minute particulars. But the religiousness of our nature was not implanted in vain. Nor would it ever deceive us provided our passions were kept in due subjection.

The same principle is thus briefly indicated by Reid:—"As far as the intention of nature appears in the constitution of man, we ought to comply with that intention, and act agreeably to it." ("Active Powers," Essay V. c. i. sect. i.) This would be irrational did not our whole nature, and not its intellectual part alone, lead us to truth. The same position is taken up by Dr. Mozley in his able lectures on miracles, and in the Hegelian schools the extent to which it is adhered to is the measure of the extent to which theism or atheism prevails. (Morell, "History of Philosophy," vol. ii. pp. 198–202.)

We proceed to examine the evidence by which it is supported. The first argument shall be the inductive argument from physical science relied on by our author. There are, he begins by saying, four planes of existence known to us, namely, those of elementary existence, chemical compounds or minerals, vegetable life, and animal life. Force manifests itself in a variety of forms, but is in all fundamentally the same. It is the special prerogative of the force of chemical affinity to lift matter from plane 1 to plane 2, and of vegetative and animal force respectively to elevate it from planes 2 or 3 to 3 or 4. In chemical affinity the material substance chooses from among the others those which will concur to form a certain compound; and inherent in the primordial cell of every organism is a force which builds matter into machines of singular complexity for a fixed, manifest, and apparently predetermined object—the preservation and perfection of the individual, and the continuance of the species. In the plant we see the consciousness balancing exactly the necessities of its being. In order that it may come to perfection it requires a certain number of chemical substances, and these it has the power to select from the earth and the air. Sensation is the lowest form of mental life; and to the animal is given a stimulus which is not possessed by the plant. This is the sensation of pleasure, when it does that which conduces to its perfect development, and of pain, when it does that which is contrary to it. Now the perfection of an organism is in proportion as the different functions are discharged by different parts; and in all except the lowest animals a special system, the nervous system, is set apart as the organ of the organizing force. Consequently, animals are more perfect in proportion to the perfection of the nervous system; *and the* special part of the nervous system which is a store-*house of this force* is the cerebral hemispheres. So that in

animals not possessed of cerebral hemispheres every impression through a sense produces a corresponding muscular discharge: it passes on as muscular action because force can no more be annihilated than matter, and there is nowhere to store it up. But in man and the brute which has cerebral hemispheres this force need not necessarily be at once employed in muscular action. It may be stored up in the form of ideas. But the same law holds. The ideas, instincts, feelings, which are assimilated by the mind of the brute are those alone which will conduce to its material development; it is insensible to all others. A horse is indifferent to the rainbow, because the rainbow in no way affects its well-being. The cat has a sense of smell, but this sense is graduated strictly by what is to it useful: the mouse is sweeter to it than the rose. The brute, like a collodionized plate, registers only one class of phenomena. But man is awake to pleasures beyond the circle of those which have to do with his material well-being, — to the good, the beautiful, and the true. He is conscious of instincts which the gratification of passion does not satisfy, and while he feels the animal instincts, he feels also other instincts and pleasures which are even in conflict with them or have nothing to do with them, as the beauty of colours and the harmony of notes. Here then is a dynamic force which urges him to some point, and as the instincts which stimulate the other orders of being are solid and trustworthy, he has good ground for believing that these higher instincts of his nature point to something objective and real, to something necessarily beyond the sphere of his earthly existence.

That this argument has force we admit; we cannot admit that it is demonstrative. This much however is true, that if the human instincts were deceptive, they would be contrary to the analogy of all instincts and of everything approaching to instinct with which we are acquainted. The reasoning would be of greater power could we assume the argument from design, and say, certain instincts have been implanted in our nature, therefore they point to something; but as Mr. Baring-Gould intends to use them to prove the existence of God, this could not be done without a *petitio principii*. If, therefore, we are so to use them, we must look for some other proof, and such proof may seem to be given by the principles of the Reidian philosophy.

We shall proceed to consider it, for it will throw light on our subject. This philosophy postulates that we must accept certain first principles, axioms, intuitions,—call them what you will. If you ask why you must do so, a Reidian will tell you simply that *you* must; if you retort that you won't, he will

calmly reply that you cannot help yourself, and have not the option: and if you implore at least some reason why you should accept them, he will probably observe that as you already believe these first principles just as much as he does, and as reasons are for people who deny what they are intended to prove, reasons would in your case be quite *de luxe*, and he therefore respectfully declines to give you any. But, you may reply, I know very well that by the constitution of my nature I am obliged to believe that, e. g., two and two make four; but this belief is no warrant of objective truth, for my nature may deceive me. What you are saying, he will reply, has no signification whatsoever, although the words are grammatically put together; it is as if you were to say that the same thing is and is not at the same time. Either half of that statement has by itself an intelligible meaning; but it is absolutely meaningless as a whole, for *is* has no signification whatever except as exclusive of *is not*. Now when you say, I believe this or that, the only meaning that the expression can have in your mouth is, I believe it to be objectively true; and it is only by a subsequent and reflex act that you pass on to consider your subjective state, and say, I believe that I believe it. When, therefore, you add, but I do not know whether it is true or not, the second statement simply sublates the assertion made in the first, so that there is no meaning left in what you say. The things you are fighting against, he may add, are part of your nature. And he may further proceed to argue that if we are to accept certain first principles because they are part of our nature, then by the same rule we must accept any instincts, yearnings, propensions which are part of it. *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.* And if it be said that we may throw off these instincts and disbelieve the conclusions to which they point, it is to be observed on the one hand that we do not set aside the instinct but endeavour to satisfy it in some other than its natural way, and on the other that even purely intellectual first principles may for a time be set aside in imagination, and that there is in memory an infinity of degrees of mental adherence. If the religious instincts were first principles, this reasoning would have a considerable force at least with those who accept the Reidian philosophy. But nothing can be adjudged to be a first principle if it can be accounted for by the laws of association of ideas or other general laws of mental action. We shall see presently that these instincts can be thus accounted for. But even so, supposing them to arise naturally in a healthy mind, how they arose is one thing, and what was the intention of nature in producing them is quite another.

However, whatever may be the weight of this argument, it is

plain that it will be greatly increased by turning it another way, and making the existence of God not a conclusion from it, but a part of it. For then it can be argued that not only the intellect but the whole of human nature is from God, and that therefore it cannot be the natural tendency of any part of it to deceive. Or, again, we may reach the same conclusion in another manner by reasoning from the end of creation, that the world is but a vast organization for salvation, and that not only do the lower orders of things in the universe subserve the higher, but they were created to do so. To this end, therefore, every part of the universe was fashioned, so that there is not a faculty in human nature, not a power in body or soul but was originally framed with a view to it. If there is a revelation, there must be beings to receive it, and between it and them there must be a mutual adaptation, otherwise it would not be a revelation fitted for them. We rightly regard a revelation beyond that which is given to us in nature as intended to supply what nature has left defective; and we have, not intellectual wants only, but likewise moral wants and instinctive yearnings and feelings and emotions, which lack in nature an adequate object. And if these wants and longings are to be satisfied they must be satisfied by what goes beyond nature indeed, but still harmonizes with it; there must be a unity in the divine dispensations. But if, rightly interpreted, they are satisfied by religion when it is present, and thus the religious consciousness rightly developed points only to what it true: then they will also yearn after it when it is absent, and heathenism and whatever inchoate and distorted religions there may be, will through all their aberrations foreshadow Christianity. Hence also, on the one hand, if any religious system be propounded to which human nature in its entirety cannot faithfully and healthfully respond, that system is so far false; and on the other the highest Christian development is also the highest natural development of man; for otherwise the supernatural would not only not help out the natural and civil order, but would thwart and distort it.

This same fundamental principle of the constructive function of the philosophy of subjective religion recommends itself to us by two *à posteriori* considerations. The first will be explained by a passage from one of Dr. Newman's writings. Speaking of the manner in which judgments on things of faith are formed, he entirely denies, as any one building on facts must deny, that they are altogether founded on a series of explicit examinations of the evidence by the speculative reason:* and

* Let us imagine a being entirely devoid of feelings, instincts, and mental predispositions, endowed with a high degree of intellectual power with this exception, that he possesses no idea of moral good or evil, beauty or deformity.

this can be *justified* only by the fact that our whole nature, and not only the speculative portion of it, is a guide to truth.

He never forgets what he once knows; his ideas are always clear and distinct, and always within call; his acceptance of a conclusion is always accompanied by an exact knowledge and appreciation in detail of the several *data* on which it rests and of the arguments against it; but he has no moral faculties, and no tastes. Now by the speculative reason we mean the reason acting apart from feeling and instinct, and not considering moral principles; the reason operating for the time as it would always operate in such a being as this, in whom these parts of our nature would have no existence. By the evidence we consequently here mean the evidence by which and by which alone such a being would necessarily be guided, and by explicit examination of the evidence we mean the exercise on it of what has been termed explicit thought (on which subject see the DUBLIN REVIEW for October, 1869). Our own mental operations, however, differ in two particulars from those of such a being as we have here imagined. In the first place we receive as evidence much that he would fail to recognize as such. To him the argument for our Lord's divine mission derived from the ethical beauty of His character would appear to be nothing but an unmeaning jumble of words; he would not be moved a whit by the argument for religion that it supplies other than intellectual wants; the argument for the Incarnation, that by it alone can the Ideal of the intelligence and the Ideal of the heart be united in one, would for him have no significance whatever; and while he would appreciate the value of the argument from design, he would fail to see any force in the ethical argument for the existence of God. But what he would reject is evidence to us; and if the fundamental principle we have been considering in the text is true, it is evidence not only in practice, to the sentiment, and subjectively, but objectively and in reality. So that we have not to say, I receive religion because it answers to the yearnings and longings of human nature, although I know that the evidence for it is insufficient; on the contrary, the response it gives to the wants of nature, the very fact that it is the objective complement of the harmoniously developed religious consciousness, is itself a real part of the evidence of its truth. What we practically act on as evidence of our religion is evidence in reality.

The second difference between us and this being is that we frequently proceed by what has been termed implicit thought, as, to take an example, when we recognize a friend in the street without being able convincingly to explain what the particulars are by which we know that it is not some one else whom, we are told, we are mistaking for him. We are here guided by a number of general impressions accompanied by some distinct and well-remembered details: and this is precisely what we feel to be the case when we try to explain the grounds of our religious convictions. We cannot adequately explain them any more than we can put into words the reasons why we know it is our friend. But it is where our thought is not dissected into its elements, where we look at things in the gross and feel more than we can say, that we are most influenced by mental and moral predispositions; and therefore an objection is liable to be made by the Rationalist that believers are convinced of the truth of Christianity because their feelings have coloured the arguments. The principle, however, which we have called the fundamental principle of the constructive function of the philosophy of subjective religion justifies the influence of good mental and moral predispositions on religious implicit thought; so that, for instance, a religious man who, in spite of an infidel education, has become a Christian, need have no fear of the truth of *Christianity because* he was impelled to it by the religiousness of his nature, *since, that it is* conformable to the religiousness of human nature, is only *another proof of its truth.*

And the universal procedure of human beings supposes this. Dr. Newman says:—

"It is commonly and truly said, that faith is a test of a man's heart. Now what does this really mean, but that it shows what he thinks likely? And what he thinks likely depends surely on nothing else but the general state of his mind, the state of his convictions, feelings, tastes, and wishes. A fact is asserted, and is thereby proposed to the acceptance or rejection of those who hear it. Each hearer will have his own view concerning it, prior to the evidence; this view will result from the character of his mind; nor will it commonly be reversed by any ordinary variation in the evidence. If he is indisposed to believe, he will explain away very strong evidence; if he is disposed to believe, he will accept very weak evidence. That the evidence is something, but not everything; that it tells a certain way, but might be more; he will hold in either case: but then follows the question, what is to become of the evidence, being what it is, and this he decides according to (what is called) the state of his heart. . . . . This is the way in which judgments are commonly formed respecting facts alleged in political and social matters, and for the same reason, because it cannot be helped." Nor (he goes on) is it unsafe in religion to act on the dictates of a religious mind; that is, in other words, a harmoniously-developed religious consciousness leads right. Goodness will fill the place of learning. Nor will the objection of infidels hold good; for they are led to interpret the evidence by the state of their minds and against Christianity, just as much as we interpret it by the state of our minds and for Christianity. The question therefore is whether the state of an infidel or of a good Christian is best. And if the infidel says, I will judge the matter solely by the aid of pure intelligence, it is mere claptrap, a *jeu d'imagination* to impose on himself or other persons without introspectiveness; he is biassed by his previous life and habits of thought. Dr. Newman concludes: "Let us take things as we find them; let us not endeavour to distort them into what they are not. True philosophy deals with facts. We cannot make facts. All our wishing cannot change them. We must use them. If revelation has always been offered to mankind in one way, it is in vain to say that it ought to have come to us in another. If children, if the poor, if the busy, can have true faith, yet cannot weigh evidence, evidence is not the simple foundation on which faith is built. If the great bulk of serious men believe, not because they have examined evidence, but because they are disposed in a certain way, this must be God's order of things. Let us attempt to understand it. Let us not disguise it, or explain it away. It may have difficulties; if so, let us own them. Let us fairly meet them: if we can, let us overcome them."—("Sermons on Religious Belief," Serm. XI.)

On examining our beliefs with reference to the extent to which they have been produced by mere reasoning alone, we find that they divide themselves into two well-marked classes. The first comprehends what we hold on, e.g., mathematical and *physical subjects;* the most prominent members of the second are

our convictions in matters of religion. A proposition in geometry or mineralogy does not excite the feelings; they slumber, and leave it to be decided by the pure intelligence which alone it stimulates; but it is of the essence of religion to arouse the feelings and the heart, and these once brought powerfully into action, necessarily sway us strongly either one way or the other. So that the fact practically is, that religious belief is and must be formed and sustained not by the influences arising out of any one department of ourselves, but by the whole of what we have denominated the religious consciousness. But the religious consciousness of any man is formed by the sum of the influences of the society in which he lives. And therefore the Catholic principle of teaching and sustaining religion, not by the mere perusal of a book or the exercise of intellectual judgment, but by a society, which acts on the individual in a thousand indefinable ways, is the only logical method of effecting this purpose; and that the foundation of this method be logical it is required that the society be infallible. On the other hand, the opposed principle of private judgment falls into either of two contradictions; for either it must be held that the person exercising it is to be led by the whole of his nature into truth, which presupposes that his whole nature has been toned into harmony with the truths to be assimilated, which again presupposes that he is not only already a member of a society which sets forth the truth, but also that he has fully submitted himself to its influence; or it must be held that the judgment is to be purely intellectual, and then the man must carefully prevent his religion from ever affecting his heart, for otherwise he will certainly be biassed by his feelings; and this would eviscerate religion, and reduce it to the level of a mere speculative philosophy.*

The second consideration is that this principle is of extreme value as setting forth in a clear light the great fact that religion is for the whole man. All our nature is to be saved, and not only certain select parts of it; all that we can believe or do is built on what we are; the adaptation of our nature to religion is only in order that religion may appeal to our whole nature. The fundamental error of that spiritual religion falsely so called,

---

* In this connexion Mr. Lecky's Preface to his "History of Rationalism" is well worth reading. Reasoning from the principle of private judgment he rightly infers (vol. ii. p. 100) that it is wrong to teach children more than the least possible amount of religion. And what they are taught should, he justly adds, be made to rest as lightly on them as possible, since otherwise *they* will of course be biassed in after-life when they come to be able to *exercise private judgment*. Thus the form of the religious consciousness is *in Protestantism* logically incompatible with its matter.

—better denominated idealism in religion—which so poisons the atmosphere of the present day, is that it appeals to men not as men, but as refined, educated, intelligent men, far above the common herd who require an element of superstition in their belief. It is a half-truth; it errs—just as the so-called evangelicalism which, with its narrow views, its irrational doctrines, and its sensational preaching, dominates another class, errs on the opposite side—in appealing not to the whole of our constitution, but to a part of it which, from the nature of their avocations, cannot be developed in the great multitude of mankind. Vague viewy sentimentalism can never be the religious food of the body of a people; and rationalism soon makes an end of dogmas which idealism in religion has deprived of their substance and precision, and sublimated into thin and fleeting shadows. But rationalism again sins by appealing to reason alone, instead of to the fulness of human nature. The rationalist pure and simple rejects all that does not appeal to mere intellect taken by itself, however deeply it may interest other parts of our constitution; he also, therefore, takes a narrow and contracted view, and cannot comprehend within the circle of his vision the whole nature of man; and therefore human nature rises up against him, and his speculations are unable permanently to stand. The Catholic religion alone is a religion of human nature. It is Catholic also in this, that it appeals to the entirety of human nature. It does not ask man to accept it as responding to his wants as an intellectual being only; not solely as a moral being, nor solely as an emotional being; not merely as a spiritual being, nor yet purely as a material being; but as a man. Indeed, a religion which embraces the whole nature of man, and so has something to be laid hold of by each part, is alone truly a *religion*. It alone can bind man to God; other religions may seek so to bind *somewhat of man;* but they cannot bind *man*.

Thus far of the proof of the fundamental principle that the religious consciousness harmoniously developed leads right; but though we have got the principle we still lack matter on which it may work. To supply ourselves with this matter we consequently turn to the examination of religious instincts; for if such instincts are developed in the mind as it is itself developed, there must be feelings from which they spring, and beliefs to which they tend, and actions which they prompt. These instincts, then, may belong to either of two classes; they may be either secondarily or primarily religious. It would be lamentably inadequate merely to say vaguely that there are religious instincts; it is necessary to specify in detail *what religious* instincts there are. The secondarily

religious instincts are innumerable; they are simply healthy mental predispositions which will be applied to religion just as they would be applied to anything else whatever existing in the mind, but which would not of themselves produce a religion. They need, therefore, a core of religion on which to act, and this core must be supplied by instincts primarily religious. They will, along with feelings and beliefs, tend to develop this nucleus into a religious system, and consequently Mr. Baring-Gould has two chapters,* which we cannot here pause to consider, on dogmatic development or evolution, which is necessarily an integral part of his theory. The primarily religious instincts on which this process of development operates he defines† to be instincts urging man to pleasures unconnected with his material well-being. Now that there are such instincts (or whatever we may choose to call them) in human nature will not be denied. But the question immediately arises, what is the point to which they in reality urge us? To this question two answers have been given. The first is that they impel us to an individual perfection in another state of existence, and that they are therefore truly and properly religious instincts. The second, the positivist answer, is that they are not religious at all, but point only to a future earthly perfection of the human species; that the good of the race is the only ultimate standard of right and wrong; and that moral discipline consists in cultivating the utmost possible repugnance toward all conduct injurious to the general well-being:—a proposition very excellent when put forward as a conclusion, but impossible to establish as a first principle of action. Our author thus attacks the second answer in order to establish the first:—

> Intellectual development necessarily leads to a deterioration of the *physique* of the species; high civilization introduces a multitude of disorders unknown to savage life; and such deterioration must end in the extinction of the race. In a simple and barbarous state of society the weak and deformed die as children. Civilization tends to accumulate and propagate disease and malformation; for science, and the attention which in a cultivated race can be bestowed on the infirm, keep the diseased and deformed alive, and suffer them to breed and spread their disorder and malformation through generations of children. In savage life the process of natural selection tends to raise the type of man, the inferior types dying out; but civilized life prevents the operation of this natural law, and therefore tends to the deterioration of the race.

---

* Vol. i. pp. 107–134, and vol. ii. pp. 360–388.

† Vol. i. chap. ii., "The Religious Instincts," p. 49. Such a definition *naturally results* from the argument employed by him to prove that the *religious consciousness* naturally leads right.

The lowest organisms are those with the greatest powers of reproduction. Among mammalia, beginning with small rodents, which quickly reach maturity, and which produce large litters, as we advance step by step to the higher animals, in proportion as intelligence lightens does reproductive power diminish. Among human beings the same law is observable. The poor, who exert muscle rather than decompose brain matter, have large families. Among the highly educated, who expend their force in the corrosion of nerve, small families are found.*

Again, the progress of the species is towards social unity, which is the differentiation of functions which in an unsocial state were exercised by the same individual. The unsocial barbarian is his own smith, tailor, builder, &c. As the body politic advances, one man exercises the trade of smith, another of tailor, and a third of builder. A further advance is made when there is a whitesmith, a blacksmith, and a goldsmith ; a draper, a tailor, and a clothier ; and in like manner trades become more and more minutely divided up. In a generation or two it will be one man's trade to hold a nail, and another man's to strike it. Whether such a subdivision of labour is really indicative of progress of the species is an open question.

Men's interests are too self-centred to make them feel solid consolation amid present trouble in the reflection that a thousand years hence the race will have worked itself clear of such things. And on the whole, it will be found that the amount of happiness in a race not highly civilized is far more general, and its sum-total far higher, than that of an over-civilized race. The rude and simple Swiss peasantry are thoroughly happy, while in a large city like London the upper stratum of society is engaged in nervous quest of pleasure which ever eludes them, whilst the lower is plunged in misery. Besides, what is really meant by the progress of the species ? "The only tangible superiority of a generation over that which has preceded it appears to consist in its having within its reach a larger accumulation of scientific or literary materials for thought, or a greater mastery over the forces of inanimate nature ; advantages not without their drawbacks, and at any rate of a somewhat superficial kind. Genius is not progressive from age to age, nor yet the practice, however it may be with the science, of moral excellence. And as this progress of the species is only supposed, after all, to be an improvement of its condition during men's first lifetime, the belief—call it, if you will, but a dream—of a prolonged existence after death reduces the whole progress to insignificance. There is more, even as regards quantity of sensation, in the spiritual well-being of one single soul, with an existence thus continuous, than in the increased physical or intellectual prosperity, during one lifetime, of the entire human race." (Lowndes, "Philosophy of Primary Beliefs," p. 235 ; 1865.) The development of social life can more-

* This is a reason ; but too often there is also another, which was some time ago commented on by an American paper, speaking of the difference in this regard between Irish Catholic families in the United States and the population among which they live. If a religious system, or what stands in the place of one, has not sufficient power to guard the fountains of life, it must in the end die out through progressive degradation of successive generations *and proportional decrease* of those who belong to it.

over be accounted for without having recourse to all those instincts directive of what we call the spiritual consciousness of man. (Vol. i. pp. 49-51.)

The positivist, therefore, is pursuing a chimæra; and even if it were not a chimæra he would have no adequate motive for pursuing it, especially on his utilitarian principles. A system without motive is a system without power; and positivism, therefore, can never stand to mankind in place of a religion. It will be able to keep up a respectable appearance only as long as it is confined to a few select persons.* However, from what we have said on a preceding page it will be seen that this argument, except it be preceded by proofs of the divine existence, will not of itself show that positivism is false. But it will show that it is unworkable; that it is mere quackery to give out that it can occupy the place of a religious system. And, if the existence of God be antecedently proved, the existence of religious instincts will confirm those proofs; for as men are not led only by the intelligence but also by the heart, it was fitting that He should be pointed to not only by proofs from reason but likewise by propensions and needs in other parts of our

* Leibnitz has some memorable words here very applicable:—"I know that there are some excellent and well-meaning persons who maintain that theoretical opinions have much less influence on conduct than is generally supposed; and I also know that there are men of an excellent natural disposition whose opinions never [?] make them do anything unworthy of themselves. And besides this, those who have been led into these errors by speculation are wont to be naturally less inclined to those vices into which the multitude of men are apt to fall, in addition to which they are solicitous for the dignity of the sect of which they are the leaders; and we may say that, for instance, Epicurus and Spinoza led altogether exemplary lives. But these reasons generally cease to be effectual in the case of their disciples or imitators, who, believing themselves set free from the obtrusive fear of an All-seeing Providence and a menacing future, give the reins to their brutal passions, and their minds tocorrupt and seduce others; or if they happen to be ambitious and of a somewhat severe character, they will be ready for their pleasure or their advancement to set fire to the four quarters of the earth: and I have known some of this sort whom death has taken away. I find also that these growing opinions are worming themselves little by little into the minds of the men of the great world, who give the tone to the others, and are insinuating themselves into fashionable books, preparing everything for the general revolution with which Europe is threatened. . . . . But it may happen to these persons to experience themselves the miseries which they fancy are reserved for others. If even then they correct themselves of this epidemic mental disorder of which the evil effects begin to make themselves visible, these misfortunes may perhaps be prevented; but if it goes on increasing, Providence itself will correct men by the revolution which they will themselves produce; for, whatever may happen, everything will always turn out for good at the end of the reckoning; although this cannot and ought not to be without the chastisement of those who have contributed *even to this triumph of* good by their bad actions." The ideal of positivism *points one way; its* practical tendency among men another.

nature. Thus all will be seen to be parts of one concordant hypothesis.

The first of the primarily religious instincts is, according to Mr. Baring-Gould, an instinct of immortality which is founded on a simple incapacity of thought, and would tell with especial force among barbarous nations :—

> The idea of the immortality of the soul is far more widely spread than the idea of the existence of one or more Gods. This shows that it must rest on an exceedingly simple basis.
>
> The conception of a deity requires some mental exertion ; that of immortality requires none. Given the consciousness of personality, of a self the seat of the will, the thoughts, and the feelings, and the belief in the perpetuity of its life follows at once. For the supposition that death annihilates the conscious principle could not be entertained by an unphilosophic mind. A high degree of education must be attained before the notion of annihilation can be apprehended. The mind receives positive impressions only, and intelligently conceives negatives by eliminating positive impressions. Night is regarded as the absence of day, death as the absence of life. In order to form an idea of the destruction of the conscious self, an amount of exhaustion of impressions is required wholly beyond the powers of an uncultivated mind. Man's personality is so distinctly projected on the surface of his consciousness that the idea of its obliteration is inconceivable without doing violence to his primary convictions." (Vol. i. pp. 70–1.)

Round this instinct cluster that instinctive clinging to life without which life would soon cease to exist in the world, and a want of discrimination between objective and ideal existence which is very pronounced among savages, and of which relics may be detected among those who are civilized. The belief which it produces naturally leads to belief in a deity; and, as significance can be given to a future state only by supposing it to be one of retribution, it sharpens and strengthens the moral sense, while the grounds on which it rests supply foundations for the distinction between soul and body. It also furnishes part of the materials for a first sketch of angelology and demonology ; for it suggested belief in ghosts,—the ghosts of savages were demons, and among a vast number of nations the demons were the souls of the bad and the angels those of the good ; and thus until the idea of God arose to give a centre to worship and impose law on the spirit world, religion was steeped in spirit-worship and saturated with sorcery. However, that we cannot imagine ourselves to be annihilated, that a mental picture of one's own grave implies a notion that somehow one's self is looking at it, is no argument that we shall not be annihilated. But an investigation into the state of the mind about religion would be notably *imperfect* did it omit the consideration of this instinct,

which is, moreover, so simple, so powerful, and so universal, that it may perhaps be regarded by some as a divinely appointed means of educating in the belief of immortality those who would be inaccessible to more subtle and more refined arguments. Of the belief in a distinction between soul and body, which is antecedent even to the idea of immortality, of the causes which produce it in a confused form even among the lowest and most degraded communities, of its gradual development into the theory of a properly immaterial soul which is *forma corporis*, Mr. Baring-Gould, for reasons which may be guessed at, does not treat: although such treatment was necessary to the discussion of immortality. We also note the absence of any preliminary exposition of the distinguishing characteristics of the mental processes as observed among different races, among savages, and in a civilized state; but this, while it would greatly have contributed to the elucidation both of the origin and of the development of religious belief, would perhaps have distended the book beyond reasonable limits. The information given on this subject is consequently mixed up with discussions on other topics.

Far more extensive in its relations than the above instinct of immortality is the second force that impels man toward religion. Even the veriest savage has some notion of right and wrong; but the savage lacks introspectiveness, and therefore his moral appreciation is vague and feeble. It is therefore unimpressible; a crime more heinous than usual or an act of heroic virtue may move him, but daily life is a table-land flat and even. His life is too violent for his moral sense to become delicate: he needs for this the order and the refinement of civilization. He is also thoughtless, and therefore takes partial and haphazard views of actions; but to submit an action to conscience we must fully know what the thing done really is. He requires the consciousness that he bears an immortality within him to accentuate his moral perceptions, and an ideal to go before him to point the way to better things. But when these thoughts lighten on his mind they lead him at first but a little way. For his ideal is a barbarous god, capricious, narrow-minded, often commanding what is pernicious or ridiculous, who may even impede his progress by becoming traditional while he advances; and his immortality is a continuance of the pleasures of his earthly life. So that as he advances he will have to mend from time to time the ideas he had formerly about God and a future state, that they may continue to tend to lead him on by presenting to him always the reflex of his better self; otherwise, indeed, he ceases to have an *ideal, and therefore* a religion. Again, although happiness is not *moral good nor pain* moral evil, yet our judgments of what is good

or evil in detail are largely and rightly determined by the pleasure or pain which we believe an action tends ultimately to produce; and he sees that in the life he lives skill and strength, courage and cunning, what will win respect and devotion in his savage home and abroad pre-eminence among savages, are the things which succeed, while the possession of the nobler and finer virtues would only make him falter in the race. However, as civilization advances the need of self-control grows, since his happiness comes to depend more and more on that of others, and his power of thinking has to be exercised more frequently as he perceives that the ties which join him to others are becoming more and more complex, so that he has to look further into the consequences of actions. And thus his moral code gradually becomes clearer and more fixed, and as a consequence the ideas of good and evil shape themselves more firmly and definitely before his mind. Such is the character of the development of the moral side of human nature; to see more exactly what it implies, we must look more narrowly at its basis.

Human reason may exercise itself on moral actions as such, just as it may on any other subject; when it occupies itself with other things we call it the speculative reason, and when with moral actions in so far as they are moral, the practical reason or conscience. Thus, if a trilateral figure is brought under the cognizance of reason, it at once affixes to it the predicate triangular, and if an action is submitted to it, it in like manner decides that it is good, or bad, as the case may be. But in order that it should judge of anything whatever, it is necessary that that of which it judges should really be set before it. And while triangles are very simple, actions are generally very complex things; if they were distinct entities it would be otherwise, but they are nothing but the agent acting; and to come to a conclusion about their moral character it is therefore necessary that their antecedents, consequents, and necessary concomitants should be kept before the mind. These may be very numerous, and of very various importance. In our *à priori* speculative judgments what we have to judge of always embraces but a few elements which can be grasped in a moment; there are at most only two or three things to be considered, and if they are present the predicate is unhesitatingly affirmed. If a line is straight, we need look no farther; let other things be as they may, it is the shortest way between two points. But if, in order to join to straightness the predicate of being the shortest way between two points it were necessary that thirty or forty attributes any of which might be present in the subject should be absent, and that thirty or forty more any of which might be absent *should be* present, the reason might well hesitate before

pronouncing any given line the shortest way between two points not because of any wavering about the truth of the *à priori* part of the operation, but through a doubt whether it had veritably grasped this complexus of attributes, and whether the representation before it did not leave out attributes existing, or presume the existence of attributes having no existence, in the objective line to which its judgment was to be referred. This, consequently, is precisely what happens in moral judgments, and the circumstance affords a ready answer to Locke's argument from their diversity in different states of society. In contemplating the action something is left out, or something is unwittingly put in, and the resultant *à priori* judgment that the action is morally good or bad, which is true enough of it as conceived, may very well be false of it as objectively existing. Hence by considering simpler actions we apprentice ourselves to consider the more complicated, and form general laws of morals by generalizing empirically on the decisions given about groups of actions which appear more or less similar; or we decline the labour of deciding for ourselves at all, and accept without personal examination what is told us by others, or follow the lead of sentiment or interest. Thus the formation of our moral closely resembles that of our speculative convictions. But the voice of conscience has in it a notable peculiarity. It says simply, that is right, happen what will, it is your duty to do it; that is wrong, and whatever the consequences to yourself may be, you are bound to abstain from it. It proclaims in accents which we cannot dispute that it is the supreme tribunal of the mind, and unconditionally requires all other faculties and all other motives to prostrate themselves before it. The speculative reason suggests things to us as a friend, and tells us, if you do not follow my advice, you will certainly lose by it; the practical reason commands us as a superior, and addresses us in imperatives: and when we do not obey it, it declares us worthy of punishment, and we are filled with a vague fear. But while it places us under a law, it does not affirm that the observance of this law will lead us to earthly happiness. On the contrary, it may subject us to pain and death, and will certainly deprive us of many things which we might possess if we disregarded it, and acted only with a prudent and consistent view to our personal interest. We are continually finding that the pleasant and the right are in opposition the one to the other, and hence arises the moral conflict in human nature. Is the moral law then a chimæra, good for nothing, an illusion of which we for our own advantage should *rid ourselves* as soon as possible, since it may lead us even to *pain and death*, and will certainly involve us in a useless con-

flict and deprive us of much that is agreeable? We are incapable of making such an affirmation. We are therefore led to see that there must be a future life of retribution, and that this should be so there must be a Supreme Cause of nature, having a causality conformable to the moral law. This is finely brought out in the following passage, of which the first part is a quotation from one of the writings of Theodore Parker:—

> The world festers with the wounds of the hero; but there is no cure for them: the hero is a fool—his wounds prove it. S. Catherine has her wheel, S. Andrew his sword, S. Sebastian his arrow, S. Laurence his fire of green wood; Paul has his fastings, his watchings, his scourge, and his jail, his perils of waters, of robbers, of the city and the wilderness, his perils among false brethren; and Jesus His thorny crown, His malefactor's death. . . . . These die as the fool dieth. There is no hope for any one of them in a body without a soul, in an earth without a heaven, in a world without a God.
>
> The belief, the hope, that there is a future in which the wrongs of suffering humanity will be righted, has been ploughed into the conscience of mankind by the oppression of centuries. History paints oppression whirling its bloody lash after man, and man in the madness of his despair flying like Orestes to the temple of God, and there sitting as a suppliant, sullen and resolute:—
>
> Here will I keep my station and await the event of judgment.
>
> Without a belief in God, the avenger of all such as call upon Him, and a future life, in which the wicked should cease from troubling and himself be troubled in turn, man, the most down-trodden of all creatures, would wrap his mantle about his face, and sob himself to death. (Vol. i. pp. 76, 77.)

Theodore Parker is a pantheist. On the first part of the passage we would remark that it effectually reproves pantheism, which asserts that we are but bubbles on the sea of existence, who after death have no individuality, but sink again into the ocean of being whence we were evolved. But what is a future life to me if I am not to retain my personal existence in it? It is myself which is dear to me. If I as *I* am not to live on, what hope, what encouragement is there for *me* in that? On the second part of the passage we would remark that it helps to account for the prominence given to the doctrine of eternal punishment in the middle ages. Mr. Baring-Gould does not include the moral law among the primarily religious instincts, because, he says (vol. i. p. 207), the moral sense is certainly an intellectual faculty and not an instinct; but he treats of the origin and development of morals as connected with that of religion in his chapters on Theocracies, the Ethics of Religion, the Idea of Evil, Asceticism and Mysticism, and the Basis of Right. (Vol. i. pp. 190–236, 326–367; vol. ii. pp. 55–71.) The essence of the chapter on the Basis of Right we shall presently consider; that on the Ideal of Evil is an attempt to justify by natural

reason belief in the existence of evil spirits; and the chapter on Theocracies is an introduction to that on the Ethics of Religion. The chapter on the Ethics of Religion is an endeavour to ascertain what system of ethics corresponds to what system of religion, and the conclusion arrived at is that the *à priori* system of morals answers to monotheism, and utilitarianism to polytheism, or, we may add, atheism. Pantheism denies the existence of evil, and therein contradicts flatly the conscience of us all. Mysticism our author abominates; but by this word he understands the domination of the feelings at the expense of the reason, and in that sense everybody except some of the upholders of the Lutheran doctrine of justification abominates it equally with himself. Religious asceticism he declares to be a physiological consequence of the recognition of the existence of God implied by the moral law; and of this, and of the congruity of polytheism with utilitarianism, he speaks in the two following passages:—

> The principle of asceticism is abstinence from lawful pleasures, the subordination of certain faculties to others, and the restraint of certain propensities.
>
> It is a law of nature that if important results are to be attained, certain portions of our faculties have to be steadily subordinated to others. The abstinence from social enjoyments incumbent on a man who desires to rise rapidly and surely at the bar is considerable; and similar examples might be diversified almost indefinitely. Nor is it quite enough to say that these checks are merely temporary. They involve the formation of habit, which is not temporary. Men with no specially religious feeling adopt this principle in their practice. . . . . The fact of the digestive apparatus becoming disordered in students is an instance of the manner in which the vital attention, being focussed on the mind, neglects the body. On the other hand, the concentration of the spontaneous force on the body lowers the tone of the mind. Immediately after a meal thought is difficult; because then that vital force is busy in the stomato-gastric ganglia, and cannot be spared elsewhere. That luxury and sexual indulgence are ruinous to mental and therefore to moral health is well known to physicians.
>
> From whatever motive an ascetic life is undertaken, the result is accumulation of force. The ascetic cuts himself off, as much as possible, from all means of liberating force. His voluntary celibacy and abstinence from active work place at his disposal all that force which would be discharged by a man in the world in muscular action and in domestic affection. By fasting, he withdraws his spontaneous force, to a very considerable extent, from the stomato-gastric ganglia, and uses it for the construction and transubstantiation of cerebric neurine. Withdrawal from society intensifies his individuality, and . . . . if the object of his contemplation is one which is calculated to draw out his affections, the result is a co-ordinate accumulation *of mental and affectional* power . . . .
>
> *If asceticism* were to come into vogue again, it would exercise an influence

over men of the present day quite as great as it did in former ages—not because it is right or wrong, but because, from a positive point of view, it has a condensed dynamic force which will bowl down all the feeble and foolish who fritter away their energies, and make no effort to concentrate their will on the cultivation of their nobler faculties. (Vol. i. chap. xvii.)

Polytheism, pantheism, and monotheism have very distinct ethical leanings, which can be best perceived by an examination of representative systems under each of these heads. We have already taken Greek mythology as typical of all mythologies, and we will take Greek pre-philosophic ethics as repsesentative of all polytheistic morals.

To the Greek, the κόσμος was also οἰκουμένη, of which the inhabitants were gods and men, living in republic. An inroad on the privileges of any one member of the polity produced discord, and peace and goodwill and happiness attended on a careful regard for the preservation of individual rights and the rendering each his due—honour to whom honour, custom to whom custom, tribute to whom tribute was due . . . . . The principle of polytheism is the independence of forces ; in the universe and in human societies, order results from the concert of free wills ; social right is based on individual right ; the authority of law reposes on the consent of all. The city, the republic, πόλις, is a voluntary society which has for its normal conditions liberty and equality, the independence of each, but also the subordination of the individual to the whole. Law is not imposed by a will that is dominant and powerful upon feeble and yielding wills ; not even by divine power on human weakness, but it is the free and spontaneous agreement among equals.

The sum of duties to a Greek was the merging of his personality in the state. The position he was to occupy was not left to himself, but it was traced beforehand for him. Morality and virtue consisted in the conformity of the individual will to that of the body corporate ; that was just which benefited the state, and that was heroic virtue, meriting canonization, which consisted in self-sacrifice for the good of others.

Beautiful and grand as is the ethical doctrine of Greek polytheism, as a system it is faulty. It viewed man only in his relation to other men, and wholly omitted to see him in his relation to himself. Consequently there was no check provided against that immorality which is not political. He was ruled in his dealings with the commonwealth ; he was free to do what he liked as an individual. The education of children in the paths of virtue, which was strictly insisted on by many ancient religions, was left arbitrary to the Greeks ; and Aristotle rebuked them for allowing their children to grow up wild as the beasts. No incitement was held out to labour, and the maxims of Hesiod were forgotten. Herodotus wondered whence they had acquired their contempt for labour, whilst the barbarians actively encouraged the mechanical arts. Of twenty thousand Athenians, Demosthenes tells us, every one spent his time in the agora, for the first thought of the poorest Athenian citizen was to be idle, and trouble himself only with the business of the state, and be supported by the state. (Vol. i. pp. 220-223.)

The basis of monotheistic ethics, he goes on to say, is altogether different. Submission is the keynote to all the moral har-

monies of the monotheistic systems of antiquity, for monotheism implies the recognition of our duties as commandments of God. Utilitarianism cannot even admit submission into its system except secondarily and in so far as it may minister to egoism; but conscience, by making morality consist in conformity to the law, places its very essence in submission. In submission to whom? For it points, as a living writer says, to an authority above the mind altogether. It does not claim for itself that it is infallible (because it may not realize all that an action implies), that it is sufficient, that it is independent. It bows to something which has authority; it acknowledges a standard which is and must be right; it looks up for sanction and guidance. My practical reason, which is a part of myself, reveals to me a moral law, but reveals it in such a manner that I clearly understand that this law is not created by any part of myself. It reveals this law to me as all-holy, necessary, universal, everlasting. It was before I was born; it will be after I am dead. Who imposed it? There might be a moral standard without there being a moral *law;* imagination might construct an ideal of excellence, but imagination could not bind me to attain it. But I am bound to obey the law; who is it that can thus command me and all other beings? The practical reason in order that it should not be a delusion requires as the foundation of its commands that a Being ideally moral and possessed of absolute power should objectively exist. And the moral Ideal which it thus forms is not any partial ideal; for thus it would not be moral but immoral. If the supreme governance of things be idealized in Fate, and wisdom in Minerva, and courage in Mars, and chastity in Diana, and the higher love in the Ἀφροδίτη ἐπουράνια, then chastity may be divorced from love, and bravery from wisdom, and any or all of the virtues from the supreme governance of things, while by typifying qualities separately those opposite qualities which to form a perfect whole ought to accompany them are thrown into obscurity. The ideals of polytheism are partial; that of monotheism is complete, and therefore alone truly an Ideal.

It is surprising to find Mr. Baring-Gould saying that the ideas of good and evil are generalizations from the "perceptions" of pleasure and pain (vol. i. pp. 208, 326). In the long run no doubt happiness or misery does even in this life at least very commonly follow the performance of virtuous or wicked actions, and we believe that this will be unvaryingly the case in the next life; but just as trilaterality always accompanies triangularity and yet the two are not the same thing, so even if happiness *were* always attendant on moral goodness, moral goodness *would mean something* more than the power of producing hap-

piness. The contrary position is utilitarianism; and the utilitarian stand-point obscures the doctrine of the freedom of the will. It does so, because it deprives that doctrine of the argument deducible from the proposition that our actions would have no moral value if they were not free. For on utilitarian principles *moral value* is simply another expression for *tending to produce happiness;* which evidently has nothing to do with human liberty. A cloud may produce happiness to the husbandman. It also obscures the goodness of God, both indirectly, by obscuring freedom, and so tending to make Him responsible for all the actions of human machines; and directly, by inferring that He is good only in so far as He produces happiness. By identifying goodness with simple benevolence it destroys the attribute of Holiness; and as this benevolence must work in conformity with the nature of the human beings who are to be advantaged by it, a gradation of states in the next life, indefinitely advancing from happier to happier, must, if we would be consistent, be admitted. But the perfection of the divine dealings consists not in unlimited communication of benefits, but in rewarding or punishing according to morality and repentance. Utilitarianism looking out on this mixed world can conclude only for a cause possessing mingled good and evil qualities, or at best for a finite deity who meant well but was unable to accomplish his purpose. It abolishes the doctrine of the final condition of man being a *state* as contrasted with a *process,* as well as the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction, or, as Protestants prefer to call it, using a vaguer word, of the Atonement, by doing away with merit; and it leaves no place for eternal punishment by insisting that all punishment shall be medicinal, thus logically allowing only purgatory. Some of these consequences, which are contradicted by the opposite and *à priori* theory of the nature of morals, are admitted by our author. But in admitting them he is actuated by different principles, and does not mean utilitarianism; so that the expressions quoted at the head of this paragraph appear to be no more than an incorrect manner of expressing the fact that the co-ordinate gratification of the instincts of which he makes so much is productive of happiness, while, according to the principle that the religious consciousness points only to that which is good and true, such gratification is also right. But this is not utilitarianism, if only for the reason that this happiness may be more than counterbalanced by pain arising either from imperfection in the person performing the good action or from external circumstances.

In the chapter on the Basis of Right he institutes an examination of the answers given to the question, what is the

objective character of the actions which the practical reason pronounces to be morally good? and the reply which he, conformably to his principle about the instinctive yearnings of human nature, gives, is that they are such as tend to the development of the nature of the person performing them. The yearning indicates an incompleteness; supply the want, and you get a perfect whole. The moral law may therefore be put in this form: Realize your essence; become *in actu* what you are *in potentia*. This is the same as the second form of the categorical imperative of Kant, "Act in such a manner as never to employ humanity, be it in thine own person, be it in that of others, as a simple means, but respect it always as an end in itself," which again is fundamentally identical with the truth that *Bonitas moralis est convenientia cum natura rationali*.* Thus suicide is immoral because in committing it a person disposes of himself as a mere means of escaping from pain. The moral law therefore by precepts commands and by counsels directs us to an Ideal which we are to realize; and by setting before us this Ideal it implies, as it is not a delusion, that its realization is possible. Otherwise the moral law would lead us in chase of an *ignis fatuus*. But such realization is impossible in this life; another is therefore necessary.

We can devote but a few words to the consideration of the two remaining primarily religious instincts, of which one is, according to our author, the craving man feels to discover a cause for every phenomenon, and the other the prosecution of an ideal of perfection. "In man, mind operates on matter. Where matter is set in motion independently of man, he looks for a cause, and expects to discover it, in a force outside of himself similar to that working within him. . . . . It was a legitimate inference from the known to the unknown drawn by man, when he attributed the force in nature to a will like in kind to that he was conscious existed in himself." (Vol. i. pp. 60, 61.) This, the reader will observe, has nothing whatever to do with the argument from design; it is an immediate inference, thus: the effects which I produce are produced by volition; then the effects which I see produced in nature are also produced by volition. To make it legitimate it requires what is called the volition theory of causation, which is upheld by Dr. Newman, Dr. Mansel, Dr. Tulloch, and many of the most able present British advocates of Christianity, and, if it were true, would set in a strong light the existence of God and of human liberty, the possibility of creation in time, and the possibility and even one may say the naturalness of miracles. This theory, to

* *See Vazquez in* 1, 2, d. 95, cc. 9, 10; Suarez in 1, 2, tr. 3, d. 2, s. 2, n. 12.

which we do not assent, divides causation into physical and efficient, and affirms physical causation to be merely the unconditioned and unvaried succession of one physical phenomenon after another. In material changes there is nothing but succession. So far it agrees with Brown's theory; but it presently differs from it by refusing to analyze power into possible succession. Efficient causation is that wherein the effect not only *succeeds* the cause but is *produced* by it; and for this "power" is required. But the only thing possessing "power," according to this theory, is the will, and when we attribute power to other things we are like children, who when a door hurts them beat it as if it were alive. Volition is therefore the only efficient cause, and therefore when we see effects that have not been produced by our volition, we may at once and without the intervention either of the argument from design or of anything else, conclude that they are produced by the volition of some other person. Although we cannot admit the truth of this fanciful theory—which is required to substantiate the assertion that the causal instinct is primarily religious—the adoption of the gist of it by primitive races is historically sufficiently established. The most rudimentary idea of God was therefore that of a vague will-power acting in nature, and fetishism, which is the rudest form of religious worship, is the result of an imagined focussing of this power in particular objects. If this spiritual force is conceived to reside in matter, we have the basis of pantheism; if it is conceived to act on matter as from without, we have the basis of theism. At first different classes of objects will, when the process has gone thus far, be supposed to be directed by different spiritual principles, but as generalization forms groups larger and larger, we shall have the idea of one God. First, we have polytheism—a god of the sea, another of the sky, another of the earth; then we have monotheism,—one God of the whole universe. On this it is unnecessary to make any further remark than that it totally neglects the influence of primitive tradition. But we must first consider separately the various influences which have produced and guided religious beliefs, for only after this has been done can we proceed to evaluate the joint effect of the sum of them. So that in explicating the foundations which religions have had in the interpretation or misinterpretation of human nature, we may abstract from the purely extrinsic influence of primitive tradition just as in explaining the laws of planetary movement round the sun we leave the influence of mutual perturbations to be afterwards dealt with.

The last of the primarily religious instincts of which we have to speak—of which, indeed, in speaking of the moral law we have already spoken—is the disposition to form and follow an

ideal. Religion operates by ideals. What philosophy teaches by abstract precepts religion presents in the concrete in an Ideal Being; and therein is its strength. Man requires an Ideal as a progressive animal, and this Ideal, if it be more than a mere phantasy, if it is really to animate and encourage him, must be either some possible state to which he may attain, or some Being objectively existing whom he may imitate: the first is the ideal of attainment, and the second the Absolute Ideal—God. The existence of the second is required to found the possibility of the first. The ideal of attainment is the final reward, the state of the world to come, the fulfilment of all the desires, longings, yearnings, of the human heart. Desire is a pain; there, therefore, nothing can be wanting that is to be desired. But the desires of the heart of man are infinite; they cannot be satisfied except by an infinite object. This infinite object is God, the Absolute Ideal, Who is therefore postulated that the ideal of attainment should be possible, the ideal of attainment being in its turn postulated by the yearnings of humanity, which otherwise would be balked and unsatisfied. Thus we are led to the doctrine of the Beatific Vision, which solves the apparent contradiction that man can remain unabsorbed in God and retain his proper personality, and yet enjoy a happiness which leaves nothing to be desired.

We have now concluded what we purposed to say on the first part of Mr. Baring-Gould's work, and in examining it we have necessarily been led to comment on some portions of the second part which, as we conceive, naturally belong to the first. We have endeavoured to describe how philosophy is to be applied to subjective religion and to justify the use within due limits of its fundamental principle, and have criticised the scope and the execution of the work we were considering. Finally, we have sought to set before the reader the forces which primarily move man to religion, and have endeavoured to indicate some of their reactions one on another; but the description of how they are more fully developed in the course of mental action, and how they are satisfied by Christianity, belongs to the examination of the second part of "The Origin and Development of Religious Belief," where the Christian religion is considered.

Art. II.—FATHER LIBERATORE, FATHER HARPER, AND LORD ROBERT MONTAGU.

La Chiesa e lo Stato. Del P. Matteo Liberatore. Napoli.

Sermons by Fathers of the Society of Jesus. Volume II. By Rev. T. Harper. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

Arbitration instead of War. By Right Hon. Lord Robert Montagu, M.P. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

WHEN we wrote our January article on liberalism, we fully intended, either in our present or some very early number, to attempt, under F. Liberatore's guidance, a substantial disquisition on the true relations between Church and State. After our paper had been written however, we received from a very distinguished theologian the article, called "The World turned Atheist, &c.," which appeared in a later part of the same number, and which is to be succeeded in due course by others from the same pen. We are only too happy to leave so vitally important a theme in the hands of one, who is indefinitely more competent to handle it than is the present writer. On this occasion therefore, we shall make no attempt to deal with the subject as a whole: but, as we are anxious to press F. Liberatore's invaluable treatise on the attention of our readers, we shall give a general account of the ground which it covers; and we shall place before them some of those more salient remarks, which can most easily be detached from the context. We shall add some citations from the other two admirable works named at the head of our article, as powerfully illustrating in various ways the Roman theologian's argument.

We shall begin however by briefly making use of F. Liberatore's work, for a different purpose altogether. A question has quite recently been raised, how far it can be legitimate for a Catholic writer to allege publicly a charge of doctrinal unsoundness against any theory, which certain other Catholics may maintain. Doubts have been expressed, whether it is in accordance with the Church's spirit and principles, to adduce such a charge otherwise than in the way of private appeal to ecclesiastical authority; and whether a different practice, so far as it prevails in England, has not arisen from Catholics living

in the midst of a Protestant world. Now as we have ourselves from time to time made accusations of the very kind here censured, we shall not be suspected of undue aggressiveness if we briefly refer to this allegation: for if it could be maintained, it would follow that the view of our duties, on which we have habitually acted, is seriously opposed to ecclesiastical principle. And as our purpose is exclusively to speak in our own defence, we must beg our readers to bear in mind a fact, which we have often mentioned; viz., that whatever we write with any doctrinal bearing, is submitted to censors, who are appointed by the Archbishop of the diocese in which our REVIEW is published.

We would point out then, that F. Liberatore's volume consists entirely of papers, which had been contributed anonymously to the "Civiltà Cattolica"; and that if there be any periodical in the Church which may safely serve as a model to the Catholic public writer, it is assuredly the "Civiltà." Now we will give a few specimens of our author's language concerning Catholic liberals. He cites (p. 17), against these Catholics, Suarez's statement, that "the ecclesiastical power has the civil power subordinate and subject to it"; and that "this conclusion is certain and common among theologians." "In proof of this assertion," adds the author, Suarez gives "a long catalogue of theologians and Pontiffs, to whose teaching every one ought certainly to conform, who desires to have *not the name only but the reality also of* [*being*] *a Catholic.*" But such, he elsewhere adds (p. 61), "is *the obedience of the Catholic liberal:* to submit to *the Church's judgment,* provided the Church's judgment conform with that of *his own infallible brain.*" Undoubtedly then, he publicly accuses Catholic liberals of rebellion against the Church's teaching. During two articles he is engaged in controversy with a certain Signor Tagliaferri; who (p. 93) is no layman but an archpriest. F. Liberatore nowhere intimates, that he has put forth any complaint privately to that dignitary's ecclesiastical superior. At all events, he does not hesitate to charge his opponent distinctly and publicly with doctrinal unsoundness. Signor Tagliaferri had said, that a certain "party" is for subjecting the State to the Church. "The State's subordination to the Church," replies F. Liberatore (p. 106), "is the doctrine of all those theologians, Fathers, Pontiffs, who have touched on the point. Now as I do not wish to suppose that Signor Tagliaferri calls *the whole Ecclesia Docens* by the name of a 'party,' it is best to say that this proposition of his proceeds from an absence of ecclesiastical erudition in the matter. And accordingly we much *marvel that, being* as he is an archpriest, he does not know

that of which *a simple cleric ought not to be ignorant.*" F. Liberatore then directly alleges, that the doctrine of this priest contravenes that of the whole Ecclesia Docens; though charitably attributing this circumstance to the priest's theological ignorance, rather than to any contumacious intention. And with special reference to this particular opponent, he makes the following general remark.

> That the laity should be unacquainted with this perpetual tradition of the Church, is a pardonable defect; as they are not obliged to any large and profound knowledge of sacred doctrine. But in regard to this we would make two remarks. One is, that for the opposite reason *ecclesiastical persons cannot justly plead such an excuse.* The other is, that when any treatment is put forth of matters so delicate as morality, and specially if they are connected with religion, the first care of every good Catholic should be to inform himself as to the Church's mind, in order thus to secure his own mind against danger of error. (p. 92.)

Now we beg our readers to look back at Pius IX.'s Brief of Feb. 12, 1866, which we reprinted in the following July, erecting the writers of the "Civiltà" into a college possessing privileges of its own. The Pontiff mentions, that that periodical had been started originally in obedience to his desire, and that its writers have "every day deservedly obtained for themselves in a greater degree his good will and high estimation." But from its very foundation its constant and uniform tone, whether concerning Catholic liberalism or the philosophical errors of Catholics, has been in entire harmony with these passages of F. Liberatore. Moreover such language has otherwise also the direct sanction of Pius IX. As we have more than once pointed out (see e. g. April, 1869, p. 366) he commanded a warm letter of paternal commendation to be sent in his name to M. de Beaulieu, for his reply to M. de Montalembert. In that Letter the Pontiff names as one special ground of eulogy, that M. de Beaulieu had to so great an extent based his argument on those Pontifical pronouncements, which had not been "received" by Catholic liberals "*as they should have been.*" In other words Pius IX. specially praises M. de Beaulieu for having virtually brought against Catholic liberals a charge of doctrinal unsoundness. Lastly, we would remind our readers of the same Pontiff's Brief, referred to by us at some length in April, 1870 (pp. 310, 311, note), addressed to three laymen who edited the "Catholique." The "Bien Public" of Ghent thus sums up the purport of this Brief.

> The Pope addresses himself to simple laymen, to journalists. He sets forth that *these* journalists treat the gravest and most delicate questions;

since he says that many sincere Catholics lose their way on them to the Church's great detriment. He sets forth that these same journalists discuss the *sense and bearing of the Holy See's teaching*, not only in opposition to enemies of the Faith, but also [and often*] *in opposition to other Catholics.* And he approves their conduct: not only in that they inculcate this teaching by example and by exhortation; but also in that they interpret and re-establish—in opposition to ignorance and sophism—their *native and sincere sense.*

That is to say,—whereas certain lay journalists publicly accuse various Catholics of not accepting the Holy See's teaching in its "native and sincere sense"—Pius IX. encourages these journalists to continue in a course, which he so warmly approves.

We could most easily show, that all this is but an application to present times of what has been the recognized and universally approved Catholic usage from the first. But we have said enough for our immediate purpose, which is purely one of self-defence; and we have no wish to insist further on the theme.

What then *is* the doctrine, so earnestly defended by F. Liberatore against Catholic liberals? What is the doctrine, which he considers to be thus indubitably imposed by the Church on the acceptance of Catholics? Its general outline may be expressed in two propositions. He teaches (1) that Christian States are subjected by God's Law to the Church, in all which concerns the welfare of souls; and (2) that, wherever Catholic unity exists, the civil ruler, acting in constant subordination to the Church, should enforce that unity by the power of the sword.

Now at starting, an obvious objection may be raised against the propriety of treating such a theme at all. "Suppose such "a doctrine to be ever so true"—such is the objection—"what good purpose can be answered by supporting it? It "is wholly inapplicable to existing phenomena: for as to the "*second* proposition, there is now no country in the civilized "world which *enjoys* Catholic unity; and as to the *first*, the "State is now everywhere so thoroughly disunited in spirit "from the Church, that the Supreme Pontiff does not attempt "to exercise whatever power God may have given him over "civil governments. And while the doctrine is thus in the "present day barren of *good* results, its assertion is pregnant "with *evil* consequences: for it both sows division among "Catholics, and increases among externs their detestation of

* *Pius IX. had* added these words, "and often," though the "Bien *Public*" *accidentally* omitted them.

"the Church." Such is the objection. And in curious contrast with this view of the case, F. Liberatore does not hesitate in his Preface to declare (p. vi.), that present circumstances not only constitute no reason for silence on these matters, but on the contrary make it more imperative to speak on them loudly and clamorously. Catholics ought now, he says, to proclaim from the housetops, what in better times it would have sufficed to teach from the professorial chair. We avow ourselves to be entirely of his opinion; and will add a few remarks in way of corroboration.

In such remarks we are of course to take for granted, that the doctrine in question is quite certainly the Church's doctrine: for we do not ourselves contend, nor does F. Liberatore, that Catholics would act defensibly in publicly advocating such a view, were it a mere private opinion of their own. And this being understood, we would first repeat what we said on this matter in our number for January 1868 (pp. 54-57). We admit heartily the principle, on which the objection is founded. It does not at all follow, we admit, because a doctrine has been infallibly determined, that its expression and advocacy are always expedient. We speak of doctrines which are no integral portion of the Deposit, though (as being importantly connected therewith) they may have been infallibly ruled by the Church. And we readily admit that prudence and moderation require a writer to consider, not merely whether what he says is true, nor even whether it has been sealed with the Church's infallible impress; but also whether its inculcation at this particular time be conducive to the Church's benefit. Where the Church has long abstained from expressing some doctrine, and where that doctrine has no obvious practical bearing, it will commonly be the wisdom and the duty of a Catholic writer to accept her implied lesson. Just as it is to the Church alone that he looks, when he desires to know what doctrine is infallibly true,—so it is to the Church alone that he looks, when he desires to know which of these doctrines, *being* infallibly true, should under particular circumstances be prominently and urgently enforced. Everything turns on this, the Church's indication of her own desire.

But it is plain that whatever doctrines are taught in the Encyclical and Syllabus, are doctrines which she desires, not to be forgotten, but to be distinctly borne in mind; not to be passed over, but to be earnestly enforced. To the Encyclical and Syllabus then let us appeal. The 24th error condemned in the latter is, that "the Church has no power of *employing force*, nor has she any temporal power direct or

indirect." Again, in condemning the 31st error therein recited, Pius IX. puts forth the de jure claim of clerics under certain circumstances to be exempted from secular tribunals. In several portions of the Encyclical and in three well-known propositions of the Syllabus, he peremptorily condemns the modern notion, that liberty of worships and of the press is in itself desirable. Now in 1872 we cannot consider the decisions of Dec. 1864 to be obsolete. What the Holy Father *then* wished, he now wishes, to be prominently asserted. Even if Catholics could see no reason for this, the indication of his wish is amply sufficient to direct their conduct.

We repeat this statement. Even if a Catholic writer could not himself see the benefit to be obtained by his advocacy of some true doctrine, it is amply sufficient for his guidance, that the Teacher of all Christians desires its inculcation. The benefit of that inculcation may be really great, though an individual do not happen to see it. How often it happens that some speculative truth produces the most unexpected and invaluable practical results! To take a very trite illustration. A number of ancient geometers investigated the properties of conic sections; a purely speculative investigation: circumstances arose, which those geometers could not have ever so distantly imagined; and behold a precious practical result of their speculative studies, in tracing the planetary movements. So in the present case. No one can say that the present condition of European society is normal or stable, for it rests on no one definite and consistent principle. Who can tell what revolutions are in store for the civilized world? what circumstances, now quite unimaginable, may arise? At some future period the doctrine of the Church's power in things temporal may be—in some corner of the earth, or even in large portions of it—the very bond of new social relations, the very anchor of strength and stability.

(2) Then further, even at the present time, though the doctrine were not directly practical, it might be indirectly practical in a high degree. Our meaning may be thus illustrated. In a theological treatise on the Trinity or the Incarnation, there are several propositions which cannot be called directly practical; for the keenest dogmatic student does not actually consider them in his prayers and meditations. Yet their indirect practical value is very great. They enable theologians to grasp far more thoroughly the substance of the doctrine; from theologians this greater keenness of apprehension spreads through the body of priests, and through *these again it* reaches the faithful in general. Something

very analogous takes place on the matter before us. To contemplate steadily the authority over society which God has given to the Church, conduces signally to increased unworldliness of view; to a keener sense of the intrinsic superiority possessed over things temporal by things spiritual; to a profounder and higher conception of the Church's office; to a more undivided and ardent loyalty towards the Holy See.

Moreover (3) to express frankly the Church's true doctrine, is in such times as these the only course which can save a Catholic controversialist from irretrievable disaster. If there is one specialty of the day, it is historical research; and consequently, if there is one class of objections which it is impossible to ignore, it is that which is founded on history. What reply shall be given to those anti-Catholic disputants, who throw in your teeth the facts of mediæval times? Even if it were expedient it would not be right—and even if it were right it would not be expedient—to defend the Church's acts, except by the Church's doctrine. Some of the French "Liberal Catholics" have been most pious men, admirable servants of God, and in intention zealous sons of the Church: but their view has no intellectual basis whatever. Liberalism is a consistent system, wrought out by men (in part consciously, in part unconsciously) from a fundamentally false principle. Catholicism is a divine system, implying throughout that principle which directly contradicts liberalism, viz., the dogmatic. In fair argument with a rightly-disposed inquirer, the truth of the latter principle and the falsehood of the former may be triumphantly evinced. But the "Liberal Catholic" is afraid to break with either of the two; nor can he give any intelligible reason, why at this or that particular point he parts company with one and cleaves to the other. In argument, the "Liberal Catholic" is utterly baffled and crushed, when pressed either by consistent Catholics or consistent liberals.

(4) In the first article of our last number we adduced what seems to us a still more urgent and deeper reason than the two preceding, for loudly insisting on the heterodoxy of ecclesiastical liberalism. The doctrine, which this error denies, is the Church's authority in teaching and ruling throughout that portion of secular science and politics, which affects directly or indirectly the religious welfare, whether of the individual or society. Now to our mind the most subtle and most dangerous poison of the soul, against which it is necessary in these unhappy days for more educated Catholics to be on their guard, is what we may call worldliness of judgment. By this phrase we mean to express that view of

men and of affairs, which is based on a forgetfulness of S. Ignatius's Foundation; and which accordingly under-estimates, or even ignores, the sin that is involved in a mere preference of creatures over the Creator, where no gross acts are perpetrated of overt transgression. In the early part of our article we drew special attention to three profoundly antichristian habits of thought, which result from this worldliness of judgment, and which in their complex may perhaps be said to constitute "religious liberalism": viz. idolatry of temporal greatness, idolatry of intellect, and indifferentism. These evil habits of thought, we further argued, issue inevitably in that *ecclesiastical* liberalism, with which we are concerned in our present article. By no course of proceeding therefore will an educated Catholic more securely protect himself from all religious liberalism, and from all treason against S. Ignatius's Foundation,—than by studying, in order to accept, the whole body of anti-liberalistic utterances which have issued from the Holy See. Or to put the whole thing in brief,—there is no mode more easy and more certain than study of the Church's politico-religious doctrines, for the prevention or cure of the most fatal spiritual malady now raging.

We will here interrupt the thread of our remarks, to point out that, in two different parts of his volume, F. Harper has illustrated the very important truth we have incidentally mentioned; viz. the sin involved in a mere preference of creatures over the Creator, where no gross acts are perpetrated of overt transgression. He refers (p. 43) to "the touching story of Dives and Lazarus. There is nothing that is disgraceful, as the world would say, recorded of the former; no flagrant vice of impurity or injustice. It is only told of him, that he was clothed in purple, fared sumptuously every day, and was hard on the poor. Yet he is in hell." He then proceeds—

> Listen to the more direct teaching of an Apostle:—"Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl for your miseries, which shall come upon you. Your riches are corrupted, and your garments are moth-eaten. Your gold and silver is cankered; and the rust of them shall be for a testimony against you; and shall eat your flesh like fire. You have stored up wrath for yourselves against the last day." In truth, the whole spirit of the New Testament echoes the solemn words of the Redeemer, "You cannot serve God and mammon at one and the same time." Have you still a doubt remaining about the teaching of Christ? Listen once more to these terrible words of His, which we dare not set down to exaggeration: "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God. It is easier for a camel *to go through* the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the *kingdom of God.*" (pp. 44-5.)

Again, having quoted our Blessed Lord's description of "the world's last dreary winter" as found in S. Matthew and S. Luke, F. Harper thus continues:—

> You see that in neither of these cases does the Evangelist mention any of their horrible sins. It behoves us to mark this well. The one peculiarity, which in both instances is prominently brought before us, is the utter materialism and sensuality in which the world was then plunged. And it is precisely this peculiarity, which constitutes the predicted resemblance between these epochs and the times of Antichrist. Such is the picture of the last days given us by the Incarnate Truth. Eating and drinking, marriages, sensual enjoyment, domestic comforts, utter forgetfulness of God, disbelief in God's ministers and God's warnings—these are the things that are to be, as Christ tells us, one of the signs of the world's last winter. If Christ were to come to judgment now, would He, or would He not, find it to be a characteristic of the age, that men's hearts generally are absorbed in matters of eating, drinking, marrying, giving in marriage, planting, building; that all classes of the people are walking to and fro in quest of money, closing their eyes to the chastisements of God's providence, and their ears to the warnings of His Priesthood? Judge ye. (pp. 13–14.)

So much we have said on former occasions, as to the importance of earnestly setting forth the Church's doctrine, on her due relations with the State. But we may here go further. We do not see how Catholics can be warned against what are undeniably two very prevalent and pernicious errors, unless the Church's full doctrine on the subject be sufficiently exhibited. Thus no one will say that the antichristian notion is *obsolete*, of drawing a distinction between men's standard of morality in their private and their public action respectively. It is of urgent practical importance at this moment to insist, that a statesman's predominant aim, in his political no less than his personal capacity, should be to promote the highest interests of those with whom he is concerned; that he may not sacrifice the supreme to any subordinate end. Yet there is serious danger, lest in avoiding Scylla men fall into Charybdis: lest, in discerning the odiousness of political atheism, they come to fancy that the civil ruler has a power of pronouncing on dogma; of forbidding opposition to his own religious opinions as such; of trammelling the Church's action; or generally of exercising authority within the supernatural order. We shall presently see that the Church's full doctrine, as set forth by F. Liberatore, guards against both these errors; but we do not know what other standpoint can even be imagined, from which *both* of them shall be successfully resisted.

In fact nothing shows more irresistibly the urgent existing

importance of the whole question, than F. Harper's volume. He is absorbed in present phenomena; and yet he is necessitated by the exigency of his argument, to set forth emphatically the Catholic doctrine on Church and State.* The *second* series indeed, contained in the volume, has a different drift; and as we shall not be further concerned with these in our present article, we will at once give a general account of their character. They were preached at Farm Street during the summer of 1869; and they are directed against what the author happily calls that "know-nothing school of so-called philosophy," which counts Professor Huxley as its principal disciple, and in which high place is held by Messrs. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Bain. The greatest injustice will be done to F. Harper, if his readers forget his repeated protest, that he is not professing to *refute* the philosophy with which he is engaged. He is addressing Catholics throughout. His purpose is to show *these* the utterly detestable and indeed appalling character of that strange philosophical theory, which is now in the ascendant; and to stimulate them towards straining every nerve for its resistance and overthrow. He does this, not only with great power, but with great originality of thought; and we heartily wish the scope of our article permitted us to enter more at length into the course of his argument.

It is with the earlier course however, that we are here directly concerned. These were preached at Salford during the Christmas of 1866; and we are unacquainted with any publication, which contains so vigorous an exposure and denunciation of existing English social evils. We cannot too earnestly recommend them to the earnest and repeated meditation of all Catholics; especially of those who are disposed to take a sanguine view, on the state and prospects of religion in England. For three centuries, says the author, Englishmen have thrown off the Church's social rule. What has been the result?

> There has never been an age since the birth of the Christian Church wherein a gross materialism, and a love of the comforts and sensual pleasures of life, have been so universally spread among all classes of society, as the age in

* A question has been suggested to us, how far it is legitimate to express a public judgment, even a favourable judgment, on the published sermons of a Catholic priest. Our own view has always been this. We understand that a priest, by *publishing* his sermon, submits it to public criticism. Take the *volume* before us. If it had been published as a series of *essays*, no one *doubts that its notice* would have come within our province. It seems to us *mere trifling to insist* on the mere difference of conventional form.

which we live. The increased facility which cheapness offers may have helped to stimulate such an appetite, especially among the masses, but it would be irrational to ascribe to this alone the universal prevalence of so marked an epidemic. That the misery exists everywhere, who can doubt? The house, the table, the dress, proclaim it. Workmen nowadays are not contented with what in former times would have been deemed luxuries too expensive for their masters. Merchants strive to rival the magnificence of noblemen. On the Sunday or holiday the factory-girl and shop-boy strive to mask their real calling in life by a useless parade of dress and ornament. Each man endeavours to outdo his neighbour in display. And it has been publicly affirmed more than once, as a reason for the admitted unwillingness of young men in the upper classes of society to get married, that the habits of our English ladies have become so luxurious as to make of marriage a bargain too costly for any save the wealthiest. (pp. 7, 8.)

Why are Monks and Nuns ever depicted as lazy, disaffected, unsocial nuisances, worthless mendicants, useless drags on society? Why does our free press in England applaud to the echo the forced suppression of religious houses in Italy by acts of injustice, which, if perpetrated here, would be at once the signal for a civil war or popular insurrection? Why is it that, while the inviolability of private property, and the right of the individual to employ his wealth in any way he pleases, are sacred principles of the English Constitution with which no one would be permitted for a moment to tamper, we quietly ignore them when their protection is claimed by a community of men or women, who choose to consecrate their fortunes and life to the service of Christ? Why do we, as a people, look on unconcerned and without one word of protest, while Religious, stripped of their means, are forced within forty-eight hours to leave their country and home for a life of exile in another land; and raise on the pinnacle of fame the chief actor in these savage outrages? I fear me well that the reason is but too plain. Poverty, chastity, and obedience, are the three nails of Mount Calvary. And the world hates the very sight of such unwelcome relics. (pp. 57, 58.)

The great idol of the hour is temporary success, the short-lived victory of force; or what has been called the inexorable logic of facts. In the actual political philosophy of the nineteenth century might is right; and an action is deemed praiseworthy, whatever it may be, if only it attain its ends. (p. 85.)

Yet even the anonymous preachers of our new philosophy are not slow to admit that such proceedings have destroyed all force of treaties, and have sapped the very foundations of international law. The only law which now exists is the law of the strongest; and the old picture of the wolf and the lamb is indelibly photographed on the present map of the world. It has resulted from all this that revolution is nowadays our model form of government; and unrestrained license is undermining political unity. We have nothing to fall back upon but brute force. (pp. 85, 86.)

In one passage F. Harper expresses a comparison, which he implies throughout, between modern ages and ages of the Church's social rule. It would appear that F. Harper thinks

no more favourably than F. O'Reilly, whom we quote in another article, on the modern ideal of popular education.

It is a confessed fact that, while what our modern sciolists call education has been perseveringly extended amongst the mass of our people, nevertheless such mental training is at the best rudimentary, and merely instrumental. Reading, writing, book-keeping, mental or other arithmetic, elementary geography, and a series of historic facts and dates, are doubtless very good things in their place. But these, even taken collectively, do not constitute mental education. *They are mere instruments for good or evil, according to the way we use them.* The real work of education has yet to be done. And it is in effect begun among the English masses only after the boy has turned his back on the school-door. And who are then his masters? I answer, Newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, novels, and mechanics' institutes. *Our "free press," in a word, is the real schoolmaster.* And English youth, nursed in all its shallow dogmatism, its continued self-contradictions, its prejudices, sophisms, its conflicting and ready-made judgments even about moral and religious truths the most sacred and immutable, its self-sufficient criticism and its tone of infallibility—our youth, I repeat—what must become of them, nursed in such a chaos of crude thought? The Apostles, whom I have quoted, tell us. They are ever learning, never coming to the knowledge of the truth. They ape the tone of their master. They become pert, stubborn, self-willed, proud, lovers of themselves and of their own hastily-adopted opinions, mockers, deriding the sober and well-tried wisdom of the past, puffed up with their useless scraps of knowledge; often too blasphemers, *copying in their dreary conversation the flippant ribaldry of their bible—the newspaper or weekly journal which they read.* The most sacred mysteries are profaned by their sneers. God's holy Church, His Sacraments, His creed, fare no better than does the solid teaching of antiquity. Everything, human and divine, must bow down before the omnipotence of private judgment—and such a private judgment too! God's acts and words must be criticised like those of statesmen, philosophers, men of science. Mere upstarts arise to interpret the Bible, and shape a creed, and determine a ritual. So men fear not to bring in sects, blaspheming. Objective truth retires behind a cloud; and human thought at last collapses into one huge, dreary negation. And the popular mind feeds contented on platitudes, gaily garnished with pleasantries and a ringing style of writing. So the press, while it nurses this superficial and conceited dogmatism, is also the truest reflex of its presence in what is called public opinion. What a mental education for a people!

What then am I to say of the moral part of education—of the education of the will? This is no small or unimportant question; for the whole life of a man, properly so called, depends upon his will. It is here resides his freedom. Here it is that the mainspring of action—and action is man's life—is to be found. How does this nineteenth century educate the will of the child? A sort of worldly, respectable, outside morality—enough to pass muster in the world—it may give; but the heart and centre of action it *cannot* touch. For it cannot get inside. And it has no authority to get *there. Secrets that* are in a boy's heart, which your national schoolmaster *cannot near*—a war of passion, of which he knows not one syllable—habits

forming, which are as invisible to his eye as the world of spirits—these are just the matters about which his scholar will never let him into his confidence; and yet which put the boy's whole after-life out of joint. Yes, he is a noble, affectionate, open boy, you will tell me; manly, winning, frank, clever. This may be very true, so far as it goes. But if that is all you know, you know little indeed about him. For all the while, poor soul, he is being eaten up with impurity; because he has no one to whom he can venture to betake himself for sympathy, relief, and cure. He has no confessional where his sad secret is safe, where he could find an easy outlet for his miseries, and where God would heal, and, healing, educate him by His Sacrament. He has been brought up to hate the very mention of the word confession. And so he goes out into life, like an apple fair to look upon, but rotten to the core. His whole moral being has been already blasted by the deadly blight of lust. Thrown thus entirely upon himself and his own weakness and frailty, with a powerful habit playing the tyrant with him, what chance is there for the liberation and education of his will? The confessional is the only school for him, and by the prejudices which you and your free press have instilled, you have barred its door against him. What is the inevitable result upon your youth? Why it is this. They must grow up to be self-willed and sensual. They become lovers of pleasures more than of God. They walk after their own lusts—walk after the flesh in the lust of uncleanness; or as St. Jude says, "they walk according to their own desires in ungodlinesses." What else can you expect, when you imprison a man in a cage with a troop of hungry wild beasts, and trust to the turn-up of chances that he will not be devoured? You cannot educate the will yourselves; and yet you do the best you can to hinder the Church from doing it for you by an authority—innate in her, for you and your schools impossible. And you admit in your more honest moments—though you cannot arrest—the consequences. Sins of uncleanness—for which by far the greater number of Christians who are lost eternally will find themselves in the torments of hell—are the rule, not the exception. This is a patent fact, which statistics, newspapers, courts of law, combine to illustrate and confirm. But such witnesses cannot, from the nature of the case, get at more than one instance out of ten thousand that are never known. Nevertheless, to illustrate what I have said by one most striking example. What *in the whole history of pagan crime* can surpass the revelations—half hinted at, made, as it were, by accident—of the normal state of our casual wards? One night's glance was enough to make the whole head sick and the whole heart faint. Yet in such a very hell upon earth as it has been described to be, *you have only the picture of one workhouse for one night out of the three hundred and sixty-five.* And this is one of the fair fruits, I suppose, of what people call our modern civilization—of the wondrous light of the nineteenth century! *This is the new way of educating the poor.* Yet without a particle of shame men talk as glibly as before about *the darkness of the middle ages, and our glorious emancipation as a people from the trammels of Rome.* This is the harvest, which they are gathering in, of the so-called Reformation. Do I then combine the two facts, or find a connection between them? Yes, I do. (pp. 18–23.)

There is but one passage bearing on social phenomena in the whole volume, with which we find ourselves out of sympathy: viz. where (p. 18) F. Harper calls the English "a great and noble people." He cannot merely mean that the English people, like every other, has its own special good points and tendencies: for this is a very small matter indeed. He cannot mean that the *mass* of Englishmen, any more than of men born in other countries, are "great and noble": for his one pervading purpose is to show the contrary; and he says expressly (p. 110) that "there is nothing to which the whole tone of opinion in England is so diametrically opposed, as the habit of Christian faith." He must mean, we suppose, that the higher and saintlier class of Englishmen are greater and more noble than those of other countries. If this be his meaning, we are not aware of any ground for such a judgment. Our own notion would be, that—though no doubt a certain reaction has quite lately set in—free intercourse with Protestants has before now seriously affected the spiritual character of English Catholics. F. Liberatore says (p. 54) that during the last three centuries Saints have been comparatively rare among professors of the true Faith, in countries infected by Protestantism; whereas they are much more frequently found among peoples free from heresy. However it is very probable that we have failed rightly to apprehend F. Harper's meaning, in this incidental expression.

We pass to Lord Robert Montagu's little volume, for which we owe its author the warmest acknowledgment. It is comparatively easy for a writer who does not emerge from private life, to express freely unpopular opinions; but a nobleman, circumstanced like the author before us—actively engaged in the political world and mixing daily with politicians—displays rare courage in so openly expressing views, which (as he mentions in his Preface) "will in this time and country be sure to injure his prospects." The truly Catholic complexion of his principles, on the social and political course of affairs, is displayed at the very outset.

> Every earnest man, who for the first time studies the Encyclicals and the Allocutions of the Popes, will be amazed to find that each of them in turn has been "a voice crying in the wilderness" those fundamental truths concerning society, which men persist in utterly ignoring; and proclaiming from the housetop those social and political ills which afflict us, and the remedies which will assuredly remove them. Every Pope has been a Vox clamantis in deserto, crying out when no one will lend an ear and hear him. Yet these ills are the vexed questions which have for centuries been perplexing every *Government* and nation of the world. Is it not then a matter for wonder, *that no one will* pause to give a moment's thought to the infallible words of

the visible Head of Christ's Church? It is not that his words are unknown, or pass by without attracting attention. The Syllabus, for example, incensed every one in 1864, and the anger which was then kindled has not yet, in the space of seven years, subsided. It is not for want of hearing; it is that men will not study those infallible judgments. Even Catholics do not give to them a sufficient attention; while they deliver opinions at their dinner-tables in the very words of the errors to which the Syllabus has subjoined anathemas.* (pp. 1, 2.)

Again. From the time that the Church's political supremacy

has become impaired through the spread of the so-called Reformation, society has again been falling, and becoming more and more degraded. As the Jews of old refused the government of God, in order to put themselves, according to the principle of Cæsarism, under the caprices of men; so has society for three hundred years been going backwards, ever since it has resisted the supremacy and spiritual rule of Christ's Church. To save society there is but one remedy, that which Jesus, the Healer, devised; that which saved the world at the break-up of the Roman Empire. (p. 104.)

In moral things there has been a serious retrogression; public and private morals have been declining; family and domestic ties have become utterly slack; youths run wild at will, and the public spurns at all authority; the literature of the day disseminates materialism and atheism; murders, suicides, thefts, frauds, and immoralities are numerous; science multiplies the means of destruction, and governments increase the numbers of their armies; religion is despised, families are disintegrated, individuals become frivolous and degraded. Society is, in fact, becoming dissolved. In former times it was through impulse or passion that men sinned, whether publicly or privately; but the mind was sane; they knew they were sinning, and every one else perceived that it was sin, and called crimes by the right names. Now men prevaricate through degradation of intellect. They are surprised and offended if you tell them they are criminals. They will not believe that they have sinned; and other men have ceased to call their acts by their proper names. An adultery is a "conquest"; a lie is "another version"; a piratical expedition is called "putting on a moral pressure"; robbery on a grand scale is "annexation"; fraud by a whole nation is "repudiation"; a multiplication of murders is called "war," or a "military operation," or "military glory." Men's thoughts have become corrupt and are in the darkness of error: and "My people have been silent because they had no knowledge." These times have been described by Osee.

The disease of society arises from error. But the remedy cannot come from philosophers, or from human science, because philosophers themselves are diseased and cannot rightly see. It was they, indeed, who produced and spread the disease, by their rebellion against God and against His Vicar upon earth. There is, moreover, this difference between bodily and mental

* Not precisely however "anathemas," though it has infallibly censured them.

diseases : a bodily disease is at once known, because it causes discomfort to the mind ; but the man whose mind is diseased does not perceive it, for the disease causes self-satisfaction and pride. The only remedy therefore, for a nation diseased, is to be found in divine science, which comes to the mind from without, which is imposed on the mind, and clears it from error and diseased vision. But this requires a promulgator and interpreter in constant activity. And thus it is that the definition of the dogma of the Papal Infallibility was the only possible remedy for society. Yet statesmen have opposed this remedy. "The light has come into the world, but men have loved darkness rather than the light, because their deeds were evil." (pp. 117, 118.)

There is one feature in the volume, which we certainly regret. The writer is not content with descanting on the grievous injury which society has suffered, through the Church's comparative disuse of intervention in things secular: he urges that it would be a great blessing, if she *at once resumed* this intervention. "Suppose that England were about to enter upon an unjust war" at this very moment; he thinks that most important practical benefit would result, if "the Pope were to denounce" it (p. 17). Nay, he seems to think that the Pope is *bound* to denounce it. "All wars are either just or unjust. It is the duty of the Church to censure every criminal act; for 'qui tacet assentit.'" Such language is surely in effect—though nothing could be further from the excellent author's intention—to accuse the Church of having grossly neglected her bounden duty. And even apart from this, we suppose there are few men who can doubt, that the Holy Father would do immeasurably more harm than good, by expressing a solemn judgment, one by one, on the various political measures of every nation calling itself Christian. Lord R. Montagu would have made better use, we think, of the very important historical facts which he has so serviceably brought together, if he had adduced them—not as illustrations of what the Church could now do if she pleased—but rather as proofs of the deplorable calamity which has befallen society, through its rebellion against ecclesiastical guidance. We greatly fear, that what we must be allowed to call the manifest unreasonableness of this particular opinion may possibly blind some persons to the singular good sense and moderation, by which the work is otherwise distinguished. Those who read it will observe repeated coincidences with F. Harper's statements. And these coincidences are the more remarkable, because the design of the two writers is in many respects so different, and because each must have been wholly unaware of the other's work. F. Harper preached his sermons *in 1866, when* Lord Robert had not yet written; and Lord *Robert published* his work by instalments, in our admirable

contemporary the "Tablet," when F. Harper had not yet published.

We now return to F. Liberatore. His work, as he explains in his Preface, was not written as a whole, but is composed of various articles which appeared from time to time in the "Civiltà." Accordingly it is not exhaustive; for it treats many of the Church's rights without treating all.* By a very few alterations, however, he has wrought it into a consistent whole, which retains very few (if any) traces of its fragmentary origin. We cannot too earnestly recommend its study: for we are not acquainted with any work which can bear comparison with it, as setting forth, *with special reference to existing circumstances*, the Catholic doctrine on Church and State. It is divided into three chapters: (1) "on the Church's position in regard to the State"; (2) "on political naturalism"; and (3) "on the Church's *rights* in face of the State." These are subdivided into various articles; and partly from the peculiar clearness of the author's style, partly from the close and obvious connection of one part with another, we never came across a work which carries the reader more pleasantly along.

As regards its principal doctrine—the Church's divinely-given power over the State, in things bearing on the salvation of souls—several Catholics have of late years so clamorously disavowed and even reviled this doctrine, that a certain idea of exaggeration is conveyed to many minds by its mere mention. Yet a Pontiff so recent and so moderate as Benedict XIV., in his well-known official Letter to the Spanish Grand Inquisitor, speaks of this doctrine as received *everywhere* except in France.† Moreover that one of the four Gallican articles which denied it, was no less peremptorily reprobated by Pope and bishops than the other three. And any one certainly, who reads F. Liberatore's work, will see that nothing can be more alien from its character than the least tinge of exaggeration. For instance, he takes care to explain, that the duty of repressing heresy by the secular arm obliges only where Catholic unity actually exists. That "good once lost" may not be "reacquired by violent means" (p. 52). "The apostolate of the sword was always the prerogative of the Koran, not of the Gospel" (p. 73). Then he makes very clear (p. 16) that he by no means advocates his general doctrine as capable of being

---

* It does not e. g. include any remarks on the *deposing power* exercised in the middle ages. The "Civiltà" supplied this defect in a later article, of which we printed a translation last October.

† We suppose Catholic writers in the British islands were so few as to *escape his attention.*

fully practised, in times so anti-Catholic and so godless as these; just as neither could it be practised in the time of the heathen emperors. But when Catholics cannot do everything, they may nevertheless do something. Even in heathen times a Christian could use what little political influence he might happen to possess, for the purpose of promoting, under the Church's guidance, his country's supernatural welfare; and Catholics of these days can do vastly *more* in that direction. At all events, under all possible circumstances this is the only legitimate norm of a Catholic's political action. Surely there is nothing violent or exaggerated in such a view as this; it resembles a truism rather than a paradox.

It was free to God, we need not say, whether He should or should not promulgate a revelation, and institute the Church and the supernatural order. It is necessary therefore in the first instance to suppose that He had *not* done so, if we would obtain clear views on the State's proper office. On such an hypothesis it would by no means have followed, that the civil ruler could legitimately have placed his predominant end in any lower good, than the promoting among his subjects virtue and the love of God.

> Society, though it be regarded within the pure limits of nature, has for its end virtuousness of life. And there is certainly no virtuousness of life where men fail in their first and supreme duty; which is indubitably that towards the Supreme Author of our being. Authority, in the purely natural order also, has its ministry from on high; and cannot therefore, without misunderstanding its own office, treat on equal terms the good man and the wicked, the worshipper and the blasphemer of God. (p. 49.)

F. Liberatore cites S. Thomas for this doctrine.

> "A virtuous life is the end of human society," says S. Thomas; and he gives as his reason for this statement, "that the same judgment must be formed on the end of the *society* of men, which is formed on the end of *each individual*. . . . . If therefore the end of the individual is virtue, no other can be the chief end of the united multitude of men." (p. 12.)

This doctrine seems to us the one foundation of all true political science; and in the very first number of our new series we argued for it—entirely prescinding from *the Church's* power in temporals—in an article on "the intrinsic end of civil government." F. Harper admirably sets forth and supports this great verity.

> If there be a God in Heaven, Who is our Creator, Preserver, and the final *end for which* we were created, it must inevitably follow that man's true *life and only happiness* consists in the possession of God. And if the posses-

sion of God be the only true happiness and life of *the individual man*, such too must be the end at which *all political government* of whatever kind should aim. Even heathen philosophy teaches us thus much; so deeply is this twofold truth impressed on the rational instincts of our common nature. The great philosopher of antiquity tells us at the beginning of his Ethics, that man's happiness, which is the end of the moral science, consists in the possession of the supreme, perfect, and incomparable Good; which of course, if there be a creating God, all-perfect and self-existent, must be He. But he makes another very important remark, which bears an intimate relation with the idea which I purpose to develop on the present occasion. He says that *the end of the moral science is also the end of the political*; for *what is the end of one man must of necessity be the end of a body or multitude of men.* In other words, the State, if it would wish to fulfil its high and noble office, must direct and aid its citizens to energize for, and aim at, the possession of God, in like manner as each man must energize for, and aim at, such possession. (pp. 28-9.)

And Lord Robert Montagu—

What is the efficient cause of the essential good of a civil society? It is that which is the only guarantee of right or justice; namely, religion. Therefore, the first duty in the art of governing is the preservation and increase of the power of religion in the hearts of all the governed. The ruler must ever keep his eye fixed on the ultimate end of man, and must know the means appointed by the Creator for arriving at it. The government *must aim at the ultimate, and facilitate the proximate good of each citizen;* because to this end does man live in society and submit to rule, and for this end do the bases of the state exist in the family, which is, therefore, "the germ of the state." Now every citizen must tend to spiritual good as his ultimate end; and therefore his *spiritual good must be the work of society and the aim of the government.* But to separate the material or external part of man from his internal or spiritual part, and to say that the former alone is the subject of politics while the latter has nothing to do with politics, is, as we have seen, a grievous error. It is moreover contrary to common sense, for a man cannot be happy if his spiritual part is unhappy. He cannot say: "The same thing makes me politically happy and spiritually unhappy." What is here said of each man is true also of the state: "Non aliunde beata est civitas, aliunde homo; quum aliud civitas non est quàm concors hominum multitudo:" says S. Augustine in his treatise on the Commonwealth of God. For a man, in becoming a citizen, does not cease to be a man. He becomes a man and something more; he adds the duties of a citizen to his separate duties as a man. As an individual man he is impelled, by his instinct for happiness, which is a force of nature, to a spiritual good as his ultimate end. But *as a citizen he should aid others, and should himself obtain aid from society, in pursuing this ultimate good.* In the words of S. Thomas Aquinas, in his treatise De Regimine: "But since man, living according to virtue, has his life ordered towards his ultimate end, which is the fruition of God, as we have already shown; so the whole society must have the same ultimate end *as one man.* Therefore, the ultimate end of the whole society is not to

live in accordance with virtue, but, by means of a virtuous life, to attain to the fruition of God." (pp. 123-4.)*

Here a question arises, which demands consideration. A *Catholic* civil ruler—acting under the Church's authority—can in all security proscribe the publication of anti-Catholic arguments and the exercise of non-Catholic worships, in a country possessing Catholic unity; because he is absolutely certain that Catholicity is the one true religion. What would have been the civil ruler's duty in respect of any analogous coercion, had there been no other than the purely natural order? He ought, says F. Liberatore (p. 11), "to grant liberty of conscience and permission to follow any doctrine, *which is not evidently opposed to the first principles of reason*" (p. 11). And in various different parts of his volume the author builds a powerful argument on this, as illustrating the vast benefit which Christianity has conferred on society. Thus he immediately follows up the passage just quoted, by asking, "*how* can due help be given by the ruler to his subjects' due progress in virtue, if beyond the above-named limits he must allow free rein to every caprice of doctrine, every disorder of practice?" But it would carry us too far to pursue this particular inquiry.

We are here brought to what seems to us the most practically persuasive of all the author's arguments. It runs thus. The end of human society must be (as has been seen) identical with the end of individual man. Introduce now the Church and the supernatural order, what results? Each individual Catholic achieves his true end, in proportion as, under the Church's guidance, he firmly believes revealed truth, and bases on that faith all practices of virtue and piety. If then it be the Church's exclusive function to guide each *individual* to his true end, it must be no less her exclusive function to guide human *societies* to their true end. If she have the power of imposing laws on men in their *individual* capacity, with a view to their sanctification and salvation;—she must equally have the power of imposing laws on each *society* of men, in order to the same purpose. This is also F. Harper's argument:—

The Church concerns herself with the souls, not with the temporal interests, of men, save so far forth as she is asked to do so, or as these indirectly flow from the moral and spiritual peace and progress of a people. And, within

---

* We need hardly explain, in reference to these two passages,—what the authors of course did not dream of disputing,—that that *supernatural* "possession" *and* "fruition" of God, which consists in His facial vision, is not *known to man* except by *revelation* as future.

this her own peculiar sphere, *Kings and Princes and Potentates must obey her orders just as unreservedly as the meanest of their subjects.* She does not pretend to concern herself with commerce, markets, exchange, railroads, war, police, penal laws ; except when these *involve other moral and religious interests far more momentous,* and which come under her especial cognizance. No. She rules over consciences. She guards the immutable principles of right, justice, purity, charity, the worship of God, the eternal salvation of man. She leaves purely earthly matters to earthly kingdoms ; and *does not think of interfering, unless these should entrench upon those unchanging laws of which she is the guardian and judge.* There is therefore room enough for both. The civil and ecclesiastical power have each its own sphere of duty. Nevertheless, it *is of the highest necessity that the civil power should be subservient to the Church as regards the first principles whch direct its action.* This it must needs be for the sake of God's glory, for the sake of Christ's supreme authority, for the sake of true peace, true prosperity, and the ultimate happiness of the governed. Natural philosophy itself plainly teaches, that a power which rules over the heart, conscience, soul, and internal life of man, must be the ultimate refuge and director of a power which can only pretend to direct the outward action and external life. *That Government which guides man on with an infallible authority to his end—to his final perfection, —must give law to a government which, because of its weakness, can only at the very best concern itself with the means towards that end.* The sanctification of the soul, and the eternal beatitude of Heaven,—these are the end of man. And the State by itself knows nothing about them ; so that when it presumes to meddle with them, it at once presents a chaos. Let it, then, concern itself with riches, political economy, taxes, police, international policy, health-bills, and the like, as much as it pleases. But let it leave to God's Church the promulgation of divine truth, the administration of the divine law, the regulation of divine worship, the education of the people, the care of the poor, sick, wounded, prisoners, orphans, sinners. "Render to Cesar the things that are Cesar's, and to God the things that are God's." (pp. 146-8.)

Again, a certain objection, to which F. Harper is replying, assumes throughout the existence of two authorities, independent of each other, equal, both supreme, only in different spheres. I say that this is impossible ; and am willing to own that it would give rise to all the difficulties which have been so clearly depicted. The difficulties of Piedmont, in consequence of this untenable attitude which it has assumed towards the Church, are a striking and living example. But I have already pointed out that *God has given supremacy to the Church alone ;* and consequently that wherever and whenever the principles of the Church are affected, the State must necessarily give way, if it would answer to the end for which it has been constituted. Its laws, its government, its policy, its wars, its commerce and trade, are only legitimate so far as they do not clash with the teaching of Christ and of His Church. Wherever they do so clash, the State must—if it would be Christian, if it would live in the light of God's favour—*lick the dust before the feet of its divinely-appointed Queen.* The captain of a ship does *not ordinarily* unfurl or furl the sails himself, stand at the helm, or run

aloft up the shrouds. He leaves this to others. But he directs, orders, forbids. And the sailors must needs obey his voice. If they should resist, it would soon result in an inevitable shipwreck. (pp. 149-50.)

Lord Robert Montagu contemplates the same doctrine from a somewhat different point of view :—

But how can a ruler know, in every case, what is God's will, unless he hears and obeys a living Church, whose head shall interpret the moral law, and judge acts, and determine controversies? Thus again we arrive at the conclusion, that every ruler owes obedience to the appointed and authoritative head of Christ's Church. If this be not true, what is the alternative? Naturalism. But a natural religion—a God of nature, who does not rule the world—is not sufficient to solve our perplexing political problem. Morever, it is false to assert that "all action of God on mankind and on the world is to be denied." It is also false to suppose that "human reason, without any regard whatever being had to God, is the one judge of truth and falsehood, of good and bad." These fundamental maxims of our opponents have been condemned in the Syllabus. Besides, it stands to reason, that their utilitarian politics, which leave each man to judge of what is right, are no more than universal anarchy. Anarchy, which all condemn in name, means a deficiency of rule, a want of sufficient guidance. If each man is free to judge of what is right or wrong, and of what is good or bad for men, then where can a government of those men reside? The governing authority —the ruler who is to steer the nation and maintain its unity of operation— has no longer a moral power or authority; and therefore it must resort to physical force, in order to secure obedience. Yet the subjects have physical force on their side, and are sure to rebel, unless the ruler is always ready to satisfy their caprices. And why should they not rebel, if their ruler has abjured all moral authority? How then can a ruler govern, when the obedience of his subjects comes merely from fear, and not from moral authority? He must assiduously set one party against another, keeping the parties evenly balanced, and inflaming their jealousies and rivalry. This is the old maxim of "Divide et impera," which was in vogue before the Church was instituted. Such a ruler must, in fact, "divide the kingdom against itself." This is called "party government." It is a pagan institution. Such a "kingdom cannot stand."

But if you do not act on the pagan maxim, the only other alternative is to resort to Christian politics. The ruler must be in subordination to the Head of the Church; he must rule a province in God's commonwealth, and so provide for the moral and religious good of his subjects. He will then stand on another and a firmer base, and will rule by a moral and religious authority; and his subjects will obey, not from fear, but as owning the agent or minister whom God has set over them. (pp. 126-7.)

We fancy the great majority of French "Liberal Catholics" would admit, that the State in its corporate capacity should *aim predominantly* at the promotion of religion and virtue, and *by no means* merely of temporal enjoyment. Their tenet is

that of *political naturalism;* they hold that the State as such should ignore *the Church* and the *supernatural* order. Their error then, though singularly perverse and paradoxical, does not contradict the essential principles of reason and morality. But F. Liberatore certainly describes *some* of his opponents as having fallen into a far lower abyss; as maintaining, that the advancement of virtue itself is a matter to which, as such, the State in its corporate action should be entirely indifferent. As F. Harper points out, even the more enlightened *heathen* philosophers would have abhorred such a notion.

We have been able to exhibit no more than a very small part of the Roman theologian's reasoning. He adduces his arguments from various sources; from the first principles of morality and religion, from the elementary doctrines of Catholicity, from the Church's constant practice, from her express definitions. If any Catholic liberal has so much as attempted to derive a defence of his doctrine from any of these four sources, we have not had the good fortune to come across his treatise. These gentlemen abound in reprehensive language: "retrograde movement"; "ecclesiastical tyranny"; "dark ages"; "ages of blood"; such a vocabulary is familiar to their lips. But they shrink with a sure instinct from the arena of theological and philosophical argument.

We must not omit to mention the ironical "defence of the Commune," with which Lord Robert Montagu's volume concludes. It contains a most serious and unanswerable argument, though ironically expressed. How are the principles of the International to be resisted, unless the principles of '89—the so-called principles of modern society—be abandoned? The imaginary internationalist thus concludes:—

> These inconsistent liberals, with pale and quivering lips, ask: "How are we to stop this irruption of barbarians?" How, indeed! By force you cannot; for force is on the side of numbers. Besides, what is physical force against an absorbing idea? "For it is, as the air, invulnerable, and your vain blows malicious mockery." Jules Favre confesses that force is useless, and tells you to seek a moral change. But to produce a moral change you must have a moral power, and a more potent idea than that which you have to combat. Here we may laugh you to scorn; for there is no idea half so potent as that which you yourselves have been humbugged into destroying, by means of your rationalism; that idea which you yourselves have mutilated, by adopting our principle of separating morality from religion, and eliminating Christianity from politics. There is no idea so potent as that one which you have well-nigh killed out of this country—I mean the Church; that Church which has indeed stood the storms of eighteen centuries, *and whose principle* it has ever been to combat "the world, the flesh

and the devil," which are our and your best allies; that Church which now has undertaken an internecine war against your own principles—the principles of '89. That is the only idea we Communists had to fear; and you have released us from that fear. For you never had but two courses to choose from: you had either to join heart and hand with us, or else to retrace your steps, and submit to the Church, and to the Ruler whom the Church has declared to be infallible; and I say that you cannot now retrace your steps, for you have well-nigh cut off your retreat. There is nothing left for the liberals, then, but to become Communists, and enter into the cause with as much ardour as we did in Paris. (pp. 148, 149.)

Look at the public events which are proceeding over the whole stage of the civilized world. In how conspicuous and irresistible a light do they place that truth, for which our three authors are contending; viz. that the great body of social corruption which surrounds us originates in the State's practical apostasy from the Church! In one pole of the social sphere stands the Church, in the other the Revolution: between the two are the civil governments, obliged to fight against the latter in their own defence, and yet recalcitrating against the sweet yoke of the former. Were Church and State united, the army of combined anarchists and antitheists would be unable to occupy one single stronghold: under existing circumstances it seems the more probable supposition, that they are moving to ultimate victory. Or, changing our metaphor,—the present social fabric is not improbably tottering to its fall; and if so, when its ruin is consummated, amidst earthquake and tempest a new social edifice will have to be slowly and patiently constructed. We are persuaded that no such edifice will be able to withstand the fury of those elements which have been let loose in our time, unless it have for its corner-stone the Rock of Peter.

Art. III.—SAINTS' LIVES AS SPIRITUAL READING.

Lives of the Modern Saints. Oratorian Series. Richardson & Son.

Life of S. Catherine of Ricci. (Same Series.) Founded upon the Processes.

The Life and Letters of S. Francis Xavier. By Henry James Coleridge, of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates.

Essay on the Interest and Characteristics of the Lives of the Saints, with Illustrations from Mystical Theology. By F. W. Faber, Priest of the Oratory. Richardson & Son.

THERE can be no healthier sign of the growth of the Catholic spirit in any country than a wide-spread, earnest, and spiritual study of the lives of God's Saints. Wherever and whenever this is found, it is a proof that men are becoming conscious of a higher citizenship than that of earth,—a citizenship which, without destroying their interest in the course and vicissitudes of national, or civil, or domestic life, does but purify and raise it to a higher level, and make it worthy of the destinies of their own God-like souls. It is a proof that they already feel that they have here no continuing city, but that, although living themselves "in cottages" or "tabernacles," their eyes are fixed upon "that city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God." Now "that city" is the Catholic Church, not indeed as yet all-radiant and glorious, as it shall be hereafter, when it shall have no more need of the sun or the moon to shine in it, but still beautiful and perfect, with its foundations of precious stones already laid, and its walls of jasper-stone, and its gates, each of one several pearl, and its streets of pure gold, lit up even now, amidst the mists of earth, with rays from the Eternal Throne. Wherever and whenever, therefore, men begin to realize in their hearts, and to show forth, however imperfectly, in their daily lives, whether public or private, that they are fellow-citizens with the saints, and that their conversation is in heaven, there and then we may be sure that the whole Catholic system, down even to its minutest details, is in progress of being carried out with unselfish loyalty and childlike simplicity and obedience, simply because they are endeavouring to walk in the footsteps of those who have themselves been filled with the fulness of His spirit Who *filleth all in all*, and Who yet has chosen the heart of a

little child as the type of the highest citizenship in the kingdom of heaven. There and then the written Word of God, we may be sure, will speak with a diviner voice to the souls of men, because they will have entered into closer membership with Him Who is *the* Word, spoken from everlasting in the silence of the Eternal Mind, outspoken in the fulness of time on the gracious lips of Mary's Son. There and then the glorious Catholic dogma will be studied with a keener relish by the Church's priests, who, quickened into new life by the purer air of these life-giving truths, will come down from the mountain with redoubled vigour, to lead and encourage the people of God in their wanderings through the plain. There and then the majesty of the Divine Law will be a lamp to the consciences of men, casting its rays alike upon public and private life, enlightening the councils of the senate both by showing a higher standard than that of mere human policy, and by disclosing the hidden pitfalls of un-Christian statesmanship, solving the more difficult social problems in harmony with the will of the Divine Ruler of the world, and lighting up the path of each struggling soul towards all that is good, and beautiful, and true, and noble, and just, and pure. There and then the dignity of the Church's law will be recognized, and allowed to throw its light upon human law and its shadow upon human institutions; while loyalty to the Sacred Person of the Vicar of Christ, and childlike obedience not only to the solemn decrees, but also to the wishes of the Holy See, will sanctify and fertilize the land. There and then the spirit of asceticism will seize hold of the nobler amongst men, and transfigure them inwardly and outwardly into the Master's likeness, destroying in them all that is not His, building up within them the temple of the Holy Ghost, purifying the troubled waters of their souls, and making them smooth and limpid, so as to catch and reflect the rays of the light and purity of God; simplifying their hearts by detaching them from creatures, and attaching them to God alone; binding their free-will to His will by fetters of love, so that they may have no other will but His: in a word, rehabilitating their spirit, and enabling them to grow to the full height of the stature of Christ, "unto the measure of the perfect man." There and then, last of all, amongst the noblest souls, if God so will, will be seen those rarer manifestations of His mighty gifts, which, when purification has begot light and light has begot love, liquefy the heart and cause the soul, still preserving her created essence, to melt away into the object of *her love, and to* become one with Him, that God may be all *in all. We have* said last of all, and yet this is hardly all; for

side by side with, and underneath the shadow of these leading glories, which a widespread and whole-hearted study of the lives of the blessed saints confers upon a church or nation, and which may be said to stand out in the garden of the Christian life like the cedars of Libanus, the "trees of God," there will spring up on all sides a luxuriant undergrowth of beautiful and varied devotions to Christ's sacred Humanity, His Maiden-Mother, and all the saints, gladdening the people of God with the fragrance of their flowers and the richness of their fruits. Such are the glories, such the gifts, blessings, graces, and advantages which the study of the lives of God's saints brings with it. "Such glory have all the saints," the once mortified, but now glorified members of His Body, "Who was begotten before the morning star amid the brightness of the saints."

Are these glories beginning to show themselves in England in the midst of our Church and people? Of the manifestation of the higher gifts of God which may be going on in elect souls, we dare hardly speak; nay, we cannot tell. He alone knows, to Whose eyes "all the ways of a man are open, and Who is the weigher of spirits." God alone knows, and His blessed Mother, without whose knowledge no grace is given, and the saints and angels, who are ever marvelling with intensest joy as they watch how loop by loop of the gracious network of God's providence is being worked out day by day, and hour by hour, and minute by minute, in the souls of men, in perfect conformity with that divine pattern, conceived from everlasting, on which they are ever gazing in the Eternal Mind. It has been said, indeed, that the higher gifts of God and the secrets of heroic virtue have hardly ever been known to come to their perfection in a missionary country. "Even the virtues of the Jesuit Paraguay," says Father Faber, "or the old Franciscan California, were far other things." Yet when we look around, and see how those masterworks of the elder saints, the contemplative institutes, the whole business of whose daily and nightly lives is with God alone, unstained by contact with the rough tumult of the world, undimmed even by the dust of Martha's busy toil, are beginning once more, after centuries of desolation—not, indeed, as yet in many places, but here a little and there a little,—to strike their roots downwards in this long desecrated land, is it too much to hope that the day is not far distant when they will also bear fruit upwards in God's sight,—that mystical fruit of prayer and praise and of death in life which is the Church's hidden sustenance in every age, because it is the *principle of life* in death,—to be gathered in His own

good time by the hands of men, perhaps even by these hands of ours in the face of all the world?

The religious orders, too, both of men and women, who bring forth the fruits of prayer in action and sanctify action by prayer, themselves in like manner the offspring of the saints, are again amongst us, not coming one by one, but crowding into our land, and pitching their tents now in the heart, now on the outskirts of our great cities, or nestling down amidst the pleasant fields and green hedges of our country parts. All these are bearing witness that the saintly life, the features and the name of which England had forgotten, is still a reality lying within her grasp, while each, by showing forth in its own way its own peculiar type of sanctity, testifies to that beautiful variety in unity which in grace as well as in nature is the finger-mark of every work of the Most High. Shall these be always barren of the higher manifestations of the Spirit's working, or is it England alone that must remain a stranger to the wonderful works of God which have been wrought even in our own time in so many a congregation, especially of religious women, in France, and Italy, and Belgium? Again we say we cannot tell, but surely His arm is not shortened Who has sent these His servants, the children of the saints, to visit us; nor do we see why the sword of the soldier-priest S. Ignatius should be less sharp, or its temper less bright, in the midst of an English noviciate, than when piercing the soul and spirit and dividing the very bone and marrow of Italian boys gathered round the virgin-body of S. Stanislaus upon the Quirinal. Who shall say that the day shall never come when Woodchester and Haverstock Hill shall give us white-robed sons of S. Dominic as saintly as those that have gone forth from S. Sabina on the Aventine to the uttermost ends of the earth? Shall the cord of S. Francis be less powerful to fasten our English youths and maidens to the poverty of the blessed Cross on the downs of Sussex or in the valleys of Gloucestershire than it has been for six hundred years on the hill-side of Assisi or in the valley of Spoleto? Is the Sacred Heart of the world's Saviour less mighty in its pulsations of sanctifying love when its likeness is worn upon the habit of an English Passionist as he meditates on our Lord's Passion, the source of all holiness, amongst the hills of Worcestershire, or looks down from the rising ground of Highgate upon the sins of the great city, than when worn at SS. John and Paul's close to our own S. Gregory's on the Cælian? Who shall venture to say this when our Lord *Himself deigned* to break, as it were, the silence of the *Adorable Sacrifice*, and to show S. Paul of the Cross his

future children working in the fields of England? Why has God sent us the children of S. Alfonso, the messengers of the Redeemer, unless in themselves and amongst our people to stir up that spirit of prayer by which the holy bishop thought to reconcile the omnipotence of God's efficacious grace with the freedom of man's will? Why is our Lady heaping fresh fuel upon the altars of Carmel, unless to draw down once again from heaven the fire of the Lord, as in the days of Elias the Prophet, when the altars of the living God had been pulled to pieces by the false prophets of Baal, in order that it may again consume the holocaust, and the wood and the stones and the dust, and lick up the very water in the trenches;—that same fire which she kindled of old with her own hands in English hearts when she gave her brown habit to S. Simon Stock? Why is it that her own domestics, the Servites of Mary, have been sent to us from Italy, unless Mary has a work for them to do in London of a kindred nature with that which at the first she gave them to do among the rich merchants of Florence? Why all these congregations of holy women which she is sending to us year by year from generous-hearted France,—generous to Christ and to us, even during its own death-struggle of well-nigh a hundred years with revolution and the powers of darkness,—to minister to our every want, to our poor, our sick, and our children, if not to build up in England for her Son a people thoroughly furnished unto all good works? Who can count up all the graces, and inspirations, and conversions, and vocations to the priesthood and the religious state, which have come to us during the last twenty years and more from S. Philip, the apostle of apostolic Rome itself, since the day when he drew to his side out of the house of bondage one of the leaders of English thought, and gave him a work to do hardly less important than that which he gave to Baronius in his own day? Who can measure the growth in holiness, the sanctification of family life and of individual souls, the increase of the Catholic spirit of loyalty to the Vicar of Christ, of devotion to the saints and of the study of their lives, which have all been S. Philip's gifts to England from the day when his spirit took possession of Father Faber's whole being, and taught him the secret how to make the beauty of holiness attractive to the minds and hearts of thousands of our people? Who can call to mind all this, and say that at least the seeds of the higher spiritual life have not been sown upon English soil? Nay, even if we confine our thoughts to Father Faber's written works, and to the harvest of good which, under God, we have a right to look *for from them* not only in our own days, but amongst our

children's children, who shall venture to limit the effect of S. Philip's mission? Twenty years ago this very year, when preaching before the fathers of our restored English Church in the first synod of Westminster, Father Newman said that the shadow of the saints was there in their religious orders. How much more true are those words now than then? S. Benedict, S. Dominic, and S. Ignatius may be said, indeed, to have never left us, and S. Bernard came to join the holy work before the dawn of that "second spring"; but saints have come since then, whom England knew not in the olden time, and new saints still are coming. Other lands are driving them from their coasts, and they are asking for a home in England, so that the loss of other lands is becoming our great gain. If, therefore, Father Newman, speaking of sanctity amongst ourselves, could say even then of the glories of our second temple, that "saints shall rise out of them if God so will," may not we say, now that the shadows of the saints are multiplied, that the prospects of our being visited by the higher gifts of God are proportionately extended and enlarged?

But this is not all. Have we not the poor always with us, and when have ever contemplative souls been wanting amongst Christ's forgotten and forsaken poor? Nay, here we will grow bold, and ask whether there be even one London priest of only a few years' experience who has not found *one* at least among his poor, perhaps the poorest among the very poor, in whose soul, intimately united with God, the seven pillars of the mystical temple have risen up in all their beauty of proportion and magnificence of strength? One perhaps it was of whom the world knew nothing, or knew only to shrink from and avoid, but whom Divine Purity had singled out for the sanctuary of its rest; one hardly strong enough to bear up against the never-ebbing tide of London poverty, and yet strong enough to welcome the pressure of the waves of Almighty love; one, it may be, who amidst the seething tumult of the mighty Babylon was able to keep her thoughts centred upon the Crucified, while the rich and the profligate, and the impure and the blasphemer, and the drunkard jostled by her, without ever turning them to what was going on around her, save to offer acts of reparation for some foul word or hideous oath, or to breathe a prayer of love for a poor abandoned sister in the streets, for whose soul the Good Shepherd was yearning with the same unutterable tenderness as that with which He forgave Magdalen her sins. *Such a one* some of our readers may perhaps have known—*ay, not one* alone, but two and three; yet if there be but

one such soul in each London parish, can we be said to be even now altogether without the first-fruits of the higher gifts of heroic sanctity, or of the secrets of heroic love? How often is it that amongst the hearts of the poor the change of the right hand of the Most High begins? So perhaps it may be in England, and God grant it may be, for it is saints, more than other blessings, that England stands in need of now.

But leaving aside for the present these higher gifts, and keeping only to the thought of those other invaluable advantages, which, as we have said, are the constant attendants upon a widely-diffused knowledge of the lives of the saints, namely, the practical working out in all its parts and with greater perfection of the whole Catholic system, a deeper insight into the Written Word, a keener appreciation of the Christian dogma, a more reverent observance of the law of God and of the Church, a deeper and more sensitive loyalty to the Holy See, and last of all, the growth of the spirit of asceticism; have we not made progress in some of these at least during the last twenty years? Of course in a country, the vast majority of whose inhabitants are either Protestants or unbelievers, the whole Catholic system cannot be perfectly carried out, nor can the Church's law exercise its proper public influence; and yet even here we do not think it can be denied that a far higher standard both of Catholic principle and, so far as is possible, of Catholic practice exists among Catholics themselves, than could have been found in England before the first Synod of Westminster; and we believe that although we are still comparatively few in number, the existence of this high Catholic principle in the midst of us and the example of our Catholic practice will in time be strong enough, under the Divine blessing, to leaven the whole mass of the English people. If we should be asked for a proof of this happy change, we need only contrast the low views which were taken of the relation of the spiritual power to the temporal and of that of the Church's constitution and government to the State at the time of Catholic Emancipation, with those higher and sounder principles which are now, we may say, received and adhered to by our leaders at the present time. What, for example, can be more consoling than the difference in this respect between the utterances of the public speakers of that day, and the speeches of such laymen as the Duke of Norfolk, the Earl of Denbigh, Sir G. Bowyer, and our other leading men at the present? The circumstances are no doubt greatly altered, and for these we make all allowance, but the *gain is not the less* striking or important; nay, it is rendered

even more striking and important by the utter want of influence within the Catholic body of those very few amongst our public men who fail to rise to the higher and more Catholic level. So again, the same may be said of loyalty to the Holy See, which seems to us to be far more widespread, practical, and thorough than it was twenty years ago, entering as it does into the hearts of our Catholic youth in quite a remarkable way, as the recent deputations to the Holy Father have shown. Many circumstances, indeed, external to England, have contributed to this, such as the heroic character, the saintliness, and persecutions of the Holy Father himself, and the revival of Catholic devotion, and of somewhat of the old crusading spirit throughout the whole of Christendom; but still, independently of all this, there have been other influences at work which belong to England alone, and amongst which we must place the teaching and example of the first Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, and of his Grace the present Archbishop, the thoroughly Roman spirit of our episcopate, and the preaching and writings of Father Faber. So too, it is impossible to exaggerate the healthful influence upon the English Catholic body, and far beyond it, at the present time, of the sermons and pastoral letters of our chief Pastor, whom God seems specially to have raised up to carry on and perfect the work of his great predecessor, and to grapple with the four great evils of the day, by setting before men's eyes the fourfold Sovereignty of God over the intellect and will of man, over society, and the course of the world—sermons in which knowledge of the Holy Scriptures is only equalled by a firm and vigorous grasp of the Catholic dogma in its Divine completeness; or again, of the discourses of Father Newman, which are read wherever the English tongue is spoken, or of those of the Jesuit Fathers, whose mission seems to be to bring our higher classes into subjection to the law of Christ. All these are endowing us with a deeper knowledge of the Divine Word and the Divine Law, while at the same time they help to create amongst us a higher standard of sacred eloquence, for which we cannot be too thankful. Nor would it be right to forget to mention here the incalculable benefits we have received from the happy way in which Catholic dogma has been placed before our people in so many of the works of Father Faber. Yet once more, although the spirit of the age, as indeed in every age of excessive material civilization, is eminently unascetical, and although we ourselves are constantly exposed to the danger of catching *the prevailing* epidemic, at least in a milder form, yet we *find it impossible* to deny that the spirit of asceticism has

been growing, in the midst of us, slowly perhaps, yet surely and perceptibly for many years past, and is still growing. Not to speak of the works of F. Faber on the spiritual life, why are such works as those of Scaramelli, Courbon, Boudon, Condren, and others too many to mention,—nay, such higher works as those of S. Teresa, S. John of the Cross, Blessed Angela of Foligno, and S. Gertrude,—or again those grand old English spiritual and mystical works, on which our forefathers fed their souls, before England was severed from the Church, as e. g. Hilton's "Scale of Perfection," "The Cloud," "The Revelations of Mother Juliana of Norwich,"—why are all those appearing, or beginning to appear among us, unless indeed, as the "Tablet" remarked the other day, the Holy Spirit is seeking to stir up within us a spirit of antagonism to that selfish love of ease and pleasure, and lust of gold, which are eating out the manhood from the hearts of so many English youths, and withering up the affections of so many English maidens? Surely it is a good sign that the hearts of the children are being turned to their fathers, to listen to the words of spiritual wisdom which were spoken in England of the past; surely it is a healthful sign that the holy men and women of every age are speaking to us of the things of God in our own English tongue. Demand, we all know, creates supply, and these works, we may be sure, would not be supplied to us if there were no demand. Here, then, surely we have at least the seed of still higher and holier things, although the harvest may be long in coming:—

> God has sown, and He will reap,
> Growth is slow when roots are deep.

Lastly, for twenty years and more the many and varied devotions of Catholic lands, and above all, Roman devotions, have been taking root amongst us. Thus, only to mention two; the Forty Hours' Adoration has encouraged a more watchful love of the Blessed Sacrament, the Month of May has nourished a more tender love of our Blessed Lady. In this last respect alone,—devotion to the Mother of God, the change is beyond measure striking, while the benefits we have received thereby are simply incalculable, for wherever Mary is, there all good things come together with her, and devotion to the Mother is the surest way of drawing down blessings from the Son. A great change indeed, since the day when, as we learnt from his own lips, Cardinal Wiseman, on first going to Ushaw College from Spain, was the only boy who owned a Rosary, or even from the day when an English priest, now a Cistercian father, erected the first image of our

Lady in London, at S. Mary's, Chelsea! Ah! how much we owe to that Rosary of Cardinal Wiseman's boyhood!

Now for a moment let us pause, and ask ourselves when it was that these great and memorable changes began to renew the face of the Catholic Church in England? Do they not date from the very time when the publication of the Lives of the Modern Saints began in England? We do not of course mean to say, that all these changes for the better followed the publication of the saints' lives as effect follows cause (although of some of them this is true), for we have already said that many causes contributed to bring them about; but we do say, that they developed themselves side by side with the gradual unfolding of the ascetical and mystical lives of the servants of God, and that as "all things work together unto good to such as, according to His purpose, are called to be saints," so the influence and lives of those who are already saints help forward every good work within the Church. For what is the influence of the saints except the Blood of Christ passing from His Sacred Heart through the more honourable to the weaker members of His Body; and what are their lives, except the Life of Christ living again in them? Nay, we know that the promoters of the Lives of the Modern Saints had some at least of these changes in view when they undertook their publication; and this is especially true of the honour and love of our Blessed Lady, and of asceticism, with the latter of which we are at present more immediately concerned. We know also that he who both conceived the plan, and was the animating spirit of the whole work, was also one of the chief instruments chosen by God to bring about these changes. Let us listen to what F. Faber says of his series of the Lives of the Saints seven years after he had stated in the original prospectus, that the Lives in question had three objects: to put down "earthly principles and low views of grace," "to make inquirers more really in earnest about their souls," and to spread "the honour and love" of our Blessed Lady.* The passage is so much to our purpose, that we will quote it at length. The italics are of course our own.

> The Lives of the Saints, it was hoped, would be a fair contribution to the ascetical work of which we have spoken. It was thought that it would *help*

---

* Writing on Sept. 23, 1847, to Mr. Watts Russell, F. Faber thus speaks of the Lives of the Saints:—"I often think in the middle of the weary drudgery, what invisible secret good this or that life may do—what love to *Jesus and Mary* it may breed—what souls it may stir onward to perfection, *and how the blessed saints will love those who thus work to manifest Quam mirabilis Deus in sanctis suis.* ("Life and Letters of F. W. Faber," p. 323.)

forward every department of it very materially. And we have not been disappointed of our hope. It is now nearly seven years since the first steps were taken towards the publication. How many were the doubts, the difficulties, the disappointments! How many the fears, the thwartings, the despondencies, the beginnings of drawing back! The rooms at Oscott can witness, where the then Coadjutor of the Central District combated the doubts and fears, made himself the foster-father of the series, and bore it triumphantly over obstacles which less confidence in the goodness of the plan, less devotion to the later saints, many of whom were little known in England, and less generosity in staking his own name and credit on the soundness or discretion of a convert never could have surmounted. There is a story told of the deathbed of Surius, that in the last agony all the blessed spirits—and there were hosts of them—whose lives he had published, assisted and supported the dying man. May the saints of our series do the same for our kind patron, when His Eminence shall come to die; and it is but one of many reasons for trusting that day is far, far off, that the longer it shall be delayed the more saints there shall be to lighten the darkness with their beautiful ministries!*

Since then, both His Eminence and Father Faber have passed away, and—how can we doubt it?—have been gathered to the company of the saints whom they served so faithfully on earth. The prayer of the one for the other has been heard for himself, and both have felt on their own death-beds how precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of His Saints. Yes, and the prayer then uttered has been heard for those who are now living, as well as for those who have passed away, and more saints have come to minister to us who are still alive. Even here, too, what a change in our estimate of the value and importance of the study of the saints' example, from the day when the publication of the Lives of the Modern Saints began with fear and much trembling, nay, when for a time it had to be suspended, because the beauty of their saintly wisdom seemed to not a few amongst us as little better than foolishness and a scandal! But the main consequence which we wish to draw from Father Faber's words, and indeed from all that has been hitherto said, is the close and intimate connection between the study of the lives of the saints, *as saints*, and the growth of the spirit of asceticism, as well as the progress of the Church in England in every good and perfect gift. Now this brings us to the point on which we wish especially to dwell at present, the very object for which this article is written. We feel most strongly that if the study of the lives of the saints is to exercise its full influence and to have its full effect upon our souls, this can only be when the

---

* "On the Interest and Characteristics of the Lives of the Saints," pp. 119–20.

saints are regarded and studied, not as great and remarkable characters, not even as great and remarkable in the history of the Church, but as the living embodiments of His Spirit, Who is the life and light of men. Not that the human side of their lives, whether historical or psychological, is not most interesting, or has not its own allotted place in the literature of every Catholic country; quite the contrary, for we hold that at the present day, and especially in England, works which treat in this way of the lives of the saints may be of immense service by helping to correct the many corrupt influences of our current literature, and by attracting men to the Church, who would never otherwise come across her path, and who would in all probability be repelled by any direct treatment of their sanctity. But let it be distinctly understood, that this is not the aim, or the object, or the end for which the lives of the saints should be either studied or written. This is not what we mean by Hagiology. It is the divine side of their lives, the saintly element, the life of Christ manifested within them, with which Hagiology has to do, just as its *sole* end is to enable those who read them to *become thereby more closely united with God*. Now it is evident that for this it is necessary that the lives of the saints should be written in such a method as both to set the whole saint before the reader, and to bring out clearly and distinctly the several elements of sanctity, one by one. All therefore that is over and above, or beside this, however beautiful and interesting, and deserving of record in its own proper place,—all that is merely of human interest, becomes a positive hindrance and a distraction. A certain amount, no doubt, of biography there ought to be to serve as a frame for the portrait of the saint, but it ought be a frame, nothing more. Hence we said in October of last year, when noticing Father Genelli's life of S. Ignatius, that the "history should present us with a portrait of the *saint*, the devout portrait of the saint should give us the lineaments of the man." This will be seen more clearly further on; meanwhile we must say a few words upon the necessity for this method, if Hagiology is to fulfil its object and gain its end, keeping in view, as we have done all along throughout this article, not only the sanctification of individual souls, but also the progress of the Church in England.

From the very beginning of the publication of the "Oratorian Lives of the Saints," exception has been taken every now and then to the "hagiological" method on which so *many of the* lives are written, and which Italian writers, *with true Catholic* instinct, have generally adopted. Father

Faber had publicly stated his preference for this method from the first, and it was chiefly to combat the objections brought against it, that, in the year 1852, he wrote his Essay "On the Interest and Characteristics of the Lives of the Saints," prefixed to the "Life of S. Francis of Assisi." He there tells us that in a previous essay, published five years before, the promoters of the series, while meeting objections of a different nature, had found it necessary to say: "The lives drawn up for or from the processes of canonization, were always to be preferred, although often with less literary attractiveness about them than lives written with more freedom. The object of the series is rather spiritual than literary; and *as all masters of the spiritual life tell us* that the biographies of the saints should be read slowly, *pausatim*, and a little at a time, the style of the processes seemed in some degree more suitable" (p. 82). Again, in the same page, "Notes were to be avoided as much as possible, as so many vents of private opinion, and involving more or less the office of critic or censor." This original idea, F. Faber assures us, had been consistently kept to up to the time when he was then writing. Then, after noticing the historical and psychological interest attached to the Lives of the Saints, and admitting that, when written from these points of view, they are in many respects more captivating, and more obviously telling to those who only read them as they would read the lives of Wellington or Nelson, than when written on the method he has adopted for his own series, he goes on to speak of that higher and more practical interest which is taken in them by those who *use them for spiritual reading*, in order to make them bear upon "their daily lives, their prayers, mortifications, self-knowledge, and devotional practices." We confess that we ourselves think that F. Faber has somewhat underrated the interest which cannot fail to be excited in our minds even when looking at the saints *as saints;* for when a man has once felt what a marvellous and divine creation is disclosed in the soul of each separate saint, and then goes on to think of the countless multitude and endless variety of these creations of spiritual beauty—how saint differs from saint, as "star from star in glory"; how infinitely varied are the same heroic virtues common to all when looked at in the soul of each,—more varied far, under the sweet breath of God, than the leaves of the forest trees, as they are shaken by the summer wind, more many-hued, as they lie on the bosom of the Eternal, than the delicately-tinted shells on the shore of the boundless sea;—surely that man must become absorbed and fascinated, and his heart must burn with an interest which, although dependent upon, may

very well be distinct from, any higher and supernatural delight, yet which at the same time is more intense than that which accompanies his contemplation of the beautiful face of God's world, or of the intellectual gifts and characters of men. But perhaps F. Faber is speaking only of unscientific minds, for he admits that a scientific mind may have "a turn" for Hagiology, as well as ascetical and mystical theology, without any love of mortification, or of the spiritual life, just as a man may have a taste for dogmatic theology without any earnest desire to save his soul.

However, be this as it may, we do not see, unless we are to go against the teaching of all the masters of the spiritual life, how it can be denied that the chief interest of the Lives of the Saints lies in their sanctity, that is to say, in their heroic exercise of the virtues, theological and cardinal, quickened by the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost,* and that their chief value consists in their practical bearing as *spiritual reading*, to enable men to purify their daily lives from the dross of earthly things, to inform their intellect with somewhat of that deeper faith which enabled the saints to overcome the world, and to bring their wills into perfect subjection to that of their master, Christ. We say *spiritual* reading, because, as Scaramelli admirably remarks, "a study of spiritual books is one thing, to read holy books spiritually is quite a different thing. When we study, our object is to gain a knowledge of the truths we read, while in spiritual reading we aim at gaining love for those truths, and penetrating ourselves with them through and through, in order afterwards to reduce them to practice. Study aims at enlightening the mind" (and we may say the same thing of the interest taken in the Lives of the Saints as mere biographies, histories, or as affording matter for psychological investigation); "spiritual reading is intended to perfect the will by means of pious affections, and to spur it on to put these affections into practical shape."† In a word, purification, illumination, union with God; or, if we reduce these to their constituent parts, penance and mortification, prayer and meditation in the earlier stages of the spiritual life, union with God by contemplation, and the higher kinds of prayer in the later and more perfect stages; these are the fruits of the spiritual reading of the Lives of the Saints. It follows, therefore, necessarily, that the Lives of the

---

* We speak thus generally in order to avoid touching upon the question of the relation of the gifts of the Holy Ghost to the virtues, which seems to *us one of the* most perplexing questions of theology.

† *Scaramelli*, "Direttorio Mistico," Sect. I. Art. iv. c. 3.

Saints, if they are to fulfil this high and holy function, should be composed on such a method and plan, and written in such a style, as to set the heroic virtues of the saints in the clearest possible light before the minds of those who are wrestling with sin and aiming at a higher life, and to afford the means of easy and ready reference to all who may wish to consult them. It follows, further, as we have just hinted, that every method which makes the biographical or historical or psychological interest overshadow the all-important practical interest which should be taken in the sanctity of the saints, necessarily deprives the reader who uses their lives for spiritual reading of the higher advantages which he looks to find in them; while every kind of style which causes the reader to think more of the manner in which the lives are written than of the lives themselves, becomes an actual distraction and a drawback. For, as F. Faber tells us, if there be one thing upon which the masters of the spiritual life are agreed, it is that the works used for spiritual reading, or as a help to mental prayer,—and the Lives of the Saints are, of course, eminently fitted for such a purpose,—should be read slowly, a little at a time, with many pauses and ejaculations. Hence it has been recommended that the works chosen should be those which are not too attractive to the intellect; nay, according to the rule of F. Consolini, the first novice-master of the Oratory, that they "should not be even read quite through, in order to lose the intellectual interest which completeness might give." Nourishment of the spirit, not instruction of the mind, is the end for which the Lives of the Saints should be written. Now it is quite clear that all this is almost wholly incompatible with any method in which the mere biographical, historical, intellectual, or psychological interest is kept in view as the main object. However admirable the works may be which are written on such a method, and however useful in their own proper place, they can hardly be called lives of the saints, or be said to belong to the province of Hagiology, but are simply the lives of great, or wonderful, or intellectual, or exceptional *men* who have happened to be holy; and of course the greater this kind of interest, the farther they are removed from all that we understand by Hagiology.

We may illustrate these remarks by a very valuable work, "The Life and Letters of S. Francis Xavier," the first volume of which has been recently brought out by F. Coleridge. This work is professedly written to "satisfy in some sort the legitimate requirements of our own time." It is meant to bring *out* "those indications of personal character in the life

of S. Francis Xavier which, as in the case of other great men and conspicuous saints, are to be found in their own words, in their letters, in anecdotes which set them familiarly before our eyes, and the like." (Preface, p. vii.)

Again, he tells us that in these days—

> We value above all things the minute traits of character and shades of ceeling which can only be discerned by close and faithful study of the mind and heart of some one in whose history we are interested, and set the highest store on such *biographies as make this study most easy to us*, by putting before us in its native simplicity whatever comes to us most immediately from such a heart and mind.
>
> There can be no doubt that if S. Francis Xavier had lived within the present century, the first thought of his biographers would have been to collect every detail within reach, even as to the external circumstances and scenery of his career, and that in particular every scrap of writing that ever proceeded from his pen would have been religiously preserved and examined, even if it had not been published. Such was not the way in which biographies were written in the generation which succeeded that of Francis Xavier and Ignatius, and the lives which that generation and subsequent generations produced differ in proportion from those which we require. (Preface, pp. vii. viii.)

The above passage, and especially the words which we have italicized, sufficiently show that in the opinion of the author, Lives of the Saints written in the form of biography are more suited to the requirements of our own time than those which are composed on the method adopted by past generations. Now we fully admit, with F. Coleridge, that biographical Lives of the Saints are exceedingly valuable, and peculiarly suited both to the tastes and needs of the present day. We go even farther, and say that a life of a saint may with great advantage be written in many different ways, and we think this especially true of such a life as that of S. Francis Xavier, which is full of so much varied interest, and which might very well be written from four or five distinct points of view. This is equally true of the lives of such saints as S. Bernard, S. Gregory VII., and S. Pius V., who were the central figures of their times, or of S. Thomas Aquinas, whose gigantic intellect may be said to have left its impress upon human science for all time. Hence the importance of such a work as F. R. Vaughan's "History of S. Thomas." We therefore gladly welcome F. Coleridge's carefully-written biography as an important addition to our English Catholic literature, and, indeed, as a gain to the whole Church. But we cannot allow *either that this* kind of life is the highest kind, or that even at the *present time it* ought to be exclusively adopted. Certainly,

when we take into consideration the highest and holiest ends which the Lives of the Saints are capable of fulfilling, the biographical form,—and this applies equally to every other form in which merely human interest predominates,—cannot and ought not, as it seems to us, to be preferred to the method generally adopted by Italian hagiologists, founded, as the latter is, upon the Processes by which the heroic sanctity of the saints is brought to light and established. "Canonization," says F. Faber, "is not concerned with the historical interest or importance of the facts, but with *given results* of heroism, no matter under what pressure or from what occasions." Again, speaking of the manifestations of natural character, he says that "in respect of canonization these are only *accidental* characteristics of the saints, and though full of spiritual teaching, they are not the reason for which the Church honours them upon her altars."

That surely must be the highest kind of life in which the history of holiness in the man, that is to say, of the growth of the Life of Christ in his life, is elicited by a careful arrangement of his words and actions, so that the saint rather than the man is presented before our eyes. That surely must be the most useful kind of life for spiritual reading, or for a help to mental prayer, in which the heroic virtues of the saint are all set down, each in its proper place, along with facts, gifts, and miracles, with the clearness and distinctness of a map; so that instead of searching through page after page of biography, through countless anecdotes and adventures, we may be able at once to place our finger upon the virtue for which we are looking, whether for application to our own daily lives, or for comparison with the exercise of the same virtue in the lives of other saints. It is this definite and orderly arrangement which makes the Italian method so highly useful for all spiritual purposes, and which guided F. Faber, as far as was possible, in the choice of the Oratorian Lives. Grateful, therefore, as we are to F. Coleridge for his new "Life of S. Francis Xavier," we cannot say that it fulfils the highest ends for which the life of a saint should be written, for it is the biography of the man far more than the life of the saint; nay, it seems to us that its very artistic merit is a distraction rather than otherwise to those who take it up for spiritual purposes alone. If, for example, fancying perhaps, rightly or wrongly, that the acquisition of Christian humility could have been no easy task to Francis Xavier, we open the first volume of F. Coleridge's biography of S. Francis with the hope of gathering light and strength from his heroic example, we *have to search*, both in text and letters, through more

than four hundred pages, full, it is true, of beautiful thoughts and valuable matter, but treating of subjects of such varied interest as the University of Paris, Labours in Italy and Rome, Francis in Lisbon, Voyage to India, Labours at Goa, Among the Paravas, the Fishery Coast and Travancore, Affairs of Jaffanapatam, Meliapor, Francis at Malacca, the Moluccas, &c. We have to take here an anecdote and there a miracle, we have to weigh one letter with another, at the expense, perhaps, of greater time and labour than can be given by a priest in the midst of his missionary work, or by a nun in her half-hours for spiritual reading, or by the Christian merchant during the free moments of his already overburdened day. Besides, how few there are who are capable of doing this at all for themselves, and for those few how difficult it is; and if the few find this difficult, how much more difficult will it be for them to compare the lights and shades of the same virtue in different saints, if their lives should be exclusively written upon such a plan? On the other hand, how easy all this becomes even to those who have little learning or little time to spare, if the life be written upon the "hagiological," or Italian method. "They can turn to each virtue," says F. Faber, "as easily as to an article in an encyclopædia, and see the various guidance of the Holy Ghost exemplified in the lively, real revelations of the heroism of the saints. The same method is equally convenient for the preacher with his sermons, or the novice-master with his conferences. It forms for all a sort of summary of spiritual theology, much more attractive than the mere rules of a spiritual treatise."* Take for example the "Life of S. Catherine of Ricci," which was made from the Processes, and of which a translation is given in the Oratorian Series, and the truth of these remarks will be perceived at once. The Life is a short one, it is true, but this does not affect the method; and, indeed, a longer life, composed upon the same method, would serve just as well for illustration. S. Catherine's whole life may be said to be divided into four parts,—facts, virtues, gifts, and miracles. By means of this division we are enabled to see, almost at a glance, the particular virtue for which we may be looking, and the saint is made to stand out before us in all the magnificent proportions of her heroic sanctity. How, indeed, could it well be otherwise, since this form of life simply rests upon and follows the Processes by which the saint's heroic exercise of the theological and car-

* "*Essay* on the Interest and Characteristics of the Lives of the Saints," *p. 28.*

dinal virtues has been brought out and proved to the satisfaction of the Holy See? From what we have just said it will be seen that the proportion of biography to the "hagiological" parts of such lives is comparatively small,—only large enough, as we remarked once before, to serve as a frame for the portrait of the saint.

For these reasons, while fully appreciating the great merits of F. Coleridge's new work,—which in fact will do very great service in a large number of different ways,—we may perhaps be allowed to express our regret that one so well fitted for the task should not have given us a life of S. Francis Xavier more capable of being used for the highest spiritual purposes by English Catholics. That biographies of the saints are called for by the needs of the time we have already granted; and we cannot imagine a biography of the kind, more perfect in all points than the one before us. Still there are many amongst us who have both the taste and the skill required for writing biographical lives, while there are few indeed in England who possess the requisite qualities for writing Hagiology. We regret this all the more, as F. Coleridge tells us in the Preface that he has had "the advantage of using a manuscript *Relatio super Sanctitate et Miraculis Francisci Xaverii*, drawn up before the canonization of the saint by three distinguished Roman theologians in the time of Paul V., men of the very highest character, who had examined the evidence formally as its judges, and who made their report to the Pope in this *Relatio*, upon which it seems very clear that the Bull of Canonization was founded." The document contains "a full account of the Processes," and is also "full of consummate theological and ascetical learning." (Preface, p. xiii.) When we have here so grand an opportunity for a Life of S. Francis Xavier on the "hagiological" method, we confess that we are indeed disappointed to be told by the author that we shall have to content ourselves in the second volume with perhaps a mere abstract of this very interesting document. For our own part, we would have gladly contented ourselves with an abstract of S. Francis Xavier's biography, if we could have had two volumes founded upon this *Relatio*, so confident are we of the spiritual good they would accomplish. Is it too much even now to ask F. Coleridge to give us a third volume built up out of such magnificent materials?

It may be said perhaps that F. Coleridge's new work contains not only the Life of S. Francis Xavier, but his Letters; and that the letters of a saint must surely be full of matter suitable for spiritual *reading, and* well calculated to promote the growth

of the ascetical spirit in England. This no doubt is true, at least to a certain extent; but it must be remembered that the correspondence of a saint like S. Francis, who bore upon his shoulders daily the care of so many churches, must necessarily be concerned with a vast number of persons, events, and circumstances, and that therefore it cannot always have a direct bearing upon the spiritual life. We do not see, then, that our argument is materially affected by the objection, or that a good English life on the "hagiological" method would even at the present day be either superfluous or ill-timed. We think it, however, well to point out to our readers Letters V., VI., VIII., IX., XIII., XIV., XVI., XXVIII., XLVI., in which the humility of the saint and his self-distrust, his spirit of holy joy, which seems to be quite one of the more striking features of his sanctity, his remarks about those who trifle with their vocation, and his appeal to the example of God's patience, his observation that fear is a grand teacher of prayer, and his confidence in God, may all be noticed and meditated upon with great profit to the soul. We would also invite the reader's special attention to the notes at the end of Book II., in which will be found most beautiful and useful daily exercises for souls desirous of eternal salvation, drawn up by the saint himself, not so much apparently for his Indian converts as for the Portuguese. From this instruction we extract the following passage, which not only offers excellent advice to ourselves, but which also seems to give us no little insight into the saint's own heroic practice of the theological virtues:—

The second duty is the exercise of the three theological virtues, thus to consecrate to our Creator the first fruits, as it were, of the day, and to gain to ourselves beforehand His favour which we so much need for everything. Repeat, therefore, the Creed, pronouncing each of the articles with your whole heart, and making an act of the strongest adhesion to all the dogmas it contains concerning the nature of God, the divine Persons, the Incarnation, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Holy Church, and all the rest, saying in your heart as you give utterance to the words: O my God, Three Persons in one God, I believe in my heart all that the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church believes and teaches concerning Thee; all that she believes and teaches concerning the Son of the Eternal Father, Who for me was made Man, suffered, died, and rose again, and Who reigns in heaven with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and all the other articles of faith which this Holy Church teaches and professes. I am ready to lose everything, to suffer all violence, and more than that, to pour forth my blood and my life, rather than allow this faith to be torn from me, or allow the least doubt as to any part of it. I am fully resolved to live and die in this profession, and if speech shall fail me when I come to my last hour, now at this moment,

instead of then, I declare in words which express my whole heart, that I acknowledge Thee, O Lord Jesus, for the Son of God, I believe in Thee, and submit most humbly to Thee all my thoughts. Amen.—(Notes to Book II. p. 307.)

Do we not recognize in these words both the Martyr and the Saint? We also cannot refrain from placing before our readers the following touching testimony to the saint's habitual consciousness of God's presence. It is extracted from Letter XIII., in which he tells S. Ignatius of his visit to a village of heathens :—

There was there a woman with child, who had been three days in labour with so much difficulty that many despaired of her life. Their prayers for her were not heard, for the prayer of the wicked is an abomination in the eyes of God, because the gods of the heathen are all devils. I went with one of my companions to the sick woman's house, and began with confidence to call upon the Name of the Lord, forgetting that I was in a strange land. I thought of that text, "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof, the compass of the world, and all that dwell therein." So I began, through an interpreter, to explain to her the articles of our religion, and by the mercy of God this woman believed what we taught her.

There is perhaps one other objection which requires just a word of notice. It has occurred to us more than once while writing this article that some of our readers may object, that we cannot thus tear the saint, so to speak, out of the man, for it is by watching the struggles of the man in striving to grasp at holiness and to clothe himself with the life of Christ, that we perceive his sanctity; and that even if this were possible, it would only render the life unreal and unpractical. To this we answer that by following the "hagiological" method we by no means separate the saint from the actions of his life which have rendered him heroic: quite the contrary, we do but bring together under distinct heads all the struggles of his soul after each separate virtue, which in the biographical form are necessarily scattered here and there throughout the work and separated one from another in point of time. Thus we are enabled to see at a glance the progress of the saint in each particular virtue. In fact we only do for his sanctity what the biographical form does for his character and the incidents of his life. We make his sanctity the predominant feature of the work, and this we consider is no more impossible than to concentrate the chief interest upon the traits of his character, or the circumstances through which he has passed from the life of this world to victory with Christ. Far, then, from this method or form of life offering to our eyes an unreal or unpractical *view of the* saint, it seems to us to be the most real,

the most practical way to enforce the saint's example, because it prevents our attention becoming absorbed in what after all is only of secondary interest; while, as we have shown, for spiritual purposes of every kind, the advantages of such a method can hardly be overrated. We must again repeat that the predominant object for which the Lives of the Saints should be written, and read, and studied, is the closer union of the soul with God. All other objects, however important, are secondary to this. For the Lord of Glory lives again in His servants, and in them, as in Him, we see "His glory, the glory, as it were, of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." The Lives of the Saints are simply the Gospel, the Word of God, written in the hearts and lives of the now glorified members of Christ's Body Mystical, and require, therefore, to be read with the same dispositions as the Word of God itself,—dispositions which S. Augustine compares with those with which we ought to receive the adorable Body and Blood of the Redeemer of the world. Not for the sake of their merely human interest, not for the gratification of merely natural curiosity; not for even merely intellectual pleasure, or as studies of the human mind—at least not for these objects alone—should the lives of the servants of God be read; but in order to build up the spiritual temple in the soul, and to set before our eyes, as S. Jerome observes in one of his letters, a clear and brilliant mirror, in which we may see whatever is defective in ourselves, so that we may reform it, whatever is already good, so that we may perfect it, and render it conformable to the example of the saints and of Christ.

We have been led to make these remarks because, as it seems to us, there is a growing tendency amongst us to unfairly depreciate the value of lives of the saints written upon the "hagiological" method, although at the same time we hope that we have said more than enough to prevent our meaning from being misinterpreted. By all means let us have lives of the saints of as great literary merit as possible, written from different points of view,—biographical, historical, psychological, intellectual—all these are good and useful; but if we have at heart the growth of our people in holiness, do not let us lightly set aside or undervalue a method consecrated by the wisdom of past generations, which the foresight of our first Cardinal Archbishop inaugurated in the midst of us, and for which F. Faber so earnestly contended. The growth of a soul in holiness, in union with God, is of infinitely more importance than philosophy, or history, or science; the *manifestation* of heroic virtue and of the gifts and graces of *God than that* of intellect and character, the scenery, if we

may be allowed so to speak, of a saint's soul, than that of the country in which he lived and died. The latter need not, ought not indeed, to be forgotten, but for spiritual profit the former must be all in all. For this we plead, for this we shall continue to plead, touching as it does the best interests of Christ and of His Church in England; and as with England we began, so let us end.

Marvellous indeed have been God's gracious dealings with this poor land of ours, above all in these latter days,—so very far above what our forefathers could have dreamed or hoped for, that we may say in all truth that the finger of God has touched us. That touch has quickened the Catholic life-blood of our land, which even in the dead of England's darkest night, after it had ceased to beat in every limb, still lay imperceptibly and very faintly, beating at the heart, and has sent it coursing again through well-nigh every vein, not indeed as yet with the old exuberance, but nevertheless with almost exulting gladness, for to-day there are few indeed of our cities and towns in which at least the pulse of Catholic life may not be felt again. There was a moment in the dead of that dark night when England seemed to die to Christ, but she did not really die. He came Himself, the King of the saints, the Lover and the Saviour of the souls of men, with S. Benedict the father of her monastic spirit, and S. Ignatius, the soldier-saint of the latter times, and S. Thomas of Canterbury, the heavenly Patron of her secular clergy, even as, in the days of His flesh, he had stood with Peter and James and John over the real deathbed of the maiden of twelve years, and bent over England's seemingly lifeless form; and as all wept and mourned for her, He said, "Weep not, for she is not dead, but sleepeth." And the world laughed Him to scorn. But He, taking her by the hand, cried out, "I say unto thee, arise," and she rose up, and He commanded that something should be given her to eat. Then the saints and the children of the saints began to feed her again with the Bread of Life, the Word of God, and from that hour to this England's Catholic life-blood has been strengthened and renewed. Ever more and more as life and health and strength came back to her, and as she was able to bear it, she has been fed with spiritual food, until within the last quarter of a century, God has gone out of His way, if we may dare to say so, to provide her with new nourishment, and to strengthen her with new graces. His Church in England had need of a stronger and more majestic position in order to influence the intellects of men, and so in His own good time His Spirit breathed over *the old universities* of the land, and behold! those who said

they were Catholics and "were not, but did lie, He made to come and adore before her feet," carrying their gifts with them. His Church had need of that mightier energy which springs from the living faith that overcomes the world, in order to leaven the mass of the English people, and to build up again throughout the length and breadth of the land temples to His name, and altars to His honour; and so overruling the results of centuries of persecution and misgovernment in the sister isle on the part of England's rulers, He brought over thousands of the Irish people across the sea, bearing with them S. Patrick's undying faith as the "revenge of recompense"; so that wherever even small groups of Ireland's sons are gathered together, there before long priests are seen, and churches spring up, and the sacraments are administered, and the old faith lives again. Then, to crown His work, He gave England back her Hierarchy, and the Bride of the Lamb stands forth once more in the eyes of the whole English people, the city which stands on a hill, and cannot be hid, the city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God. Oh! surely God "has turned again our captivity, we are become like men consoled. The Lord hath done great things for us, we are become joyful. The Lord has turned our captivity as a river in the south"!

But why have these great things been done for us, why has our captivity been turned and our Catholic life been renewed, except simply to win more souls to Christ, to bring more of the English people into closer union with God? If this be so, then we must not leave our Lord to work alone, we must be fellow-workers with Him, by helping forward the growth of holiness, the progress of the spiritual life, the poverty of the Cross, the spreading of His Spirit in opposition to the formal and self-indulgent spirit of the age; and this by every means in our power, and above all by multiplying amongst us the examples of His Blessed Saints. What the future may have in store for the Church in England we cannot tell, whether when more of God's Spirit has been poured out upon us, our sons and our daughters shall prophesy, and our young men shall see visions, and our old men shall dream dreams, as in the days of old, when Juliana, the anchoress of Norwich, had revelations of Divine love, and S. Simeon Stock had visions of our Lady; but of this we may be sure, that in exact proportion as English Catholics succeed in beating down the spirit of the world beneath their feet, and in walking in the footsteps of the saints who are now in glory, will be the manifestation of the kingdom of God with power and majesty in the midst of this English land, and the grasp of God's

Church upon the hearts and minds of this English people. It is only because we feel this so strongly, and because we earnestly desire that the examples of the saints should be set before us in the most efficacious way, that we have written as we have done, and now we leave the matter in God's holy keeping with the prayer that "the path of the just" in England, "as a shining light may go forward and increase unto perfect day." "Have mercy upon us, O God of all, and behold us, and show us the light of Thy mercies. Lift up Thy hand over the land, that men may see Thy power; for as Thou hast been sanctified in us in their sight, so shalt Thou be magnified among them in our presence. Renew Thy signs, and work new miracles. Hasten the time and remember the end, that they may declare Thy wonderful works. Have mercy on Jerusalem, the city which Thou hast sanctified, the city of Thy rest. Fill Sion with Thy unspeakable words, and her people with Thy glory, that men may know Thee, as we also have known Thee, that there is no God beside Thee, O Lord!"

Art. IV.—PROTESTANT LECTURES ON MODERN SCEPTICISM.

Modern Scepticism. A Course of Lectures delivered at the request of the Christian Evidence Society, with an Explanatory Paper by the Right Reverend C. J. Ellicott, D.D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. Third Edition. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1871.

BELIEVING, as we do, that heresy is fast working itself out, and that the religious struggle of the future lies with unbelief, we naturally take a profound interest in the progress of the controversy with infidelity, not only when it is carried on by Catholics, but also when non-Catholics enter the lists and defend on their peculiar principles the foundations of our holy religion. For, we need not say, while Catholics are a comparatively small, though organized and united, body in this country, and those among them who have leisure for religious discussions have by force of circumstances been up to a time quite recent led to occupy themselves with the defence of the distinctive doctrines of the Catholic religion, the Protestant bodies have for long been carrying on the contest with scepticism, and in virtue of their greater numbers have been able to bring into the field an amount of critical and historical ability

and learning which we cannot hope at present to equal. So that we have a lesson to learn. And we have another lesson to learn besides this. It not unfrequently happens that the Protestant advocate is in consequence of his Protestantism debarred from taking up a stronger position which only a Catholic could logically occupy, or is compelled by the exigencies of the argument to reason from principles which lead to Catholic conclusions; and, if we are only careful to note where this is the case, we are thereby enabled to test and deliberately select the weapons which we had best ourselves employ. For there is no better way of gaining a thorough insight into the essence of a controversy, than to consider how its issue may be affected by modifications of the positions taken up by the parties to it.

In the explanatory paper, which oddly enough comes at the end of the book, Dr. Ellicott describes the plan and object of the lectures, and briefly points out some of the intellectual causes of the prevailing scepticism and hesitation about religion. In the first place he says:—

> We may venture to express the opinion that [this general prevalence of doubt and scepticism] does seem to stand in some degree of connection with the historical criticism, or, to speak more exactly, with the philosophical mode of treating ancient history, which, especially since the time of Niebuhr, has so honourably marked the present and latter half of the preceding generation. It was obviously impossible that a system which appeared to yield results judged to be eminently satisfactory and trustworthy in regard of the general history of the past, should not be applied to sacred history, and to the various documents which together make up the Holy Bible. And it has been applied, sometimes cautiously and reverently, and with a due regard for the convictions of Christian readers, but sometimes also with an eagerness and persistence which may not unfairly be characterized as both inconsiderate and unjustifiable. This method of criticism, especially in its more unfavourable manifestations, may certainly be specified as one of the earlier causes of that suspended belief in the historical truth of certain portions of the Old and New Testament, which many entertain at the present time, and make no scruple of avowing and justifying. (pp. 506-7.)

We may add that it is pre-eminently dangerous to those whose only ground of religious belief is the Bible; and that it effectually disposes of the vulgar notion of private judgment, by requiring as an indispensable qualification for the interpretation of Holy Scripture an amount of special knowledge, which comparatively few can by the nature of the case attain to. And the popular Protestantism has been so much accustomed to consider the Bible as *one book*, and has held so much by the theory *of verbal inspiration*, that anything which brings into relief the *difference* of character between different portions of Holy

Scripture, and the differences of time and circumstances at and under which the several books composing it were written, by overthrowing these notions tends to shake the rest of the fabric. Moreover, the destruction of the idea of the unity of Holy Scripture is the destruction of the idea of its autonomy; but while it has no unity or autonomy in itself, but is merely a part of a more general system of revelation, it is on the idea of its autonomy that Protestantism is based. And whatever brings out the local and temporary and even personal character of the special needs in view of which its books were written, in the same degree indicates to us that it cannot be the sole divinely-intended depository of religious belief for all future persons and nationalities and states of civilization. So that when we are examining any piece of "historical criticism" pronounced objectionable by a Protestant writer, it is necessary to see whether what it attacks is necessary to Christianity, or is necessary only to Protestantism.

The second of Dr. Ellicott's causes is, of course, the "tendency to over-hasty generalization that has of late marked the rapid development of some of the natural sciences." A tendency to unverified hypotheses and over-hasty generalization is, like a conceited assumption of superiority, a natural consequence of rapid development; and that such is the tendency of physical science at present is recognized by physicists themselves. "A careful examination of the scientific hypotheses of the present day," the "Quarterly Journal of Science" (Oct., 1868, art. "The Modern Aspects of Physical Science") tells us, "will convince the examiner, that although they assist us to climb, they are but stepping-stones which will be kicked away as we advance." But what is the reason that this tendency to over-hasty generalization is specially productive of generalizations which appear, or are, inimical to religion? It seems to us that there are two reasons. The first is connected with the state of mind which Dr. Ellicott considers to be the third cause of modern scepticism. "One other cause we may pause to specify. ..... This cause is the eager and often impatient search for solid ground whereon religion and morality may be based." It at first sight looks rather odd that this should be a cause of scepticism; but it is intelligible enough when we consider the diversity of opinions in religion which the use of the individual judgment as the means of attaining religious truths has brought about. "The multitude and variety of the schools of religious thought," it is continually being said, "deprives them all of authority; the fact that able and learned men are to be found, perhaps, in each of them, makes us distrust ability and learning as means of coming to a decision. *You* say that *your* arguments are the stronger, but

how am I to place any reliance on this when, as you know as well as I do, so many men of unquestioned ability declare them weak or fallacious? or how shall I pin my faith on *them*, when they are contradicted as to the force of their arguments by so many able and learned men of your own side? You tell me to judge for myself; but I really cannot go over all the ground again; I have to occupy myself in other ways, and the labour is too great for me. Besides, when I have gone over it all for myself, how am I to know that I have fared any better than multitudes who have preceded me, and, according to you, went wrong in spite of their labours? Now, don't tell me that if I go wrong, my conscience will reproach me; somebody will tell me that, whatever conclusion I come to. I am in what you call the dark, I know; but just for that reason I am not going to make a fool of myself by pretending that I can see. You want me to run after a will o'the wisp, and the only course open to me is a *Docta Ignorantia*." And the argument is unanswerable, so long as the exercise of the individual judgment is represented as the only means for gaining religious truth. But Catholics follow a different method,—that of the collective judgment, the sense of the Church, felt in her general teaching and definitively enunciated by the Holy See. And therefore they do not participate in the perplexities which have arisen through the use of a vicious method reprobated by their religion; nor are they likely to imagine their position to be weakened by that having happened which they three hundred years ago predicted would be the result of the theory of private judgment. Those who stand by that theory have got into a muddle, we know; and, once in, it is not so easy to get them out: but there is not the slightest difficulty in seeing how they got in.

But although the attitude, described above, of many of our most eminent physicists causes them to reject the guidance of dogmatic religion, and readily allows of their being in opposition to it, they have not by any means therefore renounced the idea of having a religion; on the contrary, and this involves actual rivalry, they want to construct one, or what will do instead of one, out of the ultimate conclusions of physical science. And, therefore, when physical science gives any sign that she is approaching a religious question, though it may lie on the very frontiers of knowledge, in regions where as yet only a dim, vague, and uncertain light is visible, it is to the answer that she seems to have for this question, the answer that they think she will at some future time give to it, that they direct all their attention. Looking to the future religion *of science*, their sympathies are aroused, and their interest is *excited; they* talk of the intensity of their own personal con-

victions, make acts of scientific faith, prophesy, supplement evidence by imagination, argue with all the vigour and passion of controversialists. Thus these speculations are brought prominently before the general public; special efforts are made to popularize them; and as they are frequently opposed by religious men, and have indeed a fair chance of being wrong, the opposition excites in the minds of some of those who have identified themselves with them a feeling of antagonism to religion itself. But there is in one point of view some satisfaction even in this state of things. It is easy to perceive that, as Dr. Ellicott observes, "The processes of destructive criticism are, in fact, nearly over, [except in so far as destruction is regarded as a means to reconstruction,] and the difficult process of reconstruction is commencing." And this has obvious advantages. As long as those who decline to accept Christianity confine themselves to denying, they have in appearance a comparatively strong position, for plausible objections may be brought against any positive doctrine whatever; it is when they attempt to frame a counter-hypothesis that the weakness of their case is most plainly seen. Nor is it difficult to perceive that Catholic Theology will as a science greatly benefit by the controversies with scepticism and unbelief; for it was almost created by the controversies with the Arabian philosophy, and greatly expanded by those arising from the sixteenth century heresies. And on account of its being more systematic and more scientific in its character it will have over non-Catholic theologizing a very considerable advantage in the power of steadily assimilating and constructively employing whatever is true in the scientific conclusions and method on which the present forms of scepticism rely. Assimilation needs a rule, and construction needs a basis; but Protestant theology can supply neither the one nor the other, except in the most rudimentary form. Let the reader compare, for instance, the Archbishop of Westminster's discourses on the Fourfold Sovereignty of God with any Protestant production on a similar topic. We speak of *method* as well as of *conclusions;* for, because of the interminable discussions which have come of private judgment, physical science is made to appear opposed to religion not only in its conclusions, but likewise in a more severely logical character being attributed to its method and spirit. While some of our physicists are making science sensational in order to make her popular, and departing the farthest from the strict rules of scientific inference, they at the same time claim to use a stricter method of reasoning than is employed in supporting the conclusions of religion. And there lies an element of danger to *many minds* not only in this self-assertion but in the half-

truth which may be pleaded in its favour,—in the difference of the manner of argument and the use of logic in physical science and in theology, and in the different form into which evidence is thrown in the former by the prominence given in it to what is popularly known as the Inductive Logic. But the difficulties which have been brought forward from alleged scientific conclusions have had at least this result, that they have infused a little good sense into the minds even of the persons who were continually talking about Galileo; while the difficulties about scientific method will make them look more narrowly to the subject of their rule of faith.

A second cause of the anti-religious character of some recent speculations is to be found in the disinclination of many scientific men to accept anything miraculous. They may see a particular opinion to be surrounded by great and even apparently insuperable difficulties; it may, like the molecular theory of organization, have scarcely any appreciable evidence in its favour, so that if it had to be judged on its own merits it would be unhesitatingly condemned by the logic of science as visionary and unsatisfactory. But there are, say, only two possible opinions on the subject, and the other opinion involves the miraculous, or what is confounded with it; and then, because this latter opinion supposes a miracle, the former, with all its faults on its head, and even though the evidence be rather against than for it, is represented as the only view of the subject which can be taken by a scientific man. Thus there are speculations which have the name of being conclusions of *physical* science, but in reality rest on no basis of physical science at all, their real ground of support being the false proposition in *theology*, that miracles are impossible or much more unlikely than even very far-fetched and fanciful hypotheses. The conclusion then, that such an hypothesis is true because if it were false we should be landed in a miracle, is in reality nothing more, than the theological conclusion of a person who in all probability has never studied theology. And the reason of the habits of thought which produce this morbid and unreasonable aversion to the miraculous is to be found in the prevailing spirit of doubt and hesitation, of which we sketched one of the most powerful causes in a preceding paragraph, and which is itself one of the principal causes and supports of modern scepticism. A man whose mind is frequently occupied, and whose emotions have often been excited, by the contemplation of the merely temporary and accidental character of Nature and her laws, will find it only most natural that Almighty God should intervene to suspend the operation of those laws for higher purposes. But just as this man, who

firmly holds and is fully possessed by the ideas of God, heaven, hell, grace, prayer, naturally keeps them in view wherever he turns his eyes, so does another man, on whom religious ideas hang but loosely, incline to expend the bulk of his mental force on processes in which he leaves them practically no part. So that if he takes an interest, *e.g.*, in physics, the idea of absolute, wooden, mechanical laws, the mechanical view of nature, will tend to crowd out the moral view of nature; for his mind grows more sensitive to the mere physical order of things with which it is habitually occupied, and more and more obtuse to ideas connected with the supernatural order, on which it is never or but rarely employed. He begins, therefore, to shrink from the idea of miracles; they are to him incongruous, wanting in all verisimilitude, unlikely in the extreme. The more he thinks over a miracle, the more improbable it appears; and though he may for a time continue to believe in miracles which, he comforts himself by saying, happened a long while ago, the nearer a miracle is to his own time, the better he can picture to himself its details, the more does it appear out of keeping with everything else.

And not only on the student of science, but likewise on any clever, intellectual man, does the prevailing spirit tend to produce a certain secularism of thought. He gets into a non-religious frame of mind, and, say, takes to reading non-religious books; and then unconsciously carries this frame of mind with him to the perusal of devotional books and of the Holy Scriptures; he applies (and this is the source of many of the aberrations of what is called "historical criticism") to the characters first of holy men and then of our Lord and His Apostles, the same principles of judgment he is in the habit of using in daily life, without recognizing that he is forgetting the difference in the persons which has of necessity to be taken account of in the transfer. He, too, begins to shrink from miracles. And, in virtue of this shrinking from miracles, the tone of his mind with respect to special providences, answers to prayer, the divine guidance over the life of each individual, becomes unconsciously but logically altered. Actual graces,—those lights, and pious affections, and good resolutions by which Almighty God strengthens us, he begins to "explain" to himself by the action of ordinary mental laws. The world of thought and will, the human mind, has, he argues, its laws as well as the world of matter; and it is as ridiculous to suppose the one broken through as the other. So, also, does he explain away the effect of the Sacraments, ignoring the fact that the very circumstances to which, in them, he directs his attention, do but *in reality bring* the natural to bear on and co-operate with

the supernatural, and the better fit it to become an instrument of grace. For this secularism of thought the appropriate remedy would appear to be the realization of what religious beliefs are still acknowledged to be indubitably true; if this is once done, the obscured religious ideas begin, as if by magic, to ascend into their proper place. But if the disintegration proceeds, the man, clear, clever, intellectual, though he be, cautious in assenting, incredulous by habit, begins to feel the ground crumbling under his feet, becomes dissatisfied with his position, and looks about him for help from without. And he cannot tell where to find the truth amid the whirl of contending opinions; he concludes that there is no reliable truth to be found, and gives up in despair the search for it on theological grounds. But he sees with his eyes the triumphs of the physical sciences, and he has heard, if only from the divines, that they trench on religion; so he turns to the physiologists, the geologists, the psychologists, the anthropologists, the sociologists, and the historians of civilization, to men eminent in their own line of thought, whose methods are *known*, he says to himself, to give valuable and trustworthy results, and learns what they have to say on the subject of religion: and from the fragments he gains from them, together with some natural principles of morality, he seeks to put together a pseudo-religious system.

Such is with many the natural tendency of the prevailing spirit of doubt and hesitation. There is another class of minds which is in its own way equally liable to be affected by it. Those who are marked rather by great emotional capacity than by the possession of intellectual power stand a fair chance of being reduced by it to a state of mental bewilderment, and then, as they feel they cannot do without religion, they fall back on sentiment and feeling, and seek refuge in the vague and the intangible. Though perhaps quite incapable of examining the body of evidence or following the logical processes on which a difficulty derived from physical science rests, they may be quite able to see, and quite unable to refute, some sharp, short objection raised to a definite doctrine, or to the accuracy or authenticity of some portion of Holy Scripture; and they therefore seek to avoid the incidence of such and such-like objections by holding as few definite doctrines as possible, by talking about faith being of the heart, separating Christianity from its historical foundations, and damning with faint praise the evidence derived from miracles. Of this kind of scepticism it has been well said that "the prevailing tone of divergence from the traditional standards is not one of disbelief. *There is nothing* masculine enough [?] in the mental fibre of *the present* generation for the hard, trenchant atheism of the

last century. Its peculiarity is rather a dreamy, sentimental delight in the vague. The ideal of a religious belief in the present day is an indefinite proposition doubtfully entertained. The model of a popular preacher is one who can surround muddy expositions of doctrine with tender thoughts and beautiful imaginings. It is hardly too much to say of some that their course of thought is practically equivalent to a sentimental attempt to form a creed out of gushing phrases." But dogmas are the bones of religions; people pronounce dogmatic religion hard and angular because they have confined their attention to its skeleton. And while the subjective evidence strengthens the historical, the historical cannot be dispensed with without doing violence to the subjective.

The first reason, therefore, why the conclusions of many physicists are opposed to religion is the confusion which private judgment has produced in the non-Catholic world; the second is antagonism to the miraculous. The first of these causes acts in four ways. In the first place it diminishes the credit given to conclusions based on theological grounds, so that if for any reason any of the natural sciences appears for the time to tend even very slightly to a contrary conclusion, there is not to the eyes of physicists sufficient strength in the opposed theological evidence to prevent them from embracing that conclusion. Again, by rendering the prospect of gaining truth by theological investigation apparently hopeless, it causes those who cultivate the physical sciences to regard *them* as the only reliable means whereby a reply to the questions which religion professes to answer can definitively be obtained; and thus actual rivalry and consequent antagonism to religion is set up. And it is to be observed that those who seek to construct a religion out of the ultimate conclusions of physical science say little or nothing about God; if once they realized the existence of a personal Maker and Ruler of the universe they would have to admit some revelation, and this would ruin their theories; so that we have an inchoate positivism. Thirdly, this state of things stimulates those physicists who fall the most under its influence to dogmatize on questions which science has scarcely begun to grasp; and as on such questions they are peculiarly liable to misinterpretation of the facts, and, from the circumstances of the case, to exaggeration, with respect to these questions collision with religion is peculiarly liable to occur. And in the fourth place, the opposition which they experience from religious men—even sometimes when they feel themselves to be in the right—widens the gap, and increases the antagonism, so that some of the weaker-minded among them or their followers are glad to have any *opportunity* of speaking against religion, and try to take

and make advantage by doing so. The second cause, aversion to miracles, favours and is favoured by secularism of thought, which produces further evils. From this cause, and from other causes, we have two typically distinct forms of scepticism.

The volume before us contains eleven lectures, intended to meet "in fair argument" the scepticism, some of the causes of which we have briefly and imperfectly indicated in the preceding pages. The lectures are mostly by well-known men. The subjects are treated in a popular but generally satisfactory manner, without any parade of learning or unnecessary technicality; and, especially those handled in the latter part of the book, with a solidity and common sense, which at once commend themselves to the mind. There is also a breadth of thought, and a praiseworthy absence of pettiness of tone and bitterness of spirit, which must greatly have increased their effect on the auditory to whom they were delivered, and produce a very pleasing impression on the reader. The student, indeed, who desires an answer to difficulties suggested by physical science, will not derive from these lectures any considerable assistance, as they were composed by clergymen exclusively, and deal chiefly with difficulties of a philosophical and historical character; but with regard to the subjects of which they do treat, valuable remarks are to be found in each of them. The first three lectures have the function of clearing the way; they were intended to dispose of Materialism, Pantheism, and Positivism, so as to secure a better hearing afterwards for Christianity. The first lecture, by the Archbishop of York, is on the argument from design: it is, we need not say, good as far as it goes; but it is to be regretted that Dr. Thompson takes no notice of the narrower basis to which, at first sight, the biological doctrine of morphology restricts this argument, nor of the objections to it which have been suggested by the theory of the origin of species by natural selection. The lecture on positivism is perhaps the least satisfactory in the book; for, although many good things are said in the course of it, the writer often speaks as if he were addressing children, has evidently not mastered his subject, and throws over his treatment of it a gloss of false and strained rhetoric. The argument of the very excellent lecture which deals with that form of pantheism which recognizes a kind of vague divinity—and no more—in everything, is that it combines the difficulties of atheism with the difficulties of Theism. The fourth, fifth, and sixth lectures gradually work up to the *evidences* of Christianity, by considering the reasons which *physical science* affords for expecting a revelation, the evidential *value of the* miracles, and the gradual character of revelation

itself. For, as one of the lecturers observed, if the existence of God be admitted, we cannot stop short at deism. Deism is obsolete. "Deism grants too much to the Christian. If a man really believes in a living and personal God, a Divine Maker and Ruler of the Universe, with a moral character and will, he finds it hard to deny the possibility and probability of a revelation, and impossible to maintain the impossibility of miracles. Having been obliged to yield thus far to the Christian argument, the deist is unable thereafter to withstand the positive evidence in favour of Christianity. Moreover, deism is surrounded in effect by the same difficulties which beset the Christian revelation, without its lights, its consolations, its blessings. The man, therefore, who rejects Christianity seldom finds his resting-place in deism. He becomes a pantheist or an atheist." The lecture on miracles is inadequate to the subject, and tries to cover too much ground. It is the Bishop of Carlisle who takes up the subject of the gradual development of revelation. The acceptance by the higher class of non-Catholic minds of some form or other of the theory of dogmatic evolution is one of the phenomena of our time which has arisen out of a more philosophical study of religious history; and while it has, especially in Germany, been not unfrequently distorted, and difficulties have been built on it by persons who were working it from a false point of view, we cannot but regard its growing influence as eminently favourable to Catholic interests. And it was practically inevitable that, this theory once accepted, it should be applied to Holy Scripture, to show, not, indeed, that the only revelation was an initial germ whence the rest was evolved by a purely natural process, but that the revelations historically presented to us in Holy Scripture exhibit a general plan, the later ones unfolding and clearing up the earlier, and the earlier being, relatively to the later, imperfect. In this way it is applied by the Bishop of Carlisle, for the purpose of furnishing general grounds of solution to sceptical objections arising out of the earlier portions especially of the sacred writings, and showing that their various parts, though written by very different authors, and often at long intervals of time, so dovetail into one another as to indicate a deeper unity of authorship—a divine hand guiding the human penman. And, indeed, the principle of development in Scripture affords materials of reply to many of the objections raised by "historical criticism." The results of historical criticism are then treated of in three very excellent lectures. In the first of these Professor Rawlinson undertakes to reply to all the alleged *historical difficulties* of the Old and New Testaments which have

arisen from a comparison of sacred with profane history, and to show that the criticisms indicate merely the mistakes which its critics would have made, had they, learned as they are, undertaken to write the Bible, for that in every case modern discoveries independently show the Bible to have been in the right. The second and third are respectively on "Mythical Theories of Christianity," and the "Evidential Value of St. Paul's Epistles." It is suggestive, that no attempt is made to prove the *inspiration* of Holy Scripture: the lecturers contenting themselves with showing, that on the one hand the parts of the sacred writings which they take in hand are not fraudulent compositions, the production of later ages; and that on the other certain popular accusations of inaccuracy are frivolous, grounded on no solid basis. It was impossible on their principles to establish the inspiration of the several books to a sceptical auditory; for it is only by invoking the authority of the Church, after proving the authenticity of such parts of Scripture as may be required to show the divine mission of Our Lord, and of the teaching society which He founded, that this can be at all satisfactorily accomplished.

We can do justice to the striking argument of the lecture on "Science and Revelation," which is by Dr. Payne Smith, only by a series of quotations, which, however, it is not necessary to distinguish by dotted lines:—

> Now the argument which I shall use as my proof of the possibility of a revelation is simply this,—that in the present system of things we find no being endowed with any faculties without there being also a proper field for their exercise, and a necessity imposed upon that being of using those faculties. In this argument I assume nothing. I do not assume that there is a God who made these beings. I look simply around me at what is—or, at all events, appears to be—and I find myself in a world in which there is a very exact correspondence between the endowments and faculties of every existent being, and the state of things in which it happens to be. I need not detain you upon this point: you will readily grant that this correspondence does exist. If a plant is not suited to its habitat, and cannot use its natural powers, nature imposes upon it the severe penalties—first, of degradation, and then of death. Upon the animal world she imposes just the same penalties. There is neither excess nor defect in her operations. Whatever she gives must be used; but animals, being governed in the main by instincts, have no choice. They necessarily employ all their living powers, and apparently have no powers beyond those indispensable for their existence. This point, however, I will not press.* But of actual powers it is evident that animals do use them all, and have to use them all. Scientific men try their hand at accounting for this state of things, and say, perhaps, that there is a

* *The point* which he will not press is the absence of latent powers.

struggle, a competition in nature, so sharp and close that no creature can continue to exist save by the vigorous exercise of all its necessary faculties, while all useless qualities will be cast aside as mere overweight and incumbrance. I want no decision upon this point; the fact is all I want: the admitted fact that every living organization fully possesses all those faculties which it needs, and must use all its faculties under penalty, first of degradation, and finally, in the long run, of extinction.

But man is a living organization, and must, therefore, come under this law. Now, in all the long line from the ascidian upwards to man, nature has supplied none but physical wants. Her children need food: she gives them each those senses and that conformation which enables them to get each their own food. They need safety: she uses much ingenuity in providing for their safety. She is, moreover, liberal. Their food is, in general, gained so easily and their safety so well provided for, that their lives are full of enjoyment. Her care, however, is taken in the main for the species, and not for the individual. He enjoys his food, because nature has taken loving care for the whole family to which he belongs; and she further takes care that this family shall continue to exist. When we come to man, we find these three leading necessities equally well provided for. Man is provided with the means for obtaining food, for providing for his safety, and for propagating his species. But, though nature's ends are the same, her means are different. The animals are moved to gain their subsistence by their senses working upon their instincts. But man rises above the animals as much as they transcend vegetables. He attains to these same ends of food, safety, and continued existence by the use of his reason. But not only can man, by the use of his reason, obtain food, provide for his safety, and continue his race; but higher ends are made possible for him, to be attained by the use of this higher endowment. Man has the power of articulate speech, and upon this follows the power of learning to read, to write, and to cypher; and upon the power of doing these three things follows a plenitude of other powers. Now I shall not stop to inquire how man gained these powers, whether by natural and sexual selection or not. Has nature supplied a proper field for the exercise of the mental powers, not merely of Fuegians, but of the most highly-developed man? You know that she has. Take the senses which he has in common with the animals, but see what vast means have been provided by which he can make an intellectual use of them. What arts and sciences, painting, music, harmony, numbers, eloquence, have grown out of their use. As for our mental powers, think only of the vast number of ologies which are claiming admission into our very normal schools. Nature makes us use our mental powers to some extent. She encourages us to use them thoroughly and earnestly. And many of these sciences relate to our social condition. Here, again, nature provides a field for the employment of our faculties, and compels us to use them. If not, there is the same penalty,—degradation. I do not know how many geological periods it would take before, by the neglect of our powers, we could retrograde back to our ascidian progenitor; but I see everywhere around me the proofs that retrogression is as much a law of man's nature as progress. We can continue what we are only by using all our powers.

There is another broad distinction between man and all the other inhabitants of this earth. He alone distinguishes between right and wrong. Now, if man possesses this faculty, then, if nature's laws are universal, he is both bound to use it and will suffer from not using it, and will have a proper field provided for its use. Nature gives no faculty without imposing an obligation of exercising it,—an obligation, however, which rests in its full force upon the species, and upon the individual only, as belonging to the species. [If this be true] then the existence in man of faculties obliging him to distinguish between right and wrong, constitutes him a *responsible* agent. If he is responsible, he is responsible to some one ; and certain penalties are necessarily attached to the neglect, the misuse, and the violation of his moral powers. It does not matter to the argument whether conscience and your other moral faculties be natural or acquired. You are bound to use them simply because you have them. I have chiefly spoken of conscience, but the argument takes in all man's moral and spiritual powers. No man can doubt but that man has within him powers which exactly correspond to religion without him. And what is more, man's moral and religious faculties develop with advancing civilization, just as much as his mental faculties do. Now, the only thing that acts powerfully upon man's moral faculties is religion. [And] by the possession of conscience and other religious faculties, man holds a definite relation towards God. Plainly, the most tremendous results may follow from this relation, and man ought to have some sure knowledge of these results. Now it is conceivably possible that God might have given us this knowledge by means of the light of nature, as we call it. But He has not. Confessedly, natural religion is neither clear enough nor certain enough* to affect powerfully the masses. Man is not a quiet, orderly, neutral sort of being ; he bears about with him a nature fraught and fully charged with the most dangerous passions. Reason, with its prudential maxims, has never done much to restrain these passions. To take, then, the lowest possible ground. As Nature has given us moral qualities, she supposes that moral excellence is a thing as necessarily to be attained to as physical or mental excellence. But while Nature provided ample means for attaining to the two last, she will not, without a revelation, have provided sufficient means for the attainment of the first. By the aid of religion, about as many men probably attain to moral excellence as by other means attain to physical and mental excellence. Without religion, nature will have broken down. You would have universally a state of things like that in ancient Greece,—one Plato, surrounded by the mass leading the most grossly sensual life.

---

* Rather : is neither full enough nor concrete enough, and therefore cannot continue to exist as a power among the mass of men, if it is not joined by revelation. The lecturer is not a Darwinian ; he simply says, "*transeat*." However, a person who holds the theory that species, and not only species, but conscience and religious instincts, are to be accounted for by natural selection, will hold, not necessarily, unless he be a Theist, that they point to what is true, but that natural selection destroyed those races in which they did not exist, and tends to destroy those in which they are less perfectly developed. Thus irreligion and the destruction of conscience would mean *not necessarily falsehood*,—at least, so far as the argument in the text goes,—*but certainly* ruin.

Now it is very easy to say, in answer to this, that our wanting a thing is no proof that we shall get it. But such a reply is a mere *ignoratio elenchi*. While we have no reason to believe that merely individual wants created by fancy, or by personal and accidental circumstances, will ever be gratified, the case is very different as regards the faculties and necessities of a species. If a man wants fifty pounds never so much, the mere fact of his needing that sum affords no ground for supposing that he will obtain it. But if the young of a bird could reason, it would be justified in concluding that there is a world beyond its egg from its instinctive desire to get out of it; and if the young of a mammal could reason, it would be justified in concluding, from its instinctive propensity to suck, that there are beings from whom it may obtain something to its advantage by sucking. Instinctive desires are the *nisus* of nature toward the performance of a function, and all biological science concurs in showing that there is no function without an object.

The subjects of the two remaining lectures are "Christ's Teaching and Influence on the World," and "The Completeness and Adequacy of the Evidences of Christianity." It is sufficiently remarkable that all the beneficial effects of Christianity on mankind from which the Bishop of Ely, who delivered the first of these lectures, draws his argument, were produced in times preceding the Reformation, and that many of them have sensibly diminished since. We shall conclude by a quotation from this lecture:—

> [Christianity] has succeeded incomparably beyond anything else that has ever been devised, or ever attempted by man.
>
> Let us take great and acknowledged facts. It is confessed that under the influence of Christianity gladiatorial shows, and the throwing of prisoners to wild beasts, were given up and done away with. It is impossible to deny that the worst forms of licentiousness, which were not only tolerated in Greece and Rome, but indulged in openly by their heroes, attributed to their deities, and celebrated in verse by their poets, have been universally reprobated in Christendom, and dare not now show their heads abroad even in the most corrupted centres of modern society. The respect paid to women is due before any other cause to the honour with which the Great Founder of our faith treated those women who waited on Him, and to His filial reverence for the mother that bare Him. The laws of marriage which now [?] rule in Europe are not heathen, nor even Jewish, but pre-eminently Christian. What Christ spoke concerning marriage and divorce regulated the principles of the Church, and the first Christian rulers incorporated those principles into the laws of the empire. Our domestic morals have thus been governed by a few sentences from the lips of one Man. The softening of the horrors of war, and the better treatment of prisoners, are equally the result of Christian

influence.* . . . . . This regard for human life is justly regarded by philanthropists as the truest test of a high civilization ; and I confidently ask whether it has ever come but from the influence of Christian teaching and the effect of Christian sympathy.

Let us turn to the question of slavery. It is objected by some that there is no direct denunciation of slavery in the Scriptures. I am not now concerned with the Old Testament ; but I may yet, in passing, say that whilst Moses could hardly refuse to recognize slavery as a prevailing institution, he still gave laws concerning it which mitigated its horrors to the utmost, and placed the Jewish slave in a condition, moral, social, and spiritual, utterly unlike to his condition in any heathen state. As regards the Gospel, we must remember, once more, that Christ was not a political reformer, not professedly a social reformer, not even primarily a moral reformer. His mission was to elevate men's whole spiritual nature ; and this He did by the infusion into society of a new religious or spiritual principle. It did not fall in with the purposes of that mission to descend to every detail of social life, still less to regulate political institutions. So, He never denounces war, nor imperial tyranny, nor even the political factions of the Jews. It is scarcely a question that sudden emancipation of a great slave population is never desirable. And if the first Christians had preached against a deeply-rooted social institution, they might easily have produced great political convulsions, and have ultimately rendered less tolerable than ever the condition of those whom they desired to befriend. But the principles of Christ's teaching are directly adverse to slavery, and their progress has invariably tended to mitigate, and at length to eradicate it. . . . . The abolition of domestic slavery was one of the most important duties incumbent on the missionary energies of the mediæval Church. It is sad, indeed, to think how the plague of slavery broke out again on the discovery of the West Indies and of America,—slavery, too, in one of its most revolting and debasing forms ; but it still is true that Christianity and Christian missions have struggled with it from the first,† and that now, at length, it seems to be yielding, and there is good hope that it may ere long be utterly subdued.

In every way Christianity has been the pioneer of civilization, and the giver of social comfort and peace. Very truly, many colonists from Christian lands have given to the colonies they founded not comfort, nor peace, nor civilization ; but it has been because they have left Christian lands and not

---

* "The terrible scenes just enacted, and even now enacting, in Paris, almost seem to contradict my words concerning mercy in war, words written and even printed before Paris was burned and wasted. But . . . . . the chief perpetrators of the horrors of the past week not only abhorred Christianity, but murdered priests, only because they were ministers of Christ, and proclaimed Atheism and Materialism to be the very basis of their theory, both in politics and in life. There is nothing to surprise us when we find that those who deliberately cast off religion and humanity, faith in God, and faith in man, fall lower than those who are simply ignorant of the true principles of either. Atheists in the midst of faith are very likely to be *much* worse than heathens." (Author's note.)

† *This notoriously* was not the case with Protestant bodies in the Southern *States.*

carried their Christianity out along with them. Often, indeed, they have only laid waste heathen lands, and oppressed heathen races; and Christianity following after them, has had to undo the evil, which apostate Christians had inflicted. Still we may challenge any one to show a single instance in which civilization in modern times has spread to any place to which Christianity has not first found its way. We may challenge any one to deny that where Christianity has been forsaken and neglected, there have sprung up, instead of it, as in revolutionary France, cruelty, licentiousness, and social degradation.

Christianity, once more, has been favourable at least to the development of mind, the cultivation of letters, the advancement of science. It is easy, of course, to say that there have been efforts among Christians to check the progress of science, still more frequently panic terrors as to its unexpected discoveries. It is easy to point to Galileo, easy to speak of the fate of geology in the earlier days of the present century, of the reception of Mr. Darwin's theory now. As to Galileo, we may at once disown the Inquisition as representing Christian faith.* But it is unnecessary to deny that an appearance of antagonism between faith and science, or faith and literary criticism, will alarm timid believers, and so may lead to temporary

---

* The answer given to the case of Galileo leaves no answer for the other cases. If thus of Galileo, what, then, of Kepler? and what of the uniformitarian geology and the antiquity of man, and the objections raised on religious grounds to Newton's theory of gravitation? In fact, Protestant controversialists have discovered that in talking about Galileo they have only been preparing a rod for their own pain. They have been representing as extraordinary and abominable a line of conduct which is only most natural and most justifiable, and forging weapons for unbelievers to use against them when they have themselves followed it. But when Dr. Whewell is looking about for a rule whereby we may be guided in those cases where the speculations of physicists are at variance with received interpretations of Scripture, he can find no better one than this: "A rule on this subject, propounded by some of the most enlightened dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, on the occasion of the great Copernican controversy, is well worthy of our attention. The following was the rule given by Cardinal Bellarmine at the time:—When a demonstration shall be found to establish the earth's motion, it will be proper to interpret the sacred Scriptures otherwise than they have hitherto been interpreted in those passages where mention is made of the stability of the earth and the movement of the heavens." (History of Scientific Ideas, vol. ii. p. 306.) As we plainly see from the case of the Galileo controversy, scientific views, opposed to formerly received interpretations, do not, when familiar, disturb the authority of Scripture; but while they are as yet novel, may trouble and unsettle many minds. And the religious opposition, which often most reasonably rises against them on the part of pious men, is part of the probation which new and untested opinions have to undergo. But this opposition may go *too far*, just as it may not go *far enough*; and of both these extremes non-Catholicism furnishes the most abundant examples. "Catholics who care for science at all," declares the scientific Quarterly (Brit. Quarterly Journal of Science, April, 1865), "are really more liberal in their views than many who profess to belong to a more tolerant faith." In fact, Catholics possess a very safe guide on *the matter in* ecclesiastical authority.

misunderstandings between Christians or men of science or of literature. Yet, look at past history and say, first, whether science and philosophy and literature did not for centuries find their only shelter in the Church, even under the deepest shadows of its cathedrals and monasteries. When all the world besides was unlettered and ignorant, learning flourished among the schoolmen, philosophy and physical science were pursued, as far as they could then be pursued, by ecclesiastics and divines. The name of Roger Bacon stands out conspicuously as one who, in the cell of a convent and under the garb of a friar, carried inquiries into physical truth to a height which, considering his date and his difficulties, may compare even with the great and rapid discoveries of the present day. In short, it may be said truly and fearlessly, that whilst the only other religious systems in the world which deserve consideration, Mohammedanism, Brahminism, and Buddhism, have either stifled, or at the best stunted, science, and made stagnant civilization, Christianity has fostered learning of all kinds, and has been in itself the highest civilization ever known.

I have naturally dwelt upon the external development of the religious life of Christians, not upon its inner being. A lecture on evidence must of necessity appeal to that which can be known and read of all men; yet I might, if there were time, point to the characters of individual Christians as proof of the elevating, ennobling, purifying, sanctifying power of the teaching of Christ, of the contemplation of Christ, and of the love of Christ. I will content myself with quoting words which many here have read, and read with interest long ago. The author of "Ecce Homo" writes,—"That Christ's method, when rightly applied, is really of mighty force, may be shown by an argument which the severest censor of Christians will hardly refuse to admit. Compare the ancient with the modern world. 'Look on this picture and on that.' One broad distinction in the characters of men forces itself into prominence. Among all men of the ancient heathen world there were scarcely one or two [the lecturer proceeds to show there were none] to whom we may venture to apply the epithet holy. In other words, there were not more than one or two, if any, who, *besides being virtuous in their actions were possessed with an unaffected enthusiasm of goodness, and besides abstaining from vice, regarded even a vicious thought with horror.* Probably no one will deny that in Christian countries this higher-toned goodness, which we call holiness, has existed. Few will maintain that it is exceedingly rare. Perhaps the truth is, that there has scarcely been a town in any Christian country since the time of Christ where a century has passed without exhibiting a character of such elevation that his mere presence has shamed the bad and made the good better, and been felt at times like the presence of God Himself; and if this be so, has Christ failed, or can Christianity die? (pp. 442–450.)

Art. V.—REVISED ENGLISH VERSION OF THE PSALMS.

The Book of Psalms; translated from the Latin Vulgate, being a Revised Edition of the Douay Version. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

IT is certainly a very striking thought, that the Catholic Church, instead of receiving her ritual of praise, among the many other gifts which are the fruits of the Spirit's coming on the Day of Pentecost, should have borrowed it from the Church of the elder covenant, when the Spirit was as yet not given. The spirit of praise and thanksgiving is essentially one of the chief outward manifestations of the presence of the Holy Ghost. Hence the Apostle says, "Be ye filled with the Holy Spirit, speaking to yourselves in psalms and hymns, and spiritual canticles, singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord; giving thanks always for all things, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, to God and the Father." (Eph. v. 18–20.) Judging, therefore, by our poor human estimate of the fitness of things, we should have thought that the Church's chief songs of praise would have been written after the coming of the Holy Ghost. Moreover, praise and thanksgiving form the eternal worship of the Church in heaven; and here again we should have supposed that these would have assumed a higher outward form under the covenant of the Spirit, than under the Law; for as grace is the seed of glory, so the old law was but the figure of the law of grace, "the shadow of the good things to come." As the New Law, says S. Thomas, is the way or path to the Church in heaven, so the Old Law was the way or path to the New Law. Yet we should have been wrong. The songs and hymns which accompany the "clean oblation," in the better and "more perfect tabernacle," are still the same as those which went up before God with the smoke of the burnt-offerings in the Temple at Jerusalem.

His Grace the Archbishop of Westminster, in his preface to the new edition of the Psalms, which we are at present noticing, calls our attention to this striking fact, and draws from it a proof of the unity of the mystical Body of Christ. "It is a remarkable token of the unity of the mystical Body of Christ," he says, "both before and since His coming, that the Catholic Church should receive from the Church of Israel its chief songs of praise. The saints of old were not perfected without us, and

we from them have inherited the Psalter of divine joy. Without doubt the Spirit of God, who dwells in fulness with His Church, could have multiplied the psalmists of His true Israel. But He has been pleased to make the Psalter of the Temple the daily manual of praise and thanksgiving for the Church of all nations." (Preface, p. vi.) Perhaps, also, if we may venture reverently to search for reasons where nothing has been revealed to us, it may be that as David was the type of the Son of David, and as the Psalms sum up not only all the works of God, and all the history of the Old Testament, but also all the chief mysteries of Christ's Incarnation, and its consequences; so it was fitting that the mind of David should prefigure the mind of Christ's mystical Body, the Church, and that the Psalms should set forth the outlines of the features of each several phase of the spiritual and mystical life, which was afterwards to be manifested in its fulness amongst His members. Thus the Psalter is divinely fitted both to form the outward expression of the Church's praise in her sacred offices, as she lives over again the life of David's Son, and at the same time to adapt itself, with a marvellous completeness, to every feeling, desire, and want of the Christian soul, in its struggle to rise to a higher life, and to "put on Christ." For "the Book of Psalms," says S. Basil, in the passage quoted by the Archbishop in his preface (p. vi.), "contains all that is useful in the other [books of Scripture]. It foretells the future, it commemorates the past, it lays down rules of life, it suggests counsels of practical utility. In a word, it is a treasury of good maxims, furnishing each one with all that is useful. . . . . The Psalter serves as a commencement for beginners; it is a means of progress for those who are advancing, the support of those who attain to perfection. It is the voice of the Church." (Hom. I. in Ps. i.) So also S. Thomas, speaking of praise as a preparation for prayer, and of the sacrifice of praise as a preparation for the great Eucharistic sacrifice, tells us that the opening of the Mass is taken from the Psalms, because the Psalter "sums up by way of praise (*per modum laudis*) whatever is contained in Holy Scripture."*

A few considerations will make this still more clear. Everything that has come from the hand of the Creator is typical of something higher. The kingdom of nature is typical of the kingdom of grace; the kingdom of grace, although no mere empty type, because grace is in a certain way the commencement of glory within us, is typical of the kingdom of glory. The Old Law, with its multiplied rites and cere-

* 3ª Qu. 83, Art. 4, C.

monies, was the passing shadow of the Law of truth, with its efficacious sacraments, and means of grace. The New Covenant is, indeed, no longer the shadow, but it is still the type, although the efficacious type, the "very image," to use the Apostle's words, of the heavenly things that shall be revealed in us hereafter; for as "the patterns of heavenly things have been cleansed" by earthly sacrifices, so "the heavenly things themselves have been cleansed with better sacrifices than these." We have even type within type.

Thus Jerusalem, the city of the great King, is alike the type of our Lady and of the Church, and of the soul in a state of grace, and of the heavenly Jerusalem. So, too, is it with David, whose person and character and many-featured life are all so many types either of Christ, or of His Church, or of the soul that has not as yet offended God, or of the penitent and contrite soul, or of the soul in a state of perfect union with God, or of humility, or of trust in God, or of spiritual and holy joy. So, also, the Psalms—for although some of them may not have been written by David, yet they are all full of David's spirit—are more than mere prophetical anticipations, clearer even than mere reflections of the life of Christ, or of His Church, or of the Christian soul. David, as both S. Thomas and Bellarmine remark, seems to be an Evangelist rather than a Prophet, and his songs of praise are glowing, life-like descriptions of the Life, Passion, Death, and Resurrection of the Son of God, and of the Church both in all her varying trials, vicissitudes, and persecutions, and in her triumph and glory, as well as of every phase of the Christian life, purgative, illuminative, and unitive; in other words, ascetical and mystical. David himself, the shepherd-boy, the fugitive among the rocks of the wilderness of En-gaddi, the Prophet-King of Israel, the man after God's own heart, who, nevertheless, fell so low as to be guilty of the double sin of adultery and murder; the monarch who, flying from before the face of Absalom, his own son, passed over the brook Cedron, and went up the Mount of Olives weeping and barefoot, with his head covered, or who went along the hill-side jeered at, and cursed, and pelted with stones and earth,—David himself, in the typical representativeness of his many-sided life, stands almost alone in the history of God's dealings with mankind. The royalty of the King of kings seems to rest upon his shoulder, the shadow of the Man of sorrows to hang over his path, while the very imperfections and sins into which God suffered him to fall enable him to portray in his own person—what had no part in the sinless Son of Mary—the rising of a soul from a state of sin to a state of grace and of union with God. The lowest depths of humiliation and the highest manifestations

of God's favour seem to meet in him, who had been a saint and became a sinner, and then a saint again. The Psalm "Miserere" is the cry of one whose very bones have been humbled by the flesh with which they were clothed, and yet of one who can still speak of being sprinkled and cleansed and washed by God, and of being made whiter than snow. The Psalms *Quemadmodum desiderat* (41st), *Deus, Deus meus, ad te* (62nd), *Quam dilecta* (83rd), in which David sings of himself as "thirsting," or "panting," or "fainting" for the "strong and living God," and many other psalms which we have no time to mention, have furnished the masters of the spiritual life with expressions admirably suited to describe the highest stages of the mystical state. What a wonderful proof, therefore, we have of the Divine wisdom that the Book of Psalms, which was afterwards to become the ritual of praise in the Church of the living God, and the familiar manual of devotion for the Christian soul, under every want, both in sorrow and in joy, should, for the greater part at least, be the work of that *one* man, who, as we have said, represented in his own person not only Christ and His Church, but also every step and every phase of the spiritual life; who was both a sinner and a saint, a penitent and a mystic; and who in the outpourings of his spirit has left us lessons beyond all price on the seven virtues and the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, from "the fear of the Lord, which is the beginning of wisdom," unto the day when the soul, perfected and "precious in His sight," passes through the everlasting doors, and enters into the presence of the King of Glory. It seems, then, especially fitting that God the Holy Ghost, who breathed the spirit of the Psalms,—His own spirit,—into David's heart, throughout all the changing circumstances of his chequered life, and who watched over their utterance, and perfected them with His own fulness, should have set them forward for all time by the side of the Law and the Prophets, so as to form the triune foundation of the Gospel of the ever-blessed Trinity; the Book of the Psalms standing in relation to the Spirit of praise as the Law to the authority of the Eternal Father, and as the prophetical word to the Wisdom or Word of God, although, of course, in the Law and the Prophets, as well as in the Psalms, "the holy men of God spoke as they were inspired by the Holy Ghost."

For these reasons, then, we cannot feel too grateful for the new and improved English version of the Book of Psalms, which his Grace the Archbishop has lately "commended to the piety of the faithful," coming to us as it does with his own *imprimatur* and preface, and also, to use his own words, "as one more of the many gifts bequeathed to us by his learned and

lamented predecessor," one-half at least of the Psalms having been revised by the hand of his Eminence Cardinal Wiseman. Such a version of the Psalter can be productive only of incalculable benefit to our Catholic laity. It cannot, we fear, be denied, that one of the worst and most mischievous consequences of the Protestant abuse of the Bible has been to render Catholics somewhat timid in using the Holy Scriptures for devotional purposes, even when furnished with those notes and comments which the Church in her wisdom requires. It is much to be wished that our English Catholics should imitate the pious example of their forefathers before the Reformation, when, as Sir Thomas More tells us, "the whole Bible was, long before Wycliffe's days, by virtuous and well-learned men, translated into the English tongue, and by good and godly people, with devotion and soberness, well and reverently read." Recent investigations have quite borne out the holy martyr's statement, and have, therefore, utterly exploded the old Protestant lie, that Wycliffe was the first to translate the Bible into English, or the still more absurd myth, that before Luther happened to lay his hand upon a Bible, the Scriptures were almost unknown.* The Psalter, especially, seems to have been commonly read in English before the Reformation. Thus, not to mention the earlier Saxon or English versions, or several Latin Psalters with interlinear English translations, we have the English version of the Psalms by William de Schorham (Shoreham), vicar of Chart-Sutton, in Kent, date about 1320, the MSS. of which still exist in the British Museum, and in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin, and the Latin Commentary

---

* S. Aldhelm's (656–709) translation of the Psalter still exists in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris. Translations, either of the whole Bible or of certain portions of it, were made by V. Bede, Alcuin, King Alfred, and Archbishop Aelfric. (MSS. of latter in British Museum and Bodleian.) We have also the Cuthbert Gospels or "Durham Book," with interlinear English translation of a date somewhat later than that of S. Cuthbert (British Museum); the Rushworth Gospels, with interlinear English translation, of the ninth century (Bodleian); several interlinear English Psalters of an equally early date, some of which have been printed by Spelman, the Surtees Society, and Thorpe; a copy of the Gospels in English, date about 1189 (Bodleian); besides many metrical versions of different parts of Scripture, similar to those of the Ormulum. We have the testimony of a writer of the fourteenth century (1398,—the compendious old treatise on having the Scriptures in English) that in his day there was "a Bible in English of Northern speech," which seemed to him to be two hundred years old. Our list is by no means complete, and of course we should also bear in mind that many vernacular translations of the Bible must have perished, both in the time of the Danish invasions and in the reign of Edward VI., when so many libraries were wantonly destroyed. (See Blunt's "Plain Account of the English Bible"; Craik's "History of English Literature," vol. i.)

on the Psalms, re-written in English, with vernacular translation, the work of Richard Rolle, of Hampole, near Doncaster, chantry-priest, or perhaps hermit, who died in 1349. The latter version seems to have been a favourite with our forefathers, and is alluded to in a commentary on the Divine Service, printed in 1520 for the use of the nuns of Sion.

> Of Psalms I have drawn but few, for ye may have them of Richard Hampole's drawing, and out of *English Bibles*, if ye have license thereto.*

Richard of Hampole's version keeps as much as possible to the letter, as he himself tells us in the following words, which, for their important bearing upon our present subject, we will quote at length :—

> In this work I seek no strange English, but lightest and commonest and swilk [such, swa-lik] that is most like unto the Latin, so that they that know not the Latin, by the English may come unto many Latin words. In the translation I follow the letter als-mekille as I may, and there I find no proper English, I follow the wit of the words, so that they that shall read it, them there not dread erring. In expounding I follow holy doctors, for it may come into some envious man's head that knows not what he should say at will, that I wist not what I said, and so do harm till him, and till other.†

Certainly our Catholic forefathers had no lack of English versions either of the Psalms or of the other Scriptures. Indeed, it was, in all probability, the very multiplicity of such translations,—some of them unlearned, and others, after the time of Wycliffe, like Wycliffe's own version, heretical, or at least, to use Sir T. More's expression, "naught,"—that is, bad,—which led to the publication of a canon in Convocation under Archbishop Arundel, in 1408, decreeing that from that date "no unauthorized person should translate any portion of Holy Scripture into English or any other language;" ..... and that no "such book, or treatise, or version, made either in Wycliffe's time or since, be read, either in whole or in part, publicly or privately, under the penalty of the greater excommunication, till the said translation be approved either by the bishop of the diocese or, if necessary, by a provincial council." It will be observed that this canon, as Sir T. More points out, leaves untouched the translations "that were done of old, before Wycliffe's days"; and that there were early English Bibles existing in 1540 we know from a statement made by Cranmer, in his Preface to the Bible, of the same year, as well as from Sir Thomas More's words, already quoted, just as we are

---

* "*Mirror* of Our Lady," Prologue, fol. iii. Quoted by Blunt.

† *See Blunt's* "Plain Account of the English Bible," pp. 16, 17—28, 29.

informed of the same fact by a writer of the fourteenth century, who wrote in 1398.*

So far, then, as to the existence of English versions of the Psalms and other books of Scripture before the Reformation. Yet, hardly had the Catholics of England recovered from the first shock of that fearful uptearing of all the old religious landmarks, than we find their spiritual rulers anxiously endeavouring to the best of their power to supply them with new English translations of the Bible, with the special view of counteracting the errors of the Protestant versions. Now, we cannot help thinking that the passage quoted above from Richard of Hampole may serve to throw light upon the spirit in which these new translations were made. Protestant writers, for the most part, it is well known, throw in our teeth the Latinisms to be found in the Rheims translation of the New Testament of 1580, and in the Douay translation of the Old Testament of 1609; while Catholic writers generally excuse them on the ground that the translators were in exile, and were unfamiliar with their native English tongue. To some extent, of course, this may be true; but we cannot forget that Gregory Martin, who seems to have had the chief part in the translation of both Testaments, was a convert, and that, having been a Fellow of S. John's College, Oxford, he must have been thoroughly acquainted with vernacular English. He was an excellent linguist, and was considered superior to most scholars of his time.† To us it seems far more likely, nay, absolutely certain, that Richard of Hampole's plan of choosing "English words most like unto the Latin,"‡ was purposely adopted by the Rheims and Douay trans-

* The "Compendious Old Treatise," mentioned in a previous note.—Ibid., p. 28. It seems probable that neither William of Schorham's translation nor that of Richard of Hampole fell under the prohibition of the Canon of 1408. William of Schorham, however, was not a learned man, at least if we may judge by his translation of Psalm lxxviii. 1, to which we shall shortly call attention. Richard of Hampole's Psalter, on the other hand, seems to have been highly thought of, and was, as we have seen, singled out for recommendation to the nuns of Sion.

† "Plain Account," p. 99. We leave it to Mr. Blunt to reconcile his statement at p. 99, that Gregory Martin before his conversion had been a Fellow of S. John's, Oxford, and that it is to him that the Catholics chiefly owe their English Bible, with his statement in the very next page, that the English of that Bible is "such as would be used by a foreigner who had learned the language in middle life, rather than that which would be used by a native Englishman."

‡ Although Richard of Hampole tells us that he acted on this plan, his northern dialect, so far at least as we have been able to form an opinion, seems to have been too strong for him to allow him thoroughly to carry it out. Indeed, for one speaking provincial English, as opposed to the Court English, this would seem to have been hardly possible in the first half of the fourteenth century. (*For* the distinction between the people's English and *the Court English*, see Earle's "Philology of the English Tongue.")

lators, not because they were ignorant of vernacular English, for this in Martin's case, at least, is absurd, but because being convinced that the Hebrew and Greek texts then known were corrupt, their object was to furnish English Catholics and honest Protestants in those days of bitter controversy with an accurate rather than a devotional translation of the Latin Vulgate. In other words, their object was polemical rather than devotional. This, we think, may be gathered from the title-page, in which we read that it was published "for the better understanding of the texts, and *especially for the discovery of corruptions in divers translations, and for clearing controversies in religion.*" For this, it was necessary to keep as closely as possible to the letter; and, therefore, when a Latin-derived word could be found to express the meaning, it was only natural that they should choose it; nor should we forget that at that time, especially in prose literature, many Latinized expressions were in use which have since been thrown out of the language, and that the taste of the day was rather in favour of such expressions. When Bishop Gardiner took part with Cranmer and the other bishops in the revision of the Bible in 1541, he suggested that many Latin words should be transferred into English with their Latin dress,* and the Rheims and Douay translators forty years later only extended the same principle much farther. That they did act on this principle is expressly stated in the preface to the Old Testament of 1609, published at Douay, by Lawrence Kellam, "at the sign of the Holie Lamb." In this preface the translators of thirty years before are spoken of as men "excellent in the tongues, sincere men, and learned divines"; and we are told that where the English has no sufficient term, they "either kepe the word as they find it or only turne it to our English termination, because it would otherwise require many words in English to signify one word of another tongue." It is added that the sense of the Latinized words "is as soon learned as if they were turned so near as possible into English." It is all very well for Mr. Blunt,—to whose "Plain Account of the English Bible" we are indebted for much valuable information, although when speaking of Catholics he is singularly unjust and uncourteous,—to try to raise a smile at such translations as "He exinanited Himself," Phil. ii. 7, or "against the spirituals of wickedness in the celestials," Eph. vi. 12, or "the passions of this time are not condigne to the glory to come,"

---

* As e.g., *Ecclesia, Pœnitentia, Pontifex, Contritio, Justitia, Justificare, Adorare, Baptizare, Merces, Satisfactio, Gratia, Charitas, Virtutes, Dominationes, Potestates, Hostia*, and many others. (Blunt, p. 56.)

Rom. viii. 18; but it would not be difficult to show, did space allow, that many Latinized and foreign expressions were then in use,* while the object of the translators being to give an exact rendering of the Latin words, we cannot wonder that they should have acted on Gardiner's principle, and in many cases transferred into English the Latin words themselves. Some of our readers may here, perhaps, ask what need there was of a new Catholic translation of the Scriptures, if so many English Bibles existed before the Reformation. But we have not far to look for an answer, for we have already pointed out in a note that in the reign of that godly youth and friend of an "open Bible," King Edward VI., most of the old libraries in England were wantonly destroyed. Even Mr. Blunt admits this, and adds that the older and less intelligible the books "the more pernicious they would seem to the silly vandals who wrought such destruction."

From these remarks upon the Rheims and Douay translations we do not wish our readers to suppose that in an English version of the Latin Vulgate we ourselves in any way prefer a Latinized diction to our more vigorous vernacular English. Quite the contrary; we believe that the sense of the Holy Scriptures as contained in the Latin version, which the Church has declared authentic, may be—at least in most instances—better and more clearly rendered in thoroughly native English than in words and idioms having a closer affinity to the Latin. As a proof of this we have only to point to the Authorized Protestant Translation, which (as Mr. Blunt has, we think,

---

* As for the word "certes," the Rhemish use of which Mr. Blunt contrasts disparagingly with that of "verily," in the Protestant Bible, it had long been naturalized in English (see Chaucer, "Piers Plowman," Passus ii., 151), and was then, and for some time afterwards, by no means obsolete, but probably a more common and more forcible word than "verily," which is itself of Latin derivation. See "Othello," act i., sc. 1; "Tempest," act iii., sc. 3; "Love's Labour Lost," act iv., sc. 2; "Comedy of Errors," act iv., sc. 4. In 1553, Thomas Wilson, in his "Art of Rhetoric," complained that some men were wont "to Latin their tongues"; and Webster Puttenham, in his "Art of English Poesy," 1582, the very year of the publication of the Rheims New Testament, alludes to the introduction of many strange terms of other languages by men of learning, such as preachers and schoolmasters, and of words not usual or well-sounding, "though they be daily spoken at Court." We do not hesitate to say that if the diction of the Protestant Bible is not more Latinized than it is, this is because it was founded on the old English versions; for, as Hallam has pointed out ("Lit. of Europe," ii. 464), whatever may be thought of the English of that translation, it is not the English of the reign of King James. See Craik's "History of Eng. Lit.," vol. i. pp. 433-4, where he says that at this period (1553—1582) a debasement was going on in the language, and that the ancient English was beginning to be half suffocated by additions from foreign sources. Shakespeare *could hardly have* begun to write before 1586.

conclusively shown), although revised and corrected by comparison with the Greek and Hebrew, has, like Wycliffe's Bible, been built up from, or rather grown out of, old Catholic versions made from the Latin Vulgate, throughout successive generations, almost from the days of S. Augustine of Canterbury, and which, therefore, if we except a few errors and a certain number of alterations, is far more our own property than that of the Protestant Church.* We have been simply contending that sufficient justice seems hardly to have been done to the object which the Rheims and Douay translators had in view, and that it is scarcely fair to excuse their Latinisms wholly on the ground of their inculpable ignorance of the vernacular, when they themselves, from the peculiar circumstances of their own day, would certainly have defended them on principle.

However this may be, we think there can be no doubt that at the present day a vigorous English style is to be preferred in our translations of the Holy Scriptures, and it is for this reason that the new English edition of the Psalter, recommended to us by the Archbishop, is especially welcome. Indeed, everything coming to us with his Grace's recommendation is sure to be as remarkable for literary merit as for doctrinal accuracy. In this edition many of the Latinisms of the ordinary Douay version, of which it is a revision, and which, it should be borne in mind, has itself been much altered from the original Rheims and Douay translations, have given place to more idiomatic English expressions. We subjoin one or two verses as given in this new edition, and in the original and modern Douay versions,† that our readers may observe the change:—

Ps. xlvi. 5, 6. New Edition.	Original Douay Version.	Modern Douay Version.
"He hath chosen *His inheritance for us.* The beauty of Jacob which he hath loved. God is *gone up with a shout of joy:* and the Lord with a sound of the trumpet."	"He hath chosen his inheritance *in us,* the beauty of Jacob which he hath loved. God *is ascended in jubilation,* and *our* Lord in the voice of the trumpet."	"He hath chosen *for us his inheritance,* the beauty of Jacob which he hath loved. God is *ascended with jubilee,* and the Lord with the sound of a trumpet."

The Protestant version (Bible) has the following (Ps. xlvii.):—

"He shall choose our inheritance for us, the excellence of Jacob whom he

* See Notice of Blunt's "Plain Account of the English Bible," in this REVIEW, January, 1871.

† As several modern editions are in circulation, we quote from that which *was approved by* the Hierarchy of Ireland in 1857, and published by Duffy *in the same year.*

loved. Selah. God is gone up with a shout, the Lord with the sound of a trumpet."

There can be no doubt, we think, that the New Edition renders these verses in more vigorous English than the Douay version; but we have chosen them, because in this particular instance we almost regret that in place of "*gone up*" the word "ascended" has not been retained, as in Ps. xxiii. 3,—"Who shall *ascend* into the mountain of God?" In reading the Psalms a single word often stirs up within us a whole train of thoughts; and as the 46th Psalm refers to our Lord's ascension, the word "ascended" strikes us as more suggestive, and better calculated to awaken attention to the full meaning of the Psalm. For the same reason we prefer the Douay reading of "sepulchre," in Ps. lxxxvii. 12, to that of "grave," as given in the New Edition.

We will give another instance in which the superiority lies entirely with the New Edition:—

Ps. cxxv. 6, 7. New Edition.	Original Douay Version.	Modern Douay Version.
"They went forth on their way and wept: scattering their seed.	"Going they wept and went, casting their seedes, but coming they shall come with exultation, carrying their sheaves."	"Going they went and wept, casting their seed.
"But returning, they shall come with joy: carrying their sheaves with them."		"But coming they shall come with joyfulfulness, carrying their sheaves."

As the New Edition has been published by Messrs. Burns & Oates, we need hardly say that, with regard both to type and paper, it has been excellently brought out. We have, however, observed a slight inaccuracy in Ps. lxxxvii. 15, where "casteth" is found instead of "castest."

We will conclude by placing before our readers a verse or two taken from old English translations:—

Ps. xxii. 1—3. (Trans. of William of Scorham (about 1320).)	Original Douay Version.	Modern Douay Version and New Edition.
"Our Lord gouerneth me, and nothyng shal defailen to me; in the stede of pasture he sett me ther.	"*Our* Lord ruleth me and nothing shal be wanting to me: in place of pasture there he hath placed me, upon the waters of refection he hath brought me up, he hath converted my soule."†	"The Lord ruleth me: and I shall want nothing. He hath set me in a place of pasture. He hath brought me up on [N.E. *to*] the water [N.E. *waters*] of refreshment: he hath converted my soul."
"He norissed me up water of fyllynge; he turned my soule fram the fende."*		

* Quoted by Blunt, p. 14.

† "Our Lord," instead of "the Lord," is read throughout the original Douay version, in accordance with the almost universal custom of our forefathers.

Ps. lxxviii. 1. (Richard Rolle, of Hampole (1340).)	Original Douay Version.	Modern Douay Version and New Edition.
"God, folkis come in to thyn heritage, thei defoulden thin hooli temple; thei setten Jerusalem in to kepynge of applis" (*in pomorum custodiam*).*	"O God, the Gentiles are come into thine inheritance, they have polluted thy holie temple, they have made Jerusalem as a watch toure of fruits."	"O God, the heathens [N.E. *heathen*] are come into thy [N.E. *Thine*] inheritance: they have defiled thy holy temple: they have made Jerusalem as a place to keep fruit."

We may also state that in Ps. xxxix. 7, for "*aures autem perfecisti mihi*," where the modern Douay version translates "Thou hast *pierced* ears for me," in the sense of "fodisti," which is the reading of S. Jerome, the new edition reads, "But ears Thou hast *perfected* unto me," which seems to be more in harmony with the commentaries of the Fathers, and with Hebrews x. 5. It is also a return to the original Douay version, which has "but eares thou hast *perfited* to me." We have now only to add that we trust that the day is not far distant when an English Catholic version of the whole Bible may be formed from the old Catholic versions in existence before the Reformation, with, of course, whatever corrections the present state of Biblical criticism may suggest, or the present condition of the English language may require. The advantages of such a version have already been touched upon in the pages of this REVIEW, when noticing Mr. Blunt's work in January, 1871, and every fresh discovery or investigation of ancient manuscripts does but strengthen and confirm the view there taken. Meanwhile, the new edition of the Psalms cannot fail to be of great use to all who desire, in language inspired by the Spirit of praise, to "give thanks always for all things, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, to God and the Father."

* Blunt, p. 15.—The good Vicar of Chart Sutton does not seem to have been so happy in his translation of this verse as Richard of Hampole, as he is evidently puzzled by *in pomorum custodiam*, which he renders "into the keeping of a manner of folk that was called Pomos."—Ibid., p. 16.

Art. VI.—Mr. PLUMMER'S TRANSLATION OF DR. DÖLLINGER ON THE POPES.

Fables respecting the Popes of the Middle Ages. By Dr. Döllinger. Translated with Introduction and Appendices. By Alfred Plummer, Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford. Rivingtons, 1871.

HIS would be a small mind indeed, which could feel anything but profound sorrow at the present position of Dr. Döllinger. His bitterest enemy, however, could wish him no deeper shame than the praises of his Protestant friends. He who has spent a life in attacking the Reformation is hailed in his old age as a second Luther. His enormous and astonishing learning is now used as a quarry, out of which ignoble hands hew stones to cast at the religious principles in which he still believes. Men praise him to the skies, select from his works what suits their purpose, and coolly ignore his opinion about historical questions on which he has staked his reputation. Amongst these offenders Mr. Plummer, the translator of Dr. Döllinger's "Papst-fabeln," is one of the worst. He is one of those men who keep up in the British mind the delusion that Catholics dishonestly ignore historical criticism, while they themselves notoriously take as much of it as is convenient and pretermit the rest. On the present occasion we can only give two or three specimens of what we mean, but they will be sufficient to prove our assertion.

A first principle of Dr. Döllinger's school is historical dogmatism. By this expression we mean praise not blame. A man of his erudition and acuteness has a right to be dogmatic in his own sphere. Besides this, he has great faith, and we share it with him, in the possibility of making out substantially the facts of the past, notwithstanding the sceptical use often made of the critical method. To take a crucial instance. Protestants are at this moment doing their best to prove that S. Peter was never at Rome, while the more cautious of them are contented with a verdict of "Not Proven." Now Dr. Döllinger has all his life consistently maintained, on purely historical grounds, that the theory that S. Peter was never in Rome is monstrous. He proves that the Saint was at Rome twice, that he founded the Roman Church, and was martyred at Rome. Yet Mr. Plummer, though he himself seemingly is inclined to think that the Apostle was in Rome, yet relegates

the view to his "list of unsolved and apparently insoluble historical puzzles."

Mr. Plummer has, in this instance at least, the grace to state his author's opinion. In another most important point he entirely conceals it, and even gives his reader an impression the direct contrary to the fact. The case is this. Every one will remember the publication of that most remarkable book the "Philosophumena" of Hippolytus. The whole Protestant world flew with delight upon this *chronique scandaleuse* of the third century, in which Pope Zephyrinus was accused of heresy and stupidity, and Pope Callistus of swindling, apostasy, and heresy. The temptation to be graphic was, of course, irresistible to Dr. Milman. Bunsen and Dr. Wordsworth, Broad Church and High Church, shook hands over this newfound book. It is very scandalous that the Episcopalian should have been so ready to undermine the foundation of the Nicene doctrine, by giving over two Popes to heresy. Dr. Döllinger answered the representatives of both schools, and produced a book which stopped all mouths but Mr. Plummer's. We have always considered this book his chef-d'œuvre. He puts Hippolytus into the witness-box, and analyzes his evidence as the Attorney-General tore the Claimant to pieces. In so doing he has displayed an acuteness and a knowledge of Roman law, as well as of ecclesiastical history, which are admirable. He has shown the orthodoxy of the two Popes, and that the very accusations of Hippolytus are precisely those which could not fail to be made by one holding his heretical stand-point. After all this, Mr Plummer ventures on the following statement:—"Zephyrinus, during his long Pontificate, had held and taught heterodox and contradictory doctrines respecting the Godhead, sometimes following Noetus, sometimes Sabellius. But his errors were the errors of a confused and ignorant man, ruled by the powerful and subtle mind of Callistus; and Zephyrinus left behind him no formal statement of his belief to discredit his office." Now all this categorical assertion will pass very quietly into the minds of the readers of Mr. Plummer's handsome, well-printed book, and will become stereotyped. Two Popes, declared by an Œcumenical Council to be infallible, were heretical. Such will be the myth. Surely common literary honesty, ordinary historical accuracy would have required the man who penned these lines to add that the statement is, at the very least, most uncertain, and is regarded as absolutely false by the author whom he translates and whose literary career he sketches. Yet what *shall we say* to the following astonishing passage:—"The *appearance* of the 'Philosophumena,' by Miller, 1851, gave *rise to a prolonged* discussion, in which many Catholics sought

to weaken the testimony of the author, whilst Protestant writers endeavoured to use his authority for the purpose of throwing discredit on the Church of Rome. In answer to both parties, especially to Gieseler, Baur, Bunsen, Wordsworth, and Lenormant, Dr. Döllinger published, in 1853, "Hippolytus and Callistus, the Roman Church in the Third Century," perhaps of all his writings the one in which his ingenuity of combination, his skill as a logician, and his lofty tone in handling the interests of the Church are most conspicuous." Who would not suppose from this passage, that Dr. Döllinger answered "the Catholics who sought to weaken the testimony of the author" by showing that his testimony was worthy of credit? Who could for a moment guess that Dr. Döllinger himself not only weakens, but annihilates the witness of Hippolytus, and that his only difference from Lenormant is that that writer declares for Origen, while he himself considers Hippolytus to be the author. No doubt that myth will grow, and we shall hear that Lenormant is an uncritical Ultramontane. But perhaps Mr. Plummer, though guilty of suppressing the truth about the Munich divine, is himself worthy of being considered an independent authority on the question of the heterodoxy of the two Popes. We hardly think so. He has not even read his brief. No one, not even Hippolytus, ever asserted that Zephyrinus sometimes followed Noetus, sometimes Sabellius. What Hippolytus did say was, that Zephyrinus sometimes favoured himself, sometimes Cleomenes and Sabellius. Let Mr. Plummer read p. 222 of Dr. Döllinger's book, and the note in which he castigates Dr. Wordsworth. He will find the real accusation thus formulized. "In private conversations Callistus (and subsequently Zephyrinus) expressed himself in the presence of those who favoured the truth (*i.e.* according to Hippolytus) in words which made them fancy that he agreed with them; then subsequently he, on the contrary, propounded to them the doctrines of Sabellius." Above all, if he reads p. 201, he will find that Hippolytus, like any one else, considers the doctrine of Noetus to be identical with that of Sabellius. How then can they be contradictory? O Mr. Plummer, if Zephyrinus was in error, he is not the only man in the world "whose errors are those of a confused and ignorant man!"

Mr. Plummer, however, has not only translated Dr. Döllinger but attacked the Archbishop of Westminster on the subject of Honorius. We are not going to enter again at length on this vexed question, though we cannot help saying something about it in noticing this book. If we appear to be *severe on Mr.* Plummer, we can most honestly disclaim all *personal dislike* to that gentleman, with whom we have not

the honour to be acquainted. But it is impossible not to take him as a type of many others, with whom we must confess to have been irritated. It is very coolly asserted over and over again, that the decisions of the Council of the Vatican are against history, that it is perfectly useless to declare the Pope infallible; for Popes have erred;—not even a Council can destroy facts. Of these facts the heresy of Honorius is the chief. We have seen in print that the heterodoxy of the Pope is as certain as that Hannibal crossed the Alps, and that William the Conqueror won the battle of Hastings. Now Mr. Plummer is of this school. His answer to the Archbishop is couched in the following terms. "It is difficult to decide which statement is the most audacious, that the letters of Honorius are entirely orthodox, or that the language for which he was anathematized was usual at the time." The Archbishop had said: "In the use of language, he wrote, *as was usual*" (the italics belong to Mr. Plummer) "before the condemnation of Monothelism, and not as it became necessary afterwards. It is an anachronism and an injustice to censure his language used before that condemnation, as it might be just to censure it after the condemnation had been made." Now really this is a very fair statement made by the Archbishop, and contains the key to a great deal which to some has appeared difficult in the historical question. The expression "one will" was by no means unusual, for a reason which we shall notice presently. For the statement itself we shall quote an authority most competent in point of learning, above all suspicion of Catholic bias, Dorner, the Protestant author of the "History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ." "Hitherto" (*i.e.* till the breaking out of the Monothelite controversy) "there had been no lack of teachers of the Church, who taught without fear of blame that in Christ there was unity of action and unity of will."* Thus German Protestant criticism believes, with the Archbishop, that the expression "one will" was used by orthodox writers. Our limits forbid our entering at length on this proof of Dorner's assertion. Fortunately however we can point out a striking specimen, from no less a witness than S. Athanasius. It was quoted, of course, on the Monothelite side in the sixth General Council, and we give it with Father Newman's commentary:†—"Thus Athanasius, in a remarkable passage, in which his eagerness to avoid ascribing human imperfections to the Word's humanity, makes him speak as if he would deny to it a will (which is contrary to his categorical statement *elsewhere*, de Incar., art. 21), uses φύσις simply for His *divine nature*. 'He set up anew,' he says, 'the form of man

* *Entwickelung*, tom. ii. p. 203. † Athanas.

in Himself, in the spectacle of a flesh which had no fleshly wills or human thoughts, in an image of renovation. The will is in the θεότης alone; since the whole φύσις of the Word was there,' (c. Apoll. ii. 10)." However, Dorner goes further than Father Newman; and after analyzing the whole doctrine of the Saint, thus sums it up: "That with this view a duality of wills cannot be held, appears to me evident." Many other Fathers before Honorius were preoccupied by the question which troubled him, how to explain the existence in Christ of a will, together with the absence of contrariety with the divine will. They answered the difficulty with the same formula of "one will," and in a way which might with greater show of reason be called Monothelite. They alleged the oneness of this divine will with the Father's; and took but little account of the human will, as if it need not be considered, or else resolved it into an economy for our sake. It is in this sense that S. Chrysostom uses ἓν θέλημα, and S. Ambrose "una voluntas, una operatio."* That these passages are susceptible of a right interpretation we are well aware, and we contend that the same is true of Honorius.

The reason why, before the Monothelite controversy arose, the human will was in the mind of some of the Fathers so much in the background as scarcely to appear,—is very plain, and throws a great light on the whole question. It will be well to dwell a little longer on this matter, in order to show that we are not inventing a theory for the occasion. The real reason lies in the supreme influence exercised by the Person of the Word on the human will of Christ. Unity of will is an ambiguous expression. Though our Lord has two wills, the divine and human, and though both wills are active, yet in point of fact the thing willed is always identical. The human never wills anything in opposition to the divine. The Person willing is One, and it is the divine will of the Person which always takes the initiative. This was the doctrine defined by the Council which condemned the Monothelites. "The human will follows, and does not strive against, but on the contrary is subject to the divine and Almighty will. The will of the human nature (σάρξ) must move itself, but also submit itself to the divine, as the all-wise Athanasius says . . . . As His flesh the (humanity) is called and is the flesh of God the Word, so also the natural will of His flesh is called and is the property of the divine Word. As He Himself says: 'I am come down from Heaven not to do My own will, but the will of My Father who sent Me.' He here

* *St. Chrysostom*, ed. Montfaucon, viii. 266. St. Ambrose, de Fid., ad *Gratianum, lib. I.*

calls the will of His flesh His own, because the flesh was His own. As the all-holy and sinless flesh was not taken away by its deification, but remained in its limits and mode, so is it also with the human will, which though deified is not taken away. Much more, it is maintained that, as Gregory the Theologian says, the will of the Saviour is not contrary to God, but all-deified."* Thus the doctrine of Pope Agatho, with respect to the whole human nature, is true also of the human will. That Pontiff quotes from S. Gregory of Nyssa these striking words: "The Saviour assigned to the human nature, which He had in Himself, the time at which it was to operate in its own way." Nearly the same words are used by S. Sophronius; with the remarkable addition, that He suffered, acted, and operated when He, as God, chose, and not according as the natural movements of the flesh willed to set themselves in motion.†

The same kind of language still subsists in theology. If we look at the question of the absolute sinlessness of Christ, we shall find that one reason given for it is the fact that the divine will in the Person of the Word moves and governs the human will of our Lord.‡ By other writers of S. Thomas's school, the Personality is said to "move and apply the human nature to action"; it also "effectually produces the meritorious operation" of the Sacred Humanity.§ This, of course, does not destroy the freedom or activity of the human will; any more than divine grace deprives us of liberty, though its result is infallible, for God our Creator and the prime mover of all things, moves us without interfering with the free activity of the will. Thus, while we move ourselves, He who knows the whole issues and springs of our being may in another sense be said to set us in motion. The Fathers then, before the Monothelite controversy, fixing their eyes upon the oneness of the thing willed and the oneness of the willer, might and did talk of the one will of Christ, meaning that there was a moral unity in the will of our Lord. At that

---

* Mansi, xi. 638. † Mansi, xi. 266, 485.

‡ We allude to such pronouncements as the following of S. Thomas:—"Voluntas humana Christi habuit quendam determinatum modum, ex eo quod fuit in hypostasi divinâ, ut scilicet moveretur semper secundùm motum divinæ voluntatis."—Summa 3, Qu. 18, Art. 1 ad 4. Also, Billuart. Inc. Diss., 15, 2. In answer to the objection, "impedire peccata, gubernare humanitatem, illam movere ad bonum, sunt operationes quæ sunt communes toti Trinitati," he says "that all this is done by the Person of the Word, which (v. answer to objection 5) as 'principium quod' concurs with and flows into *the action* of the sacred humanity." In general it may be said, that writers of *the Jesuit school* make the Personality of our Lord to be less active and *real than Dominican* theologians.

§ *Alvarez de* Inc., p. 47.

time it was very easy for writers to enunciate true doctrine in terms afterwards condemned. It is true to say that the will was attached to the Person, in the sense that the ultimate decision of both wills lay with the Divine Word, since the human will never rebelled. The Monothelite doctrine, that the will follows the Person and not the nature, in the sense that when there is a Divine Person there is no human will, at that period had not entered into any man's head. The Archbishop, therefore, was simply right historically in saying, that Honorius was inculpable in using language which afterwards was in another sense condemned. It is not an Ultramontane quibble to say that when the Pope said "We confess one will," he did not mean the Monothelite doctrine; but on the contrary that assertion rests on very solid historical reasons. The phrase was, as we have seen, one used by S. Athanasius in a quite orthodox sense. The Archbishop says that Honorius "defined no doctrine whatever," and Mr. Plummer puts the sentence into italics. This is the simple truth. No one asked him to define anything about the will. No one dreamed of asking him any question about the will at all. The ἓν θέλημα in Sergius's letter comes in quite by the way. Not even S. Sophronius then thought of it. The heretics were only feeling blindly their way towards it. We refer again to Dorner. "The Monothelite controversy went through three stadia. In its first stadium, which may be considered to extend from the year 623 until towards the year 638, the controversy bore chiefly on the question whether we are to assume only *μία ἐνέργεια* (*θεανδρικὴ*) in Christ, as did the Monophysites and Monothelites, or *δύο ἐνέργειαι*? Theodorus of Pharan, Sergius, Cyrus, the Synod of Constantinople of the year 626, and the Synod of Alexandria in the year 633, took the first view, Sophronius the second. *The volitional faculty was, as yet, not at all brought under special consideration.*"*

Again. "In this first stadium the question of one or two wills was not at all agitated: the principal and only question was: Are the two natures to be considered as active and efficient, or not?" Later on, it is true, he says, "the second stadium was inaugurated by Honorius. He asserted that there were two natures, each working in its own way; not one *ἐνέργεια*, but one will, which he assigns to the personality. Now *for the first time* was a definite doctrine of one will laid down." We have already shown the ambiguity of the expression, "one will"; what we insist upon here is the fact, that no one thought of consulting Honorius about the question of will at

* Entwick., tom. ii. p. 205.

all. Furthermore it is most remarkable, that Dorner himself attests that the doctrine of Honorius was identical with that of the Council of Constantinople and of S. Sophronius. "At the very moment," he says, "when Honorius was ranked among heretics worthy of anathema, and his writings were burned by the hand of the Synod, his view was in all essential features adopted by the Council."* Again, "Sophronius, the originator of the controversy, whose teachings, as we shall see, were essentially the same as those of Honorius, was, marvellously enough, recognized as orthodox by the Council." It is therefore not so very wild an assertion, that the letters of Honorius were orthodox. We see no audacity in the affirmation made by the Archbishop, that the language of the Pope was not unusual. He might very innocently say "one will," before any one had thought of the Monothelite controversy. No one had consulted him directly about the will of Christ. The Pope decided no dogmatic question. "Non oportet hæc ad dogmata trahere—relinquentes ea grammaticis," is his own expression. What he decided was, that nothing should be said about the oneness or duality of operation: a very bad decision, but not a dogmatic one.

The question of the date of the origin of Monothelism is a very important one. It is an additional answer to what has been urged against a former article of this Review. Mr. Renouf ridiculed us as if we had passed over the important fact, that some Monothelites held the duality of natures in conjunction with the numerical unity of will. This is true, but nothing to the purpose. In the time of Honorius no one dreamed of such a view. It was only developed later on in the controversy. This was what the Archbishop meant by calling the modern denial of Honorius's orthodoxy an anachronism. How does this differ from the statement of Dr. Döllinger in this very volume: "The question at issue was one which had not been raised or discussed before, but then *for the first time* occupied men's minds. In such cases a certain amount of time and of controversy is always needed, in order that the consciousness of the Church may find its bearings and define itself"? Would that these words had been laid to heart and remembered. Indeed, in the whole dispute about Honorius and the infallibility of the Holy See in general, those who on other points carry the principle of development to an extreme, forget it altogether. Men who would apply it in the wildest manner to the doctrines of the Trinity and the Atonement, suddenly become the veriest Philistines when the Holy See is in question. While they have no objection to a change of idea in the very

* Entwick., tom. ii. p. 208.

foundation of Christianity, they insist on disbelieving in the infallibility of the Pope till the terms infallibility and ex cathedrâ are found in the Fathers.

After having stated thus much, we are in a position to analyze what has been said in this volume against Honorius by Dr. Döllinger. The great argument brought forward to prove the heterodoxy of Honorius, is the fact that he deduces the unity of the will of Christ from the unity of the Person. This, it is argued, is a proof that he considered the faculty of will to be an appendage of the Person and not of the nature, which is the very essence of the Monothelite heresy. Accordingly, Bishop Hefele and Dr. Döllinger put this argument forward as being that which weighed most with their minds in their condemnation of the Pope as guilty of heresy. It is on this also that their followers rely; and they scream at us as guilty of ignorance or dishonesty, when we refuse to see the Monothelite doctrine in the Pope's words. Does Honorius or does he not say, "We confess one will"? and does he not connect this assertion with the divinity of the Person of Christ? Most undoubtedly Honorius does both; but it is not an argument got up for the occasion, but a grave theological and historical opinion, that there is a perfectly orthodox sense in which the will of Christ, even the unity of will, may be most closely attached to the Person, without denying that our Lord's human nature had a separate active will of its own. It is thus that Dr. Döllinger analyzes the arguments of Honorius: "Therefore there is unity of will: for it is the Person that wills and not the natures, and there is multiplicity (not unity nor duality) of energies or modes of operation. In this way, then, Honorius would have the controversy put down; viz., that it was preposterous to contest about one or two energies in Christ, because neither the one nor the other expression could be used in a rational sense. At the same time, however, it is set forth that all men should be united in the acceptance of a single power of volition." In this sentence there are almost as many bold unproved assumptions as there are words. In the first place, there is no command whatsoever to all men, but a simple assertion "we confess one will." Secondly, that "one will" there means "one power of volition," is the very thing to be proved, and is most coolly assumed. To take the lowest ground, what in grammar or in context forbids it to mean one thing willed, or one moral unity of will? Above all, the denial that the natures will—is a simple addition by Dr. Döllinger, and we defy him to find it in Honorius. We have argued in this REVIEW that the sense of the Pope implies the contrary; for *he gives* as a reason for the oneness of Christ's will, *the innocence of His* human nature. This we still maintain.

But what we here assert, without fear of contradiction, is the fact, that the Pope nowhere denies that the natures will; and that therein lies the whole gist of the controversy. To deny the faculty of will to Christ's human nature, on the ground that the number of the faculties of will is determined by the Person and *not by the nature*, this and nothing else is essentially the Monothelite heresy. To assert the closest union between the personality and the will, in the sense that the Person governs the decision of the will, and has the greatest influence in its workings,—is the doctrine, not of Monothelites, but of their greatest opponents. This is very easily shown. The following is the summary of the doctrine of the Fathers in Petavius:* "All those actions of the Lord Christ which were proper to human nature, not only those which were free, but those which were natural and necessary, were at the beck of the Divinity, suspended on its command and governed by it; so that *the* τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν *was but one:* wherefore the Divine Word in Christ performed the same part in governing Him, and administering His functions, as the soul or mind does in mere man." Dr. Döllinger had to prove that "one will" does not mean one ἡγεμονικὸν, and he has not attempted it. Furthermore, he must know full well that Greek philosophy had hardly risen to the conception of a faculty of will distinct from the intellect. It has even been asserted that in Aristotle there is no name for free will; it is βούλευσις προαίρεσις, a power of deliberation or of election of means to an end, united with an ὄρεξις or effort of desire. We all know how in Plato virtue and knowledge are confounded. The consequence is, that Christian philosophy had to create a whole phraseology about personality and will. This is one reason why the terminology of the Fathers, from S. Athanasius down to Honorius, was fluctuating and wanting in precision. The proud independence of a human personality and of a will that moves itself, was dimly seen before, but only clearly brought out by the very Christian doctrine which extinguishes that human personality in Christ. Hence the opponents of the Monothelites had a whole philosophy to create. The following is the doctrine of Maximus. Besides the faculty of will, he held that there was in man what he called a γνωμικὸν θέλημα; that is, as he variously described it, a deliberative will, or will as attached to the person (ὑποστατικὸν), or will actually exercising a determinate choice (τὸ πῶς θέλειν).† Now St. Maximus absolutely denies the

---

* *De Inc.*, viii. 12.

† *Petavius* de Inc., lib. ix. c. vii. passim. Especially licet ex eo perspicere cur γνώμην et γνωμικὸν θέλημα in Christo non fuisse Maximus alii-que

existence of this latter will in the sacred humanity of Christ; and that, be it observed, on the very ground that it is attached to the Person, and on account of the sinlessness of Christ. The passage might be set side by side with the first letter of Honorius, as its legitimate interpretation. This doctrine of S. Maximus is also that of S. John Damascene. He says that, "the Son of God took a human nature and a human natural will, but did not take a human person; lest the human natural will should behave itself according to a personal and deliberative will of its own (*κατ' οἰκεῖον ὑποστατικὸν καὶ γνωμικὸν θέλημα*), in opposition to the divine will."* It is perfectly plain then, that the most vehement opponents of the Monothelites attach the will to the personality so closely, that the will of the sacred humanity is in a condition very different from an ordinary human will. We are quite aware that these writers have, side by side with these passages, others which assert the freedom and activity of the human will. This, however, is the very thing which we assert. The argument against the orthodoxy of Honorius, drawn from the influence which, according to him, the Person exerts on the will of Christ, falls to the ground. There are writers who undoubtedly hold the existence and activity of the human will, and who, nevertheless, make it dependent on the personality of the Word in its actual operations. This then is our answer to Dr. Döllinger. He thus condenses his statement: "The decision of Honorius and the cause of his error may be briefly expressed thus: One Willer, therefore one will; for the will is the attribute of the Person, not of the nature."† We answer, the first part of the clause is orthodox, if by one will is meant a moral unity of will. The latter part is Monothelite; but it is the statement of Dr. Döllinger, not of the Pope. We would thus sum up the whole. 1. The formula *ἓν θέλημα* before the Monothelite controversy was orthodox, and was used by many Fathers. That that controversy had not yet arisen, is an historical fact. 2. The letter of Sergius itself, as far as it was doctrinal, was capable of an orthodox interpretation. This is expressly asserted by Petavius,‡ and has an important bearing on the controversy. It is not wonderful then if Honorius on the whole approved of it. 3. The particular question which Honorius was called

putaverint; nimirum quod *ἀναμάρτητον* illum fuisse constet, hoc est peccati nullo modo capacem.

* De duabus Voluntatibus, 40. Also, de Fide Orthodoxa, 3, 14.

† P. 225.

‡ Ad hunc modum subdoltus et veterator hæreticus dogma alioqui Catholicum ad erroris sui patrimonium assumit. Nam Christi humanitatem a Divinitate Verbi *actam et impulsam* ac gubernatam fuisse inter orthodoxos *convenit.*—*De Inc., vii. c. 6.*

upon to decide was not a doctrinal one, but a question of policy. Was it not best to silence all discussion on the number of energies? This was what Honorius decided, and decided wrongly. His words about one will, even if we could allow them to be heterodox, were "obiter dicta." This, and this alone, is to be drawn from the history of Honorius, that Popes may make great mistakes in policy; not that they may err in their office of teaching doctrine to the universal Church. If Honorius had not been Pope, he would have been neither more nor less wrong than S. Basil when, out of a spirit of conciliation, he refrained from calling the Holy Spirit expressly God.*

Let us now return to Mr. Plummer. After his attack on the Archbishop, he gives us his own view. "Let us very briefly review the facts," he says. By all means; that is just what we want; only let us be sure that they are facts. We first learn that Sophroniscus was the new Patriarch of Jerusalem; but let that pass. We will charitably suppose it to be a mistake of the printer for Sophronius. We next learn that Honorius gave four different answers. Mr. Plummer thus states the two last:—"It would be better not to talk either of one will or two wills, but to leave such a question to grammarians. We must not talk either of one will or of two wills." It is almost incredible, yet it is a fact, that it is utterly false that Honorius said this. What he did forbid was the discussion of two energies, not two wills. We do not accuse Mr. Plummer of dishonesty in this matter; for, with the utmost *naïveté*, he quotes in his note the passage which forbids the two operations. But it is perfectly plain that he has not the smallest notion of the meaning of the Monothelite heresy. He is so ignorant, that we can conceive his supposing that the questions are identical. If they were so, then Honorius held not only implicitly, but explicitly, the duality of wills; for no one denies that at least in the second Letter he teaches two energies. However, this is far too subtle a view for Mr. Plummer. He is not even audacious; he is simply innocent of the most elementary knowledge of the whole matter.

After disposing of the Archbishop of Westminster, Mr. Plummer turns his attention to the Bishop of Rottenburg. "After Bishop Hefele's letter to his clergy (April 23rd, 1871), one must cease to expect that historical learning will always baffle an authority which sets history at defiance." Mr. Plummer here touches on a question which, after what we have said, can be despatched in a few words. The Bishop has been accused of a most culpable and dishonest weakness *in surrendering* his historical opinion to the authority of the

* De Inc., viii. 15.

Council, as if facts could be altered by authority. This is the view about Hannibal and the battle of Hastings in another shape. The fact is, that the Bishop's opinion was substantially not on a question of history, but on an interpretation of theological terms. His present opinion is by no means so contradictory to his first as is imagined. He held first, that the meaning of Honorius throughout was perfectly orthodox. "We gave it as our opinion that at bottom the view of Honorius, the grounds of his arguments, and therefore he himself, was at heart orthodox." Secondly, that the Council was right in condemning him, because "his letters contained de facto heresy," and could not but further the cause of heresy. Thirdly, that in the second Letter Honorius laid down orthodox doctrine in express terms, and that it would be wholly unjust to accuse him of heresy; "nevertheless he contradicted himself in putting the expression one or two energies on a par. Yet on this point he was not heretical, but only unclear." After all, Hefele's present view is not so violently a contradiction of his first. The real difficulty in the way of the perfect orthodoxy of the Pope is discussed by him in p. 137. He there blames Honorius for attaching the will to the Personality: and he enters into a theological discussion to prove that the number of wills is decided, not by the Personality, but by the Nature; as, for instance, in the Holy Trinity there are not three wills but one. In this *theological view* he is perfectly right; but it does not follow in the least that his *interpretation of the words of Honorius* is right. What he has now done is to alter his opinion concerning the meaning of a passage in the Pope's Letter. Really it requires no great stretch of submissiveness to consider that on such a point he was mistaken, and that the Council was right. All this talk about "setting history at defiance" is simple nonsense. The question is not one of historical fact, but of the sense of a theological term; a term, which the Bishop misunderstood, because he read it in the light of a subsequent decision of the Church about a heresy not at that time in existence.

Not content with asserting that Honorius forbade the assertion of two wills, Mr. Plummer ventures on a prophecy. He proceeds, "In the Ecthesis the Emperor gave this dictum of Honorius the authority of an imperial decree. Honorius would no doubt have accepted it. He died, however, before it reached Rome, October, A.D. 638." Poor Honorius! Mr. Plummer will not leave him quiet even in his grave. So far from its being certain that he would have accepted the Ecthesis, it is rather certain that he would not. Bishop Hefele points out the difference between this document drawn up by *Sergius and the* Pontiff's Letter. "In his second Letter

Honorius speaks (as far as we know from the extant fragment) neither of one nor of two wills. This is, however, not the only difference between him and the Ecthesis, but much more does he differ from that document, though the circumstance that he, although he does not in so many words say δύο ἐνέργειαι, yet expressly acknowledges that the divine nature in Christ works what is divine, and the human nature executes what is human. That is, he teaches, in fact, two ἐνέργειαι while he forbids the expression." Even of the first Letter the same author adds, "The ground of his saying 'one will' was a misunderstanding or a want of consecutive thought; while the Ecthesis denies the human will of Christ." We may therefore assume that Honorius would have rejected the Ecthesis, in which the designs of the enemies of the truth became more apparent. He had already begun to perceive the real gist of the question, as is shown by the difference in his second Letter. He died about two months before the promulgation of the imperial decree, in December 638; and his successor Severinus, instantly refused his assent to the heretical document. The moment that the drift of the heretics became clear, the Holy See opposed them with all its might. When Honorius died, no one could have anticipated the fierce contests which have raged about the two short and fragmentary letters which he wrote on an evil day. This most unfortunate of popes deserved well at least of England.* He sent S. Birinus to Wessex, and helped Northumbria through its relapse into paganism. One of his contemporaries praises his meekness and humility. He fell a victim to his love of peace. He had every temptation to wish to conciliate the Emperor of Constantinople. If ever Christendom wanted union, it was at the moment when Islamism was working its way, in consequence of the ecclesiastical disunion of the divided East. During his reign Jerusalem was taken by the Arabs, and the Holy Sepulchre fell into the hands of the infidels. It was a trying moment for Honorius, when his rival of Constantinople wrote to ask his advice, and begged him to help in reconciling the Monophysites. The four patriarchs of the East were at his feet, supplicating for a decision. But a Pope cannot "give any boon for peace"; and his negligence in defending the Faith has left a stain upon a name otherwise without reproach.

All this while we have said little about Dr. Döllinger, but we have not lost sight of him. Even in this book he has rendered good service to the Catholic Church. He has traced to its proper source the silly myth which Montalembert was credulous enough to countenance, of the bigamy of Count Gleichen,

* This is well put in F. Bottalla's excellent pamphlet.

said to be permitted by Gregory IX. He has finally destroyed the fable about Pope Joan, and he has put into a proper light the conduct of Pope Gregory II. It was, however, in this book that he went out of his way to deliver his opinion about Pope Honorius, who was not a "Pope of the Middle Ages." We would not say a word to wound a man who must be suffering agony. That he is suffering we trust; that a man should belie a whole life, that a Catholic priest should cease to say Mass and should rebel against the Church and not endure mental torment, is inconceivable. Even his cold hard mind, cutting and polished as steel, must feel a profound sadness when he remembers that he, who is now the accomplice of the Bavarian Government in a petty persecution of the Church, was once known all over the Rhineland as the defender of the imprisoned Archbishop of Cologne. At least he has not given way to the indecent fury displayed by some of his associates. For a man like Friedrich, who, in order to calumniate the Roman clergy, has invented a professor of morals, whom he dares not name, but accuses of following an infamous trade, we can only feel unmitigated contempt. Has the man taken leave of his senses that, with a logic apparently convincing to the *Saturday Review*, he insinuates a charge of incontinence against the Catholic priesthood because Bishop Martin, of Paderborn, "a strong infallibilist, had received favourably several applications from *Protestant pastors* who were willing to conform to the Church if marriage of the clergy were conceded"! We should be glad to be informed what "kind of concubinage Bishop Dinckel of Augsburg actually thought admissible." The same Friedrich has published in his documents on the council, a paper worthy of the "Confessional Unmasked;" and has had the impudence to say that the author was an infallibilist, because, forsooth, he was a Frenchman. Dr. Döllinger has at least not given himself to such blind rage as this. God help him! Ought it to cost so much to say "I have made a mistake"? Let us look at the passage which respects Honorius. "He was compelled, therefore, equally with the Orientals, to recognize only a single will in Christ, the divine or theandric, that is a will having its source in the Logos, and as it were flowing through the human nature,—a will in which merely the Logos is the willing power and active principle, while the human nature is purely passive, so that its power of volition is either non-essential or at any rate quiescent." This is an excellent description of the Monothelite heresy. But what a gigantic gloss on the words of Honorius: "We confess one will in Christ"! Dr. Döllinger goes on to say "And this he

said in so many words: 'We recognize,' says he, conceding the point to Sergius, but expressing himself with more decision than Sergius, 'We recognize one will in Christ.'" Who says that "the power of volition is either not-existent or at any rate quiescent"? Not Honorius, but Dr. Döllinger. It is perfectly plain that the whole question turns on the meaning of the words of the Pope. That they are orthodox, we firmly believe; that they are capable of many interpretations besides that given by Dr. Döllinger,* is simply undeniable. The words of Father Schneeman's excellent pamphlet apply to him as well as to Hefele. "Hefele here assumes just what is to be proved; namely, that Honorius used the words *una voluntas in Christo* in a Monothelist sense. Without such an assumption we argue thus: According to Scriptural and Patristic usage, the unity of the will is sometimes taken in a physical, sometimes in a moral sense. How such expressions are really to be understood, must be concluded from the context. Now, when taken in conjunction with the words of the Pope which follow in the same sentence, it appears that this unity of will does not exclude human will in general, but concupiscence, the corrupt will. Thus Honorius, by the words 'one will,' either meant the human nature in Christ, or else a moral oneness of the human with the divine will." Here are two interpretations of the passage which are both orthodox and both (to take the lowest ground) just as compatible with the text as the elaborate sense affixed by Dr. Döllinger. Even on this low ground it is incomprehensible and monstrous, that a man should stake his salvation on the rightness of his view of a difficult theological passage.

It is very singular that Dr. Milman has seen the truth which Dr. Döllinger has missed. Unconsciously, but not the less really, he defends Honorius from Monothelism. Most marvellously the Dean asserts that "Honorius, in distinct words, declared himself a Monothelite." Yet, he goes on to say, "it is manifest that he entirely misapprehended the question —the unity which he asserted was *not an identity but a harmony*. His main argument was, that the sinless human nature of Christ, being ignorant of that other law in the members warring against the law of the mind, there could be no conflicting or adverse will in the God-Man." In other words, Honorius was not a Monothelite; what he denied was an adverse will, not a human will. He asserted a will which followed the Person; he did not deny that the number of wills was regulated by the number of natures. The Anglican is

* Studien über die Honorius-frage.

more truthful than the Alt-Katholik, because even his hatred of Popes was less. Truly, we agree with Dr. Döllinger, no question would have been raised about the meaning of the Letter of Honorius, "but for the fact of the author being a Pope."*

These lines will probably never meet Dr. Döllinger's eyes. If by chance he should ever see them, he may be at least assured that there are Catholics in England who have not given up praying for his return. We venture to say that the welcome given him by Catholics will be something better than the huzzas of the "Times" and of Mr. Plummer. From that gentleman we part with some words of his own. We will not imitate his rudeness to the defenders "of the Vatican" and say that he "has almost lost the sense of truth and the love of truth for its own sake;" but we do say that in him "the very power of discriminating between" historical "truth and falsehood is entirely lost."

Art. VII.—THE WORKS OF CHARLES LEVER.

Select Library Edition of the Novels of Charles Lever. London: Chapman & Hall.

Lord Kilgobbin. London: Chapman & Hall.

GENERAL incredulity attends the announcement of last appearances. The world looks with a cheerful confidence for the advent of some circumstance which shall induce the singer or the actor, the lecturer or the public personage who has made her final curtsey or his valedictory oration, to reconsider the determination which is to hide them thenceforth from its eyes and ears. The world reckons on the friends, in accordance with whose solicitations, and for a limited period, generally speaking of unwisely strained elasticity, the "diva" or the "star" will again enthral an enthusiastic audience; the lecturer or the popular personage will again perform the familiar feats which have come to be described in terms of illimitable hyperbole, until all rational expression is lost, and the talking is so tall that, like Jack's beanstalk, it is out of reach. The world is rarely wrong in its calculations, based upon the natural reluctance of men and women to relinquish the making of money and the maintenance of fame, or even notoriety, and the reminiscences of each of us include many farewells, last

* P. 250.

appearances and reappearances. But, though an announcement of this kind does not convince the world, it always suggests an examination of the career and achievements of the individual. He draws himself up, as it were, for inspection; he marches past. He invites the kind and extent of criticism which is generally reserved for the actually bygone; one imagines him exercising it himself indeed, with far more thoroughness and accuracy than are attainable by other critics. They can but discuss what he has done; he alone knows what he had designed to do, and how far short he has fallen of his intention.

Mr. Lever has just concluded a novel, of which he speaks as a final effort, and, while we believe and hope that this will prove an example of the last appearance as popularly understood, the occasion seems favourable for a brief consideration of his achievements, in the long and highly successful career which began with "Harry Lorrequer," and of which "Lord Kilgobbin" is the latest stage. In a survey of this kind it is necessary to consider not only the specialities of the writer, but the taste and manners of the period at which he first made his mark. This is especially called for in the case of Mr. Lever, because tastes and manners, in later times, have undergone so decided a change that the mere mechanism of his early works, perfectly acceptable and accepted when they were written, would be now accounted gravely defective. "Slapdash" is out of fashion. Many novelists have taken the Crimean war for their theme, and brought about meetings between wounded heroes and devoted heroines in military hospitals, attended with the triumph of Christian grace or Pagan pluck, according to the persuasion of the author; but they do not "slapdash"—they have not the faintest flavour of the old Peninsular romance. Not even the brilliant blunder at Balaklava has elicited anything like that. No Charles O'Malley or Tom Burke has told, with ecstatic bragging and boundless bounce, but yet with contagious enthusiasm, how "Into the 'Valley of Death' rode the six hundred." The Light Dragoons of fiction (we are dealing only with fiction) in the present day are no more like Phil O'Grady and Fred Power than the North American Indians of Mr. Sala are like Chingachgook and Uncas. There is a whole era of decadence in the difference; for it goes deeper, and it extends more widely than merely to the absence of the element of slapdash, to the substitution of carefulness for carelessness in construction, and the suppression of superlatives of admiration, commendation, aspiration, or emotion of any kind. We shall show this when we come to consider in detail the narrators of those hair-breadth

'scapes and moving incidents, in which probability and cohesion are utterly disregarded, and which nevertheless are still read by people who like to see the mechanism of every invention in their novels and their plays laid bare, to calculate a hair-breadth 'scape by a correct time-table, and to have a moving incident on the stage transacted by a real hansom, with a live horse, and a driver with a real badge. A beginner who should try the slapdash style would inevitably fail; he would rudely jar the public taste; but it constituted a great portion of the charm of the "Harry Lorrequer" novels. The wonderful "go" in them, the buoyant animal spirits, the confident audacity, the romance, flimsy enough when it is examined critically, which it never was by Mr. Lever's readers in those days, were irresistible. We like to believe that they are still very attractive, even to a generation to whom anything of the kind in real life, or in a description of anything within their own knowledge, would inevitably present itself as "bad form," a generation which has applauded the brutal viciousness of a Guy Livingstone, and encouraged the publishers of Ouida's tawdry nastiness to issue unending cheap editions. When Mr. Lever's first novels appeared, the traditions of the closing years of the last, and the opening years of the present century, still lingered in society; the old ways of thinking about glory and poetry, about women and love, had still adherents; and in acknowledging their rapid and immense popularity at that time, we take into account the *parceque;* whereas, in commenting upon it now, we must bear in mind the *quoique.*

There is no eminent writer of fiction in whom the defects of his qualities are more strongly marked. In some respects the contrast amounts to paradox. With great versatility he combines sameness by which any other writer would long ago have wearied his public, and with all this sameness, which, with quite audacious carelessness, he maintains unrelieved, he is not monotonous. He has a lively and brilliant imagination, but he allows it to run into exaggerations, which injure its best efforts; and he is so habitually disdainful of proportion and consistency, that not one of his works is really fine as a whole. They are like unfinished pictures, with grand masses of colour, but full of faults in drawing and incongruous grouping; in their first effect bright and charming, but with serious defects on close examination. And yet, let that examination be ever so close, it does not decrease even the critic's pleasure in books which, though constantly offending against his judgment, always appeal successfully to his fancy, and never fail to awaken some of the old gleefulness which accompanied

the first reading of them. Mr. Lever's materials are as easily reducible to a catalogue as the contents of an artist's colour-box, and his manner is as recognizable for its mannerisms as that of Mr. Dickens or Mr. Wilkie Collins; but he uses his materials deftly, changing their position, and flashing them about so dazzlingly, that he disguises their sameness with great general success, and his mannerisms are not very objectionable. The long catalogue of Mr. Lever's works—for he has been very industrious in his vocation—may be divided into three sections, the component parts of each differing from those of the others in form, spirit, meaning, and *mise-en-scène*, and yet all bearing a genuine resemblance to each other, having similar characteristic merits and identical defects. If we name these three sections respectively the military, the social, and the politico-social, our readers will be able to follow the exposition of their sameness in variety, their variety in sameness.

The military novels, which were so successful, so widely popular when they appeared many years ago, and which are still read with pleasure and appreciation gratifying to observe amid the general debasement of fiction and the public taste for it, are "Harry Lorrequer," "Charles O'Malley," "Tom Burke," and "Jack Hinton." "Maurice Tiernay" belongs, strictly speaking, to this category; but that work is inferior to all the others, possesses hardly any trace of their special merit, is vulgar in style, in many instances is the merest literal translation from dubious French memoirs, and is disfigured by the worst defects of the others so much exaggerated, that we reluctantly admit its place and record its authorship.

The social novels are, "The Knight of Gwynne," "The O'Donoghue," "The Martins," "The Daltons," "The Dodd Family Abroad," "Roland Cashel," "One of Them," "Barrington," "Davenport Dunne," "The Fortunes of Glencore," "Luttrell of Arran," and "That Boy of Norcott's." To this category also there belongs a work which Mr. Lever's admirers would much rather he had never written, which does him no credit in any way. It is "Sir Jasper Carew," a conception at once so crude and so extravagant that it is difficult to believe it can have come from even his "'prentice hand," and incredible but that it must have been written long before the time at which it appeared, when the author's reputation was firmly established.

The politico-social novels are, "Tony Butler," "Sir Brooke Fosbrook," "The Bramleighs," and "Lord Kilgobbin." Beside these, and the papers contributed to "Blackwood's *Magazine*" under the name of Cornelius O'Dowd, which we

do not propose to include in our attempt at an appreciation of Mr. Lever, there are some nondescript productions which are not worthy of being classed even with "Maurice Tiernay" and "Sir Jasper Carew." They are called "A Rent in a Cloud" and "A Day's Ride," and we never yet heard of any one who pretended to know what either of them means. Perhaps no writer of eminence who has enjoyed a prolonged career has escaped the production of something which it would have been better for his fame and his memory that he had left unwritten. Scott's "Count Robert of Paris" is a notable example, and of Mr. Lever's contemporaries, Mr. Dickens would have done well to have suppressed "Little Dorrit" and "Our Mutual Friend," and Mr. Thackeray to have put "Lovel the Widower" in his waste-paper basket. Mr. Trollope might be trimmed of the "Belton Estate" with advantage; and of the lesser novelists it would be useless to speak: they are so speedily wrapped in an evenly-spread, impartial cloud of oblivion, that their escapades do not count. Mr. Lever is not, in this respect, an exception, but he is a forcible example.

The military novels had, on their first appearance, the great charm of novelty. There was no rival in the field but Maxwell, and he could hardly be called a rival, his line was so different. Mr. Lever has never approached him in pathos, and his deep gloom, grand and seductive, was equally beyond the reach of the more facile and felicitous pen. "The" Peninsula, as it was called, when Wellington was "the" duke, was their common ground, it is true, but they trod it in different directions, and they could never clash. Stephen MacCarthy had nothing to fear from Charles O'Malley and his brothers in arms; the story of "My Life" had nothing to lose by the histories of the dashing young Irishmen, whose pecuniary difficulties combined themselves curiously with the most prodigal expenditure, and the splendid young Englishmen with gallant military fathers and foolish fine-lady mothers, who came to Ireland with one set of opinions, and went away with another. Mr. Lever had a fair, uninterrupted field, and from the first found favour. He has had fewer imitators than any other popular novelist; he would be more difficult of imitation than any. Spurious-grotesque copies of Mr. Dickens, mock-cynical copies of Mr. Thackeray, there have been in plenty; but though he is not on the same line with either, Mr. Lever is more difficult of even coarse imitation than the great humorist, or the great ethical novelist. His very faults and absurdities would be hard to catch, while the charm of his writings is lent by a quality of mind and a tone of spirits not to be simu-

lated. Mr. Trollope writes good hunting stories, but they are just a little too technical, and Mr. Whyte Melville can describe a steeplechase sufficiently well to satisfy the readers who know all about it, without boring the readers who do not; but no one except Mr. Lever could tell the story of the hunt in which Captain Hammersley's "English mare, that was such a beauty this morning," was killed at the sunk fence, or of the steeplechase which Tipperary Joe won for Jack Hinton. In both these instances, as in several others which might be selected from his earlier works, he exhibits great art. The scenes are full of stir, of interest, of excitement; there are the noise, the exertion, the bustle, all the outward characteristics of the sporting scene, and all kept up well. But there is also the intense, sustained strife of human passion, on which the reader's attention is riveted, and in the latter case there is one of the most beautiful and pathetic bits of character-drawing to be found in fiction, and, in our opinion, the finest thing in that way Mr. Lever has ever done.

"Harry Lorrequer," the first of the series of military novels, is a striking example of the effect of the quality vulgarly called "go"—so expressive an expression that it really has no equivalent. It is a story which in point of construction is ludicrously feeble and wildly untrue to nature and society. It has one central idea, of the kind on which a short and extravagant farce might be, as indeed many farces have been, built, or rather run up: mistaken identity used to bring a man into equivocal and mostly ridiculous positions. The author does not trouble himself either to supplement or to vary this sufficiently threadbare conceit; he strings together a number of anecdotes, good sayings, smart Irish stories of respectable antiquity, but so admirably dressed up that they are welcome to their oldest acquaintances, and he produces a book so amusing that no one cares to observe that Harry Lorrequer is a downright fool. Nobody but a fool could have met with such adventures even in fiction, and he does not boast the soldierly dash and ardour of his successors. He drinks and flirts as copiously as they do, but he never does anything he intends to do, or says anything he intends to say; the stage expedient of interruption in an unfinished sentence being resorted to on every occasion. He passes weeks in a country house with the lady of his love, of whom the reader has no notion whatever,—Lady Jane Callonby is a mere name,—without proposing to her, he is equally undecided when he meets her again in Paris, at the termination of the series of mistakes, and then he makes it all right as follows: "My eye caught the flutter of a Cashmere shawl in

the garden beneath. In an instant the window was torn open,—I stood upon the sill, and though the fall was *some twenty feet*, with one spring I took it, and before the ladies had recovered from their first surprise at my unaccountable conduct, put the finishing stroke to their amazement by throwing my arms round Lady Jane and clasping her to my heart." Not only is the central idea of this absurd but amusing story a stale stage contrivance, but the concluding scene, in which Harry Lorrequer comes into a large fortune and marries a "Lady"—(Mr. Lever's idea of ultimate bliss is always money and a title)—is the sort of thing one would find in an extreme specimen of transpontine drama. Lorrequer's uncle, Sir Guy, has just rebuked him very rudely for declining the "Under-Secretaryship in Ireland,"—an appointment by the way not less impossible under the circumstances than the Viceroy's post itself,—and asks him, "What have you got in the world that you should refuse such an appointment?" We quote the remainder of the scene in full, for only thus can we convey the full extent of the absurdity on which Mr. Lever successfully ventures. Lady Jane Callonby has refused to marry Guy Lorrequer, the favourite nephew and declared heir of the impossible old Baronet.

"It was the chosen dream of all my anticipations," said Lord Callonby, (that his daughter should be Sir Guy's niece,) "and now Jane's affections only—— but let it pass."

"And is there, then, really no remedy? Can nothing be thought of?"

"Nothing."

"I am not quite so sure, my Lord," said I, tremulously.

"No, no, Lorrequer; you are a ready-witted fellow, I know, but this passes even your ingenuity; besides, I have given her my word."

"Even so."

"Why, what do you mean? Speak out, man," said Sir Guy. "I'll give you ten thousand pounds on the spot if you suggest a means of overcoming this difficulty."

"Perhaps you might not accede afterwards."

"I pledge myself to it."

"And I too," said Lord Callonby, "if no unfair stratagem be resorted to towards my daughter. If she only give her free and willing consent, I agree."

"Then you must bid higher, uncle; ten thousand won't do, for the bargain is well worth the money."

"Name your price, boy, and keep your word."

"Agreed, then. Holding my uncle to his promise, I pledge myself that his nephew shall be the husband of Lady Jane Callonby. And now, my Lord, write Harry instead of Guy in the contract, and I am certain my uncle is too faithful to his plighted word, and too true to his promise, not to say it shall be."

The rashness of this sudden declaration absolutely stunned them both, and then, recovering at the same moment, their eyes met.

"Fairly caught, Guy," said Lord Callonby; "a bold stroke, if it only succeeds."

"And it shall by G——," said my uncle. "Elton is yours, Harry, and with seven thousand a year, and *my* nephew to boot, Callonby won't refuse you."

Lord Callonby, catching my uncle's enthusiasm, seized me by the hand, and said: "With her consent, Lorrequer, you may count upon mine; and faith, if truth must be told, I always preferred you to the other."

After this, the twenty-feet jump into the garden hardly signifies. In his first work almost all the mannerisms which Mr. Lever has persisted in ever since are to be found. The gorgeous upholstery, the constant eating and drinking, the affectation of a perfect connoisseurship in cookery by his heroes, who describe all their meals as "appetizing," and all their loves as "superbly beautiful," and possessed of wonderful feet; the lavish prodigality of wealth, especially in the case of people who are picturesquely ruined; the versatility of emotions, which fulfil the whole Shaksperian category within a page; the constant use of the generic term "passion" for the specific term "anger," and the invariable representation of people of rank in attitudes of haughty "insolence," and people of no rank in attitudes of curiosity and cringing; we find them all in "Harry Lorrequer." We also find them all in "Lord Kilgobbin," and in every intervening novel of the long series, sometimes more, sometimes less disagreeably prominent, but always there, and always giving an impression of vulgarity which is provoking, and of which one longs, vainly, to get rid. These things come between the reader and a hearty sympathy with the author, but they do not prevent a cordial admiration. In "Harry Lorrequer," some of his best effects are produced by slight touches of description, contrasting pleasantly with the daub which is as much a characteristic of his general style as its dash. For instance, Emily Bingham is capitally drawn, as no inferior artist could draw her,—a flirt without a suggestion of impropriety; and no one can fail to recognize the adroitness with which her girl friends are generalized as "of that school of young ladies who admire the 'Corsair' and Kingstown, and say, 'Ah, don't!'" In "Harry Lorrequer" we find the prototype of that wonderful person who is always turning up in Mr. Lever's novels, the kind-hearted, choleric, amusing Irishman, whom no one ever saw at any time off the stage, and now never sees on it—the *man who flies* into a rage and breaks things. Mr. O'Leary's *conduct in the* French gaming-house, where he upsets the crou-

pier, chair and all, with one sudden jerk upon the floor, and giving a tremendous kick to the cassette, sends all the five-franc pieces flying over him, then jumps upon the table, and brandishing his black-thorn through the ormolu lustre, scatters the wax-lights on all sides, accompanying the exploit by a yell that would have called up all Connemara at midnight, is milder than that of many of his successors. Mr. Dodd, a very estimable person, and the author's favourite among all his creations, returns unexpectedly on two occasions to his place of abode, and finding, on each, a large and distinguished party assembled without his knowledge, proceeds to beat the attendants and smash the furniture, lamps, and table equipage, as a gentle hint to his wife and daughters that he does not approve of the festivities. Mr. O'Shea (in "One of Them") is frequently "about to" hurl articles of brittle fabric at his servant's head; the military heroes get knocked down into insensibility almost as frequently as the superbly beautiful heroines faint; a glass of wine "dashed" into the face of an opponent is an ordinary incident;—on the whole, there is a surprising amount of assault and battery distributed through these volumes, and yet, the riot in them is not rowdy, and the life is not low. There is in Mr. Lever's pictures of Irish life and character genuine, racy, exuberant humour, so captivating, that, if the reader cannot ignore, he is forced to forgive the extravagances which accompany it. When he began to write, the old school—which cultivated the emotions, and dealt in gestures and changes of complexion—had not utterly ceased to exist. Miss Burney's heroines, who "fell into a fit"—the word meant fainting or hysterics in those days—had been replaced by the proud, elegant, dark-eyed creatures, who "sank into insensibility," or "swooned," or "softly murmuring an almost inaudible assent, fainted" in the arms of the favoured one, who was always a "peer" with an immense fortune, or a military hero with none, but not the worse for the deficiency. We must not, therefore, condemn the violent emotions to which Mr. Lever constantly appeals in his earlier novels, as such completely ludicrous machinery for producing effects, as they would certainly appear if employed by a writer of the present time; but neither are they to be quite overlooked, for no fashion can ever have prevented them from being bad art, and no toleration can disguise the fact that they are very tiresome. Roars of laughter; bursts of laughter; convulsive merriment; shouts of laughter which make the glasses ring and shake the table; peals of laughter rising beyond all control; unrestrained mirth; *hardly-contained* laughter; people who repress with difficulty

an almost irresistible inclination, not simply to laugh, but to burst into laughter. These are only a selection from the phrases which stud the pages of the Irish novels; and they alternate with faces darkened by passion, bursting hearts, and hearts which are only almost bursting, eyes blazing with rage, features convulsed with misery, eyes brimming with scalding tears, frames quivering with emotion, eyes covered by trembling hands, lips blanched with agony, brows lifted in disdain, lips curled in indignant pride, convulsed faces hidden in ready handkerchiefs, and wonderful lashes drooping over wonderful eyes in which there is a "world" of something or other much too tremendous for words—fortunately too tremendous, for if the utterances of all these people were only equal to their contortions, if their language were as expressive as their looks, one would be swept away before such a "reg'lar knock-down of talent." One of the best bits of one of his best books—the meeting of Charles O'Malley and Mickey Free at Brussels after Waterloo—is turned into a positive absurdity by one passage, a perfect sample of the convulsive-tempestuous style in which Mr. Lever deals with the emotions: "Regardless of everybody, Mickey burst his way through the dense mass. 'Oh, murther! Oh, Mary! Oh, Moses! Is he safe here after all?' The poor fellow could say no more, but *burst* into a *torrent* of tears. A *roar* of laughter around him soon, however, turned the *current* of his emotions; when, *dashing* the *scalding* drops from his eyelids, he *glared fiercely like a tiger on every side.*" The physical feats of the people in these books are no less sudden, surprising, and swift-succeeding than their emotional paroxysms. They are always rushing, dashing, galloping at the top of their horses' speed, waving rapid adieux, clearing fences or hedges at a bound, getting terrible wounds of which they are unconscious, fracturing their limbs and getting over it with wonderful celerity, springing down staircases or out of windows, flinging themselves into the saddle and disappearing, getting into tremendous difficulties for want of common sense and discretion, and rushing away from them, half mad, rather than take time and pains to explain. Their love-making is very funny. The fair ones always have long and heavy "tresses," which "droop" across the manly bosom of the devoted dragoon; and they always faint, when they do not utter an "insolent" dismissal, unless when they combine those lines of action. Then the devoted dragoon sprinkles the pale face with a few drops of water, and the conversation goes on quite as naturally *as before,*—that is to say, very unlike nature indeed. Charles O'Malley's description of his leave-taking with Inez at the

villa is incomparably droll, though the author no more means it to be so than Joe Gargery intended to speak in rhyme: "I felt her heart almost beat against my side; I muttered some words, I know not what; I felt them like a prayer; I pressed her cold forehead to my lips; rushed from the room; cleared the fence at a spring, and was far upon the road to Lisbon ere I could sufficiently collect my senses to know whither I was going. Of little else was I conscious: my mind was full to bursting, and, in the confusion of my excited brain, fiction and reality were so inextricably mingled as to defy every endeavour at discrimination." And all this pyrotechnical pathos is about the wrong lady! The leading ladies, who do the fainting and sentimental business, are usually stagy and indistinct; while those who are of secondary importance, are generally charming and much more spiritedly drawn. Lucy Dashwood is silly and stagy; the Senhora Inez is a delightful coquette; and who does not like Baby Blake? Jack Hinton's high-born love, Louisa Bellew, is a lay figure; but Lady Julia is as amusing, as piquant, as her own letters. The Kennyfeck girls are very successful, but no one cares for Mary, or even Maritana; so are the Dodds, though they are caricatures, not portraits; so is Kate O'Donoghue; while Sybella Travers is a mere shadow, no more substantial than the weak boy she marries; and all the more correct and conventional leading young ladies of Mr. Lever's later works are tiresome to a degree, whereas there is always something pleasant, if extravagant, about the girls to whom minor parts are assigned, and who are introduced by almost identical machinery in every instance. Mr. Lever's works contain more flirtation than sentiment—a wise apportionment, for he does the flirtation remarkably well, but the love-making very badly. Nothing can be more inflated and absurd than the final love scenes in "Harry Lorrequer," "Jack Hinton," "Charles O'Malley," and "Tom Burke"; and the author, with the audacious carelessness of success, has not taken the trouble to vary them to any even reasonable extent. Charles O'Malley's love affairs set themselves to rights with as much accommodating celerity as those of the gentleman who jumps twenty feet as a preliminary to his proposal; and Lord Callonby's sudden acquiescence is hardly more unaccountable than Sir George Dashwood's ardent desire to confer his daughter's hand upon the Irish dragoon, who is, as usual, suddenly raised from the depths of despair to the heights of felicity. Lucy Dashwood faints as often as all the other heroines put together; so she only fulfils one's expectations when, at the critical moment, "the door burst open, and Sir George appeared. Lucy turned *one fleeting look* upon her father, and fell fainting into

my arms. 'God bless you, my boy,' said the old general, as he hurriedly wiped a tear from his eye; 'I am now, indeed, a happy father.'" The Comtesse d'Auvergne, whom Tom Burke marries, is a mere shadow; but Minette, the *vivandière*, is one of the author's happiest conceptions—a picture in which one recognizes his best and most delicate touches, one in which he is quite beyond the reach of his male and female imitators.

The materials of which the military novels are constructed have been selected somewhat after the fashion in which M. Alexandre Dumas chose the stuff whereon he laid his cumbrous and gorgeous embroideries. They are, like the "Trois Mousquetaires" and their fellows, quasi-historical; and they have a certain sequence as well as an undisguised likeness. We prefer, for the sake of the writer's fame, to put "Maurice Tiernay" out of account, and to consider only those works in which Mr. Lever illustrates Irish life on the one hand, and, on the other, the stirring military events which made memorable the beginning of the present century. To estimate them and their effects rightly, we must bear in mind that they appeared in a time of profound peace, when the strife they recalled was a tradition, and young people regarded any war as a thing which their parents had seen, which, after a shabby sort, might be seen in India and elsewhere among "blacks," but which was replaced, in their time, by home politics and exhibitions. War was just far enough removed to be capable of endowment by so skilful a writer with the romance, the dash, the daring, the personal heroism, the individual interest, which it has no longer, now that the horrible and gigantic mechanism of it is displayed before us, on a scale which utterly dwarfs the campaigns through which Charley O'Malley and Fred Power, Jack Hinton and Phil O'Grady, Tom Burke and Tascher dashed and slashed, loved and laughed, played the hero and occasionally the buffoon. The fighting scenes are very brilliant—full of life, colour, and movement, instinct with the pride, the excitement, and the romance of war. We do not believe in the romance of war now, but these pages make us almost believe in it again, and even in the fun of it, still more incredible. The pictures are all drawn from the officer's point of view, and the artist's; they are the precise antithesis of the Erckmann-Chatrian pictures; they are brim full of dash and humour, and they are most fascinating. The grimness of war is not here, though its sad and solemn side is not utterly ignored either, but the "long sword, saddle, bridle, whack, rowdydow!" predominate. The animal spirit, the glee, the extravagance which make the scenes of Irish life so delightful and so impossible, are rife

on the fields of the Peninsula, where more things were possible than in Galway; and Dr. Quill and Major Monsoon are sufficient in themselves to render the book which has to tell of them famous. Mr. Lever is very skilful in his combination of the real and the imaginary; thus he places the Major and the Doctor in fictitious circumstances, which admirably develop the characteristics of the two well-known originals. "Harry Lorrequer" and "Charles O'Malley" are, indeed, little more than the cleverly-contrived medium for the telling of a number of good stories, of which some were widely and well known, and others had a more restricted currency. They were all less novel thirty years ago than they are now, when the mess, and the bar, the castle, and the circuits have lost even the tradition of the old jollity and "good things," when there are no eccentrics, and originality is, of all *cachets*, the most avoided. Thirty years ago the wits and the oddities were at least remembered, and there was a pleasurable excitement in the identification of Mr. Lever's good stories, in fitting names to his people, in observing where he touched up his text, and how he touched up his subject. The stories and the jests were as good as new then; they are better than new now, for they have the charm of a double antiquity. Thirty years ago, his readers read the description of life at Portumna Castle, Gurtnamorra, Dublin Castle, Paul Rooney's house in Stephen's Green, and Gwynne Abbey with wondering amazement, asking themselves and their elders if Irish life had ever really been like that, and inclining to think it might have been, perhaps, when the wits and the duellists, the splendid gentry—who had no money, but who revelled in wonderful profusion—had everything their own way, before the Union, and when the claims of the "ould faith" and the "finest peasantry" had not been discovered. But we have ceased, under the influence of the very dull reality of the present time, to believe in Irish life after that fashion as possible even then. The days of Curran, and "the Monks of the Screw," are not much more unlike our days than those of the small "Castle" and "Four Courts" celebrities, whose portraits Mr. Lever's readers used to look for and find in "The Martins" and "Roland Cashel"; when everybody knew whom Downie Meek was meant for, and laughed at the omniscience of Archbishop Whately in the person of the Dean of Drumcondra. At a later date they were to find the same fine skill in delineation in the portrait of Chief Baron Lendrick, which every one recognized as that of the notorious old Irish judge, who would neither die to relieve his relatives, nor retire to save his character; but this belongs to another era, and has

no flavour of humour or of the rollicking, jolly old times, now quite mythical. Were they ever anything more? Has the national character completely changed, or was it only persistently misrepresented? Did the "contiguity to a melancholy ocean"—which is certainly not a recent arrangement of Nature—always exercise the influence so ingeniously assigned to it, though undiscovered until now? Be that as it may, these stories, whether those which tell of Ireland thirty or seventy years ago, are equally novel and strange to the readers of to-day, who compare them with the Ireland of the present time. In "Charles O'Malley" the best examples of the author's skill, both in the real and in the imaginary, are found. "From conversations with friends," he says (in the preface to the edition before us), "and such other sources of information as society opened for me, I obtained intelligence about the battle-fields of the Peninsula; and was enabled to sketch certain scenes with a degree of accuracy that has obtained for me the credit of being an actor in events of which I have only been a very humble chronicler. I say this in all humility, because any credit that may pertain to these descriptions is entirely due to others; and I but mention the fact as an evidence that, whenever truthful events crossed the course of my fiction, I treated them conscientiously and faithfully." The Peninsular scenes are of first-rate merit, it is impossible to read them without a kindling of enthusiasm, a *verve* something like the author's own; and the glimpses they afford of the great historical personages engaged remain upon the mental vision more clearly than any formal presentments of them. The Wellington, Picton, and Uxbridge of Mr. Lever—even the sketchy Napoleon—are to his readers Wellington, Picton, Uxbridge, and Napoleon, as truly as Scott's Graham of Claverhouse is their "bonnie Dundee," and Scott's Duke of Burgundy is their Charles le Téméraire. Even Erckmann-Chatrian cannot destroy the impression of Tom Burke's First Consul and *Petit Caporal*.

In "Charles O'Malley" we find the two best samples of Mr. Lever's humour, and, indeed, we do not think Frank Webber and Mickey Free have ever been surpassed by any writer. For pure unmitigated fun, the extravagant ebullition of animal spirits, for extreme irresistible drollery, Frank Webber has no compeer; and the happiest idea that ever occurred to any writer is, surely, his sham despatch upon the capture of the college pump, and its arrival in the midst of the terrible earnest of the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo. The Trinity College scenes are incomparably ludicrous, and Frank Webber sustains his character to the last. Mickey Free is, in our opinion, a far

superior conception to Sam Weller: he is more true to nature, as all Irish readers well know—none but an Irishman could have drawn the character,—his humour is much more real and brilliant, and his fidelity to his master has nothing of the hap-hazard, good-eating-and-drinking-secured complexion, which is all Mr. Dickens has invested Sam with; besides, he is consistent even in his absurdities. Sam Weller is inconsistent with his first introduction to Mr. Pickwick, and with his father's situation in life. Next in force and vitality, and in strong contrast, comes Corney Delaney, but the interval is wide. We do not know of any parallels for them in English fiction in merit and humour except Andrew Fairservice and Caleb Balderstone. Mr. Lever describes his own idea of Mickey Free almost as well as he has drawn the character: "I had no type for him," he says, "or rather, I had a thousand. He was about as droll, as light-hearted, and as light-principled as nineteen out of every twenty taken at hazard from his own class. He is not an exaggeration, simply because nothing can exaggerate the versatile drollery of a people who, with the raciest turn for humour, combine the sharp-witted flippancy of a polished Frenchman. Never nonplussed for an expedient, never pushed for a rejoinder, like their native horses they are always well back upon their haunches and ready for a spring. I knew if Mickey ever became what he might be, from the mass of originals which suggested him, that in whatever circumstances the course of the story might throw him, he would acquit himself with all his national dexterity; in fact, once launched upon the world I gave myself no further trouble about him, but left him literally to shift for himself." A most successful expedient. Mickey Free is the only singer of comic songs who is not a bore; and, though there is one feature in his fun to which we shall presently take grave exception, his humour is never tiresome or misplaced, because the true depth of feeling is never wanting to modify and adorn it. What perfect point there is in that line:

"How nate one must be to be kilt by the French."

How characteristic is Mickey's remark when Lord Wellington harangues the "Fourteenth," "Oh, tear an ages, listen to that, and there's to be no plunder after all!"

Corney Delany, the plague of Phil O'Grady's life; Tate Sullivan, the fine old man, whose solitary ramble among the family portraits in the picture gallery at Gwynne Abbey, gives one touch of pathos to a book which, with plenty of room for it, is singularly deficient in that element; Darby M'Keown, the

piper and conspirator who rescues Tom Burke; Kerry O'Leary, whose relations with Mrs. Branagan the cook, supply all the fun to be found in "The O'Donoghue,"—on the whole, the dreariest book written by Mr. Lever;—and others, too numerous to name, who are old servants or retainers to the always ruined and yet uprising Irishmen, old and young, with whom he deals, are very amusing, but not one of them equals Mickey Free. And yet it is chiefly by means of Mickey Free that Mr. Lever has most grievously offended a large number of his admirers, and done discredit to his own taste and breeding, while sinning against the truth to an extent of which it is impossible he can be unconscious. Is there only one class of his countrymen of whom Mr. Lever is so entirely ignorant, that his attempt to represent them agreeably is fraught with injustice and insult? We should hold him in more esteem if we could believe this, but, unfortunately, we cannot; and we are forced to see, in his systematic and coarse misrepresentation of the Catholic priesthood, a bid for popularity, based upon an intimate knowledge of the ignorant prejudices of Irish Protestants, to whom anything which turns the vows of the priesthood into ridicule, and casts suspicion on the conduct of priests, is welcome; and the ignorant indifference of English Protestants, who have a kind of general notion that what an Irishman, with so extensive a knowledge of Irish character, has to say of Irish priests, must be as true as it is humorous. This is none the less unworthy because Mr. Lever tries to secure himself against the disgust and indignation which his priests are calculated to excite in our minds, by such epithets as "the good priest," "honest Father Tom," &c.; and by depicting such a scene—full of power and pathos as it is—as the anguish of Father Tom Loftus by the deathbed of the unshriven murderer. The whole thing is untrue, unseemly, and impossible; the tragedy as false as the farce; the priest weeping, praying, and gesticulating in the cabin as the priest gambling and drinking, cracking loose jokes, and telling stories of successful cajolery of his bishop in the canal-boat. This sort of thing, sufficiently offensive in the case of Jack Hinton's clerical friend, Tom Loftus, becomes still more so when conveyed through the medium of Mickey Free, who is made to heap ridicule, by his stories and his songs, not only on priests, but on the tenets of the Catholic religion, in confirmation of the lowest and most ignorant prejudices. Mr. Lever knows perfectly well that the story of Mickey Free's father being brought out of purgatory by Father Roach—a poor piece of humour in itself—is one which *no Irish* peasant would tell; and when he makes Father *Roach say,* "two masses in the morning, fastin', is two, and

two in the afternoon is four, and two at vespers is six—six masses a day for nine days is sixty masses—say sixty, and they'll cost you—mind, Mickey, and don't be tellin' it again, for it's only to yourself I'd make them so cheap—a matter of three pounds," he offends against truth, decency, and the most ordinary knowledge of the least-instructed peasant. He repeats this offence again and again in the same book, in prose and verse, each time with a lessening excuse in the supposed fun of the allusions, and there are few of his subsequent works free from similar treason to truth and taste. The Abbé Esmonde, who does the confused and clumsy mischief which constitutes the involved plot of "The Daltons," is quite unworthy of Mr. Lever; he is of the lowest melo-dramatic type—even Rafferty, the rogue priest who figures in "Luttrell of Arran," is more possible, less repellant to common sense than the felonious, conspiring, profligate French abbé, who turns out to be an Irish peasant. Whom did the author mean to please by so coarse, indecorous, and foolish a picture? Evangelical spinsters, who would take it all for gospel, do not read novels, especially of the "Rollicker" reputation; and he can hardly have been ambitious of a *clientèle* such as frequent Dr. Tresham Gregg. His own countrymen, whatever their religious opinions or class feelings, must have immediately recognized the utter untruth, not only of the individuals but of the situations which are designed to render priests contemptible or ridiculous in Ireland and hateful abroad; and it is not likely that English readers, even when they knew so little of their Catholic fellow-countrymen as they did know thirty years ago, accepted Father Tom Loftus, Father Malachi Brennan, and Father Rush, as true types of the men to whose ministrations those millions looked in life and death with unfaltering faith and well-merited reverence. In his habitual misrepresentation of the priesthood, Mr. Lever has not only been guilty of a grave moral wrong and of a shortsighted expedient, which has considerably impaired sympathy and admiration for him in quarters where those feelings ought to have been most grateful to him, but he has made a silly and shallow blunder, not only in the instance of putting ribaldries, in prose and verse, about priests and religion into the mouth of Mickey Free—where they are ludicrously inconsistent—but in making Betty Cobb, the Irish woman-servant who accompanies the Dodds, write to her friends in her native village such remarks as the following:—

"There's many things different between this and home; and first and foremost, religion. Religion isn't the same at all. To begin, there's no fastin' at all, or next to none; and there's little penance—the little there is you can

get rid of for a thrifle. Ye go to confession when ye like, and ye keep anything back for another time that ye don't wish to tell just then; in fact, my dear, it comes to this—it's harder to get to Heaven in Ireland than in any place ever I heard of, and costs more money into the bargain! The priests havn't half the power they have in Ireland, they're not as well paid, and they can't curse a congregation, nor do any other good action that isn't set down in their duty."

At a later stage of the excursion, we find Betty Cobb's description of the performances at a pilgrimage to the shrine of Saint Agatha at Monte Orsaro:—

"Shure, when we've a station in Ireland, it only lasts a day or two at most; and if your knees is sore with the penance, you have the satisfaction of the pleasant evenings afterwards, with, maybe, a dance, or, at all events, tellin' stories over a jug of punch; but here it's prayers and stripes, stripes and offices, starvation and more stripes, till, savin' your presence, I never sit down without a screech! . . . . As for Paddy, the mistress can get no good of him in regard of his duties. He never ceases tormenting me about Taddy, and says I ought to take out a few florins in curses on him, just as if I could not do it cheaper myself than payin' a priest for it. He does all his stations on his knees, to be sure, but with a cigar in his mouth; and when he comes to the holy well, it's a pull at the dram bottle he takes instead of the blessed water. I wondered to myself at his givin' a crown-piece to the Virgin on Tuesday last; but he soon showed me what he was at, by sayin': 'If she doesn't get my wages riz for that, the divil receave the farthin' she'll ever receave of mine again!'"

It may be said that it is absurd to reckon such things as these—the broad farce of the book, the red-hot poker and flour-bag business of the bustling pantomime—as causes of offence. But that is not quite true, at least it is not all the truth. We do not see the fun of them, even granting that fun, if it existed, could excuse their bad taste and coarseness; and, under their farcical extravagance there is a deliberate and malignant purpose. From the scandalous priest in "Jack Hinton"—the one fine and pathetic episode in whose career, the scene of Shaun's death, merely serves to render the picture more insidiously mischievous—to the flirting, flattering Monsignori who fish for such fashionable converts as Lady Grace Twining and Lady Augusta Bramleigh, there is in every portrait drawn by Mr. Lever's pen, in every sketch, in every reference, misrepresentation and insinuation. The taunts are thrown out jestingly, the charges are cleverly manipulated, but they amount to this—that ignorance, scheming, bullying, excess in eating and drinking, extortion and lying, are the general characteristics of the Catholic priesthood; and that the *system* of the Catholic church is one of tyranny, venality, and *superstition*, of gross falsehood, and of barter and sale. No

doubt there are persons who, having no means of knowing better, actually believe that such is the case. With them we have, we can have no quarrel. But as it is hardly possible to credit Mr. Lever with so much invincible ignorance, he lays himself open to the reproach of courting a low kind of popularity by a mean order of misrepresentation.

In his power of describing natural scenery, of bringing the localities in which his people play their parts vividly before his readers, we consider that Mr. Lever comes next to Sir Walter Scott among novelists; and he does not overdo this portion of his task, as Sir Walter sometimes did; for instance, in "Guy Mannering" and "The Monastery." In "Charles O'Malley" there are many exquisite pictures of Irish scenery; and "Jack Hinton" is yet more rich in them. The journey of the aide-de-camp and the priest, in which the episode of Shaun occurs, is a fine, picturesque, and impressive piece of writing; and the dull and improbable story of "Luttrell of Arran," is redeemed by descriptions of the scenery of the Ulster coast and the islands, which will bear comparison with the picture of the Orkneys in "The Pirate." Nothing can be more admirable than the description of Gwynne Abbey, the Corvy, and the wild and picturesque coast of Coleraine. "The Fisherman's Home," in "Barrington," "Cro'Martin," and "Glenflesk" are each perfect in its respective way; and in the much slighter and less frequent local sketches of foreign scenes the author is equally felicitous. He has caught the spirit, the peculiar tone and significance of Irish scenery, as he has caught certain characteristics of the Irish peasantry, which he presents with unexaggerated truth and force. In both these respects "Roland Cashel" is one of his best works. The description of Tubbermore and its tenants, especially of Tom Keane, is most admirable. It is a pity that the writer spoiled so excellent a book by tacking on to the natural catastrophe a number of merely sensational incidents, neither interesting in themselves, artistically contrived, nor in harmony with the tone of the preceding portions. Some of his happiest effects are made in this novel. The scene of the dinner party at Mr. Kennyfeck's, where the Dean of Drumcondra undertakes to explain the use of the lasso, and where Sir Andrew and Lady Janet Macfarlane amuse the company with their sparring, must always be extremely amusing, though the zest which it derived from the admirable "taking off" of persons well known in Dublin at the time, is not to be enjoyed now. Hardly less clever is the scene at Tubbermore, in which the author of "The Irish-Sketch Book" is quizzed, as he deserved to be, for the self-sufficiency, ignorance, and

petulance, which his pedantic Cockneyism in respect to Ireland and the Irish abundantly displayed.

No writer of fiction, with the exception of Mr. Anthony Trollope, has ventured to repeat similar combinations of character, situation, and incident so often as Mr. Lever. The ruined Irish gentleman, of old family, whose habitual extravagance is described as a very splendid characteristic, with the drawback of insolvency as a consequence, sooner or later, but generally later, is to be found in Godfrey O'Malley, Maurice Darcy, Martin of Cro'Martin, O'Donoghue, Dalton, Barrington, Luttrell, and Kellett. There is no difference in kind in these pictures, and there is not much in degree. That the Knight of Gwynne should be so very charming and high-minded, and yet so totally unprincipled, is calculated to create surprise, but Mr. Lever puts the case with a persuasive gorgeousness which drives away scruples. So it is with Godfrey O'Malley. Then there is the universal second—the fighting friend—as indispensable as Tilburina's confidant. He is Count Considine, Bagenal Daly, Grog Davis, Mr. O'Shea, and others. There is the scheming villain of the story—Ulick Burke, Davenport Dunn, "honest" Tom Gleeson, Old Hickman, the Abbé Esmonde, Mehée de la Touche, Nick Holmes, Tom Linton (who is a Carker in a higher grade), Captain Hemsworth, and as many others as there are books, and they all scheme much in the same way, and are not so much acute and clever as their victims are credulous or careless, or inconceivably absent-minded and given to make blunders. For instance, Tom Linton, who concocts so fiendish a plot against Roland Cashel, would, it seems to us, have made much more by a reasonable amount of honesty. The absent way in which the young *millionnaire* makes his acquaintance and bestows his confidence and his cheque-book upon him, is as bold a stroke as that made by Mr. Wilkie Collins, when his hero, Oscar Dubourg, accosts two strangers (ladies) as they are taking a country walk, with the surprising question: "Were you at Exeter on the —th of last month?" Only so silly a creature as Roland Cashel could have been the victim of so poor a scoundrel as Linton; and only so contemptible an old fool as Sir William Heathcote could have been taken in by Mrs. Penthony Morris. In this respect Mr. Lever is more consistent than Mr. Dickens: he provides silly dupes for his shallow rogues, but Mr. Dickens permitted rational beings to believe in Pecksniff, Carker, and Joey B.

The dashing dragoon and his equally dashing friend, who *is always* supposed to be in love with the leading lady—Fred Power with Lucy Dashwood, Phil O'Grady with Louisa Bellew,

De Beauvais with Marie D'Auvergne—is not more omnipresent than the shrewd, wealthy attorney, with his good stories, his sharp practice, and his vulgar, handsome, worldly wife, who comes of a better family than his, and never allows him to forget her origin. Mr. Lever relies much on men of law for the action and also for the fun of his novels. The Rooneys are incredibly absurd, but they are also exceedingly amusing. The undisguisedly broad caricature of the story puts it out of the reach of serious criticism. Nothing is too wildly impossible for the Rooneys, not even Mrs. Rooney's hiding her luncheon in her muff on a brilliant summer's day, or the Allied Sovereigns attending a ball at her hotel in Paris. Mr. and Mrs. Kennyfeck are reduced copies of the Rooneys, without the humour and the kindliness; but they are very real, and their prototypes are numerous. Then there is always the young lady who understands farming and administers the out-at-elbows estate; and the high-spirited brother, who must have money, and who gets it somehow, who is exceedingly arrogant and detestably vulgar, but of whom the reader happily sees very little. Mr. Lever's dealings with money are truly magnificent—he confers estates with a generosity equal to that of Miss Flite, and never are his people so superbly lavish as when they are in hopeless difficulties. Then do they give magnificent entertainments, buy thoroughbred horses, respond with alacrity to every demand of friendship and every appeal for charity, dash about in post-chaises and stimulate postboys with guineas, live in profuse luxury, and exhibit a faultless taste in cookery. The amount of eating and drinking in Mr. Lever's books is only to be equalled by the perpetual breakfasts, luncheons, and suppers of the modern English drama, and all his people talk about it, as they "sip claret," "sit over burgundy," or "quaff champagne," for there is an appropriate form for each feat. Every reader's memory will, probably, supply him with instances of this; here is an amusing and characteristic one. It occurs in "Jack Hinton," when the guardsman has been watching and waiting all night for news of his friend O'Grady, who has gone to arrange for a duel between Hinton and the miserable creature whom Mr. Lever calls sometimes Lord George, and sometimes Lord Dudley de Vere. O'Grady comes, of course he "springs" from his tandem, and "the next instant" is knocking at the door at the top of a long staircase:—

"Holloa," cried he, "by Jove, I have had a night of it! Help me off with the coat, Jack; and order breakfast, with any number of mutton-chops you please, I never felt so voracious in my life. Early rising must be a bad thing, for the health, if it makes a man's appetite so painful."

While I was giving my necessary directions, O'Grady stirred up the fire, drew his chair close to it, and planting his feet upon the fender, and expanding his hands before the blaze, called out:

"Yes, yes, quite right; cold ham and devilled drumstick, by all means. The mulled claret must have nothing but cloves and a slice of pineapple in it; and mind, don't let them fry the kidneys in champagne, they are fifty times better in Moselle; we'll have the champagne *au naturel*."

The violent incongruity of this makes it amusing, but the repetition of the same sort of thing in all the novels becomes tiresome. All the *jeunes premiers* run over *menus* as glibly as so many *garçons de restaurant*, and discuss wine with the science and earnestness of so many tasters. If Mr. Lever's young men are surprising, his old men are still more astonishing. In the first place, they are so very old. Nothing under eighty is sufficiently wonderful. Count Considine is eighty-two, and he is only a little older than Godfrey O'Malley, and the charming pair of friends cheat bailiffs, defy debtors, entertain the county and the hunt, tell boisterous stories, send belligerent letters, and are utter scamps and roysterers, in theory at all events, at that venerable time of life. Peter Dalton is eighty, and thinks of nothing but play, hunting, and schemes for raising money. The O'Donoghue is eighty, and his brother-in-law is some years older. Dr. Hickman is ninety-one; old Dunn is ninety; and Peter Barrington, the most respectable old man in the category, is eighty-three. His sprightliness is quite oppressive, and he thinks no more of a journey from Ireland to Germany and back—before railroads and steamers—than the typical "Man for Galway" thought of a six-foot wall.

If Mr. Lever's old men are very old, *en revanche*, his young ladies are exceedingly young. Jack Hinton's cousin, Lady Julia, a finished coquette and woman of fashion, comes of age (at eighteen) at the end of the story, whose incidents are supposed to have occupied some years. Clara Hawke is a mere child, and all the later heroines are equally juvenile. They are charmingly regardless of expense also, especially when they have come from foreign countries to claim the hospitality of their impoverished Irish relatives;—in that very frequent case, their jewels are peculiarly "rich," and their laces more than ever "trailing." They are altogether wonderful young women, for they captivate everybody, and they offend nobody; they upset every household, and run counter to every custom; they are "insolent," they are full of "superb disdain," they never seem to know anything about *the affairs* of their relatives, or to have anything to think of *but themselves*,—we are speaking now of the leading ladies;—

and they come and go with ease and independence, at least unusual. Many years ago, an amusing book was written as a parody upon the novels of Regina Maria Roche, Mrs. Radcliffe, and other writers of their time, then less known, and now more completely forgotten. It was called "The Heroine," and it was something like Miss Edgeworth's "Amie Inconnue," but more elaborate. There was a wonderful old greyheaded steward in this book, called Whilome Eftsoons, and the heroine was a damosel errant, who imagined herself involved in wonderful adventures, and went about in a "web of soft white muslin," precarious of tenure, and particularly suited for the exploration of dark caverns and terrific mountain heights, feats which she proposed to accomplish unencumbered with more serious luggage than a golden harp, which she never laid aside under any circumstances, being as liable to be struck with sudden ideas as Mr. Pecksniff, and requiring the means of wedding them to immortal harmony. If a satirist of the order of the author of "The Heroine" were to arise in our days, and to turn the young ladies of modern fiction into as serious ridicule, he would find plenty of material in Mr. Lever's novels, from Lucy Dashwood to Lucy Lendrick, and from Kate O'Donoghue to Nina Kostalergi. But there is also much to be admired in these fanciful creations of his brain, that is beyond the reach of ridicule. There is a total absence of the meanness so generally characteristic of the women depicted by novelists at present. He draws a fine bold line between his characters, and there is no mistaking his villains for honest people. He gives us a Mrs. Penthony Morris and a Mrs. Gore Hampton, and they fall into their right places among the *escrocs* of society, the female accomplices of male knaves. But he does not hold up to admiration a Magdalen Vanstone, an Ann Sylvester, or a poor Miss Finch.

His young ladies are stagy and silly, with very few exceptions, but they are perfectly free from the vulgarity of Miss Braddon's or the pagan lawlessness of Miss Broughton's heroines, young persons for whom one would like to prescribe solitary imprisonment and periodical whipping. He never degrades his ideal to the mere mercenary tricks, the mere low appetites, the shallow and repulsive passions, provoked mainly by bigness of stature, brutality of manners, perpetual smoking, and rowdyism in dress, which have been of late the main characteristics of our heroines of fiction. Chivalrous respect for women lends a pleasant flavour to his writings, which most readers learn to appreciate more and more as it becomes rarer in the highly-spiced novels of so-called real life, which seem

to us designed to teach that there is nothing so little worthy of respect as women, especially when interpreted by women. The beautiful girls, with whom the dashing dragoons, or the brilliant *attachés*, or the rising young politicians fall in love after a headlong fashion, are all as grand, as dignified, as pure, as elevated, as the princesses of old romance for whom brave knights fought in the lists, and were rewarded by a smile, or at most a glove or a scarf. "I have never," says Mr. Lever, in his preface to "Charles O'Malley," "written one line to disparage the good cause of honour and true manliness, nor have I said a syllable, so far as I know, to heighten the colour on the purest cheek of maidenhood." That which the author claims for himself in those words we gladly acknowledge. Not only are his works void of offence of the kind in which modern fiction abounds,—offence which renders that fiction so dangerous to the young, and which makes it incumbent on Catholic parents to exercise strict supervision over their daughters' reading,—but his ideal of womanhood is lofty and refined, his estimate of home, its duties, its virtues, and its pleasures, is high, and pure, and good. He can seldom touch any subject without exaggeration, and therefore he sometimes borders on the absurd even in this particular; as, for instance, when he makes General Hinton conceal the fact of his ruined fortunes from Lady Charlotte, and persuade her that he accepts a foreign command to oblige a royal highness; but it is impossible not to admire the standard of courtesy, consideration, and deference for women which he sets up. We do not exactly understand in what the ill conduct of Mr. Adderly Twining towards Lady Grace consists, and Lady Grace herself is a little bit of a flirt, in a sly, *larmoyante*, sentimental way; but the author of "Davenport Dunn" makes us detest Adderly Twining, and feel every other man in the book elevated by comparison with him. What a mean hound he makes Lord Charles Frobisher, and how he deepens the impression by merely the few sentences in which he indicates his brutality to the poor girl whom he marries! Grog Davis, one of the most powerfully and consistently drawn of his characters—ruffian as he is in every other respect, and villanous as are his devices for her benefit—compels something like sympathy by his love for his daughter. The semi-savages of the O'Donoghue household, the gloom of Kilgobbin, the sensational extravagance of life at Tubbermore, the ruin and heartbreak at Cro'Martin, the senseless, riotous profusion at Gwynne Abbey, are all tempered and dignified by the respect paid to the presence of women. This element of beauty, purity, and decorum is hardly ever wanting in Mr.

Lever's works; when it is wanting, as, for instance, in "The Dodd Family," in which all the women are comic caricatures, (except Caroline Dodd, who is a phantom), the book is unsatisfactory, and we miss the touch that would harmonize the whole. What a charming creature is Polly Dill, and how glad we are when that fine fellow Colonel Hunter marries her, and takes her away from her odious father and her dull home! Sybella Kellett, too, the most finished of many pictures of the same sort, has a great charm for the reader, though she manages the Glengariff business a little too well, considering her total inexperience. Her story is an illustration of the audacious carelessness of which we have already spoken. The story of "Davenport Dunn" and that of "Roland Cashel" are, in many respects, transpositions of one another. The silly, arrogant old nobleman, perpetually fuming with jealous pride of his rank and importance, despising and disliking the man who serves him and who humours his foibles for his own purposes, but who regards him all the time with the bitterest contempt, is Lord Glengariff in the former, and Lord Kilgoff in the latter. Dunn is a cleverer Linton, with the addition of being a portrait of an unhappily notorious swindler and political adventurer; and the devices by which each is for a time successful and ultimately detected are identical; the procuring of a box, which contains the true title-deeds of a disputed estate, which has been secreted in an old building; and the papers finding their way by accident into the possession of the rightful claimant. The scheme to induce the true heir to resign his pretensions, is the same in each case; Linton tries to marry Mary Leicester, as Lizzie Davis does really marry Annesley Beecher for the same reason. Roland Cashel is very inferior to Conway, but the recall of each from a low position in life to a great fortune—in both cases secured to them by the interposition of their lady-loves—is something more than a coincidence. The forgery, the concealed papers, the detection, and the rescue had all been previously used, in the case of Maurice Darcy, and villany of a similar order, perpetrated by Captain Hemsworth, an agent of a more violent type of criminality, had even preceded that of "honest Tom Gleeson." The rogues are not indebted to variety in their modes of operation for the interest we feel in them; they are not brilliantly inventive,—on the contrary, there is as constant a monotony in their roguery as there is in the journals of Mr. Wilkie Collins's methodical culprits, who keep their own *dossiers* with such admirable precision; but each man is individually distinct, and amusing. In "One of Them" we find the *same* machinery employed to produce a similar result;

and the episode of the discovery in America of the man in possession of the papers which are to secure her fortune to Clara Hawke, is brought about just like Bagenal Daly's discovery of "honest Tom Gleeson." Here, too, the chief actors are a father and his daughter; Nick Holmes, who is an Irish Grog Davis; and Mrs. Penthony Morris; and when the game is up, they also vanish, unpunished and together, like Davis and Lizzy. The campaign of Mrs. Morris is exactly like that of Mrs. Gore Hampton; but the Dodds are much more amusing victims than the Heathcotes, father and son.

In Mr. Lever's preference for "The Dodds," we do not coincide. There is more broad fun in it, more "high jinks," more sheer animal spirits, than in any of his works since the initiatory series; but it is a case, not of more wit, only of more laughter. It is broad farce; it is a picture without shadows; and every one writes in exactly the same smart style, except the sententious Caroline. Mary Anne Dodd and Betty Cobb, Kenny and his wife, all turn into accomplished letter-writers; and though they are amusing, the incongruity cannot be overlooked, from a critical point of view. James Dodd is a tiresome absurdity. His sister expresses in her first letter a doubt whether he can spell sufficiently well to correspond with his friend, and yet he writes letters full of all the smartest "knowingness" of low and loose Continental life from the start.

We are disposed to give Grog Davis and Annesley Beecher the precedence over their numerous brethren in originality and in merit. Before Davenport Dunn's time the humour which distinguished Mr. Lever's earlier works had begun to decline. By that time there was little more than smartness left. Another kind of humour developed itself later, but this was a transition period. "Davenport Dunn" is a wonderfully smart production: everybody says smart things, and the action of the story is smart. But that is all. Once more we have a military man and war times, but the author does not even try to reproduce the "go" and the dash of the Peninsular stories; and when Sybella Kellett talks pompously in set phrase and long periods about the Crimean doings, and her father harks back to the old times, and pooh-poohs Lord Raglan and the Redan, we feel that Sybella is talking for effect, and that Paul Kellett has the best of it. The only man mentioned who has anything like the old strain in him is "Jack," the prodigal son who has enlisted in the "Smasher's" *regiment;* but he is as invisible as Madame Benoîton. In *Terry Driscoll,* who makes such profitable use of the "fever,"

there is a little more than smartness, but Mr. Lever sacrifices this character, one of his best hits, to the exigencies of the catastrophe. Driscoll, having bought the ruin in which he believed, with reason, the papers on which he is trading to be concealed, would not have neglected to complete the purchase, and so thrown the game into Sybella's hands. This fault spoils the otherwise admirable effect of Driscoll's affected folly and real cunning. In Grog Davis and Annesley Beecher there is greater consistency, and though the *chantage* device is stale, it is cleverly used; and the weakness of Beecher, the man who believes that everybody is "on the cross," and nobody is "on the square," is skilfully handled. The one mystery never absent from Mr. Lever's novels is, of course, present in this one,—the confederates are in such desperate want of money that, in order to go to Germany, they have to get a bill done by a man whose property is in the Encumbered Estates Court, whose daughter is a daily teacher, and whose income is sixty pounds a-year; but they live magnificently abroad, and Davis's daughter creates as much sensation by her princely (not German princely) expenditure as by her superb beauty. There is a racehorse concerned, and a plot to deceive his owners, and a dishonest valet; and one expects there is something to come out of all this, but the author apparently forgets all about Klepper and the Baron. So does the reader, if he be not a critic too, for the smartness of the story carries him on, and renders him even more than usually indulgent to Mr. Lever's eccentric notions of construction. It is amusing to observe how irresistible by Mr. Lever is the temptation to describe wealth and finery. When Annesley Beecher supposes himself to be Lord Lackington, he, who is always described in his swindling and makeshift days as a perfect gentleman in manners, and with a horror of snobbishness, receives Mr. Spicer under the following circumstances:—

> The noble Viscount did not turn from the mirror at which he was elaborately arranging his neckcloth as Spicer entered, but satisfied himself with calling out, "Take a chair, Spicer; you'll find one somewhere." The tone of the salutation was not more significant than the aspect of this room itself. All the articles of a costly dressing-case of silver-gilt were ranged on one table. Essence-bottles, snuff-boxes, pipe-heads, with rings, jewelled buttons, and such-like knick-knackeries covered another; whatever fancy could suggest or superfluity compass of those thousand-and-one trinkets the effeminacy of our age has introduced into male costume, all abounded. Quantities, too, of the most expensive clothes were there, rich uniforms [Beecher is a civilian, unattached to any service!], fur-lined pelisses [even a Polish Jew finds one fur-lined pelisse sufficient], and gold-embroidered waistcoats. And as Mr. Spicer quickly made the tour of these with his eyes, his

gaze rested at last on my lord himself, whose dressing-gown of silver brocade would have made a state robe for a Venetian doge.

Such vulgar nonsense as this might have been written by "Ouida" in her prime, or by Mr. Disraeli in the later days, after the arrival of the Duke and Duchess of Bellamont at Jerusalem. Mr. Lever's "lords" are sufficiently foolish and unpleasant specimens of an order which, if these samples were portraits, must have bored mankind beyond endurance long ago; but they are not nearly so offensive as his "ladies." An intelligent foreigner who, judging by the large sale of Mr. Lever's works, should accept them as veritable pictures of English life and society, would be justified in believing that "peeress" and "gentlewoman" are antithetical terms, and that the houses of English noblemen are like lunatic asylums, where all the patients parade perpetually in mock robes and crowns, and make speeches to themselves about their own grandeur and their disdain of all the world. These great ladies, whose "calm grace," whose "habitual consciousness of high rank," whose "composed dignity" and "exquisite breeding" are constantly impressed upon us in description, are, in all they say and do, insufferably rude, impertinent, and ill-bred, foolish beyond belief, and vapid beyond endurance. Lady Eleanor Darcy is the only titled woman in whom the reader can recognize a gentlewoman in the long list, which begins with the Callonbys and ends with that Lady Maud who is supposed to lend the true patrician grace to the story of "Lord Kilgobbin." Lady Lackington, Lady Hester Onslow, Lady Charlotte Hinton, Lady Wallincourt, Lady Kilgoff, Lady Augusta Arden, and Lady Augusta Bramleigh are, it is to be hoped, impossibilities, as unreal as the sentiments of adulation and fulsome toadyism with which Mr. Lever invests the persons who surround them. It is by vulgar mistakes of this kind that he has spoiled some of his very best works; for instance, "The Bramleighs," which contains some writing he has never surpassed, and for fine scenes of flirtation, bringing out delicate shades of character, excels anything he has done, and is superior to Mr. Trollope himself.

When Mr. Lever's works are regarded *en masse*, there is too much clever humbug in them; but, of course, they do not produce the same effect in detail. He demands too freely our interest in schemers, our admiration for their schemes. It is quite true that he upholds courage, honour, and manliness, especially in his earlier works. There is some declension of *the standard* in the later ones. The military heroes were finer *fellows than* the *jeunes premiers* of the politico-social series.

But he takes shallow views of life generally, and there is too much of the "agreeable rattle" about his men in office and in responsible social positions. Not that we admire political dogmatism or didacticism in novels, but that there is a way of touching serious subjects seriously, and that Mr. Lever has, for the most part, missed it, and fallen into the smooth, epigrammatic line, which "makes things comfortable" without much trouble. His dashing dragoons were real soldiers, his statesmen and diplomatists are not real. In several of his most effective passages he rebukes the shallow politicians who discuss Ireland from an English point of view, and who fancy they possess the word of the most obstinate of enigmas. But his own countrymen smile at his own views, just as they admire the dexterity and humour of such creations as Joseph Atlee—the Admirable Crichton of dishonesty, the Proteus of time-serving and wire-pulling, in his latest novel—without the slightest recognition of soundness in the views, or resemblance to life in the creations. Only a short portion of Mr. Lever's life has been passed in Ireland, and the tendency of his mind, natural to a writer of fiction, is to seize upon the picturesque and the paradoxical. He found both in plenty, he has reproduced them; but he has gone no farther, and no deeper. True sympathy with the Irish people he does not feel. It could not exist together with ignorance of their religion, which implies the absence of true patriotism. An Irishman who is not a Catholic may love Ireland well and even wisely, but he cannot love her well or wisely if he regards the Catholic Faith with contempt which sometimes tries to be good-natured, and an affected magnanimity which represents to instructed minds that they really ought to be glad these poor people, with their vivid imagination and superstitious turn, can derive harmless consolation from the worship of images. There are a few finely-worded passages in Mr. Lever's works, which may seem to Protestants quite liberal and sympathetic, but, when examined, they will be found to mean simply this. His sketches of the peasantry are adorned with many beautiful touches of pathos, and the brightest, best, heartiest of his humour is lavished upon them. The funeral of Godfrey O'Malley, the scene on the course at Loughrea, the denunciation of Mark O'Donoghue by the widow, the funeral of Shaun the murderer, are among the finest examples of the former. The gathering of Sir Marmaduke Travers's tenants, and the whole picture of the old home of "The Martins" are two specially striking instances of the latter; but each of Mr. Lever's readers will recal numerous others without difficulty. He is particularly happy in episodes,

many of which will outlive that of the stories in which they occur. Miss Judy Macan's arrival at General Dashwood's ball, and the story of Frank Webber's dialogue with the man in the sewer, Miss O'Shea, Arthur O'Leary's *rencontre* with Mrs. Ram, the unlucky "Aunt Fanny" called to the Kennyfeck Council, and Peter O'Gorman, brought up express to inquire Roland Cashel's "intentions," but sent back to Galway when Aunt Fanny reports that Cashel "will 'blaze' for the asking," Lady Mary Boyle's device for keeping Billy Curtis from going to the poll, the story of Freney the robber; these and many more examples, present themselves at once to confirm this observation. Many of his comic personages have all the individuality with which Mr. Dickens inspired his, without their grotesqueness. Among the most amusing of his originals are to be found some specimens of the country doctor, old Hickman, Doctor Roach, and Doctor Dill.

There is a strange contradiction between the perennial, untamed buoyancy of Mr. Lever's spirits, and his belief in the efficacy and the prevalence of charlatanism. He is untouched with world-weariness, and yet, what could be supposed more surely calculated to inspire it than the notion prevalent in his works, that it is a world of "seems!"

In one respect Mr. Lever differs widely from other great or considerable writers, his contemporaries. He has not fallen away from the point of excellence which he attained. It was not so elevated as it might have been, had his views been sounder, his sympathies wider, his convictions more profound, and his self-confidence less active and sufficing. Those works of his which we willingly ignore are not his later performances. The fame which he achieved by his first novels is in no way impaired by "Lord Kilgobbin:" he will live as the bards of the gleeful time live, and be regarded as, "if not the first, on the very first line" of the novelists of the nineteenth century.

Art. VIII.—PARLIAMENT AND CATHOLIC EDUCATION.

Pastoral Address of the Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland. October 20, 1871.

A Pastoral Letter by Henry Edward Archbishop of Westminster. Quinquagesima Sunday, 1872.

Education to be Real must be Denominational. By Frederick Canon Oakeley, M.A. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

Intermediate and University Education in Ireland. By a Committee of Irish Catholics. Part I. Intermediate Education. Dublin: Kelly.

Queries as to Irish Education. By Rev. F. O. Reilly, S. J. ("Month" for March and April, 1872.) London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

What is meant by Freedom of Education? By The O'Conor Don, M.P. Dublin: Kelly.

Irish University Education. ("Edinburgh Review" for January, 1872.) London: Longmans.

IT was impossible in our last number to deal usefully with the general subject of Catholic education in these islands, for a very obvious reason. We had fully expected that Government in the present session would introduce some large and carefully-prepared measure on Irish education, both primary and higher. Our number was to appear in the middle of January, while Parliament was to meet early in February; and it is obvious therefore that, had our expectations from Government been realized, any general remarks we might have made would have become obsolete, before many of our readers would have even looked at them. It was the projected legislation of course, which would have given the whole point and edge to our discussion of principles. Down to the very eve of the Session, we had not abandoned our hope, that the urgent remonstrances and petitions of Catholic Ireland would have received due attention; though more than one ominous sign had appeared of a different issue. Nor even now do we regard the disgraceful omission as due to Mr. Gladstone personally, but rather to the violent anti-Catholic prejudices with which so many of his party are imbued. Indeed, the Prime Minister has taken express care to repeat,

in the debate on Professor Fawcett's Bill to secularize the University of Dublin, his conviction that the Catholics of Ireland are entitled to very much more serious consideration.

"We have entertained," he said, "and we continue to entertain, the belief—we are pledged to the belief—that it is an extreme hardship on that portion of the Irish population who do not choose to accept an education apart from religion, that they should have no university open to them in Ireland at which they may obtain degrees; and we hold that this, call it what you like, and disguise it as you may, is an infliction of civil penalties on account of religious opinions."

This language is certainly satisfactory so far as it goes. Unfortunate it is for Ireland—most unfortunate, we believe, for the empire—that so large a number of the party which Mr. Gladstone leads appear anxious to force upon the Catholics of Ireland a system of education which they abhor. On this part of the matter however we shall speak at the close of our remarks; and here we will only further add, that the delay of our article has given us one important advantage, by enabling us to make use of the various important publications which we have named at the head of our article.* All of these, except the first, have appeared since the meeting of Parliament.

But we certainly must not longer defer some comment, on the existing state of the question. In this country, as throughout the civilized world, education is now the chief battle-field, on which the powers of good and evil are engaged in deadly conflict. It is on Christian education that the Church fixes, under God, her main hopes for the future; and it is on irreligious education that infidelity fixes its main hopes for the future, *not* under God. "Everywhere throughout Christendom," say the Irish Bishops, "the greatest efforts are being made to banish religion from the school, and thus to estrange youth from God and His Church." And as to these islands in particular, hear the eloquent words of Archbishop Manning:—

The education of the people of England is, therefore, at this time passing through a crisis which, for good or for evil, will determine the future of this country. We are wasting our time in political contests and angry dissensions about theories and schemes of second and third-rate importance, while the question which is vital to the well-being of the country is passing beyond our control into the hands of those who are undermining the foundations of our national character. England is a Christian people; and the education of

* By some inexplicable oversight, we failed to observe, till it was too *late, Mr. Howley's* excellent volume on Irish schools. We have devoted a *special notice* to that volume in a later part of our number.

England, in an unbroken tradition from our forefathers, is Christian still. Its unity was, indeed, shattered, and its perfection diminished, three hundred years ago. But through all its losses and confusions the education of England and of Scotland is Christian to this day. The education of Ireland is, to this hour, what Ireland is : immutably Christian, in all the fulness of the Catholic faith. On the maintenance of this Christian tradition in all its integrity depends, therefore, the national character of our people. And at this moment, for the first time, this inestimable inheritance of Great Britain and Ireland is deliberately threatened by politicians, by organized leagues, and by the secret enemies of the Christian education and Christian character of our country.

The Archbishop would not indeed call Professor Huxley and his friends "*secret* enemies of Christian education"; but there are many others, like-minded with the Professor, who do not yet dare to avow their predilections; and there are a far larger number who—whether in blind hatred of Catholicity or in mere selfish animosity against the Established Communion —are actively though most unconsciously forwarding a result, which few would more deeply regret than themselves.

It will be seen on reflection, that the portion of Catholic education which is principally affected by legislative interference, consists in the two extremes; in primary education of the poor on one hand, and in higher education of the leisured classes on the other. The interest of Catholic *popular* education — as is evident — can be indefinitely promoted or thwarted, whether by the conditions which Parliament may attach to school subvention or (still more) by any system of *compulsory* education which it may adopt. On the other hand the higher education of leisured Catholics cannot but be seriously affected, by any enactments which may be made as to academical degrees recognized by the State. These two portions of education however—while on the one hand they are (as we have said) the two with which Parliament can far the most effectively interfere for good or evil—on the other hand are immeasurably the most important of all in their practical bearing. In fact, as it seems to us, there are but two obvious ways in which the Devil can impede the Church's steady and equable growth, as the one regenerating and saving influence of the British Empire; as the country's one hope against those miseries and perils, which on all sides surround her. The largest and best-disciplined army is powerless, if headed by disloyal and treacherous commanders; while on the other hand, if the army be contemptible in numbers, the ablest and most devoted commanders can do with it but little. In two different ways therefore may Catholic influence, within the political and social sphere, be seriously thwarted. This

result would ensue, if either on the one hand the Catholic rank and file—the number of those throughout these islands who are the Church's devoted subjects—were very seriously diminished; or if on the other hand those who are their only possible leaders *within* that sphere, were imbued with an anti-Catholic spirit. As regards the well-being of Church and nation, it would be an indefinitely less calamity that any given lay Catholic, who possesses powerful intellectual influence, should openly apostatize;—than that he should be wanting in sympathy with the clergy, and in deference to the Holy Father's teaching.* It is on the education then of the Catholic poor, and on the higher education of the Catholic leisured classes,—that the political and social future of Catholicity and of the civilized world mainly depends.

We shall now therefore proceed briefly to consider the present state of things at home, in those two particulars. We shall say nothing beyond what we have just premised, on the question of principle; on the deadly evils which must result from an education positively, or even negatively, irreligious: because we have so repeatedly insisted on this theme in earlier numbers, that nothing essential (so far as we see) remains to be said. We may add however, that F. O'Reilly (pp. 170—188) has gone very patiently and fully over this ground, deducing his conclusions with irresistible logic from Catholic first principles. We know indeed of no document to which we could more confidently refer any doubtful Catholic, for a characteristically well-balanced and dispassionate exposition of the relevant Catholic doctrine. Here however we shall consider ourselves to be addressing readers, who take the whole doctrine for granted. And we will postpone to the later part of our article all reference to the sister island: because almost all which can be said about England, applies to Ireland à longè fortiori; while there are various further considerations, which need emphatically to be pointed out as bearing on Ireland, which have no parallel whatever in the case of Great Britain. Of North Britain in particular we shall not speak at all: as we shall best consult our readers' convenience, by deferring to a future number our consideration of the Scotch Education Bill now before Parliament.

Since we last wrote on Primary Education in England

* Our readers will have observed the qualification "as regards the well-being of Church and nation." Of course to the *individual*, apostasy is a far greater evil, than unsoundness of doctrine which is not actual heresy. Even as regards the Church's well-being, the same proposition holds, we *think*, in the case of every one who is not powerfully influential over Catholic thought.

(July, 1870), the Act of Parliament which was then pending has finally passed, and there has been a year's experience of its working. It is admitted on all hands, that Catholics have put forth truly admirable efforts—both pecuniarily and otherwise—for the purpose of maximizing its good and minimizing its evil effects. Still there are some persons—of whom we would speak with profound respect—who hold that the Act is too much for us; that its principle and details are so essentially anti-Catholic, that—do what we will—gravest evil must be its necessary result. Canon Oakeley's pamphlet may be taken as representing these views. Denominational "education," he says (p. 12), is rendered utterly *impracticable* . . . . by that which is now required by our Government in all schools receiving support from the State." He considers (p. 21) that "an inadequate notion" prevails "of the evil involved in the actual solution of" the religious difficulty. "That evil," he considers, "amounts to nothing less than the flooding a nation with a kind of knowledge, sufficient to make men conceited, but not sufficient to make them moral."

Now it is not possible that Catholics should throw themselves heart and soul into the impending contest against irreligious education, if they consider the *existing* system inevitably and hopelessly irreligious. But after the best attention we can give the matter, this seems to us a great exaggeration. Doubtless the Act of 1870 has inflicted on Catholics severe mischief, and has dealt with them very unjustly. Doubtless, since that Act has been passed, most earnest and self-sacrificing efforts—even more than have hitherto been put forth—may be necessary, for the purpose of averting, not only grave violations of principle, but grave practical calamities. It is wonderful—as both Canon Oakeley (p. 21) and The O'Connor Don (p. 15) have pointed out—how monstrously one-sided has been the current talk about "liberty of conscience." A Catholic's conscience may of course be as much oppressed by his children being sent to a purely secular school, as a Protestant's can be by his children being sent to a Catholic one. We quite agree with Canon Oakeley, that Catholic children will suffer grievous spiritual evil, by learning even "the three R's." from non-Catholic teachers and among non-Catholic companions. Still we do not concur with his opinion, that *no* help can now be accepted by Catholics from Government without violation of Catholic principle. On the contrary, we think that education could be given in strict conformity with Catholic requirements, even though every Catholic school in the country accepted the State's help on the State's *present* terms. Let us suppose, for argument's

sake, that Catholic schools thus assisted were co-extensive with the Catholic population. In what respect would the state of things be inconsistent with the essential requisites of good education? We will take in order the various particulars, on which any such allegation can imaginably be founded.

(1.) It is an essential doctrine of the Church, that the education of Catholics is entrusted by the law of God to the Catholic Church. The Archbishop sets forth this doctrine with characteristic force.

That the schools of a Christian people cannot be separated without sin from the Christian Church, is surely self-evident. The Christian school is the place and the provision made for the training of those who are baptized into the Christian faith. They have been made children of God, and as such they have a right to four things belonging to them by a right of inheritance, to which all other rights are secondary. They have a right to the knowledge of their faith; to the training of their conscience by the knowledge of God's commandments; to the Sacraments of grace; and to a moral formation, founded on the precepts and example of our Divine Saviour. These four things belong by a divine right to the child of the poorest working man; by a right more sacred than that which guards the inheritance of lands and titles to the child of the rich. A child of God, and an heir of the kingdom of heaven, holds by a higher title; and his claim is under the jurisdiction of a Divine Judge. But the school is the place and the provision for the ensuring of these four vital parts of his right to the Christian child. They cannot be taught or learned elsewhere; there is no other place of systematic and sufficient formation. It is not only idle, but cruel, to say that the place and provision for such Christian instruction and formation is under the roof of the parent's home; that the best school is the family. This is indeed true of the early formation by affection, influence, example, by which fathers and mothers fashion the first outlines of character, and mature them while the education of their children is advancing. None have reminded parents of this more faithfully than the pastors of the Church. But to say that fathers and mothers are to educate their children, and that their home is to be the school of Christian instruction, catechetical teaching, formation of conscience, preparation for sacraments, and the like, is either the shallow talk of men who know nothing of Christian education or care nothing for it, or a heartless mockery of our poor. The rich, the refined, the educated, whose time is their own, do not educate their own children. They systematically send them to schools and colleges, or pay for tutors or governesses under their own roof. They wisely shrink from a work for which, if they have the time, they seldom have the acquirements, or the gift, or the method, or the perseverance, or the patience. And if this be, as it is, universally true of those who are the most competent, and the most provided with all the means and opportunities for the work, how is it not hardness of heart or want of common sense to say that the children of the poor are to learn reading, and writing, and summing indeed at school, but that their Christian teaching and formation must be provided at home? The working men of these countries

are at labour from twilight to twilight. Their wives have the burden of the whole family; the poor mother is alone both the head and the servant of the whole house. When is she to teach, and train, and shape, and fashion the characters, hearts, consciences, intellects of the children? Is it to be done in the midst of the day's work, or in the weariness after the day's work is done? And are they competent to do what the mother of the rich cannot do? Broken with cares, wearied by work, suffering from poverty, often fainting from sickness because worn out with all these burdens, how shall the father or mother of a family, huddled into a single room, do what the rich and the educated, in their spacious houses, and with abundant leisure, never dream of attempting? It is to be hoped that we shall hear no more of this heartless talk. If, then, the Christian education of a people cannot be accomplished at home, it can be accomplished nowhere but in the school; and if so, then the school becomes the depository of the rights of parents, and of the inheritance of their children. The school is strictly a court of the Temple, a porch outside the Sanctuary. It cannot be separated from the Church. It was created by the Church; and the Church created it for its own mission to its own children. As the Church cannot surrender to any power on earth the formation of its own children, so it cannot surrender to any the direction of its own schools. (pp. 4-6.)

The Archbishop implies throughout his Pastoral, that no such separation of Catholic schools from the Catholic Church has been effected by recent legislation. See especially p. 11. Nor, so far as we see, can any one think otherwise, except on the assumption that the State's conditions involve some surrender of the full religious spirit, which should animate Catholic teaching even on things secular. But, for reasons we shall immediately give, we do not think that this assumption can be successfully maintained.

(2.) It may be objected however—and indeed it has been held by some Catholics—that the State, in *compelling* any amount or kind of education, however ample the freedom of co-operative action which it may leave the Church, exceeds the power given by God to civil rulers; and it may be objected accordingly, that bishops and priests, if they do not protest against such an exercise of power, sanction an intolerable usurpation. On a former occasion however, (January, 1870, p. 6), we stated that we desired to see stronger theological grounds than we had yet fallen in with, to convince us of the above-named theological proposition; and so far as we have since considered the matter, our doubts on the truth of this proposition have largely increased. Hardly a theologian can be named in these islands, whose name carries with it so much weight as F. O'Reilly's; and he,—while strongly urging that the State is bound to *provide* for its subjects due secular education (*pp.* 195-6),—does not hint at there being any

usurpation involved ipso facto * in the *enforcement* of such education. The Archbishop indeed speaks explicitly on the subject. Here are his words; and we italicise those specially relevant.

> In putting forward this assertion of indefeasible parental rights, we are not denying to the State the right to protect itself from the dangers which arise from an uneducated population. If parents suffer their children to run wild, to grow up in ignorance and crime, the State has a right, full and sacred, to protect itself against the pestilence and the havoc of its criminal classes. *It has a right* to punish the parent for neglect of his natural duty, and *to compel him to discharge it. Compulsory education*, as a penalty on neglect, and a protection against social danger, *is undeniably within the competence of the State.* But even this does not deprive the parent of his *right to choose the kind of education he thinks fit.* These principles are fully recognized in the laws of England. When did we ever hear of compulsion in the case of the rich? The most negligent parents are left untouched, except in cases which come before the tribunals of law. And these arise only for the sake of property. The jurisdiction of the Courts in the education of children is a mere accident of the case. The liberty and the rights of the poor are equally sacred. They descend from the same divine laws. *They may be touched only in the case of proved neglect:* and that, not more *to protect the rights of society* than *to protect the rights of the child.* (pp. 7-8.)

(3.) At last then the vital and critical question is this; whether the enforced conscience clause and time table are in such sense evil, that they need prevent efficient and pious teachers from making their schools thoroughly Catholic in spirit and in tendency.

The fairest way of treating this question will be to begin by a preliminary inquiry. We will inquire, what kind of education would be promoted by Catholic bishops in preference to any other, under the present circumstances of England, if they had everything their own way; if there were ample pecuniary provision for Catholic schools, without any recourse whatever to the State for help.

On this head, the highest and most conclusive authority to which the Catholic can appeal, is the Holy See; and we will enrich our pages with a passage, quoted by the Irish bishops, in which Pius IX. sets forth the Church's doctrine on the ideal of primary education.† We take the liberty of

---

* We add the qualification "ipso facto": because of course we consider that the State is guilty of usurpation, where it so enforces *secular* education, as to interfere directly or indirectly with the effectiveness of *Catholic*.

† We have been sometimes accused of exaggeration in our doctrine on the *large* number of Pontifical ex cathedrâ Acts. We would beg therefore *particular* attention to the fact, that the Irish bishops officially set forth in their

italicising one or two sentences, that we may fix on them special attention.

But if this detestable system of education, so far removed from Catholic faith and ecclesiastical authority, becomes a source of evils, both to individuals and to society, when it is employed in the higher teaching, and in schools frequented by the better class, who does not see that the same system will give rise to still greater evils, if it be introduced into primary schools? For it is in these schools, above all, that the children of the people ought to be carefully taught from their tender years the mysteries and precepts of our holy religion, and to be trained with diligence to piety, good morals, religion, and civilization. *In such schools, religious teaching ought to have so leading a place in all that concerns education and instruction, that whatever else the children may learn should appear subsidiary to it.* The young, therefore, are exposed to the greatest perils whenever, in the schools, education is not closely united with religious teaching. Wherefore, since primary schools are established chiefly to give the people a religious education, and to lead them to piety and Christian morality, they have justly attracted to themselves, in a greater degree than other educational institutions, all the care, solicitude, and vigilance of the Church.

The ideal, here laid down by Pius IX., is beautifully developed by Canon Oakeley. We will give one or two quotations from his pamphlet, to show how heartily we are at one with him in fundamental principle, even when importantly differing on one practical application of that principle. The following passage in particular is as true and momentous, as it is beautifully expressed.

If religion be what it claims to be, the instrument by which man is to be educated for heaven, it is no mere department of knowledge, no mere accident of times and places, but something which has its throne in all companies and its right to a voice on all subjects. I am far from meaning that it should make its entrance lightly or unseasonably, or without the "dignus vindice nodus." What I mean is, that it should always act as the assessor, even where it is not the judge; and be ready, as occasion may arise, to interpose with its corrective or qualifying interpretations. No one, who feels the importance of imbuing the tender and susceptible minds of children with religious principles and associations, will be content to forego the many opportunities, which even what is called secular education furnishes for engaging them to the love of it. Those who have the direction of the books to be used in the reading lessons will take care that the superintending Providence of God, in the conduct both of the natural and moral world, be always kept

---

Pastoral this Exposition, as having proceeded from Pius IX. in his capacity of "*infallible teacher of the faithful.*" Yet the Apostolic Letter in question (1) was addressed in form to one individual, the Archbishop of Freiburg; (2) does not declare expressly or equivalently its own ex cathedrâ character; and (3) is not at all concerned with dogma strictly so called.

distinctly in view, and *that the motives and principles of the Gospel, as distinguished from those which find favour with the world at large, be everywhere recognized as the only safe conditions of human action, and the only true foundation of human happiness.* Where the imagination is to be interested, the simple and beautiful narratives of Scripture, or the anecdotes of saintly biography will be preferred to materials drawn from less religious sources. Christian doctrine will be inculcated, as well directly by catechetical instruction, as indirectly by true history, innocent fiction, and sacred song. In short, everything will be done to divest religious teaching of that cold and formal character, which comes of its being relegated to a department of its own, and confined to the repetition of phrases learned by heart, without being permanently impressed on the memory by explanations to render them intelligible, or illustrations to render them interesting. (pp. 10–12.)

Again—

We shall not be far wrong in saying that the end of education is to draw out the various faculties of the human mind, moral as well as intellectual, so as to render them subservient to the purpose for which they were implanted by the Creator; that is to say, for the advancement of His own glory, and the greater good and happiness of His creatures. This being so, it follows that the mere acquisition of knowledge, so far from being the chief end of education, is but a secondary end, or means to that chief end. To exclude religion from general education, under this view of its character, is a conception which one would suppose that no person in his senses could entertain, unless he utterly disbelieve in the providential government of God and the eternal destiny of man. (p. 13.)

Once more. The so-called education which is divorced from religion—

Is in fact no true education at all: it is meaningless, aimless, characterless. It is the form without the spirit. Far from directing knowledge to its true end, it does not even impart true knowledge. You cannot educate, any more than you can accomplish any other great work, except upon a *view*; and a view is just the thing which Governments and School-Boards will not allow us to carry out. The general who leads an army to battle, the statesman who holds the reins of civil government, the lawyer who conducts the case of his client, the author who writes a work, all start with some definite idea of the mode in which their object is to be effected, whether we call it plan, policy, theory, or whatever else. Of the educator alone are the energies to be crippled and the wings clipped. He desires to employ the great resources at his command for the permanent moral and religious advantage of the children under his care, but the Government or the School-Board steps in and says, "You shall not use this book, nor permit this hymn to be sung, nor invite the children to call God to mind in the midst of their work by some momentary act of devotion." (p. 15.)

The following is first-rate against those charlatans, who pre-

tend that children can be practically imbued with morality on a non-dogmatic basis.

You can, of course, teach children that idleness may bring them to the gallows, and that industry will advance them in the world; you may deter them from certain sins, such as intemperance, by pointing out their mischievous effects upon health, character, and domestic comfort. By similar arguments you may inculcate a preference of order to turbulence, or loyalty to sedition. I do not say that such exhortations are useless; but they clearly do not go to the root of the matter. They are very feeble weapons indeed against the powers of the world, the flesh, and the devil. They hardly suffice to produce even external decency in those who are not naturally disposed towards it; and they do not touch the thoughts of the heart, in which all morality originates. If you desire children to grow into good men and women, you must habitually impress upon them, that in their own nature they are weak and sinful, and that they must constantly seek help from above through the appointed means. (p. 17.)

It would sound almost like satire to object that such a moral education as we have supposed is unequal to the training of men and women for heaven, because any such result is immeasurably above its pretensions, and does not appear even to enter into the programme of its advocates. It is more to the purpose to inquire whether it will fit them for the duties of the present life. There is much cause to apprehend that the spread of such education as is now in fashion will create a power which it will be but ill able to control and direct. That which it will certainly do is to give a fresh impulse to trashy literature, and a keener appetite for it. This literature will at once reflect and reanimate the spirit of the age. It will enlarge freely upon the dignity of human nature and the inalienable rights of men and women; but it will say little about the duty of obedience to authority, patience under reproaches, and contentment with the state in which Providence has placed us. It will exalt political activity, and disparage the life which is without excitement and sensation. It will preach worse doctrines than these; but it may well be doubted whether even these will tend to form a community of faithful husbands, good fathers, contented tenants, dutiful apprentices, and loyal subjects. My own impression rather is, that such a literature is the stuff out of which come Socialism, Communism, Fenianism, and all the various forms of political heresy and social confusion. And if I am to speak my own mind, I must express a deep-rooted conviction that a national education into which religion does not enter as a pervading element, so far from being a safeguard against these evils, is the very instrument by which they will be propagated. (pp. 18, 19.)

On the other hand Canon Oakeley does not deny that, (whatever might be desirable in the abstract) *under the existing circumstances of England*, Catholic children must be instructed up to the level of their fellow-countrymen, in such matters as reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, &c. &c.

Now we *do not* dream of contending, that the recent Act

considerable degree interfered with the means ic teacher has at his disposal, for realizing such e have sketched: we only say, that he has r, through proportionally increased efforts, of hool thoroughly Catholic in spirit and in ten- e first place—whereas the ordinary school hours are five in number, and the hours exacted by Government for secular instruction are but four—a whole hour of every day can be given (if it were wished) to direct catechetical teaching: and we doubt whether in fact so *much* as this was given in many schools, under the old state of things. Then further (as is well known) one special means, whereby Catholic schools secure the presence of a pervasive religious element, is the continual presence of the crucifix, pious images and the like; in which respect they are still completely unfettered. In like manner (which is far the most important part of all) discipline can be enforced from first to last on Catholic motives. Lastly the continuous secular instruction required occupies no more than two hours in the morning and the same in the afternoon. The two two-hour periods may be, each of them, preceded or followed by Catholic catechetical instruction or Catholic prayer.

Then consider further. The main—the almost exclusive—staple of primary secular instruction must ever be those matters which we have mentioned; reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, and the like. Now the character of these studies should be observed. Of course the *act* of study, like all other human acts, may and ought to be animated by religious motives; but religion is simply irrelevant to *the study itself*. There is no strictly *religious* method, we say, of imbuing a child's mind with his "three R's"; and an atheist might imbue Catholic children therewith, as effectively as the devoutest Catholic. Doubtless it would be somewhat more conducive to their spiritual well-being, if the two-hour study were occasionally interrupted by some religious act: nevertheless at best this would be *simply* an interruption.

Canon Oakeley asks—

> What of secular history—such, for instance, as the history of our own country? What idea can you convey to a child of such facts as those which enter into every page in the lives of King John or Henry II., which shall be clear alike of any offence to the conscience either of a Catholic or a Protestant? How shall you extract the pound of flesh required in the bond without so much as a hair's-breadth of encroachment on the unlawful surroundings? *Again*, are you to describe the Reformation as a good thing, and thus shock *the prejudices* of the Catholic; or as a bad thing, and thus excite the indig-

nation of the Protestant? Yet, if you can do nothing of all this without an infringement of your compact with the Government or the School-Board, what more is the history which you teach than an old almanac? (p. 16.)

We have reason to know, that the excellent author is here mistaken on the matter of fact. *In*direct religious teaching is not at all forbidden during the two two-hour periods. As the Protestant teacher of a Protestant school may during those hours eulogize the "glorious Reformation," so the Catholic teacher of a Catholic school may during the same hours brand with as much censure as he pleases the schism of the sixteenth century.

In a passage we have already quoted, Canon Oakeley dwells with much force on the importance of religiously interesting the *imagination;* of placing before it "the simple and beautiful narratives of Scripture or the anecdotes of saintly biography." Doubtless it is an evil, that during four hours out of the daily five this may not be done. Yet—not to speak of the remaining school-hour—this is one of those things which may be done with much success out of school-hours altogether; for it requires no painful tension of the mind, and may be made most ministrative to healthy recreation.

We cannot then think that any intolerable hardship has been inflicted on Catholics, by the conditions enforced on those schools which accept Government interference. Nay in one respect, and that by no means an unimportant one, we think that the imposition of these conditions has been a positive advantage; because they make the fact patent and undeniable, that public money is given exclusively for the *secular* part of public education. We do not for a moment admit, that the earlier state of things was not entirely just to every member of the nation, and entirely defensible by arguments of irresistible force: but still it was open to *plausible* objection, as being unfair to anti-denominationalists. It is now a matter of actual demonstration, that the money of these anti-denominationalists is in no possible sense expended on *denominational* education; but that, as Father Porter expresses it in the "Month," their money merely "pays so many hours of secular instruction, from which all religion is excluded."

The great hardship of Mr. Forster's Act, as we think, is the withdrawal of Government help towards the building of fresh Catholic schools. In follows legitimately from the fundamental doctrines of Catholicity, that no Catholic child can receive instruction from non-Catholic teachers in a non-Catholic school, without grave religious detriment; and we think that this consideration has been most unduly passed over by Par-

liament. The evil will be greatly increased, if Government fulfils the intention, at which Mr. Forster has hinted, of introducing a bill next year for compulsory education; and we trust Catholics will use their best efforts to obtain some amendment of the law, in the interests of true religion. But even if they entirely fail in this—and we are very far from sanguine of their success—the state of things which now exists is indefinitely better than what would be its inevitable alternative; and we Catholics should continue to combine with the whole body of denominationalists, in a most uncompromising and intense resistance to the secularist faction.

In the mean time it is of course urgent, that Catholics shall strain every nerve to prepare suitable instruments and suitable machinery, for resisting the evil influences with which they are now threatened. In particular, the question of securing thoroughly accomplished Catholic *teachers* assumes, under existing circumstances, quite exceptional importance. We rather fancy that, as regards the *male* training schools, much remains to be done in this respect; and we are confident that the laity will energetically second every movement, made by the Episcopate in this direction.

We are far from implying, by anything we have said, that we ourselves sympathize with those theories of popular education, which are now so prevalent, and which indeed are commonly assumed as axiomatic. We heartily agree with F. O'Reilly (p. 195), that "the tendency in our countries and in some others is rather towards an excess of education for the masses of the people; an excess of imperfect education, which serves to communicate to a great many knowledge not needed by their position, and at the same time incomplete and (in consequence) not unfrequently mischievous." Indeed our own bias would be to speak still more severely than F. O'Reilly, on the injurious effect of what now goes by the name of popular education. It seems to us that the problem has been appreciated far more correctly in those times and countries, in which the ordinary poor have received that religious and industrial education which is best suited to their temporal lot; while youths of promise, however humble their origin, have full and free access to the priesthood with its preparatory culture. No one will suspect Mr. Froude of ultra-Catholic proclivities; but his warnings on this head impress us as worthy of most serious attention. We italicise one or two sentences, but we do not think it worth while to append comment on his incidental touches of anti-Catholic bigotry.

General knowledge means general ignorance, and an ignorance, unfortu*nately*, which is unconscious of itself. Quick wits are sharpened up. Young

fellows so educated learn the world is a large place, and contains many pleasant things for those who can get hold of them. Their ideas doubtless are inflated, and with them their ambitions and desires. They have gained nothing towards the wholesome gratifying of those desires, while they have gained considerable discontent at the inequalities of what is called fortune. They are the ready-made prey of plausible palaver, written or spoken, but they are without means of self-help, without seriousness, and without stability. They believe easily that the world is out of joint, because they, with their little bits of talents, miss the instant recognition which they think their right; and their literature, which the *precious* art of reading has opened out to them, is the penny newspaper; their creed, the latest popular chimera which has taken possession of the air. They form the classes which breed like mushrooms in the modern towns, and are at once the scorn and perplexity of the thoughtful statesman. They are Fenians in Ireland, trades-unionists in England, rabid partisans of slavery or rabid abolitionists in America, Socialists and Red Republicans on the Continent. It is better that they should have any education than none. The evils caused by a smattering of information, sounder knowledge may eventually cure. *I refuse only to admit that the transition from the old industrial education to the modern book education is, for the present or the immediate future, a sign of what can be called progress.* . . . . . France has been held up before us for the last twenty years as the leader of civilization, and Paris as the headquarters of it. *The one class in this supreme hour of trial for that distracted nation in which there is most hope of good,* is that into which the ideas of Paris have hitherto failed to penetrate. *The French peasant sits as a child at the feet of the Priesthood of an exploded idolatry.* His ignorance of books is absolute; his superstitions are contemptible; but he has retained a *practical remembrance that he has a Master in Heaven who will call him to account for his life.* In the cultivation of his garden and vineyard, in the simple round of agricultural toil, he has been saved from the temptation of the prevailing delusions, and has led, for the most part, a thrifty, self-denying, industrious, and useful existence. Keener sarcasm it would be hard to find on the inflated enthusiasm of progress.—("Short Studies on Great Subjects." Second series, pp. 267-9.)

Here however we have been only expressing our own private opinion; and we know that many excellent Catholics widely dissent from it, who on such a matter are far worthier of consideration than the present writer. At all events nothing could be more insane and indeed suicidal, than for Catholics to complicate the essential issue, by raising this episodical question. Public opinion in these islands has decided, that reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, and other such matters shall be taught to the whole population, as effectively as possible. There is nothing in such a course which *of itself* involves peril to Catholic interests; and Catholics have their hands quite full, or rather more than quite full, in combining to *protect* those interests.

We have been speaking hitherto of poor-school legislation in England; but it must not be forgotten that the existing state of Catholic *higher* education gives profoundly grave reason for anxiety on the future. The evils however, to which we refer, arise in so small a comparative degree from the action of *Parliament*, that they do not belong more than very partially to our present theme. On several former occasions we have discussed the general subject; and we would refer our readers particularly to our numbers for January 1869 and January 1870. Since those articles were written, it has become known that the English bishops, so far back as 1869, named a commission from their own body to investigate the question; and that they have now appointed a sub-commission, to ascertain the general opinion of Catholics and suggest practical measures. We earnestly hope that speedy action may ensue; but we cannot here pursue a course of thought, so external to our immediate argument. As far as the action of *the State* is concerned, Catholic grievances in England seem reducible to this.

It results from Catholic principles, and has been expressly declared by Catholic authority, that Catholics cannot, without grievous peril to their souls, enter into residence at a non-Catholic university.* Yet there are various positions, in which a youth's temporal interests seriously suffer, in default of some academical degree recognized by the State. These youths therefore, when Catholic, are almost obliged to seek such degree at London University; and the examinations, to which they are there subjected, present two evils, both serious

---

* F. O'Reilly (p. 180) points out, as we have often pointed out, that actual apostasy is not ordinarily the evil to be dreaded; though even this may be sometimes expected. "The great evil," he says, "to be feared is not apostasy, but a kind of unsoundness which may easily be found in professing Catholics. A certain undesirable class of them are an easy fruit of such training—a class distinguished by doctrinal looseness joined with a very imperfect allegiance to the Church, and, as a necessary consequence, a commenced proclivity towards unbelief. Even those who have been educated at Catholic schools too often become later infected with this pestilence, which is found floating in the moral atmosphere of society. But mixed education is naturally calculated to communicate it, and insert it more deeply; while, on the other hand, the old principles of a sound training will often rise up and assert themselves, and dispel the malady more lately contracted." And he premises a very important remark. "The upholders" of mixed education, he says, "would deplore any considerable number of" actual "*defections* resulting from it; since their favourite scheme would thereby become patently intolerable." We may add that the Devil would still less desire actual apostasy, among the few unhappy Catholic youths e.g. who have been sent *to Oxford*; and would be far from possessing the great craft which is his characteristic, if he did not do his utmost to avert such a result.

though of very unequal magnitude. One of these is the immense variety of studies peremptorily required; no less, as has been said, than all the 'ologies. This is commonly and (we think) very justly regarded by Catholic teachers, as very injurious to the highest type of intellectual training; while with some students it almost operates as an insurmountable barrier against success. A very far more serious evil is one, to which the attention of Catholics has been very frequently drawn: the London *philosophical* questions. The "Month" in particular has done very great service, by descanting on this grievance; and those who would see a vigorous statement of the evils which Catholic teachers experience in having to prepare their pupils for these questions, cannot do better than look back at the number of that periodical for May 1869, from p. 418 to p. 421. We ourselves quoted the passage in July following (pp. 93–95), and pointed out that the writer is avowedly founding his remarks on his own practical experience as a teacher. The same testimony is borne from S. Cuthbert's by Dr. Gillow, in a letter which we published in April 1869 (pp. 527–8). On the other hand it should be remembered, that there is no necessity for passing *in honours* to obtain the London degree. So soon therefore as some Catholic scheme of higher education shall have been organized, those Catholic youths, who require a degree recognized by the State, will doubtless seek *distinction* in the Catholic concursus; and will confine themselves at London to the mere pass.

However, after making the best of it, a serious grievance remains, for which Catholics have a right to expect parliamentary redress. Catholic youths cannot, without grave peril, be subjected to any philosophical examination, which is not sufficiently guaranteed as innocuous by competent Catholic authority. If any satisfactory measure, however, be enacted for Irish higher education, such measure will in all probability be also sufficient to meet English requirements.

Meanwhile it seems to us, that this particular grievance may be made the occasion of real domestic advantage. Our meaning is this. The philosophical questions, proposed at London University, are of such a character, that the student who has worked exclusively at his Catholic authors can often give them no answer at all, one way or other: they are often simply external (one may say) to his line of country. But surely our existing treatises may with great advantage be so *supplemented*, that this shall no longer be the case. Theological science is beyond question more simply divine and more immutable, than philosophical; and yet, even in theological science, Catholics have

always considered it their duty to evolve fresh developments, whenever any important heresy freshly emerges, for the purpose of more directly encountering that heresy. Much more then must this be their appropriate course in the case of philosophy. In England Catholics labour in this respect, we think, under a serious desideratum. Standard philosophical writers—Liberatore, Dmowski, and the rest—write with comparatively little reference to those particular errors, which are now destroying so many souls in England. Most important service then would be done, if some thinker, deeply imbued with true Catholic philosophy, would draw out point by point, and satisfactorily establish, the true Catholic doctrine, on those questions which now agitate men's minds. This however must be considered a digression from our general theme.

We have spoken hitherto exclusively of Catholics. But evidently it is in a very high degree important for the interests of God and the Church, that among non-Catholics also religious education may stand secure, against its envenomed secularist enemies. We do not indeed dream, that any non-Catholic form of Christianity possesses at this day any prospect whatever of permanence. As time advances it will become more and more evident, that thinkers have to choose, between Catholicity on one side and utter scepticism on the other; scepticism as to the very existence of a Personal God, and the very intrinsic distinction between good and evil. But then, when they are compelled to this, their choice will (under God's grace) mainly depend on the amount of religious practice and conviction which they shall have retained. Canon Oakeley accordingly refers all through to "the children of the *nation*" (p. 7), not merely those of the Catholic Church; and begins by explaining, that his argument "is not restricted to any particular form of religious belief." The Archbishop from first to last has an equally extensive scope. Nor can we better conclude this part of our article, than by extracting his exordium:—

> The late changes of the Statute Law, in respect to the national Universities, may be said to have effaced Christianity from the higher culture of our youth. The old Universities, created by the Catholic Church, retained, even after the mutilations of the sixteenth century, a Christian character, and a large remnant of their Christian tradition. The intellectual and moral formation of the youth of these kingdoms, in those higher schools of learning, remained strictly Christian. It is so no longer. Students may pass through those Universities without faith in Christianity, and therefore without formation of the intellect or will by the truths and spirit of the Christian revelation. Worse than this: the mental philosophy there studied is affirmed by *its own* authorities to be both destructive and constructive of faith. Facts *show* that its destructive efficacy is certain, its constructive agency merely

theoretical. The higher culture of England, therefore, has from this time ceased to be Christian. The Christian formation of our youth must henceforward be the private work of individuals. Our great national schools of learning have abandoned the duty.

What will be the harvest of this sowing, when the youth of a nation so trained shall become the heads and fathers of families, the guides of public opinion, the authorities of literature, the ministers of public affairs, the lawgivers of the empire? (pp. 3, 4.)

Seldom certainly has there been a more anxious prospect—never was there imminent a more awfully momentous struggle—than at the present time.

We now cross the Irish Channel, to consider briefly the Catholic educational controversy as it exists in the sister island. Here direction is at once given to our comments, by the exposition which the Irish bishops have authoritatively set forth in their Pastoral. Nothing can be more studiously moderate, than both the contents and the tone of this impressive document. We will at once place before our readers the "demands" which it makes, and to which its preliminary course of argument is directed :—

As to primary education, therefore, we demand :

1st. For all schools which are exclusively Catholic, the removal of all restrictions upon religious instruction, so that the fulness of distinctive religious teaching may enter into the course of daily secular education, with full liberty for the use of Catholic books and religious emblems, and for the performance of religious exercises, and that the right be recognized of the lawful pastors of the children in such schools to have access to them, to regulate the whole business of religious instruction in them, and to remove objectionable books, if any. In such schools the teachers, the books, and the inspectors should all be Catholic.

2ndly. That the public money should never be used in the work of proselytism.

3rdly. That in mixed schools, where the children of any religion would be so few as not to be entitled to a grant for a separate school, stringent conscience clauses should be enforced, so as to guard as far as possible against even the suspicion of proselytism.

4thly. That the existing model schools should be abolished.

5thly. That Catholic training schools, male and female, should be established, in which teachers would be educated, morally and religiously, as well as intellectually, and in accordance with Irish traditions and feelings, for the holy office of teaching the Catholic children of Ireland. The reasonableness of this demand is manifest from the fact, that of the entire number of teachers in Ireland—about 9,000—there are in schools connected with the National Board about 5,700 untrained.

As to *intermediate* education, we demand, that the large public endow-

ments, now monopolized by schools in which you and we have no confidence, and many of which are directly hostile to the Catholic religion, should be taken up by a Commission in which the Catholics of Ireland would have full confidence : that the Commission thus appointed should be merely for financial purposes, and should hold the endowments in question for the benefit of the whole nation, of all the intermediate schools in Ireland without religious distinction, and for the general advancement of middle-class education : that the national fund thus held should be devoted to the encouragement of intermediate education by means of exhibitions open to the competition of all youths under a certain age, and to payment by results to every institution established for middle-class education, the examinations being conducted in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of partiality or of interference with the religious principles of any competitor or of any school.

"As regards higher education" (we repeat the words of the resolutions adopted by the Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland in August, 1869), "since the Protestants of this country have had a Protestant University with rich endowments for 300 years, and have it still, the Catholic people of Ireland clearly have a right to a Catholic University.

"But should her Majesty's Government be unwilling to increase the number of universities in this country, religious equality cannot be realized unless the degrees, endowments, and other privileges enjoyed by our fellow-subjects of a different religion, be placed within the reach of Catholics in terms of perfect equality. The injustice of denying to us a participation in those advantages, except at the cost of principle and conscience, is aggravated by the consideration, that, whilst we contribute our share to the public funds for the support of educational institutions from which conscience warns us away, we have moreover to tax ourselves for the education of our children in our own Colleges and University.

"Should it please her Majesty's Government, therefore, to remove the many grievances to which Catholics are subjected by existing university arrangements, and to establish one national university in this kingdom for examining candidates and conferring degrees, the Catholic people of Ireland are entitled in justice to demand that in such university, or annexed to it,

"(*a*) They shall have one or more colleges, conducted upon purely Catholic principles, and at the same time fully participating in the privileges enjoyed by other colleges of whatsoever denomination or character—

"(*b*) That the university honours and emoluments be accessible to Catholics equally with their Protestant fellow-subjects—

"(*c*) That the examinations and all other details of university arrangement be free from every influence hostile to the religious sentiments of Catholics; and that with this view the Catholic element be adequately represented upon the senate, or other supreme university body, by persons enjoying the confidence of the Catholic bishops, priests, and people of Ireland."

All this can, we believe, be attained by modifying the constitution of the University of Dublin, so as to admit the establishment of a second college within it, in every respect equal to Trinity College, and conducted on purely Catholic principles, in which your bishops shall have full control in all *things regarding* faith and morals, securing thereby the spiritual interests of

your children, placing at the same time Catholics on a footing of perfect equality with Protestants, as to degrees, emoluments, and all other advantages.

Nothing can be more moderate, we say, than these demands. Ireland is a Catholic country: and yet no one exclusive advantage is demanded for Catholics, but on the contrary perfect equality of treatment is asked for all denominations. No claim again is made, that one penny, either of public money or of existing educational endowments, shall be devoted, either to dogmatic instruction, or to the religious accompaniments of secular instruction. Nor, further, is any objection expressed or implied against the State's ascertaining for itself, by full examination, the secular attainments of all students, who receive assistance from either of the above-named sources. What the bishops imply by their silence, F. O'Reilly expressly lays down. "I do not ask the State," he says (p. 199), "to pay a shilling for lessons in catechism." "If those teachers of secular knowledge whom Catholics trust season their instruction to a certain extent with religion, the State will not have to pay for such seasoning. Let the State, if it please, watch the teaching, and see that it is not deficient in secular teaching, for which alone the State pays."

In truth the position of the Irish bishops is so easily intelligible, that nothing shows more clearly the deep anti-Catholic prejudices prevalent in England, than the abundant misconception of their demands which has prevailed. Government desires to advance secular education throughout every class of the community; and the bishops are ready heartily to cooperate with Government for that purpose. On the other hand it is now an universally professed principle in these islands, that there is to be perfect political equality between Catholics and the rest of her Majesty's subjects. The bishops claim therefore at starting, that existing educational endowments, and such further sums as may be given for educational purposes, be devoted to the secular education of *Catholics*, in exact proportion (so far as may be) to the relative *number* of these. But further. It follows by necessary consequence from the fundamental doctrines of Catholicity, that certain branches of study—say particularly philosophy and history—cannot by possibility be *neutrally* pursued; but of necessity must be so imparted, as either importantly to forward, or else grievously to impair, the influence and authority of the Catholic Faith. Moreover, it follows by necessary consequence from the fundamental doctrines of Catholicity, that great religious benefits accrue from the most intimate possible connection of *religion with all* secular education; and indeed that a certain

degree of severance between the two can easily be conceived, which Catholics (consistently such) must regard as so disastrous, that they would be bound to contend against it to the death. Now the last thing the bishops wish is, that Catholics in Ireland should enjoy any political superiority over other denominations. They claim therefore firstly, that a youth of whatever denomination shall have full power, without incurring temporal loss or disadvantage, of pursuing philosophy, history, and other studies similarly circumstanced, in a way fully harmonizing with his own and his parents' religious convictions. And they claim secondly, that every denomination shall have fully as much liberty to mix up religion with every detail of secular education, as is consistent (1) with the equal religious liberty of *other* denominations; and (2) with thorough effectiveness of the secular education given, Government itself being *judge* of that effectiveness.

If the episcopal demands are taken point by point, it will be seen that they are entirely covered by these simple and intelligible principles. There are three particulars, however, on which a few comments may usefully be added from the various essays which we have named at the head of our paper.

Firstly, on the existing "national schools." It would need an entire article, to set forth in full the strange history of these curious institutions; and the doing so would be but very partially relevant to our theme. It will suffice on this head to extract the brief account of that history, set forth by The O'Conor Don in his very valuable and effective pamphlet:—

> Originally started, not as a secular system, but as one under which combined secular and separate religious instruction was to be given, the Irish National system has gradually been gliding into practical denominationalism. It had hardly commenced to work, when the separation for religious instruction began to be a myth. Attempts were then made to have a sort of combined religious instruction on the general truths of Christianity, equally agreeable to all Christian denominations; but this so-called non-sectarian religious instruction was also a failure. Gradually, further modifications were made, in the first instance to please the Presbyterians, by which the schools were recognized as belonging to the members of particular denominations, and the right of the patron to exclude all religious teaching except what he approved of, was acknowledged. Concessions made to one religious body, of course necessitated similar concessions to all. And the history of the progress of the Irish National system of education, as given in the Report of the Royal Commission, demonstrates beyond dispute, that from the very commencement, the overwhelming opinion of the country has forced that system *into* denominational channels. Hence the result is, that a system, never *intended* to be secular, has now, in multitudes of cases, even ceased to be *mixed*. (pp. 25-6.)

Various rules however, which were appropriate enough to the original condition of these schools, continue in force now, when they have become an absurd anachronism; and they operate practically as an injurious restraint on the fulness and freedom of Catholic teaching, while doing no kind of service to any single non-Catholic. It is this to which the first episcopal demand refers; and we will relieve the gravity of our discussion, by the recital of an amusing fact mentioned by The O'Conor Don :—

> An application for a grant was made some time ago on behalf of a convent school in the south of Ireland. In the district where this school was situated, there already existed an ordinary National school, sufficient to supply the wants of any parents who disapproved of Catholic teaching for their children. Upon the application being made, the inspector visited the locality; he found the convent school suitable for receiving a grant, and that there was a sufficient number of exclusively Catholic scholars to justify its being given: but in going over the building he discovered, that the form of a cross had been built in in the wall of the convent school; and for this dreadful offence the grant must be refused. According to the last modifications of the rules of the Commissioners, the cross was a religious emblem. No new grant could be given to a school displaying a religious emblem, and although there happened to be a cross standing prominently erected on the existing National school in the same district, yet the grant must be refused to the new school unless the cross were either removed or concealed from public view. The cross being built in in the walls, to remove it without throwing down the building was impossible. Removed or concealed it should be, and accordingly the following device was resorted to. Another rule of the system is, that over every National school a large board should be placed stating its character. Taking advantage of this, the manager of the convent school had this board hung over the cross so as to conceal it; and the symbol of our redemption having given place to the printed words "National Schools," the grant was immediately made. This grant was given to this school, attended only by Catholic children, taught by religious ladies in religious dress, and as much a denominational school after this little performance respecting the cross, as it was before; and now, no doubt, the children attending this school help to swell the numbers on the rolls of National schools, and assist in proving the success of secular or non-sectarian education in Ireland. (pp. 28-9.)

Our second comment concerns the fourth and fifth episcopal demands; those relating to model schools. "One specially bad feature," says F. O'Reilly,—

> which was being developed, was the particular character of the model and training schools, and against these the bishops protested very loudly and to a considerable degree effectually, not by direct success in moving the Board and the Government, but by keeping Catholics out of these most objectionable establishments. The absence of sufficient training and of model schools

is a loss, and rather a serious one, though a less evil by far than that to be apprehended from the provision made in these respects by the Board. (p. 200.)

Canon Oakeley here adds a fact, which ought to impress the English Government. "The ranks of Fenianism," he says (p. 19), "are known to have been recruited by several teachers in the national schools of Ireland, who had themselves been pupils in the model training schools." The O'Conor Don adds some very pertinent remarks.

It is well to remember that no necessity whatsoever exists for the maintenance of mixed or secular model or training-schools. Individual hardships would no doubt occur, if all the ordinary primary schools were made completely denominational and the protection of a conscience clause withdrawn; but such an argument cannot be applied to the model or training-schools.

There is no reason whatever why there should not be separate training-schools for all denominations, reckoning the secularists or non-sectarians as a denomination. Why should there not be training-schools for the Protestants, the Presbyterians, the Catholics, the Secularists, and every other denomination that could show it had a sufficient number of adherents to justify the establishment of separate schools for its use? This could do no possible injustice to any one, and would be attended with the obvious advantage, that then there would be no reason for employing any but trained teachers in Ireland.

At present it would be impossible to enforce any rule requiring that teachers should be trained, as many managers have conscientious objections against employing teachers who have attended the model schools: and the result is an enormous proportion of untrained teachers presiding over the schools of the country. Were denominational training-schools established, this would be at once altered; and except the foolish idea of keeping up a theoretically mixed system, no reason can be urged against the adoption of such a course. (pp. 35–6.)

Then, thirdly, as to higher education. The O'Conor Don states the Catholic case clearly and succinctly.

Equality can never be brought about, or all penalties removed, except in one or other of two ways—either by equality in endowment, or equality in disendowment. That is what the Catholic people of Ireland seek: nothing more they want, and nothing less ought to satisfy them.

By endowments they understand not alone pecuniary endowments of colleges and universities, but all the advantages possessed by an educational institution sanctioned and chartered by the State. If there are to be colleges pecuniarily endowed, and institutions chartered for granting degrees, those who have conscientious objections against secularism, should have a full share of the endowments and complete participation in the benefits of the charters. If to grant this be an impossibility, if the Irish Catholic, brought up in a *Catholic* college, cannot receive any assistance from the State in attaining *his education*, and cannot obtain a degree in his own country, the secularist

in the secular college must be placed in the same position. If privileges and endowments be taken away from all institutions established for giving education to the higher classes, none can complain of inequality. If the Queen's Colleges and similar institutions be left dependent on voluntary aid for their support, none will have reason to dread their opposition. But as such universal disendowment is not likely to receive the sanction of any party in the State, and is totally opposed to the spirit of the age, a remedy must rather be looked for in the opposite direction, especially as equality can be brought about without this wholesale destruction. The Catholics of Ireland, who object to the non-religious system, have never desired to take away from their Protestant fellow-countrymen, who have equal objections to the same system, the advantages which they enjoy in a Protestant college : they have never desired to deprive those who approve of secular colleges of the advantages of such institutions : they merely ask for similar advantages for themselves ; it is not supremacy, but equality, that has ever been sought.

Various schemes have been proposed by which this equality might be obtained. A new university with a college or colleges attached to it might be established and recognized by the State, or the existing universities might be amalgamated, and a general university for all Ireland established, with colleges belonging to the particular denominations, including as denominations the new sects of secularists and non-sectarians ; or a Catholic college might be founded in connection with the University of Dublin, leaving the Queen's Colleges and University untouched, and interfering as little as possible with Trinity College ; or, on the other hand, although there are many objections to the plan, endowments of particular colleges might be altogether done away with, and endowment of a university substituted, all the rewards and prizes of the university, including scholarships and fellowships, being capable of being held in any recognized college in the country. (pp. 48–50.)

We do not ourselves sympathize with the excellent author's objections against this latter proposal; while on the other hand we entertain one or two objections against it ourselves, which he does not state. On some future occasion we may perhaps enter on this question at length, devoting an article to its exclusive consideration. But one particular mentioned by the bishops is so vitally important, that we cannot possibly here pass it over. They demand—and would betray their trust if they did *not* demand—that "the examinations and every other detail of university arrangement be free from every influence hostile to the religious sentiments of Catholics." If this condition be not most thoroughly attained, any large scheme of higher education would simply be a gigantic tyranny, which Catholics must at all hazards resist. It is the London University *examinations*, which are the standing grievance of English Catholics. It is precisely the Oxford *examinations*—as was abundantly shown before the House of

Lords' Committee—from which issues that hideous unbelief, now paralyzing and degrading the ablest minds in that University. We do not see how this evil can be securely averted from any proposed Irish university without detriment to religious equality, unless every separate denomination—as represented in the supreme governing body—have the power by itself of definitively vetoing every examination-paper, which it shall declare to be objectionable on religious grounds.

There is but one question remaining further to be considered, in order to show the rigorous justice and moderation of the episcopal demands. We willingly admit that, under existing circumstances, Government cannot reasonably be expected to recognize the Irish bishops as *representing* their flock, unless they are truly its *mouthpiece*. Suppose the body of Irish Catholics entertained no abhorrence of mixed education, and were essentially out of sympathy with the episcopal utterance. In that case we should regard them indeed as profoundly imbued with an unbelieving spirit, and as more or less advanced on their road to overt unbelief: but on the other hand we could not constitutionally complain, if Government paid but little attention to the opinion of certain individuals, who "happen"—as an English Protestant would say—to be Catholic bishops. But in real truth no unanimity can well be greater, than the unanimity of Irish Catholics in utterly repudiating and detesting mixed education of every kind. On this head the facts adduced by The O'Conor Don have especial value.

> It is a fact beyond all doubt, that Irish Catholic opinion, as expressed by the representatives in Parliament of Catholic constituencies, is in favour of denominational and opposed to secular education. This statement cannot be called in question for a moment. No candidate seeking the votes of any constituency in which the Catholic element preponderated, would have the most remote chance of being successful if he came forward as the champion of secularism, and the addresses of the candidates at the last general election have only to be looked over to convince any impartial mind of the importance which was attached to a declaration in favour of denominationalism. (p. 18.)
>
> But we are not obliged to rely merely on representation in Parliament for a declaration of these views: they have been publicly professed by other representative bodies throughout the country, by corporations, town councils, by public meetings, by petitions to Parliament, by declarations from the laity. Of course there are some who hold that all these manifestations of public opinion emanate from the same minds, are guided by the same hands, and have no greater force than a declaration from the clergy. This cannot be said at least with respect to the declaration from the laity presented about *two years ago to* the Premier—a declaration signed by nearly all the Catholic

peers, by all the Catholic members of Parliament, by hundreds of the Catholic gentry of the country, and by the most independent, fearless, and talented professional men of the Catholic community. (pp. 19–20.)

These are some of what may be termed the positive proofs of what is the opinion of Catholic Irishmen on this subject. It may be well now to consider the negative proofs. Supposing it to be admitted that Irish Parliamentary representation is, as it is said to be, unworthy of respect, that all the manifestations of opinion from elected councils in Ireland are equally valueless—that the petitions presented to Parliament, and the other declarations, can be traced to the same source, and are nothing more than proofs of clerical opinion; yet is it not fair to ask what proof is given that enlightened, educated Catholic opinion is in an opposite direction? How has that opinion been expressed? by whom has it been expressed? or has there been an opportunity for its expression? Supposing there had been no opportunity for its expression in Parliament, surely this did not debar this highly intellectual class from making known their opinion in other ways, with the great authority of their names stamped to it. *They* might have presented petitions to Parliament; *they might have issued declarations or held meetings, select and private, it may be, but still learned and influential;* they might have passed resolutions declaratory of their views, or formed themselves into associations for upholding their opinions, or in a hundred other ways made their existence felt. Have any of these things been done? Where are the petitions, the declarations, the resolutions, the associations? They have no existence; *there is not one single symptom of vitality in this imaginary body of Catholics.* (pp. 22–3.)

It is true that here and there a few individuals may be found putting forward views of their own in the name of the Catholics of Ireland, but such men constitute the exception, which proves the rule, and have no more authority to speak on behalf of the community to which nominally they belong, than would the most anti-Catholic Protestant in the country.

Neither can it be said that the absence of any expression of opinion in favour of secularism is due to the want of an opportunity for such expression. A most notable opportunity has lately been afforded to those entertaining such opinions for clearly recording them. The National Education League, before alluded to, has lately formed a branch of the association in Ireland, with the avowed object of aiding the promulgation of secularist views, and what has been the result? This association has now been in operation in Ireland for more than a year, and where are the names of the distinguished, intelligent Catholics who have joined it? *We look in vain through the list of its members for the name of any single representative Catholic whatsoever.* Presbyterians, Unitarians, Episcopalians, Protestants of many denominations, have joined it; but the Catholics are conspicuous by their absence. A few solitary individuals representing their own interests or their crotchets, may again be found the exceptions to prove the rule, but intelligent, educated lay Catholicity has stood aloof. The establishment of a branch of the League in Ireland has accomplished one great and good result. It has burst that bubble so long floated before the view of the English public—that there was a *large class of Catholics* in Ireland in favour of secularism; it has tested

the strength of this imaginary party, and has put the climax to the other proofs that the Catholic people of Ireland, rich and poor, educated and uneducated, enlightened and unenlightened, the laity and the clergy, are all agreed in the one great principle, that there must be perfect equality in educational matters for all, irrespective of their conscientious opinions, and that this equality never can be obtained by the extension or exclusive continuance of that mixed or secular system of schools or colleges, against which so many entertain the most decided objections. (pp. 22–4.)

In fact, how is it that in practice the national schools have become so universally denominational? This has happened simply because the Irish of all denominations are so rootedly opposed to mixed education. Even the "Edinburgh Review" is obliged to admit this fact, though the writer consoles himself by venting his spleen in reproaches. "It does not certainly speak much," he says,

"for the independence of the Irish laity, that while in most of the distinctively Catholic countries of the Continent the laity are everywhere repudiating the tyranny of their bishops, and appealing to their governments for the protection of a liberal education, the Roman Catholic gentry and middle classes of Ireland are prepared to allow their clergy to decide the very form in which education shall be given to the whole country." (p. 170.)

Yet, by the writer's own confession, this dislike of mixed education is by no means confined to Catholics.

A change has of late years taken place in the policy or disposition of the Church Education party, so far, at least, as to concede that if denominational education be conceded to them, they will have no objection to Government aid being extended to the denominational schools of Catholics. Even the venerable Bishop of Ossory intimated to the Royal Commission on Primary Education his willingness to give schools under Catholic management all he asked for schools under the Church Education Society, just as the Roman Catholic bishops do not object to exclusively Protestant schools on condition they shall have schools equally exclusive for themselves. This makes their demand *all the more plausible* and dangerous. (p. 178.)

Never then was there a more shamelessly tyrannical language, than that of the Edinburgh Reviewer, echoed by so many Englishmen, declaring that education shall not (as they phrase it) be surrendered to the priests. It is a principle of the Catholic religion, that on such matters as education the priests (acting under their bishops and the Holy See) are the laity's divinely-appointed rulers and guides. The Edinburgh Reviewer then declares in effect, that Irish Catholics shall never be permitted, without incurring most serious temporal disadvantage, to receive that education, which is required by the principles of their religion. See F. O'Reilly's admirable

remarks in pp. 181–2. Irish Catholics forsooth are to be deprived of political equality, for no other offence than that of adhering to what they regard as involved in the fundamental doctrines of their faith. Catholics as such—this is in effect the Edinburgh Reviewer's amazing language—shall be allowed full political equality: but only on condition that they be inconsistent and hardly more than nominal Catholics; only on condition that they violate what they themselves regard as a fundamental principle of their religion. So in effect talks many an Englishman; and then he is amazed, and cannot adequately express his indignation, that Irish Catholics are disaffected to the rule of such as *him*.

Comment altogether similar may be made, on a perfectly childish remark of the Edinburgh Reviewer (p. 179) concerning Philip II. of Spain and Mary I. of England; and concerning the expediency of inflicting some heavy political blow on such religionists as defend these well-known historical characters. In days such as these—when it is thought uncharitable to treat the very existence of a Personal God as other than an open question—here is a new dogmatical test, devised by the soi-disant liberal organ. It may almost be expressed like the dogmatic canon of some council. "If any man shall hereafter deny, that suppression of heresy by the secular arm is under all circumstances evil and reprehensible,—let him be ipso facto politically excommunicate." But indeed, as regards the whole article, we are surprised that a periodical of such high pretensions as the "Edinburgh" should have inserted so weak and silly a contribution on so grave a subject.

The fact is, that several English public men are less prepared to treat Catholics justly, than they were (say) some thirty years ago. This circumstance originates, we think, in the fearful declension of religious belief, which is now so rapidly proceeding. For one man who expressly disbelieves the divine origin of Christianity (and the number of *these* is large enough) there are a hundred or a thousand, who have lost the power of firmly believing any doctrine whatever concerning the invisible world. To all these men, the dogmatic certainty of Catholics is of course intensely distasteful; and the Catholic priesthood is the most unmitigatedly odious of existing tyrannies. Professor Huxley, it will be remembered, has come forward as leader of the anti-Catholic—which is in effect an antitheistic—crusade. He nominally refers to the "*ultramontane section*" of "the Roman Catholic Church"; but only as distinguishing that "section" from "those liberal bodies," of which Dr. Döllinger is the representative. He "does not consider it liberal to tolerate anything which"

—like the Catholic doctrinal system—"stands against the interests of mankind"; and "if he were in power he would *withhold*" all "*aid*" to its "organization." In other words, he would refuse to assist even the secular education of Catholics, unless that education were conducted on anti-Catholic principles.

We are by no means clear however, that such views will extend very widely. We have reason to believe that far the larger portion of English liberals sincerely regret this outburst.* However increasingly liberals may dislike Catholicity —and they will probably come yearly to dislike it more and more—it does not follow that they will so utterly abandon the first principles of liberalism, as Professor Huxley has done. But let the worst come to the worst—in the present day there is a limit to what can be done by the bitterest enemies of true religion. We do not speak of the distant future which no man can foresee, but of what is now speedily to be expected. And what we say is this. Under such circumstances as those of the present and immediate future, there is on the one hand no hope that English Catholics will receive full justice; still, on the other hand, by skilful political action and political alliances, they will be able in no inconsiderable degree to save themselves from injury. Nay, they may take their part with others in aggressive action; in inflicting positive blows on the advance of that secularism, which is the predominant evil influence of this time. They may be subject doubtless to serious disasters and reverses; but they have, in the immediate future, no actual *overthrow* to dread from the political chances of war. They will retain much which is well worthy of energetic political struggle.

A far more serious political question however arises, when we turn our eyes to Ireland. Secularism has made no way whatever in Ireland; nor is it likely to do so in a Catholic country, wherein the laity are so heartily loyal to the episcopacy and the priesthood, while these in their turn are so heartily loyal to the Holy See. If Ireland were only left alone, all parties would eagerly agree in a purely denominational system of education, based on absolute religious equality. *All the Irish educational difficulties arise exclusively from English interference.* On what *principle* does England claim to interfere?

---

* Miss Helen Taylor, Mr. Mill's step-daughter, wrote a reply, in the "Fortnightly Review" of last December, to an article of Professor Huxley's on the general subject, which had appeared in the preceding number of that *periodical.* Mr. Herbert Spencer also, in the same December number, expressed dissent from Professor Huxley.

We can here do no more than most briefly indicate, what seems to us among the most momentous political issues of the time. There are two fundamentally different methods of government—each thoroughly legitimate in its place—which may be called respectively the "constitutional" and the "tutorial." Englishmen e.g. are governed "constitutionally." The English statesman's ideas, on the fundamental principles and rules of social and individual morality, are those of his countrymen; and he appeals to those principles at every turn, when he recommends his policy to their acceptance. On the other hand *India* is governed, and rightly governed, "tutorially." The English statesman knows himself to stand on an indefinitely higher platform of .intelligence and civilization than do the Hindoos; and his very end is, by benevolent despotic government, to train them towards what is higher. This, as we have said, is his one legitimate attitude towards such as the Hindoos. But it is very plain that, when a nation is fit to be governed "constitutionally," there can be no more stinging and hopelessly exasperating insult, than that its rulers should set up the pretension of governing it "tutorially."

Now, rightly or wrongly, the enormous majority of Irishmen regard England as inflicting on them this insult; and here, we believe, far more than anywhere else, lies the real root of Irish disaffection. They are under an impression, that the normal Englishman feels towards them, not as he feels towards other Englishmen, but rather somewhat as he feels towards Hindoos. They do not accuse every individual English statesman of this; there is this or that individual on either side of the house—Mr. Disraeli no less than Mr. Gladstone—from whom "constitutional" treatment may undoubtedly be expected. But then they think that if such a statesman put into practice his just intentions, he would be thrust from office by the anti-Catholic tyranny of English public opinion.

We will not attempt, at the fag end of an article, to pursue the various speculations, both ethical and political, here suggested: on this part of the matter we will content ourselves with saying, that of all existing peoples Englishmen are the very last, who would *endure* to be governed, as Irishmen suspect them of wishing to govern Ireland. We heartily hope that Irishmen are mistaken in their suspicion; at least as regards the extent to which they carry it. At all events we would earnestly press on Englishmen, that they have now an opportunity, such as they have never had before and are never likely to have again, of promoting harmony between the two countries. We firmly believe that an opportunity is now

offered them for conciliating Ireland, which, while far more powerful than any other could be, calls for no sacrifice whatever but for mere justice. Hitherto all the Irish educational projects have been accompanied with some unavowed English aim, at lessening Irishmen's belief in their religion and docility to their priests. Let all such sinister intentions be put aside; and let that which is the British Government's professed object—the advancement of secular education—be in real truth exclusively pursued. Irishmen desire no more than this; but they will not be, and ought not to be, content with less.

Art. IX.—THE GOTHIC REVIVAL.

A History of the Gothic Revival. By Charles L. Eastlake, F.R.I.B.A., Architect. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

(Communicated.)

[Our readers will be glad to see both sides defended of a question so thoroughly open as that treated in the following article; especially when the argument is expressed with such singular moderation and temperance as by our present contributor. On some future occasion we hope we may publish some argument for the opposite conclusion to that here maintained; for there are many zealous Catholics who on every ground think the Italian style more suitable than the Gothic for English ecclesiastical architecture.]

MOST works which have been written upon the vexed question of the "Revival of Gothic Architecture" are so narrow-minded, so bitter and acrimonious in their tone, and so obstinately insist upon regarding "Gothic" as the *only* Christian architecture, that it is difficult to read them without the loss of one's temper. The work before us, however, is certainly not open to this censure, for although Mr. Eastlake makes use of every reasonable and legitimate argument which can be brought forward in favour of Gothic architecture, not a single spiteful or irritable expression is to be found in the whole book. The tone used is most temperate, and the language courteous towards men who hold views opposed to those advocated by the author; but notwithstanding this, the cause of Gothic architecture is most ably advocated and pleaded by one who has great knowledge of the subject.

Mr. Eastlake is a member of the extreme "High Church" party in the Establishment, and of course his views are to a

large extent tinctured by the opinions of the party to which he belongs. But at the same time he displays such a thorough knowledge of the various questions which have agitated Catholics, and such an acquaintance with Catholic ritual and the history of architecture amongst us for the last half-century, that his book is not only exceedingly interesting, but also remarkably instructive to all who take an interest in the subject of church-building.

I shall not attempt to enter into Mr. Eastlake's arguments in favour of the use of Gothic architecture for general purposes, but shall confine myself to that portion of his work which bears more immediately upon the vexed question: "What is the most suitable architecture for modern Catholic churches?"

Now, the first argument which we meet with in favour of the use of Gothic architecture for modern Catholic ecclesiastical purposes is based upon the fact that a Catholic bishop, Dr. Millner, was one of the very earliest "revivers" of that style, for Mr. Eastlake tells us that Dr. Millner chose Mr. John Carter for the architect of his chapel at Winchester, for the following reason, which we give in Dr. Millner's own words:—

> I know of one man (Mr. J. Carter) who is eminently qualified to direct any work of this nature [the erection of a Gothic church], and who, without either an original or a copy to look at, could sit down and make a pure and perfect drawing for any kind of building in the Pointed style, from a monument to a cathedral, according to any one of its different periods. But this architect . . . . . is so inflexibly strict in adhering to ancient rules and practice that he would not build for a prince who should require the slightest deviation from them.

Dr. Millner wrote this in the year 1792, when Gothic architecture was unknown for ecclesiastical purposes, and gave it as his reason for employing Mr. Carter. In other words, the went out of his way to employ the most obstinate and uncompromising Gothic architect that could then be found, and that at a time when Italian architecture was universally in use for Catholic purposes. Now I do not express an opinion whether Dr. Millner was right or wrong, but here is a positive proof that Gothic architecture was re-introduced into this country for Catholic churches by a most learned and pious bishop; and this furnishes me with my first argument in favour of the use of that style.

A second argument in favour of the use of Gothic architecture, and one which Mr. Eastlake alludes to in the work before us, is *the fact that it is* the only architecture which Christianity

has itself invented. I do not say that it is the only Christian architecture, but that it is the only architecture originated by Christianity. A third argument is, that for ecclesiastical works Gothic is the most popular architecture; a fourth, that it is the most elastic and adaptable; a fifth, that it is in nearly universal use at the present time; a sixth, that it is the most economical architecture ever invented.

Now in order to deal fairly with this question, let us see what arguments are or can be urged against Gothic architecture for the purposes to which we have alluded. In the first place people will tell us that it is "anti-Roman and shows a want of attachment to Rome." Secondly, that Gothic churches are cut up with columns, and are devoid of spaciousness. Thirdly, that they are dark; fourthly, that they are cold; and fifthly, that is difficult to see the altar from all parts of them, on account of the aisles being separated from the nave by columns.

Now if the first of these objections is a true one, that Gothic churches are anti-Roman, and the contrary a truth, that Roman architecture shows a certain feeling of union with Rome, Dr. Millner, who re-introduced Gothic architecture into this country, and did all he could to abolish the then popular Italian style, was guilty of something very like schism. In fact that great and pious prelate, who spent his life in opposing Cis-Alpinism, and whose noble heart was well-nigh broken in fighting the cause of Rome, was building up with one hand and throwing down with the other.

Again, the Dutch Catholics, who in proportion to their numbers did more than any other people in the world to preserve the temporal power of the Holy Father, must be terribly anti-Roman in their sympathies, for in nearly every town in Holland Catholic churches are being erected, and I do not know of one which is not Gothic. The new churches at Amsterdam, Breda, Eyndhoven, Alkmaar, Vechel, Sneek, Bodgraven, and Wijk are noble and stately Gothic churches, some of them worthy to be cathedrals for their size and magnificence.

What, again, is to be said of Mgr. Martin, Bishop of Paderborn—the very leader of the Ultramontane party in Germany—the bishop who of all others has brought down upon his head the execrations of the Döllingerites and "Liberals" for his attachment to the Holy See, and who at the same time has appointed as diocesan architect, Mr. Guldenpfennig, the most accomplished, but at the same time the most ultra-Gothic, architect in all Germany? and what is Mr. Guldenpfennig doing by the desire and under the direction of the *most ultramontane* bishop in all Germany? He is actually

removing every single Italian or Roman feature out of the cathedral and many churches in that diocese, and replacing them by pure mediæval Gothic ones. Take, for instance, the high altar of the cathedral at Paderborn—the great Roman *baldacchino* and altar have been removed, and a Gothic altar of the purest fourteenth century type erected in its place; and this has been done at the express desire and partly at the expense of Mgr. Martin.

Again, where will you find more enthusiastic admirers and patrons of Gothic architecture than the Archbishop of Malines and the Bishop of Poitiers? Or cross the Atlantic, and see what the American Catholics are doing. Italian architecture is there hardly known for ecclesiastical purposes. Even in Rome itself the only new church which has been *completed* of late years is Gothic. I refer to the Redemptorist church. Yet in the face of all this I am told that the use of Italian architecture in our churches is a sign of attachment to the Holy See, and the use of Gothic the reverse. To my mind this argument is more objectionable than that which used to be advanced by the ultra-Gothic school, *i.e.*, that Gothic is alone the *Christian* style of architecture; for the latter has some shadow of truth, inasmuch as Gothic is a *truly Christian* architecture, while the former argument has not the slightest foundation, and bears in itself an insinuation which is most unjust, and even un-Catholic inasmuch as it raises a mere opinion into a matter of discipline, if not an article of faith, a thing which the Catholic Church never has and never will tolerate. It is as absurd to say that attachment to the Holy See is shown by building churches in the Italian style, as it would be to suppose that attachment to the Holy See would be shown by speaking Italian instead of one's native language in ordinary discourse.

I will now pass on to the second objection, which is frequently raised against Gothic churches—"That they are cut up with columns," and are wanting in spaciousness. Now in order to prove the incorrectness of this assertion, I have simply to mention the fact that the largest churches in Europe which are unsupported by columns and which are entirely *without* aisles, are Gothic buildings. They are the cathedrals of Alby and Angers in France; and one of these noble churches is more than seventy feet wide internally, and the other is nearly sixty; and more dignified and superb churches are not to be found in Europe. Again, the Cathedrals of Cahors and Angoulême, though not so large as the two former, are Gothic buildings on a grand scale, entirely without columns. We may also *name the churches* of La Trinité at Angers, of the Domi-

nicans at Gand (now desecrated), as excellent examples of what can be done in the way of single-span Gothic churches. Again, the vast naves of the cathedrals at Tarragona in Spain (eighty feet wide), and of the cathedral at Laval, are in one span and without columns. Or if we turn our attention to modern buildings, the New Catholic church of S. Willibrord at Amsterdam has a nave which is sixty feet wide between the columns, a width which surpasses that of any Italian church in Europe, with the exception of S. Peter's, Rome, and S. Michael's, Munich. If any one is still unconvinced, let him take the ground-plan of any Italian church and compare it with the ground-plan of any Gothic church. Take, for instance, S. Peter's, Rome, and the Cathedral of Cologne, and he will find that at S. Peter's the columns and supports cover about one-third of the entire superficial area, whereas in the Gothic churches they occupy only about one-fifth. And this is equally the case with small churches. Of course I know that Gothic churches are to be found which are crowded with columns; but I maintain that it is not a peculiarity of the style, and that, as a rule, Italian churches (especially those which have domes) are more open to this objection than Gothic ones.

I now have to deal with the third and fourth objections which are commonly advanced against Gothic churches,—that they are *dark* and *cold*. I utterly deny the truth of these accusations; and I say without hesitation that no churches are so light as Gothic ones, and for this reason, if for no other, that Gothic architecture is essentially a *window* style; that the distinctive periods of Gothic architecture are known and marked chiefly by the windows; that Gothic architecture is the only style in which the windows are made prominent features in the design. Indeed, some Gothic churches have scarcely any wall-space at all, but are nearly all window. Take, for instance, S. Ouen, Rouen, or the cathedral at Metz, or the choir of the cathedral at Aix-la-Chapelle; and so with many of the Norfolk and Suffolk churches. And then how about the windows in Italian churches? They are features to be avoided as much as possible. They are kept out of sight whenever it can be managed. They are few and far between. Take, for instance, S. Peter's, Rome, or S. Paul's, London. The former, although under a brilliant sky, is essentially a *dark* church; and the latter, with all its beauty and dignity, is like a cellar; it is, in fact, the darkest cathedral in England. To prove this, I may mention the fact that it is the only cathedral in England the interior of which it has been found impossible to photograph!

With regard to the coldness of Gothic churches there may

be some slight reason in this objection, because of course a church which is full of windows, and consequently a very light building, will naturally be rather cold in effect; and I think that the present practice of placing western doorways without any atrium or external porch in small churches has done much to strengthen this objection. However, there can really be no more difficulty in heating a Gothic than a Roman church. As to the difficulty of seeing the altar in Gothic churches, which is a point so frequently urged, of course the altar can never be thoroughly seen by all the congregation in any building which has aisles; and as most large churches have aisles, there must be some portion of the congregation so placed. But is there, it may be asked on the other hand, any Roman church in which people sitting in the aisles can see the high altar so well as can those who attend the pro-cathedral church at Kensington? While upon this subject, it is as well to refer to the advisability of retaining that much-abused feature of church furniture the rood-screen. Of course the kind of rood-screen which obscures the view of the altar must be given up, but I see no reason why such screens as those of S. Lawrence, Nuremberg, Lubeck Cathedral, the Madaleine at Troyes, S. Etienne du Mont at Paris, and the Sistine Chapel, and others we could name, which are merely ornamented arches bearing the rood with its attendant figures, should not be retained or copied in our modern churches, for they are not open to the usual objections against chancel screens, as they in no way obscure the view of the altar, but are beautiful and symbolical articles of church furniture. In other words I am in favour of retaining the rood-beam and the rood but not the screen. However, I do not see that there is much to be objected to in those light metal grylles which are to be found in many of the Spanish cathedrals and in the cathedrals of Erfurth and Ratisbon in Germany, or some of the churches in Schwäbisch-Gmünd in Würtemberg, all of which are so slight that they impart a look of intricacy and sacredness to the sanctuary without giving that isolated appearance which is so painful to some. The ordinary altar-rail is a mean and paltry feature, and gives no look of protection or sacredness to the sanctuary. Now, marble or stone screens, such as are to be seen in the pro-cathedral at Kensington or the Italian church in Hatton Wall, are far preferable; and these, with a rood *beam* high above them, would, to my mind, satisfy all requirements, and could not be objected to by the most fastidious. In great monastic churches it is a question whether the ancient practice of having a great rood-screen with a high altar for the people in front of it and a choir altar

behind it is not a good practice. This was the case at Durham, and was kept up at the cathedral at Munster, in Westphalia, until the year before last, when the magnificent rood-screen and altar for the people was destroyed. And what is the consequence? The high mass is now sung at an altar removed 150 feet from the nearest of the congregation, who can neither see nor hear as well as they did under the old arrangement. At Hildesheim the ancient plan is still carried out, and all masses for the people are said or sung at an altar *in front* of the rood-screen, the choir and clergy remaining to the rear of the screen; but all masses or services which are exclusively clerical are sung from the altar behind the rood-screen; and this seems to us such an excellent plan that I regret its disdiscontinuance at Munster and other ancient churches in Germany. Such an arrangement was evidently common in England before the Reformation, as can be seen from the ancient drawings of Canterbury and Durham Cathedrals and S. Alban's Abbey, all of which had great altars in front of the rood-screens as well as in the choir behind.

I must here for a moment return to the arguments which we have advanced in favour of Gothic architecture; in order to make one or two observations upon the two last, namely, that Gothic architecture is in almost universal use at the present time, and that Gothic churches are the most economical. Now, with regard to the first of these, I have already adverted to the fact that Gothic architecture is universally used in Holland, Germany, and America. And in France the only churches which are not Gothic are those in Paris, which have been erected under the immediate direction of Baron Haussman, to which the celebrated Père Felix has given the appropriate appellation of "warehouses for prayer."

With regard to the question of economy, I know as a positive fact that Italian churches cost at least double as much as Gothic ones, and if that noble and distinctive feature of Italian architecture the dome is added and properly constructed, the cost of an Italian church is from three to five times as great as that of a Gothic one. As a proof of this I have been furnished by Mr. Goldie, the architect of the pro-cathedral at Kensington, with the following particulars concerning two churches which he has recently erected,—the church of S. Francis, at Richmond in Yorkshire, and the church of S. Elizabeth and S. John, Great Ormond-street, London. The first of these is Gothic, the latter Italian; both have about the same amount of ornament about them, but the Gothic church is entirely of stone, while the Italian one is of brick with a stone front. Now the Gothic church at Richmond

covers a superficial area of 4,588 feet, and has cost £2,800, whilst the Italian church in Great Ormond-street covers an area of 2,062 feet, and has cost £3,600, or, when the different sizes of the buildings is taken into consideration, almost exactly three times as much as the Gothic one. Of course the furniture and fittings are not included; for if that were the case, the Italian church would be found to have cost more than four times as much as the Gothic one. And notwithstanding this I have no hesitation in saying that nine people out of ten would be found to prefer the Gothic to the Italian church, although Great Ormond-street is certainly the best specimen of Roman architecture that has been produced by Catholics in London, if not in England. I do not wish it for one moment to be supposed that I am writing *against* Italian architecture; on the contrary, I can conceive no more glorious temple erected to the honour of Almighty God than a great Italian church, with its sublime dome reared high above a sumptuous *baldacchino*, with its marble-faced walls and brilliantly reflective pavement, its splendid pictures and costly altars, its bronze capitals and its gilded vault. Truly this is a noble vision, but, alas! how often has it ever been realized! and what chance is there of its ever being realized again? This is what an Italian church ought to be; but what are most of our so-called Italian churches? Long, ill-shaped, badly-proportioned rooms, with rows of sash-windows on either side, with a flat ceiling and painted deal altars, with boarded floors and plaster walls. And *this* is what we have the presumption to call an "Italian church"! But it may be said, At least we might attempt to imitate the Italian churches of the last century, which were chiefly decorated with plaster-work. The simple answer is, Try it; just attempt to put up twenty square yards of such a plaster ceiling as that over the side-chapels in S. Pietro in Montorio, Rome, or the cathedrals of Hildesheim or Würzburg, in Germany, and after you have made the attempt you will probably come to the conclusion that it would be far cheaper to vault a church in marble. Who that is acquainted with the history of art can for a moment suppose that these stucco decorations were used for the sake of economy? The fact is that they were chiefly used by the Prince Bishops in Germany or in the more wealthy parts of Italy, and they are the most costly style of ornamentation ever invented, and simply for this reason, that when a beautiful and delicate material like marble or bronze is used, a very simple treatment will satisfy the eye, which is rather more attracted and captivated by the beauty of the material itself than the design of the artist; but when plaster is used, as there is nothing in the slightest degree

attractive either to the eye or the mind in the material, an excessively artistic treatment is required; and this is what was aimed at, and sometimes with tolerable success, in the last century; that is to say, it is successful where really first-rate artists have been employed, but is contemptible and abominable where second-rate men were employed. And what chance have we now of getting such work well done when we cannot get an ordinary domestic ceiling properly executed in stucco. We have said it would be cheaper to get a church vaulted in marble than to put up a plaster ceiling like those of the German and Italian churches of the last century. Indeed it would be as cheap to vault your church in gold, and for this reason, that both would be impossible.

Now with Gothic churches we have none of these difficulties. They may be built of the most ordinary materials, they may be excessively plain, they may be erected for a very low sum of money, and yet be ecclesiastical in character, durable, convenient, and devotional. There are only two things which Gothic architecture will not allow, and those are false construction and cheap showy decoration. Mr. Eastlake finds great fault, and *justly so*, with us English Catholics on this head. He says, "Since the Cardinal's death there has been a manifest evidence of a desire amongst Roman Catholics to return to the Pointed architecture for their churches, schools, and convents; but *unfortunately the demand for cheap showy buildings has not abated*, and the consequence is that in this direction the artistic aspect of the Revival has not improved." Now, I commend the study of this passage to all Catholic architects, and also to their employers, who are generally more to blame than the architects, because they want too much for their money. They should remember this maxim —a cheap church may be a good church, but if so it must be a plain church. Surely it is absurd to insist upon marble columns to support *plaster* arches, to have carved capitals and thin walls. We shall never obtain a true architecture of any kind when we erect our churches upon this "all-for-show" principle.

Amongst the faults committed by our Catholic architects, Mr. Eastlake mentions "shallow chancels." Now, all Catholics who take an interest in our ritual must thank Mr. Eastlake for pointing out this outrageous defect in our modern Catholic churches. When will our architects learn that a chancel should not be a recess to hold an altar, or a small adjunct thrown out at the end of the nave of a church, but the *most* important and most dignified portion of the whole building?

I know of at least four new churches where the clergy

are desirous of placing the choir in its proper position, in front of the altar, but it is impossible to carry out this excellent intention because the architects of these churches have made the chancels only just large enough to hold the priest and his attendant ministers. Now each of these churches is built in the Gothic style! And if there is one feature more than another which strikes one in studying the ancient churches of this country, it is the extraordinary size of the chancels. The real fact is, that the ancient churches of England are far more "*Roman*" in arrangement than the modern ones. Let us hope that the expulsion of female singers from our choirs, and the probable establishment of surpliced choirs in front of the altar, may suggest to our Catholic architects that it is worth their while to give some small amount of study to the chancels of their churches, and not to treat them as if they were an afterthought or a portion of the building to be ashamed of.

I have here pleaded for the use of Gothic architecture for church purposes; but do not let it be thought that I am advocating the revival of Gothic architecture as an *end*. I only advocate it as the one *existing* architecture most suited to our needs, hoping in the mean time that the future will invent or develop a style of its own. How far the Catholic Church may take the initiative in this development or invention it is impossible to say; for it must not be supposed that because in the Middle Ages the Catholic Church produced Gothic architecture, that in the age of the *Renaissance* she directed and sanctified the works of the great painters and sculptures of that age, that she will do so again. For it must never be forgotten that when the Church was most glorious in the earlier stage of history, she had no art and no literature; and although it is true that in later times she made use of architecture, painting, sculpture, music, and poetry to carry out her great aim—the salvation of souls; that although she made use of and sanctified all the great works of genius; that she inspired a Dante, a Palestrina, a Raphael, a Michael Angelo, and a William of Wickham, and thousands of others whose marvellous works are the wonder and admiration of our day;—yet when men come to adore the works themselves instead of God who inspired them, when men come to worship the mere garments in which the Church has decked herself, she may cast these away and clothe herself in others which may be even repulsive to our æsthetic tastes. But the true Catholic will be like the faithful wife in the German story, who recognized her lord and husband when he came to her in rags; for she "looked not on his garments, but into his

face." Perhaps it is as well that Catholics should be prepared to regard the possibility that the Church of the future may be without art and even without literature. But she will still be the Holy Roman Church; and though others may excel her in all that appeals to our external senses, she will alone rule the hearts and wills of men. What was said by a great poet of Rome will then be true of her, and in a higher sense than that poet ever could have foreseen or imagined.

> Excudent alii spirantia mollius æra,
> Credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore vultus;
> Orabunt causas melius; cœlique meatus
> Describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:
> Tu regere imperio populos, Romane memento:
> Hæ tibi erunt artes; pacisque imponere morem,
> Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.

Amongst living architects Mr. Eastlake mentions with especial commendation the works of Messrs. Street, Butterfield, Bodley, Norman Shaw, Nesfield, Brooks, and Waterhouse; and he devotes a chapter to Mr. Pugin, and one to living Catholic architects, in which great praise is bestowed upon the churches, convents, and schools erected by Messrs. Clutton, Goldie, Nichol, Nillson, Bentley, Hadfield, C. Hanson, and Buckler. Ample descriptions are given of many works recently erected, or in progress, from the designs of these gentlemen, and careful engravings on wood represent Mr. Hadfield's Cathedral, at Salford; the doorway of Mr. Goldie's Pro-Cathedral, at Kensington, and Convent of S. Scholastica, at Teignmouth; Mr. Bentley's Baptistry of St. Francis Church, Notting Hill; and amongst numerous other engravings is one representing the interior of S. Augustine's Church, Ramsgate. A large portion of Mr. Eastlake's book is taken up with a most interesting history of the domestic architecture of this country; and Mr. Eastlake certainly proves most distinctly, that although Gothic architecture during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was entirely given up for ecclesiastical purposes, it seems never to have been entirely abandoned for domestic buildings, and this fact leads Mr. Eastlake to the conclusion that Gothic architecture never positively disappeared out of the country. For it can be traced down to our own time, and the links of this chain are well supplied by Mr. Eastlake, who, after alluding to the many fine Gothic mansions of the time of James I. and Charles I., and giving as examples of the Gothic work of this date the second quadrangle of St. John's College, Oxford, the hall of Trinity College and Oriel

College, mentions the celebrated "Tom Tower" of C
Church College, Oxford, which was not completed u
the year 1682. From this time to the year 1753, whe
Walpole commenced Strawberry Hill, few Gothic buildings appear to have been erected, and yet the tradition was not quite lost, for Mr. Eastlake alludes to the towers of St. Michael's Cornhill, erected in 1722, and the east side of the quadrangle of Hampton Court Palace, which bears the date 1732. During the last century, although Gothic architecture underwent all kinds of degradation, it never entirely disappeared, especially for domestic purposes, for it can be traced from the erection of Strawberry Hill, 1753-1776, to 1786, in which year Beeston Hall, Norfolk, was erected, then to 1771, in which year Milton Abbey, in Dorsetshire, was commenced. In 1796, the notorious Beckford commenced Fonthill Abbey, and Mr. Eastlake tells us,—"Beckford himself stated that the entire cost of Fonthill Abbey was over £273,000." This building appears to have been to a great extent copied from St. Augustine's, Canterbury, and although its architecture was degraded and debased, yet it served to hand down the tradition of Gothic architecture to our time. The next mansion of importance to which Mr. Eastlake alludes, is Ashbridge, in Buckinghamshire, which was commenced in the year 1808. Next in point of date is Eaton Hall, in 1814, and from that time until the present, Gothic mansions have continually increased. This is an exceedingly well written and interesting portion of Mr. Eastlake's work, and I regret the limit of space which forbids my doing more justice to it.

H. W. B.

Notices of Books.

Sermons on Ecclesiastical Subjects. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. Second Volume. Burns & Oates. 1872.

THIS present volume of sermons is a continuation of the former series, issued from the press of the late Mr. Duffy in 1869. In both, the Archbishop has collected and printed in chronological order the single sermons preached by him on various incidental occasions during a period ranging from 1852 down to the Feast of S. Edmund in last year. It need hardly be pointed out how interesting, from an historical point of view, if only from that, must be such volumes as these. The twenty years named comprise an important period of time, and one upon which the future ecclesiastical historian of these islands will be glad to linger. From the first Provincial Council of Westminster to the General Council of the Vatican much has occurred which has laid deep foundations for the faith of the next generation, when it comes to occupy our place. And of these events the thirteen sermons in the Archbishop's first volume, and the fourteen in the second, present a record and, so to speak, a gauge. The latter volume may perhaps be said to differ from the former in this, that the occasions on which the sermons were delivered were, with one exception, of a more domestic character. They were the opening of churches, the anniversaries of saints' days, the sending forth of missioners to the heathen from a College: occasions of very real interest, and, in the case last mentioned, of wide and important promise, but still comparatively private when measured against the larger outlines of a provincial Synod.

The exception to this remark is formed by a most touching and at the same time graphic funeral sermon at the solemn requiem of the late Cardinal. This, indeed, is an historical sketch of high importance. The life of Cardinal Wiseman bridged over the interval between the old ecclesiastical system of vicars apostolic in England and the restoration of the hierarchy, with all its results, within seven years ago. The Bishop of Melipotamus at Oscott, and the Prince of the Church, who was borne to his grave with what might be described as a metropolitan funeral in which London shared, had lived a life of which the earlier portion could little presage the latter. But it was not only that external public events had moved on during the years so occupied. They had been in no slight degree directed by his capacious intellect and power of appreciation,—qualities that, in turn, were put in motion by his warm, generous-hearted sympathy. "There are men," said the ex-Emperor of

the French in one of his addresses, "who do not understand their epoch." The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster was certainly not of these; and we think the sketch of his mind and life presented to us in the ninth sermon of the volume under notice will be that to which many readers will turn with as lively interest as to any of the series. "His mission," says the Archbishop of his great predecessor, "was to England in the nineteenth century, and to the most critical period of that century for us. . . . . As the crisis had been preparing for him, so he had been prepared to meet it." Spaniard by birth and early tradition, Englishman in the thoughtful, studious training of his first youth, Roman from the age of sixteen till, in maturity of years and ecclesiastical cultivation, he was sent to the home mission which was to receive a deep impress from his mind and writings, Nicolas Wiseman derived from these various sources the combination of gifts which made his career so distinguished in itself, so useful to his age. And the traits of that eminent life are here touched, in the Sermon entitled by the author, from the Cardinal's own motto, "Omnia pro Christo," with an appreciative and discriminating hand.

In this and in other Sermons of the volume, which treat of S. Vincent de Paul and S. Edmund of Canterbury, the Archbishop has shown a biographical and historical power of representation which make us regret that his grace has not increased our debt to him in this department. A more extended monograph of some one Saint, or eminent ecclesiastical character, from the pen which gives us "The Apostolate of S. Vincent," "The Mission of S. Alphonsus," and "S. Edmund's Heirloom," would have been a valuable addition to our hagiology. But time and life are limited; and we must not expect that an existence devoted to bearing the heavy pastoral burden which has been entrusted to him should afford large opportunity for what the French call the *Apostolat littéraire*. Rather, we may be thankful for these products of the fragments of leisure left free from the pressure of hourly cares. We accept such volumes, then, as successive instalments of a total that swells with years to no inconsiderable amount.

We must not fail to notice, as of especial interest, three Sermons occurring towards the end of the volume, and entitled "Our Duty to the Heathen," "Missions to the Heathen a Test of Love," and "The Negro Mission." These were all elicited by various events connected with S. Joseph's College of the Sacred Heart for Foreign Missions, recently built and opened near Hendon. The opening of the Church, a collection in the Church of the Immaculate Conception for the completion of the college-buildings, and, finally, the departure of the first band of priests trained there for their mission to the negroes of the United States, presented occasions for the development of the whole doctrine of the Church's missions to heathen lands. This is a subject which various circumstances combine to render interesting and momentous to English Catholics. Interesting, because of the part which England formerly took in the slave trade, and from the extent of her colonial empire; momentous, on account of the responsibility incurred under both these counts. Beyond this, even, a special reason for including these subjects in the present volume is found in the voyage across the Atlantic, prosecuted at the time of publication by the Very Rev. Dr.

Vaughan, founder and rector of the missionary college already mentioned, with the priests whom he was taking out to labour among the negroes of America. To this coincidence the Archbishop alludes, in a brief letter to his zealous priest, prefixed to the Sermon on "Our Duty to the Heathen." "I cannot refrain," he says, "from putting into this volume the three following sermons . . . . . because they were preached at your request, and because they enable me to express what we owe to you for the founding of our first seminary for missions to the heathen. They will be, I hope, a permanent appeal to the charity and alms of the faithful in behalf of your great work; and perhaps some one who reads them may help to finish your church, or may found a burse for the education of a missionary."

"The Negro Mission" (Serm. xiii.) is, to our minds, as striking in its way as any in the volume. It contains passages to which the honoured bones of Clarkson and Wilberforce might sound in response from their graves. We give one passage:—

"England is guilty towards the poor negro race of Africa. England, before God, is stained with the blood of the negro. England has drawn more tears, and sighs, and groans from the heart of the negro than any other people. Lest I should seem to exaggerate, and lest any should say that there are others, like Spain and Portugal, who trafficked in human flesh, I answer, that for a century and a half we inflicted the slave-trade upon Africa, and that it was the English slavery of the West Indies that created this traffic in Northern America.

I know nothing more blood-stained nor more horrible in the history of man than the recitals of this murderous trade—the hovering of the slave-ship on the coasts of Africa; the sweeping away of old and young, man, woman, and child; the chaining them between decks so low that they could not stand and could hardly sit, in crowds so thick that they could hardly lie; without food or water to slake their thirst under the burning heat of the equator, and in the suffocating, pestilential air of a slave-ship, where sleep was impossible, and death the only kindly voice; festering, dying, and breeding pestilence in the stifling hold of the slaver. And when that inhuman traffic was pursued by justice on the high seas, these miserable victims of man's cruelty and avarice were cast into the deep to escape detection, like contraband goods, along the track of flight." (pp. 388-9.)

We are glad to observe among recent advertisements that a third volume of the Archbishop's Sermons is already in the press; and, as the stirring events of the day present abundant topics for such interesting *pièces de circonstance*, we hope soon to welcome that fresh production from the well-known fertile yet judicious pen.

The Dæmon of Socrates. A Paper read before the Royal Institution, Jan. 26, 1872. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. London: Longmans & Co.

THE Archbishop of Westminster, pleading before the Royal Institution of England that conscience is the voice of God, and bearing witness indirectly to His fourfold sovereignty, which, elsewhere, he has so admirably upheld in a more direct manner, cannof fail to suggest to our minds the picture of Socrates himself contending for "the supremacy of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance; the fourfold perfection of man in the order of nature," before the refined and luxurious citizens of Athens. How applicable, for example, to the wants of the present day are the words of Socrates, quoted by the Archbishop in the interesting paper which is now before us (p. 4).

"For this is the command of God, as you well know, and I think that no greater good ever yet came to the State than this service which I render to God. For I go about doing nothing else than to persuade you, both young and old, to be careful, in the first place, neither of the body, nor of money, nor of anything so earnestly as that of the soul, how you may make it as perfect as possible. I tell you that virtue does not spring from money, but that from virtue money springs, and all other goods of man, both to the individual and the commonwealth."

Yet, perhaps, we are even more reminded of S. Paul testifying in the same city that the "unknown God," whom the Athenians worshipped without knowing Him, "is not far from every one of us." We are indeed glad that His Grace is following the example of his great predecessor in thus coming before the more intellectual of the English people, as the consequences of the latter being in this way brought into contact with one who is himself graced with so many intellectual gifts, as well as the anointed ruler of the Church in England, can be productive only of unmixed good.

In the paper which the Archbishop read before the Royal Institution, he offers what seems to him to be "the true interpretation of that singular fact in the history of philosophy," known as the Δαίμων, or, to speak more correctly, the δαιμόνιον of Socrates; δαίμων signifying a divinity of lower rank, and being so far used convertibly with Θεός. The title is sometimes used for Θεός, although Θεὸς is never used for δαίμων, δαιμόνιον signifying "the abstract or neuter idea of Divine power, the Deity, or the Divinity." This δαιμόνιον, he thinks, "will be found to be no mere intellectual eccentricity, no mere superstition, still less an unmeaning record of Greek history, but a fact in the psychology of the greatest philosophical mind of the ancient world, full of significance for us, and throwing much light upon the analysis of our moral nature." (pp. 1, 2, 23.)

The Archbishop first of all (pp. 3-8) gives us Socrates' own majestic account of himself and of his mission, as placed in his mouth by Plato, in which he stands before us as "a man conscious of something in him higher than himself, of a calling and a mission to his countrymen," in order "to recall them from luxury, self-indulgence, ambition, civil strife, political profligacy,

and private corruption." In this defence of himself as well as in his address after his condemnation and sentence (pp. 8–10), Socrates explains that the cause of his conduct is a certain voice which is present with him —a certain agency of God, somewhat divine (*δαιμόνιον*). "Now this," he says, "began with me from my childhood; a certain voice which always, when it comes, turns me aside from that which I am about to do, but never impels me to do anything." His Grace points out that in the passages of the "Apology," as given by Plato, "we have the fullest and most explicit declaration of Socrates respecting the Dæmon, by which he was admonished. He tells us that it was a 'familiar sign, an oracle, a divine voice'; that this sign had been with him from his infancy, that its office was to take him off from certain lines of action, that it did not impel him to any." His Grace next shows how Plutarch, Apuleius, the Neoplatonists, and certain of the Christian fathers, understood this *Dæmonion* to be a personal being or genius (pp. 12–16), and then endeavours to discover what Xenophon and Plato, the only full and trustworthy biographers of Socrates, understood by his *Dæmonion*, in order to obtain at least an approximation to what Socrates understood by it himself. He takes down their evidence, compares the two testimonies, and makes an estimate of their difference (pp. 18, 26).

According to Xenophon, the *Dæmonion* was quite distinct from the gods, although its admonition and direction were referred to the gods, without whose counsel (*γνώμη*) Socrates never acted. According to the same authority, the *Dæmonion* showed beforehand both what was to be done and what not to be done; in other words, both enjoined and forbade. Moreover there is nothing in Xenophon to be found which invests the *Dæmonion* with personality or with anything more than a divine influence or agency, acting upon the reason of man. According to Plato, the *Dæmonion* is also represented as a divine agency or voice, and not as an agent or a person; but its function or office is differently described; Xenophon, with whom Plutarch agrees, assigning to it the twofold office of suggestion and restraint, Plato that of restraint alone. Further, Xenophon recognizes the action of the *Dæmonion* in matters of right and wrong as well as in matters of expediency, Plato seems to restrict it to the latter. We must point out, however, that the Archbishop does not quote from the "Theages," partly because doubts have been raised as to its authenticity, partly because the statements contained in it may be found also in other dialogues of which there is no doubt. A few modern critics, such as Bishop Thirlwall, Mr. Grote, Zeller, and Mr. Riddell of Balliol, are then quoted (pp. 25–28). Of these the estimate of Mr. Riddell appears to the Archbishop to be in outline both true and adequate; and he afterwards adds his own judgment both as to what the *Dæmonion* of Socrates was in the estimate of Socrates himself, and also as to what we may believe it to have been.

In the estimate of Socrates himself, he supposes the *Dæmonion* to have been—

"A belief of a divine assistance granted, as he says, to all men in some things and in some special circumstances; of which most men are hardly

if at all conscious: but in his case it was consciously recognized from his childhood, and it acted upon him in and through the intellectual and moral operations of his own mind: so that he ascribed to the action of the Dæmonion much that was undoubtedly the normal activity of his own intellectual and moral state." (p. 29.)

On the other hand, if asked what we may believe it to have been, the Archbishop would answer:—1. That as it is an axiomatic truth, in the relation of God to man, that a divine providence and a divine help are over the whole intellectual and moral world, it follows as a corollary from this axiom that they may be looked for in a special degree in just and prudent men. We may therefore well believe that they existed in a very special degree in the life of so pious, just, temperate, and prudent a man as Socrates. Looking, however, at the subject as a matter of psychology, he would say:—

2. "That the statements of Xenophon and Plato may be, not only harmonized, but brought under the same psychological explanation, resting on the laws of the speculative and the practical reason. It would indeed be too narrow an explanation, as Zeller objects, to refer the signs of this monitor to the action of conscience alone; for conscience is only one office, or one function, of the reason of man. Nevertheless it is certain that in a large part of that which Socrates referred to the Dæmonion, conscience was directly present, and perceptibly in action. It is no objection to this, to quote, as Zeller does, the declaration of Socrates, that 'it is idle to consult the gods about things which may be known by deliberation,' or to say that Socrates referred morals to the judgment of reason. This is precisely the philosophical definition of conscience. Conscience is *dictamen rationis.*" (p. 31.)

The Archbishop then enlarges on the scholastic definition of conscience, distinguishing between the *psychological* conscience, by which we reflect upon the internal acts of the mind in general, and the *moral* conscience, by which we reflect upon and judge of the *ethical* character of actions, whether internal or external. He points out further, that this moral conscience is again distinguished into *habitual* and *actual;* the *habitual,* which is spontaneous and conscious, being the permanent disposition of the mind in relation to its own *moral* state; the *actual,* which is reflex, *deliberate,* and therefore conscious, being the exertion of its attention, and judicial discernment on its own moral *acts.* (p. 32.)

The Archbishop therefore is of opinion that Socrates' internal monitor was the reason, including the conscience both psychological and moral, and this again both habitual and actual, spontaneous and deliberate, and also that this comprehensive view includes all the mental judgments, whether of expediency or of morality, that is, both of prudence and rectitude. (p. 33.)

Some objections are then answered, and passages are quoted from Aristotle's "Ethics," which, to use the the Archbishop's words, "analyze, lay out, distinguish, and define the intellectual and moral processes of the human mind—modern metaphysicians must bear with me—with a truth which has never been surpassed." In one of these passages, Aristotle seems to his Grace to "give the psychological analysis of the intuition and providence with which Socrates was eminently endowed. His pru-

dence or φρόνησις constituted the αὐτάρκεια or self-dependence of reason in all questions of morality, of which Xenophon speaks . . . . The prudence of Socrates was his own moral state, and yet *non sine Numine*, for we may well believe that to him was granted no common share in the "Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." At the same time, as we have already pointed out, the Archbishop does not reject "the supposition that the particular providence which never suffers even a sparrow to fall to the ground without its Creator's will," may have in a special way encompassed the life of a man who witnessed in a corrupt world to the lights of nature and to the laws of right. (p. 40.)

For our own part we are inclined to doubt whether as yet we are able to make an exact psychological analysis of the *Dæmonion* of Socrates. We should be more inclined to class it among those abnormal psychological phenomena, which will be better understood, when greater and more minute attention has been paid to their consideration than has as yet been paid by Modern Philosophy. We are speaking of course of those irregular and seemingly inexplicable occurrences which rest upon sufficient evidence. We have already stated that the Archbishop has not quoted from the "Theages," first, because doubts have been raised as to its authenticity; and secondly, because the statements contained in it may be found also in the other dialogues, of which there is no doubt. Now we see, indeed, no reasons for differing from Stalbaum's opinion, that the "Theages" is not genuine; still it seems to us, that if, as Diogenes Laertius assumes, the "Theages" is a genuine work of Plato, then the Archbishop's estimate of the *Dæmonion* will be hardly adequate, inasmuch as it is there stated that the warning voice of the *Dæmonion* endeavoured to restrain not Socrates himself from action, but other men; as, for example, Charmides and Timarchus. However, be this as it may, the Archbishop has done noble service, in witnessing before an English audience, in these days of "growing scepticism, and of relaxation of moral and religious traditions," when "public opinion is swayed to and fro by nameless hands and by irresponsible cries," that conscience is the voice of God. We are also glad to think that Englishmen of the present day have had an opportunity of listening to some at least of the wise definitions of that scholastic philosophy which they have so long been taught to despise.

Hints and Facts on the Origin of Man, and of his Intellectual Faculties. By PIUS MELIA, D.D. London: Longmans. 1872.

The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. By CHARLES DARWIN, M.A., F.R.S., &c. Sixth Edition, with Additions and Corrections. London: John Murray. 1872.

La Civiltà Cattolica. Serie VIII., Vol. IV. e V. Firenze: Luigi Manuelli. 1871–2.

DR. MELIA'S contribution to the "Darwinian" literature is important and hopeful, as showing that the attention of zealous and able Catholics is more and more directed to the necessity incumbent on orthodox thinkers of confronting the hypothesis by reasoning, and not leaving it to fall simply by its own weight. Moreover he interestingly illustrates in various ways the general argument for the soul's spirituality and immortality. But as regards Mr. Darwin in particular, it is not very clear what Dr. Melia intends his essay to be—whether the pleading of an advocate or the summing-up of a judge. He means, of course, to do as much harm as he can to this absurd Darwinian hypothesis on the origin of man. But it hardly serves this purpose to quote and describe a number of other equally irrational theories, gathered from all sorts of writers, of every age and country. Even if the obscure myths of the "ancient Indians" threw any light on a hypothesis that pretends to rest on hard experiment and strict science, the author might have got them from a more trustworthy source than Buffon. Comparative mythology has made some advance within the present century. But, without descending to the details of Dr. Melia's book, it seems to us that he does not attack Mr. Darwin in the right way. It is nothing to the purpose to prove that the Darwinian conclusions are not novel; that Epicurus, or Lord Monboddo, or Lemarck said just the same thing long ago. There is a certain amount of novelty in Mr. Darwin's hypothesis, the idea, namely, that development is in great measure due to selection; but it is the method of proving the hypothesis that is the really new feature of Mr. Darwin's labours. He has marshalled, in support of his theory, an array of physical science that has never been equalled. We are far from saying he has succeeded in proving what he has undertaken to prove. We hold the precise contrary. Some of his science is questionable, much of it is beside the mark, and all of it together is insufficient. But there it is; and one way to meet Mr. Darwin is to attack his science, as Mr. Mivart has done so successfully. Another way is to meet him on the ground of psychology and metaphysics generally. He himself would hardly admit all that a Catholic would advance in the way of metaphysical argument; so we should have to prove our metaphysics as we went on. But it would be a perfectly legitimate and satisfactory method of fighting. For instance, the difference of kind between intellect and imagination might be proved by analysis of the operations of the mind, or the Darwinian arguments from similarity, from embryology, and from rudimentary organs, might be shown to be inconclusive as to evolution. Those are the *two main routes* to a successful combat with a theory, which has undoubtedly

had a wonderful success since Mr. Darwin's first edition of "The Origin of Species," in 1859. Dr. Melia, in one sense, agrees with us, for he brings to bear both science and metaphysics. But his metaphysics, for the most part, touch, not Mr. Darwin, but those who deny the existence of God; which, as Dr. Melia assures us, Mr. Darwin does not. As to his science, there is an interesting account of a deaf mute in the Cambrian Institution at Swansea, published apparently for the first time. (pp. 46–8.) Otherwise Dr. Melia does not impress us as in this respect quite up to the mark. Indeed he is not very recondite in some of his authorities. Migne's "Dictionnaires" are not of any great weight in science, neither is the name of Racine.

Moreover we would submit to Dr. Melia, with very great respect, whether it would not have been better to explain himself more unmistakably, on a matter which is of some doctrinal importance. He says (p. 50) "that social teaching is absolutely necessary to the first development of the faculties of speech and reason: as it is clearly proved, that when social teaching has not been afforded, no speech is acquired; nor the faculty of reason awakened." We wish he had explained where lies the precise difference, between what he here intends to express and the disapproved Louvain traditionalism. Our readers will find the doctrine of the four Louvain Professors, as set forth by themselves, in our number for April, 1869 (pp. 532–536). And in regard to the authoritative disapproval of this doctrine, we would refer to the documents published by us in January, 1868. (pp. 281–288.)

Mr. Darwin's sixth edition contains important new matter. It purports to be a "cheap" edition, and the paper and print are proportionately bad. The most interesting feature in the new edition is the insertion of an entirely new chapter (the seventh), which is devoted to the consideration of "Miscellaneous Objections to the Theory of Natural Selection." We are glad to see, moreover, that the author, in the concluding chapter, distinctly admits that his opinions have somewhat changed since his first edition. "Species," he says, "have been modified during a long course of descent. This has been effected chiefly through the natural selection of numerous successive, slight, favourable variations, aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts; and in an unimportant manner, that is, in relation to adaptive structures, whether past or present, by the direct action of external conditions, and by variations which seem to us in our ignorance to arise spontaneously. It appears that I formerly underrated the frequency and value of these latter forms of variation, as leading to permanent modifications of structures independently of natural selection." (p. 421.) But, he continues, "I may be permitted to remark that in the first edition of this work, and subsequently, I placed in a most conspicuous position—namely, at the close of the Introduction—the following words: 'I am convinced that natural selection has been the main, but not the exclusive, means of modification.'" In spite of this disclaimer, however, it is evident that Mr. Darwin has now considerably modified the meaning of his word "main," as may easily be seen by referring, for instance, to "Animals and Plants under Domestication," vol. i. Introd. p. 12.

Mr. Darwin dedicates the greater part of his new chapter to the consideration of the criticisms of Mr. St. George Mivart:—

"A distinguished zoologist, Mr. St. George Mivart, has recently collected all the objections which have ever been advanced by myself and others against the theory of natural selection, as propounded by Mr. Wallace and myself, and has illustrated them with admirable art and force. When thus marshalled, they make a formidable array; and as it forms no part of Mr. Mivart's plan to give the various facts and considerations opposed to his conclusions, no slight effort of reason and memory is left to the reader who may wish to weigh the evidence on both sides. When discussing special cases, Mr. Mivart passes over the effects of the increased use and disuse of the parts, which I have always maintained to be highly important, and have treated in my 'Variations under Domestication' at greater length than, as I believe, any other writer. He likewise often assumes that I attribute nothing to variation, independently of natural selection, whereas in the work just referred to I have collected a greater number of well-established cases than can be found in any other work known to me. My judgment may not be trustworthy, but after reading with care Mr. Mivart's book, and comparing each section with what I have said on the same head, I never before felt so strongly convinced of the general truth of the conclusions here arrived at, subject, of course, in so intricate a subject, to much partial error." (p. 176.)

In answer to Mr. Mivart's objections, Mr. Darwin is, as usual, acute and armed at all points with instances. We do not think any one will consider him to have disposed of his antagonist satisfactorily. No doubt he explains, and makes hypotheses and postulates, and in the end the reader may be ready to admit that the thing *might* be as he says it was. And we allow that it may not always be possible to answer every objection, even to theories which are certainly proved. But it must be remembered that nearly the whole of Mr. Darwin's reasoning in behalf of natural selection is capable of being analyzed into a number of hypotheses, each grounded on a very moderate amount of fact. Homology, embryology, rudimentary organism, heredity, and the other terms that are, as it were, the fortified places of his dominion, are only generalizations from observed facts, and from facts which are not overwhelming either in number or cogency. We do not complain that the case is so, but we would point out that one way at least to disprove the theory of natural selection being to take up the particular classes of facts upon which it depends, it follows that as long as there is anything like an equal fight about the significance of the facts—as long as Mr. Darwin is not convincingly and unmistakably in the right in his inductive process, the verdict cannot be given on his side. If Mr. Mivart's book did nothing else, it went to prove that disagreement was not only possible, but a matter of necessity; and Mr. Darwin's new chapter, by the very acuteness with which it points out new facts, postulates new conditions, and lays claim to new possibilities, proves very much the same thing.

The "Civiltà Cattolica" began, in November of last year, a series of articles on the theory of Natural Selection, chiefly as applied to man. The writer does not treat the subject from the point of view of Faith, but confines himself to scientific exposition and refutation. After devoting an article to a description of the general theory of selection, he begins his answer by a definition of the word "species." Species includes two ideas; it implies similarity and descent: and the writer undertakes to prove that there really are in nature true species, that is to say, families of beings whose family likeness

is stable and unchangeable within a certain *laxum*, and which can only propagate individuals in whom this likeness is found. This, of course is the great question of the fixedness of species and of the sterility of hybrids, which has been raised in so many forms in late years. Sterility is, perhaps, the greatest of the difficulties that the patrons of natural selection have to overcome. Mr. Darwin considers the question at length in "The Origin of Species." (Chap. ix.) He brings forward facts which seem to us to prove that the doctrine of uniform sterility of hybrids, as laid down by the writer we are noticing, is too absolutely stated; but this is of little importance. What is of much greater moment is that Mr. Darwin himself confesses that the fact is "extremely general"; but he denies that specific distinctions have anything to do with it. His explanation is that it follows from "unknown differences in their reproductive systems," widened by change of soil or of climate, by captivity, or by similar causes. (p. 245, 6th ed.) It seems to us, however, that until a result which always, or very generally, accompanies what we call specific distinction can be very clearly proved not to follow from it, there is a strong case for those who maintain that this very general law is really a law of species as such, and that species therefore is, within certain limits, unchangeable.

The writer in the "Civiltà" appeals for a confirmation of his views to the fact that in Egypt, for at least 3,000 years, species have remained as they are now, showing no signs of alteration for the better or the worse. Perhaps Mr. Darwin is right in saying, after Mr. G. H. Lewes, that this line of argument proves too much, for it would prove that domestic animals, many of which are identical in the ancient Egypt representations with what are living now, were true species,—which no one would admit. The writer in the "Civiltà" does not omit to press the argument derived from the absence of grades of being in the geological record in many instances where, on the Darwinian theory, we should have expected to find intermediate beings.

Passing to the more immediate consideration of the descent of man, he first states Mr. Darwin's arguments from similarity, from embryology, and from rudimentary organs, and then proceeds to argue against each. No Darwinian has ever yet given what approaches to a satisfactory explanation, on his theory, of the enormous difference in size and weight between the brain of the lowest race of men and the highest anthropomorphous apes. Mr. Wallace, who is the co-founder of the theory of selection (which, however, he does not extend to man, as such) is as strong as the Italian writer we are quoting on this important fact.* The argument from embryology, on which Mr. Darwin lays great stress, seems to us to tell precisely against him—even more so than the "Civiltà" insists. At a certain stage the embryos of a mammal, a bird, a fish, and a reptile are utterly undistinguishable from each other. Therefore, argues Mr. Darwin, all these families have descended from the same stock. Rather, we should argue, therefore the *ova* which are so undistinguishable to sense, are really perfectly different things. In what, it may be asked, can their difference consist? We answer that it consists in that active tendency or power which was originally

* "Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection," p. 335.

given to them, mediately or immediately, by their Creator. The Darwinian cannot reject this answer as a gratuitous introduction of the unknown or the supernatural; for one of Mr. Darwin's own *postulates* is this, that a modification acquired by a parent at a given age will re-appear in the descendant *at the same age.* (p. 10.) This, be it observed, is a postulate without which his theory of selection could not walk a step; and there was never anything imagined by the wildest scholastic in the shape of form or potency that was more gratuitous, *as an explanation*, than this. It would be much more natural to say, as many of the scholastics would, that such modification once acquired (if it was to be transmitted) was there all the time, and developed itself under favourable circumstances.

We quite agree with the writer in the "Civiltà" that the argument from rudimentary organs takes for granted the all-important assumption, that certain organs really are rudimentary organs. Mr. Darwin thinks that he has discerned, by the help of Mr. Woolner, the rudiments of "pointed ears" in the ears of man. But in order to decide whether the little projection which he thinks he has found is a true rudiment or not, he ought first to ascertain how it came there. If it came about by small selective changes, then no doubt it is a rudiment; but this is just what he has to prove. If, on the other hand, it was originally made for a particular purpose just as it is, then it is not a rudiment at all. If a poor man cuts away the upper-leathers of his old boots to make himself a pair of sandals, a philosopher might call those sandals rudimentary boots; but if a rich man orders a pair of sandals from a manufacturer, no one but a wag would be allowed to call them by any such name. Many people believe that God fashioned man's body in a way in which He has fashioned no other thing of all the things His hands have made.

We look with interest for the promised continuation of the arguments of the "Civiltà."

Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. Third edition. London: Rivingtons.

WHEN F. Newman edited, as a Catholic, one volume (the fourth) of his Anglican "Parochial Sermons," it was found that the notion was a mistake. The tenets of Anglicanism were so interwoven in the volume's very texture, that they could not be thence disentangled; though of course well-instructed Catholics were able to derive very great benefit from its perusal. The result has been, that no Catholic edition has been attempted of the other "Parochial" volumes.

In the case however of these Oxford University sermons, F. Newman has judged differently and (we think) correctly. We think he has conferred a valuable boon on the Church, by not merely reprinting them in their original shape, but adding a Catholic preface and Catholic notes.

Not the least interesting circumstance about them is their date. The

earliest was preached in 1826; then come eight, preached from 1830 to 1832; and then comes a leap to 1839.

The five sermons, commencing with this latter date, exhibit the first sketch of the theory, which F. Newman has since put forth more fully in his "Grammar." We hope in due time we shall be in a position to place fully before our readers our own humble opinion on this theory; with which we largely sympathize, although without agreeing in every single particular. This theory deals with a question which—whether in its philosophical or theological aspect—is assuredly the most critical issue of the day. Total scepticism on the invisible world is the dominant and increasing error of this time; and it is their doctrine therefore on *certitude*, and on *the analysis of faith*, which Catholics are most of all required clearly to set forth. Moreover there is one special value in F. Newman's speculations; viz., that he is writing directly for contemporary Englishmen, and bears carefully in mind throughout the special philosophical circumstances of modern England. We may further remark, that this volume disproves one hypothesis which has been started. It has been thought that the "Grammar" was written *tentatively*, and does not express its author's mature and deliberate conviction: but the whole language of the preface, now prefixed to these sermons, entirely negatives such a supposition.

As to the earlier sermons, there are none perhaps of F. Newman's writings so concisely written, in proportion to the largeness of their significance. They are not to be once read and then merely remembered, but rather to be studied again and again. If we were to mention two in particular, we should name that on "Personal Influence" and that on "Faith and Sight." We will give an extract however from another, that on "The Usurpations of Reason."

> What is to be seen, asks the author, "in the actual history of revelation, but the triumph of *the moral powers of man over the intellectual, of holiness over ability*, far more than of mind over brute force? . . . The miracles of the Church displayed more physical power than the hosts of Pharaoh and Sennacherib. *Power, not mind, was opposed to power:* yet to the refined pagan intellect the rivalry of intellect was not granted. The foolish things of the world confounded the wise, far more completely than the weak the mighty." (pp. 57–8.)

Indeed we would refer to the whole passage, from p. 55 to p. 58, as powerfully illustrating views which we have from time to time expressed, on the relation of intellectual power to man's true perfection.

Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Conciliorum Recentiorum. Collectio Lacensis. Auctoribus Presbyteris S.J. e Domo B.V.M. sine labe conceptæ ad Lacum. Tomus primus. Friburgi Brisgoviæ : Herder. 1870.

A COLLECTION of later Provincial Councils has begun to be felt as a want of the present day. The great collectors of the Councils have always recognized the importance of Provincial Synods by inserting their acts and decrees together with those of the General Councils. If in the later centuries they have been held much less frequently than of old, it has certainly not been in accordance with the wish of the Church. The Fifth Lateran Council and the Council of Trent re-echo the ancient legislation on the subject. The first Council of Nicæa ordered the Synod of each province to be held twice a year, though this extreme frequency was soon modified. The Council of Trent prescribed their celebration every three years. Various causes, however, hindered the carrying out of this decree ; especially the jealousy which has so often prevailed on the part of secular governments against the free action of the Church. Benedict XIII. made fresh efforts, both as Archbishop of Benevento and as Pope, to restore the practice, but with only transitory and partial success. It was reserved for our own times to see a very general revival of Provincial Councils. The assemblies of the great historical sees of Germany, France, Belgium, and Hungary, and those of the new province of England, the work of Pius IX., which has brought a "second spring" to the Church of our own country, and the magnificent national and provincial councils of North America, held within the last few decades, will no doubt hold an important place in the history of the Church of our day. Not only have they wonderfully displayed before the world the ever-youthful energy and vigour of the Church, but they have done great and solid work in building up the ruins left by the French Revolution and the wars and changes which followed it, and in securing and ordering the new conquests of religion in America.

The Acts and Decrees of all these Synods, though printed, and in many cases published, are scattered and difficult to obtain, and, uncollected and unarranged, are practically inaccessible for study or consultation. The Fathers of Maria Laach have had the happy inspiration, therefore, of publishing a collection of recent Councils, with the proper apparatus of notes, dissertations, and indices. Moreover, finding that the addition of a few Councils held during the last two centuries would complete the whole series of the Councils of the Church, and link their work to the labours of the great collectors, they have determined to devote their first two volumes to the Councils held between 1682 and the period of the French Revolution, the first containing those of the Latin, the second those of the Oriental rites, whilst the whole will conclude with the Acts of the General Council of the Vatican.

It is hardly necessary to insist on the value of such a work. Though Provincial Councils are not called upon now to pronounce decisions on doctrine, yet even in questions of faith their acts furnish at least most important evidence. Each witnesses to the belief of pastors and people in its own province. The concurrent testimony of various provinces of the Church in

favour of a doctrine is a most legitimate and powerful argument in support of its Catholicity.

We are tempted to give an instance from the present volume on the question of the infallible magisterium of the Holy See, which, though happily out of the reach of controversy for Catholics, is still looked upon by many non-Catholics as a novelty in doctrine. We find then here, during a period closely following the famous "Declaration of the French Clergy," three very important Councils testifying their faith in the doctrine in explicit terms. A national Council of all the bishops of Hungary, in the very same year, 1682, strongly condemns the "Declaration," and appeals to the "*infallibile* Sanctæ Sedis Oraculum, ad quam solam Divino-immutabili privilegio spectat de controversiis fidei judicare." (p. 837 A.)

Twenty years later (1703) a national Albanian Council declares that "Sacrarum scripturarum oracula, Patrumque orthodoxorum testimonia, et Romanæ sedis *infallibilis* auctoritas, vel ab ipsis Ecclesiæ incunabulis [hanc Catholicæ Fidei regulam] confirmant." (p. 290 A.)

After a similar interval a Provincial Council of Avignon, in 1725, treating expressly on the subject, says "Quis tandem tam rationis expers qui excelsæ Ecclesiæ Throno, id est Petri Cathedræ, hoc deneget veracitatis et *infallibilitatis* donum, quod Moysi Cathedræ, docentibus Scribis et Pharisæis, a Christo ipso legimus attributum." (p. 477, D.)

We have only singled out explicit testimonies.

For the study of the discipline of the Church such a collection was still more needed. In many respects the laws of the Church have to be applied in our times to a totally new state of things. The practice with regard to the ecclesiastical courts, the mode of holding Church property, the precautions necessary for the protection of Christian marriage, &c., in an order of things in most countries completely changed from that of Christian ages, has been deliberated upon in all, or most of the Provincial Councils of this century; and though their decrees are not, of course, binding upon the Universal Church, still, having received the approbation of the Holy See, and containing the solution of so many difficult problems, they cannot but be full of interest and instruction.

Of course the Councils of each country have an especial value for ecclesiastics and students of that country, and the editors, by adopting a local instead of a simply chronological order, enable those who do not care to have the whole work, to obtain in one volume the Councils of their own province. Thus, the third volume will contain the Councils of North America and the British empire, and the fourth those of France. We ought to add that the excellent series of indices at the end of the present volume give evidence of the painstaking care which the editors are bestowing on their work.

Before taking leave of the Fathers of Maria Laach, we think it a duty to mention that this is not the only literary work in which they are engaged in the cause of religion. It will be remembered that at different intervals, from 1865 until last year, they issued a number of popular treatises in the form of pamphlets, under the title of "Voices from Maria Laach." These were first on the chief subjects treated of in the Encyclical "Quanta Cura," and then on the Vatican Council. These pamphlets seem to have suggested the idea

of a regular periodical with a wider and more varied scope, and accordingly these energetic writers have issued, since last July, a monthly review under the same title. We earnestly wish it the success and influence which its high Catholic tone, genuine learning, and spirited management well deserve, and seem, as far as we can judge, to promise.

A History of the Christian] Councils, from the Original Documents, to the Close of the Council of Nicæa, A.D. 325. By CHARLES JOSEPH HEFELE, D.D., Bishop of Rottenburg, formerly Professor of Theology in the University of Tübingen. Translated from the German and Edited by WILLIAM R. CLARK, M.A. Oxon, Prebendary and Vicar of Taunton. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1871.

BISHOP HEFELE'S great work on the Councils is too well known to need any introduction to our readers, and any attempt at a critical review of such a work is, of course, out of the question in a short notice. Of the book itself, therefore, we have no intention of speaking at present. But the publication of an English translation of it, of which the present volume is an instalment, seems to us little less than an event, and calling for some notice. A French translation had already appeared, but it is well known how deficient Englishmen, even of high attainments, commonly are in acquaintance with modern languages, and the English translation will no doubt multiply largely the number of those able to read the book in this country. Moreover the Messrs. Clark, the publishers, will not consider it uncomplimentary to them if we suppose that they had good grounds for expecting a considerable public who would *in fact* read it. This is what we have called an event—that there should be among the scholars and students of England a readiness, and more than a readiness, a demand, to read a great Catholic work of ecclesiastical history. We hail this as one of the signs, multiplying day by day, that the mind of the country, so long sealed against everything Catholic, is more and more opening to a fair and candid study of the past.

The translation has evidently been carried out in the fairest spirit, and the translator, who is a Protestant clergyman, and who must have found himself often unable to see things from his author's standpoint, has abstained even from the course which he at first thought of adopting (Preface, p. vi.) of adding "notes from writers who regard the subject from a different point of view." The English reads on the whole smoothly, and the rendering seems, as far as a judgment can be formed without a systematic collation with the original, to be generally correct.

If we go on to point out some blemishes, we hope it will be understood that it is not in a critical or hostile spirit, but, on the contrary, from a wish to see the work completed, and the succeeding volumes preserved from the faults which to some extent disfigure the first.

One blemish, then, which we would point out, is the very bizarre rendering of the names of places and persons adopted by the translator. We cannot speak of it as a system, for there is evidently no system. Some foreign names, of which there is a customary English rendering, are given in their native form with a most pedantic effect. Others appear in their English dress. Sometimes a Christian name is translated and the surname left unaltered, or presented in a Latin form. Cologne is repeatedly called Köln, sometimes Cöln (pp. 67, 68, 153, 178, &c.). Trèves appears as Trier (p. 181), and Umbria as Ombria (p. 398). To be consistent, Prebendary Clark ought to speak of the galleries of Firenze or München, the Doges of Venezia, and the Court of Wien! On the other hand, we have "Alphonso Pisanus" (p. 360), Paul Ursinus (ibid.), Severin Binius, Canon of Köln (p. 68), Charles Ludovic Richard (p. 74), and Lud. Thomassin (p. 75).

Another criticism we have to offer regards the use made of the French translation. The translator, in acknowledging his obligations to it, expresses the hope that "by this means not only greater accuracy has been attained, but frequently a more readable and perspicuous rendering has been suggested and adopted." This has certainly not invariably been the result. Take as an instance the passage (p. 84)—"*In* admitting that the usual date . . . . may be inexact . . . . *yet* it is clear from this document, &c.," where correct English has been sacrificed to the literal translation of the French idiom, "en admettant," though there was no difficulty whatever about the German. Take another specimen at page 163:—"Like Rome, many municipalities had a Capitol, in the court of which sacrifices were offered to the gods, and many Christians were present at the ceremonies of the pagan worship. Was it from curiosity? Was it in order to shelter themselves from inquiry . . . .? *This is what* we are unable to decide," where "C'est ce que nous ne pouvons décider" has been literally translated to the injury of sense and English. At p. 85 the French has misled the translator as to the title of a well-known work, which he calls Assemani's "Bibliothèque Orientale." As Assemani's work was not written in French, this is much as if an Englishman were to speak of Dante's "Enfer"!

Some of the translator's mistakes point to the advisableness of having the future volumes revised by some one familiar with Catholic doctrine and usage. Thus, Kirchengefässe is translated "sacred vases" (p. 191), after the French expression "vases sacrés," instead of "sacred vessels," which is the usual English expression. A more serious mistake is made in the sentence (p. 118) "Sabellius had wished to strengthen the idea of unity in the doctrine of the Trinity by suppressing the *difference* between the persons, and only admitting instead of the persons three different modes of action in the one person of God; consequently denying the personal *difference* between the Father and the Son, and identifying them both" (*sic*). The correct expression here, we need not say, is "distinction," not "difference"; and the self-same German words, "unterschied" and "verschiedenheit," have been rightly translated in many other passages.

Besides the points on which we have dwelt, there are a considerable number

of simple mistranslations, which we hope there will be an opportunity of correcting in a second edition. Thus we are told of a heretical "Bishop Arsenius who, *it is said*, had had one hand cut off by S. Athanasius;" where "it is said" should be "it was pretended" (*angeblich*). At page 298, "whether the *Primate* had gained or lost in this controversy," should be "whether the Primacy," &c. "Baronius and the Spanish Cardinal d'Aguirre have tried hard to prove *from the only Greeek and Latin manuscripts*," ought to read "from the Greek and Latin manuscripts *alone*." After interpreting a Canon of Elvira as enacting that "a Christian woman must not marry an actor," the translation continues, "and this prohibition *would explain* the aversion of the ancient Church to the theatre." We were puzzled by so obscure an explanation until, on referring to the original, we found the exact converse,—"would be explained by."

There are also many instances of loose and slovenly English which should be corrected; as at page 355, where we read that Rufinus "was born near the period when the Council of Nicæa was held, and about half a century after he wrote his celebrated history of the Church," which reminds us of the old child's riddle, "King Charles I. walked and talked, half an hour after his head was cut off:" or at page 365: "The Constitutiones edited by Echellensis, still less than the eighty-four canons, maintain the pretension of dating back to the Council of Nicæa."

But we have pointed out instances enough to show that more careful revision is needed. We have no desire to be hypercritical, and we sincerely hope that, in spite of the drawbacks we have noticed, the present volume may meet with such success as may lead to the completion of the work

---

The Pope of Rome and the Popes of the Oriental Orthodox Church. An Essay on Monarchy in the Church with special reference to Russia, from Original Documents, Russian and Greek. By the Rev. CÆSARIUS TONDINI, Barnabite. London: Longmans. 1871.

FATHER TONDINI has with great care and laborious pains furnished us, in the book before us, with a most accurate and intelligible account of the principles which still keep alive the great Eastern schism. His work describes the Russian schism chiefly, but it gives a view at the same time, clear and defined, of the cognate bodies which still occupy the ground, and grow up as tares in the fields which should be in the possession of the saving faith. In reading his book it is impossible to forget England, and the miserable heresies which corrupt it—heresies of the same kind, and the fruit of the same spirit, as that which has taken hold of the East and the dominions of the Tzar of Russia.

It has been said that one of the reasons which moved Peter the Great to visit this country was his wish to know how the Government dealt with the *Protestant bishops*, whose condition seemed to please him, and whose utter

subjection to the State was, to him, the most precious use to which bishops could be put. Whether that story be true or not is what we cannot determine, but it is quite true that the Emperor brought the bishops of Russia into the same state of servitude, and made them the companions in misery of their English brethren, who have worn their fetters without much inconvenience and some satisfaction.

Russia was lost in schism long before the reign of Peter the Great, and its bishops were really destitute of all authority over the people still obedient to their rule. They had set up a patriarch in Moscow, and had released themselves even from their old dependence on their schismatical head in Constantinople: schism begets schism. They had formed a body outside the Church, though they had sacraments and the visible form of a Church. They had also preserved some of the traditions of ecclesiastical government, and felt that they were not, or ought not to be, under the control of the civil power. This principle which they still held was the one principle which they were not to be allowed to hold. The State had nothing to say to doctrine, nothing to interior discipline; it respected, and even shared in, the rites and ceremonies, but it would not confess that the bishops were anything more than public functionaries of the State, and it was in the right.

When the day arrived on which the civil power thought it necessary to settle the question between itself and the poor patriarch in Moscow, the latter found he was the weaker of the two. The Emperor had no need of a patriarch, and undertook the duties of that office himself. He took the jurisdiction, such as it was, of the Russian schismatics into his own hands, and put it into commission, as the English Government has sometimes done with the offices and duties of Lord High Chancellor, and does always now with those of the Lord High Admiral and the Lord High Treasurer. Peter the Great invented the "governing synod," and gave to that body all authority in the Russian Church, but to be always exercised under his supreme direction and by his advice. Thus the Tzar is the head of the Russian Church precisely as the Queen is head of the English Church. The latter has the merit of being the first degraded, for Henry VIII. did his work about the middle of the sixteenth century, when that of Peter the Great was wrought in the beginning of the eighteenth.

The Russian bishops were ruined by schismatical principles, and were ready for the yoke, because they were outside the Church, and had been so long before Peter made them his special slaves. The English bishops had been also corrupted and infected with evil doctrines, and when Henry VIII. took them with him into schism, they scarcely felt the change; they were willing serfs of the civil power, and had been so for many years: so they made no resistance, neither were they moved to a sense of their danger by the rapid growth of a heresy which, they always protested, was hateful in their eyes.

Peter the Great had a less difficult task to accomplish than Henry VIII. The former abolished the Patriarchate of Moscow, which was a human invention, and his act was in itself not more unlawful than the act of the bishops by whom that Patriarchate was originally set up. They were schismatic bishops, and their Patriarch was a schismatic with them. In one sense Peter the

Great did a lawful deed, for he abolished an iniquity. Henry VIII. undertook to destroy the Papacy, and made himself and his successors on the English throne Antipopes, for the crown of England has possession by Act of Parliament, so it is said, of all the jurisdiction of the Sovereign Pontiff; that is, the English doctrine. The sovereign power of the State in this country is an Antipope to all its subjects: hence, among other reasons, the unlawfulness of all *communicatio in divinis* with the secular power, and the studied non-observance of its ordinances in matters of religion by all Catholics.

In Russia the bishops are under the control of a body called the Most Holy Synod, which is in itself under the control of the Tzar: in England the bishops are under the control of the Crown, which exercises its supreme jurisdiction partly through its ministers and partly through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, while the ordinary business of religion is settled in the courts of common law. In no country are bishops supreme: the bishops of Russia, Greece, and Turkey are subject to the secular sovereigns of those countries respectively, precisely as the so-called bishops of England are subject to the Crown. It is a most true commentary, but by way of irony, perhaps, on the Catholic doctrine that the bishops are not the supreme rulers of the Church. If bishops will not obey the Pope, they shall be made slaves of the civil power. The Russian bishops were not asked to make any changes in the doctrines which they were in the habit of teaching, none in the rites and ceremonies of the public services of their Church. Monks and nuns and monasteries were respected, and no priest being a priest was allowed to marry. The change was hardly visible to the people at large, except in the loss of their Patriarch in Moscow. The jurisdiction alone was touched, such as it was; that had been supposed to flow from the Patriarch before the reign of Peter the Great, and since that day it has flowed from the Emperor, while in point of fact neither Patriarch nor Emperor ever possessed it. The work of Peter the Great was, on the whole, not difficult; he had nothing to do with the priesthood generally, or with the people throughout his wide dominions; the bishops submitted, and there was no reason why they should not submit—they were bishops without jurisdiction, and from the day of their submission were nothing more and nothing less.

In Russia, however, there is nothing certain or stable, and of necessity the sacraments are touched. In England they were got rid of, and baptism alone was retained. The English bishops fell from a greater height than the Russian, and their fall was greater. The Russians retained the sacraments, but they forgot the doctrine thereof, and they were guilty of reordinations and rebaptisms.

But Peter the Great, at last, did interfere with the Sacrament of Penance; he may have borrowed his theory from England. Father Tondini, p. 104, quotes from the Criminal Code of Russia a rule of law which even in England is not admitted. It is to the following effect:—

"Art. 245. Priests are forbidden to reveal, in giving evidence, what their penitents may have said to them in confession, except in the following cases."

Now the Russian priest is authorized, and perhaps compelled, to reveal the

secrets of the confessional, if he comes thereby to the knowledge of a plot against the Emperor, or of an intended rebellion. In England the rule binding on the Anglican clergy is different, but its binding force is not great. The Anglican minister may not reveal, according to the Canons of 1604, any crime of his penitent, unless his own life should be endangered by his silence. The two religions of England and Russia correspond certainly in one point —the confession of sins is a part of the police of government.

Father Tondini has traced the story of the Russian supremacy with great patience and convincing proofs. It is impossible to escape the conclusion; the facts he alleges and the documents he quotes show beyond all question that in Russia, as in England, the sovereign power of the State is the sovereign power of the so-called Church. In both countries the same doctrine and the same practice prevail, because rooted in the law and upheld by the forces of the State. In Russia, as in England, there are men who deny the doctrine and claim independence for the supposed spiritual power of their bishops; but such men have no influence and less authority, and cannot, by their protests, change the constitution under which they live and by which their lives are ordered.

Our author has taken pains to show that the so-called Eastern Church is in no sense one; that the words Eastern Church mean at least three sects, each independent of the others—precisely as the Scottish Episcopal, the American Episcopal, and the Anglican Establishment are. These latter bodies are in a sense one, because the two former are offshoots from the last, and have nearly the same doctrines or opinions. So is it with the Eastern Church. The Russian community is governed by the Tzar, that of Greece by its king, and the Constantinopolitan schismatics are under the control of the Sultan, though somewhat less so than the others are under the Tzar and King George. Father Tondini sees Anglicans turn their eyes towards the Russian communion, and therefore warns them of the frail nature of the reed on which they are about to lean. But we do not ourselves agree with him in thinking that Anglicans will gain anything by becoming members of the Eastern schism. He writes thus, p. 4:—

"Though Catholics, and especially desiring, as the wish nearest our heart, the return of the Oriental orthodox Church to Catholic unity, we are far from being alarmed or dissatisfied in witnessing such feelings in England towards the orthodox Church. The Oriental orthodox Church is far better than Protestantism, and *Protestants* cannot but find great advantages in becoming *orthodox*. It is, even for us, a consoling thought that, on the day following the fall of the State Church of England, very many souls, whom ignorance or prejudice keeps from embracing Catholicism, would be preserved from total incredulity by having at hand the Oriental orthodox Church. Moreover, the union of this Church with the Anglican would not only be for England one step more towards Catholicism, but would very likely remove for ever one of the chief obstacles to the reunion of the Oriental orthodox Church herself with the Roman Catholic—we mean the contest about the Procession of the Holy Ghost. Fully convinced that with regard to this point great misunderstanding underlies the alleged opposition between the doctrine of the Oriental orthodox and that of the Roman Catholic, we gladly welcome attempts at union which will necessarily lead to a fair and public discussion of the matter. The Anglican Church professes, as to the Proces-

sion of the Holy Ghost, to hold the same doctrines which Catholics hold; hence it follows that before the union takes place this point ought to be discussed, and an agreement arrived at. Whatever the result may be, the discussion itself cannot but be favourable to the Catholic Church."

At this moment the Anglicans seem more likely to give up their belief in the Catholic doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Ghost than to retain it, and so far will be the more ready to accept the Greek opinion. But there are other difficulties in the way. The Greeks or the Russians hold many doctrines against which the Anglicans protest as strongly as they do against the supremacy of the Holy See. Besides, if our countrymen were to coalesce with the Russians, they would do so on such hollow foundations that the union would not last. Both sides are deficient in the vital principle of unity —belief in the Divine authority to which the Church is subject. England and Russia might enter into a coalition, as political parties are said to do; they will never unite, because union is impossible on their principles; and if they were to accept principles which make union possible, they would return to the Roman Church, from which they are aliens now. Schismatical bodies seem to remain ever apart. They do not unite even among themselves, and we should be very much surprised to see any great numbers fused together, and still more to see them persevere in the fusion.

We commend Father Tondini's book most heartily to our readers, for they will find it a complete manual of the history and discipline of the Russian schism. He has shown most clearly the utter hollowness of its professions, and the incurable vice of its constitution. It is simply a State institution; and viewed in that light, it must strike every one with fear. A schism with bishops and priests and sacraments, but without jurisdiction, because outside the fold over which the One Shepherd rules. The misery of souls under its influence, the daily material sacrilege and profanation of the most awful gift made to man, must be a terrible thing to witness, and, if duly pondered on, must cause all men within the Church to give more earnest thanks daily for the inestimable gifts of the true faith, and the grace of being governed by the King whom God has set up in Sion.

The Patriarch and the Tzar. The Replies of the Humble Nicon, by the Mercy of God Patriarch, against the Questions of the Boyar Simeon Streshneff, and the Answers of the Metropolitan of Gaza, Paisius Ligarides. Translated from the Russ by WILLIAM PALMER, M.A., late Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. London: Trübner & Co. 1871.

WE begin with an expression of wonder at the patience of the learned translator of this bulky volume, treating of a question though interesting enough in itself, yet, in these times, slightly regarded by the greater number of men. Those Anglicans who busy themselves with the possible

recognition of their singular claims by Russia will, we fear, be somewhat disappointed by it, for the story it tells can be to them of no particular comfort; in some respects it must remind them too much of their own domestic misery. The Patriarch Nicon lived, and probably died, in his errors, but he did not hold all the errors of his successors in Moscow, and rejected many held in England. He could resist sin and suffer for his resistance, but how far he merited by the way he suffered is a question which cannot be solved. He was outside the Church, but nevertheless he held some principles which men in a safer condition have not, we do not say held, but always respected. Most men hold some truths amidst the mass of errors which disfigure their reason, and in some the truth prevails and banishes the errors at last; but it cannot be said that this process is common. The good seed is too often choked by the briars and thorns, which grow so rapidly and do so much mischief.

The Patriarch Nicon suffered persecution, that is true; but as it is not the act of dying, but the cause, which makes martyrs, so persecution by itself is not a proof that it is persecution on account of justice. There were Jansenist bishops in France who suffered because they defended certain true principles, while bishops of unsuspected orthodoxy proved more pliable, and yielded to the unjust demands of the king. So far as the former suffered for the sake of justice, so far we must sympathize with them; but, for all that, we must side, however unpleasant the company, with the more courtly bishops who preserved the faith, and who were on the whole more obedient to the Sovereign Shepherd of our Saviour's flock.

Nicon's troubles, no doubt, were brought about by his belief in certain true principles, and so far we must respect him. The Emperor of Russia also had his principles, and one of them was that he was the fountain of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. He therefore,

"in contravention of the divine canons, took away the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and ordered that both we ourselves [Nicon], and the bishops, and the archimandrites and hegoumens, and all the sacred order, should be judged by people of his own courts, as now also is done in the sight of all." (p. 104.)

Nicon protested against the Tzar's proceedings, but Nicon's protest was too late, and in his mouth of no force. The Emperor took away what he had given, neither more nor less; and though it be unhandsome in a man to recall his gifts, yet it is often done, and law generally allows it, and Nicon should have thought of this when he consented to accept the Patriarchate from the Tzar. He was the creature of the civil power, and, indeed, the very title he bore of Patriarch was the invention of the civil power and of schismatical bishops. He was no Patriarch at all.

It is objected to Nicon that the Emperor committed to him "the supervision of all ecclesiastical causes and judgments." To this Nicon replies, but he does not answer the objection. He is in a position in which the true answer is impossible; but it is more probable that he did not know what the true answer would be, even if his position had been other than it was. He replies in these words:—

"It was not the Tzar that committed to Nicon this authority; it was the grace of the Holy Ghost which committed it to him." (p. 206.)

It is manifest that the poor Patriarch confounded orders with jurisdiction, and held that the latter was transmitted together with the former. He was made, or elected, Patriarch of Moscow, but there was no confirmation of his election other than the approbation or consent of the Emperor; and certainly whatever jurisdiction he borrowed must have been committed to him by the civil power, unless it can be held that jurisdiction came together with orders, which doctrine is simple anarchy.

Nicon's knowledge of law and history is no doubt scanty, and theology also was not among his acquired sciences. But he had a great acquaintance with certain books of his own schism, and of these he makes abundant and even appropriate use. Whenever he travels beyond the bounds of Russia he falls, and makes the most extravagant statements. According to him, there are or were "five heads of the hierarchy." He then goes on as follows :—

"And originally the highest was the Pope of Rome. And when the Pope died, then, by the counsel and election of the four Œcumenical Patriarchs, another instead of the one deceased was appointed to the Apostolic Chair. In like manner when any of the four Patriarchs died, thereupon, by counsel of the Pope of Rome, and by election of the three Patriarchs, a fourth Patriarch was appointed. But when the Pope of Rome fell into heresy, from that time the Pope is excluded from the fellowship of the four Œcumenical Patriarchs, and from the usual commemoration. And after him the primate is the Œcumenical Patriarch of Constantinople." (p. 230.)

So singular a statement, even in the mouth of a schismatic, may create some surprise; but it is perhaps the best account he could give of a fact which must have been troublesome to him. Nicon could know nothing of the election of a Pope, and he is probably guessing at facts in the light of his own imagination. He never understood apparently what the Papacy is, and was in complete ignorance of the nature of the office as well as of the way in which the Popes are chosen. The Oriental Patriarchs, as such, have not, and never have had, any share whatever, directly or indirectly, in a Papal election. The Roman Church elects her own bishop, without reference to any Patriarch, and the bishop so elected is the Pope. The Papacy is a dignity or office annexed to the Roman episcopate, and men have discussed the question before now whether the Pope could not dissever the Papacy from the See of Rome, and transfer it elsewhere. It is the successor of Peter in the See of Rome who is the Pope. The Eastern Patriarchs had, therefore, nothing to say to the election of the Bishop of Rome, any more than they had to say to that of Toledo, and never gave any counsel in the matter. As for the "heresy" of the Pope, that needs no discussion nor even observation.

Then, again, it is strange that Nicon, who throughout the work before us quotes the Canons of Councils, and speaks with reverence of the decrees of the Fathers, should have been so ignorant of the doctrine of the Sacrament of Orders. His adversary, who seems to have had a Western training before he lapsed into schism, taunted him with his sin of being reordained. Nicon admits the fact, and seems wholly unconscious of the sacrilege. He throws the guilt, if any, on the bishops who ordained him, and speaks of the iniquity as if *he were simply* an injured and innocent man. Nicon was a bishop

before he was made Patriarch, so there was no necessity for his second consecration. He seems thoroughly unconscious of the sinful act in which he was a willing evil-doer. These are his words:—

"But as respects my election to the Patriarchate, it was not of my desire or seeking; for it is certainly improper that a bishop who is advanced to a higher grade should be reordained by imposition of hands. Not that I condemned, God knows, my former consecration. Wherefore this concerns those who lay on their hands; and it might be well if they would keep themselves blameless, and so not bring those upon whom they have laid hands into trouble." (p. 13.)

The poor man does not show the slightest sign that he was as guilty as the others; in fact, he was more guilty, for he was then Patriarch, and might have dispensed, at least, with the sacrilegious act. His defence is, that he did not despise his original consecration, forgetting, or not knowing, that the "despising" is involved in the act, and that his predecessors in the Patriarchate had been guilty of the same sin. "Many bishops before me have received a second consecration to the Metropolitan Chair of Russia." So much the worse, then, for the Metropolitan Chair.

Though Nicon had quarrelled with the Emperor and resisted his authority, he nevertheless admitted that he was subject to him even in spiritual things. He quotes and allows without a protest the act by which Moscow was made a Patriarchate; it is to him the "act of the holy fathers." (p. 53.) Well, we read there the following astounding confession of the Oriental bishops:—

"And though he could have decreed by his own authority, as Tzar and Autocrat, to erect a chair of the highest Patriarchal rank, he nevertheless was pleased to submit himself to the will of God as revealed in the canons of the holy Apostles and holy fathers and to the advice of the bishops." (p. 45.)

If Nicon held the doctrine taught in this passage,—which he clearly did,—it is impossible to defend him. The Emperor was his chief and master, for if he could erect a Patriarchal chair, he could also have suppressed it, as Peter the Great did at a later time. Nicon knew he was a priest, and it is on his priesthood, not on his jurisdiction, that he relies when he thus defends himself against "the encroachments" of the Tzar; but the Tzar never attempted to exercise the functions of a priest, and was satisfied with the exercise of his supreme jurisdiction, which Nicon really confessed to belong to him. He denies, nevertheless, that the Tzar had any jurisdiction over the Patriarch (pp. 192, 193), but we cannot see how that denial can be made good; it is precisely of the nature of a like denial made by Anglicans when they rise up from time to time against the exercise of the Queen's spiritual jurisdiction over them.

If the Patriarch's arguments are not always strong, his language is clear enough. He addresses a bishop who has disobeyed him and resisted his authority, because he preferred the higher authority of the Tzar, in this way:—

"'O thou fool.' 'If thou knowest not where thy father Anti-Christ is to be born.' Hear, thou forger of lies.' (p. 68.) 'And so, O answerer, thy

lewd and lying rhetoric.' (p. 125.) 'Thou, wretched man and unrighteous man-pleaser, rushest like a hog against God's commandments.' (p. 287.) 'O thou opposer of God and blasphemer of the Gospel.' (p. 417.) 'O thou apostate from God and subverter of the evangelical commandments.'" (p. 472.) In short, language of the same kind is plentifully sprinkled through the Replies.

Mr. Palmer has undoubtedly rendered a great service by his admirable translation. In that he has given us materials hitherto unknown for judging of the interior spirit of schismatics. He seems to sympathize more with Nicon than we do; but it must be remembered that he has no equal in his knowledge of the history of the Russian Church, and nobody can detest its slavish submission to the Emperor more than he does. It is but natural that he should be glad if he can meet with an honest man anywhere; and whatever faults we may seem to detect in Nicon's character, it cannot be denied that he was honest, according to his probable lights.

We regret to find in a note (p. 216) that Mr. Palmer believes in the Arian story of Constantine's baptism, and that he rejects the constant and invariable tradition of the Roman Church. We should have been glad if we had the weight of Mr. Palmer's authority on our side, and we must therefore regret that his learning and persuasive rhetoric become another element in the case which the opponents of the Roman tradition have to maintain.

But in taking leave of Mr. Palmer, we must not leave unnoticed the clear analytical Index which he has made of the whole book, and which must have given him no inconsiderable trouble. Indeed, no one can in any measure understand what a labour it was who does not test the Index. Many parts of it are so full that reading it seems almost like reading the text, which is so lucidly analyzed and so admirably condensed.

The last Twelve Verses of the Gospel according to S. Mark vindicated against recent Critical Objectors, and established. By JOHN W. BURGON, B.D. Oxford and London: James Parker & Co. 1871.

THIS able work was briefly noticed in our number for October of last year. Mr. Burgon, however, has done such good service to the cause of true Biblical criticism, both on his immediate subject and in a much wider sphere, that we are glad to give a little more attention to his argument and to place it somewhat more fully before our readers.

The last twelve verses of S. Mark's Gospel contain some precious truths, which Christians should be jealous of losing, but which, there is little doubt, have really had the effect of reconciling certain Christians to the total rejection of the passage that contains them. We do not allude to the apparitions narrated in that passage, nor to the account of the Ascension. There is a condemnation in v. 16 which is too strong for the Broad Church, and there is a prophecy in vv. 17 and 18 which is abominable to the Rationalists.

"He that believeth not shall be damned." "If it be acknowledged," says Dean Stanley, in his Essay in the "Contemporary," on the Athanasian Creed (August, 1870), "that the passage has a harsh sound, unlike the usual utterances of Him who came not to condemn but to save, the discoveries of later times have shown, almost beyond doubt, that it is not a part of S. Mark's Gospel, but an addition by another hand." With Dean Stanley agree Archbishop Thomson, Professor Norton, in his useful work on "The Genuineness of the Gospels," Professor Westcott in his "Introduction," and perhaps most of the popular text-books; and the text-books only follow the lead of those who undertake to be thorough critics, such as Tischendorf, Tregelles, and Dean Alford. As for Dr. Tischendorf, since great critics are, after all, but mortal men, it was hardly to be doubted which side he would fight for when he found that his own grand discovery, the Codex Sinaiticus, agreed with the celebrated MS. in the Vatican in omitting the contested passage. However, we are not sure that Mr. Burgon does not exaggerate in some degree the number and authority of his opponents. He admits that the Rev. F. H. Scrivener, whom he calls the "best living master of Biblical criticism," is on his side, with Bishop Ellicott and Bishop Wordsworth. He might also have added that the formidable Dr. Davidson, who disputes everything, considers the *external* evidence to be in favour of the authenticity of the passage;* though, as Dr. Davidson, in his last edition, has seen fit to assign the Gospel of S. Mark to the second century, Mr. Burgon perhaps objects to accept a gift from him.

If we say that this interesting volume is here and there fanciful, and sometimes exaggerated, we shall not thereby be denying that it is full of sound learning and strong criticism. Mr. Burgon has followed out arguments that Scrivener had used before, and he has been preceded in some of his observations by Wordsworth; but he has hit upon one or two new and telling lines of argument, and has worked out others until they really have the force of fresh discoveries. In fact, his book is much more than a defence of Mark xvi. 9–20. His remarks on the superstition of trusting altogether to the oldest codices merely because they are the oldest as to paper and ink, have a bearing on other controversies besides the one which is his immediate subject. So have his animadversions on the authority of Patristic citations. He is very happy in showing up the "follow-my-leader" style in which rationalistic critics have reproduced the shortcomings of Griesbach and the blunders of Scholtz. And perhaps the most original part of his labours is his research, leading in some cases to novel results, into the subject of Church lectionaries and Church usage generally, as connected with the text of the New Testament. Let us briefly analyze his treatment of one or two of these subjects.

Mr. Burgon is not a novice in the matter of codices. Not to speak of the British Museum, M. de Wailly, of the Imperial library, seems to know him, and he is not a stranger to the Vatican and F. Vercellone. Like most Anglican textualists, Mr. Burgon has had his grumble at the Vatican authorities and their dealings with Codex B. If we do not mistake, he published, in 1860, in the "Guardian" newspaper, a series of letters, written in

* "New Testament," ii. 116.

Rome, in which he was very severe on Cardinal Mai, and for which he was rebuked by Vercellone himself. However, in what he says about the Vatican codex itself, Vercellone would nearly agree with him. "Codex B comes to us without a history; without recommendation of any kind, except that of its antiquity. It bears traces of careless transcription on every page. The mistakes which the original transcriber made are of perpetual occurrence." And then he quotes Vercellone,—"They are chiefly omissions, of one, two, or three words; but sometimes of half a verse, a whole verse, or even of several verses. . . . . I hesitate not to assert that it would be easier to find a folio containing three or four such omissions than to light on one which should be without any." This translation slightly misrepresents Vercellone. He is saying that the mistakes of the copyist are, indeed, very numerous, "*but*," he adds, "they nearly all consist of simple omissions, &c."* His view is that it is one of those exemplars of which S. Jerome complains, in which the scribe cared more for the writing and the handsome get-up of the book than for its correctness. So that there are plenty of errors, but no trace of wilful perversion. Mr. Burgon testifies, apparently from personal inspection, that there are many repetitions as well as omissions. "What, then," he asks, "are the grounds of the superstitious reverence which is entertained in certain quarters for the readings of Codex B?" And the lately-found treasure, the Sinaitic MS., is spoken of in quite as plain a fashion. It "abounds with errors of the eye and pen, to an extent not unparalleled, but happily unusual in documents of first-rate importance. On many occasions ten, twenty, thirty, forty words are dropped through very carelessness. Letters and words, even whole sentences, are frequently written twice over, or begun and immediately cancelled; while that gross blunder . . . . whereby a clause is omitted because it happens to end in the same words as the clause preceding, occurs no less than one hundred and fifteen times in the New Testament." Mr. Burgon, indeed, goes so far as to assert that both the Vatican and the Sinaitic have been *designedly* corrupted and interpolated. After the complete exhibition of the untrustworthiness of the two MSS. in any matter in which they are contradicted by other authority, it is a little startling to find that, after all, it is not quite accurate to say, without qualification, that Codex B omits the last twelve verses of St. Mark.

"It requires to be stated in addition, that the scribe, whose plan is found to have been to begin every fresh book of the Bible at the top of *the next ensuing* column to that which contained the concluding words of the preceding book, has at the close of St. Mark's Gospel deviated from his else invariable practice. He has left in this place one column entirely vacant. It is *the only vacant column* in the whole manuscript; a blank space *abundantly sufficient to contain the twelve verses which he nevertheless withheld. Why* did he leave that column vacant? What can have induced the scribe on this solitary occasion to depart from his established rule? The phenomenon—(I believe I was the first to call distinct attention to it)—is in the highest degree significant, and admits of only one interpretation. *The older*

* Vercellone, "Dissertazioni Accademiche," p. 125.

MS. from which Codex B was copied must have infallibly *contained* the twelve verses in dispute. The copyist was instructed to leave them out, and he obeyed; but he prudently left a blank space *in memoriam rei*. Never was blank more intelligible! Never was silence more eloquent! . . . . . By *leaving room* for the verses it omits, the Vatican Codex brings into prominent notice at the end of fifteen centuries and a half, a more *ancient witness than itself*." (p. 87.)

Mr. Burgon clears up, for the first time, several patristic difficulties with regard to the controverted passage. Mr. Scrivener had already questioned the title of Gregory of Nyssa to the authorship of one well-known testimony on the negative side.* But the reasoning by which Mr. Burgon disposes of the evidence of Eusebius is in great measure his own. The reader who wishes to understand the full weight of the author's argument will have to compare two different parts of the work, viz. chap. v., in which he examines the passage in which Eusebius seems to say that the passage is not in the "accurate" copies, and the conclusion of chap. xi., in which he arrives, in a way at once ingenious and convincing, at the exact meaning of the terms used by Eusebius. For our own part, we confess that we found chap. xi. the most interesting portion of the work. It is always satisfactory to "account for" a phenomenon that seems to contradict your views—even after your views have been invincibly established. Mr. Burgon finds an explanation of the admitted fact that the last twelve verses of S. Mark were absent from many copies of the New Testament at a very early date, in the history of the Lectionary system of the Church. The Holy Scriptures having been publicly read in the churches from the very earliest times, it is natural to find traces of this practice in some, at least, of the extant codices of the Scriptures. It is not known at what period separate "Lectionaries" began to be made and used. The oldest extant example is of the eighth century. But a Lectionary would necessarily be a very perishable book, and therefore it is by no means certain there were not such things at a much earlier period. And whether there were or not, it is certain that existing codices show by ocular demonstration that they have been used as reading-books, or copied from books that had been so used. Mr. Burgon proves that all five of our primary uncial MSS. show traces of "depravation" throughout by the operation of the ancient Lectionary system. There are insertions in them, there are omissions, and there are traces of rubrical directions, which are only explicable on some such hypothesis, but easily explicable when it is granted. For example, the two verses of S. Luke's Gospel which describe our Lord's Agony and bloody sweat (xxii. 43–4) are missing from Codex B and Codex A. Now it is found, by examination of existing *Evangelistaria*, that these two verses, as to whose authenticity there has never been any doubt, are actually omitted from the lesson for the Tuesday after Sexagesima, whilst they are retained in the lesson for the Thursday in Holy Week. The truth is, that they were always skipped by the reader (even when not omitted in the text) on the former day. And the scribes of those two ancient MSS., or some earlier scribe, evidently left them

* "Introduction," p. 431.

out for some reason founded on this Lectionary practice—perhaps from a desire to conform to the Church Lesson for a certain day. Take, again, the very singular omission, on the part of Codex B and Codex D (the *Codex Bezæ* in the University Library at Cambridge) of our Lord's Prayer for his executioners (Luke xxiii. 34), "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." It is explained by the fact that in the Eastern Church "the Lection for the Thursday after Sexagesima breaks off abruptly, immediately after these very words,—to recommence at v. 44." It is this way that so many versions differ in their introduction of liturgical formulas ("it came to pass," and the like), of the Sacred Name, and of various connecting words. Mr. Burgon, indeed, seems almost to assert that whenever a MS. contains an admitted error, you are warranted in suspecting, in default of other explanation, that the Lectionary system has been to blame; especially if the error be an omission. Now, it is certain that the "Lectio Evangelii" for the second Sunday after Easter, in the Oriental Church, ends, and has ended from time immemorial, with Mark xvi. 8. An important result seems to have followed from this. It was usual to indicate the beginning of a Lection by the word ἀρχή, contracted in some way, and written in red ink in the margin; and to mark the conclusion, there was a corresponding contraction of τέλος, not in the margin, but in the body of the text, the better to attract the reader's attention. It is true that such indications are met with chiefly, almost wholly, in cursive MSS. of a comparatively late date; but there are not wanting indications that, occasionally, τελος (or το τελος) was written in the margin of copies of the Gospels at an exceedingly remote period. Mr. Burgon's suggestion then is this. Some copyist—one of those of whom S. Jerome complains as caring more for penmanship than for accuracy—has seen this isolated liturgical note at the end of the Lection terminating Mark xvi. 8; and has hastily concluded it was the *end of the Gospel*. Mr. Burgon goes into the subject at length, and gives the results of his own investigations in innumerable MSS. He states, among other things, that he examined ninety-nine codices in the Imperial Library at Paris, and found that nearly every one of them had the τελος in this place, even when they had it hardly anywhere else. Mr. Burgon pushes the application of his hypothesis still farther. He goes back to the passage in Eusebius, in which that Father is considered to say that "the accurate copies place the end of Mark's history" at xvii. 8, and on examining the terminology of the author he finds that his expression is a little peculiar. He does not say —or rather he does not offer as a solution — that Mark's Gospel *ends* at xvi. 8, but that, "in certain copies here τὸ τέλος περιγέγραπται," "the τέλος is circumscribed." This peculiar expression, which is twice repeated with only a change of inflexion in the course of five lines, seems to make it certain that Eusebius does not by any means state that S. Mark's Gospel came to an end in the greater number of ancient copies at xvi. 8. This fact is the more important, because to get rid of Eusebius is to get rid of S. Jerome also. S. Jerome has evidently copied Eusebius, without taking the trouble to add or alter a word on his own account, except that he has a little exaggerated what he says. What S. Jerome says, therefore, is in the *first place not his own*—and it is well known that he habitually dictated to

his numerous correspondents answers that were not his own,—and in the second place, it falls with the text of Eusebius.

We cannot follow Mr. Burgon further, though his book is full of interest. It is difficult to do him justice in a notice, because in matters of this kind accumulation of evidence is everything. But there are few books that have lately appeared which will give the average student such an intelligent interest in textual criticism of the New Testament, and so much sound method and accurate information, as the one we are noticing. One especially valuable piece of advice the author is fond of insisting upon. The text of the Scriptures is not by any means to be settled exclusively by old codices. Since the science of text-criticism was created by the genius of a Montfaucon or a Mabillon, and by the labours of a Mill or a Bengel, materials and results have accumulated so rapidly, that the text of the New Testament is as unsettled as ever. Dr. Tischendorf, after spending a lifetime in editing Testaments and Codices, finds the Cod. Sinaiticus, and reverses one quarter of his former conclusions. Tregelles in great degree impairs the value of a gigantic labour by working on the narrow canon of using no MSS. but three or four of the most ancient. Well may Mr. Scrivener admit that "much remains to be done in this department of biblical learning."* While so much remains to be done, students should be warned not to pin their faith to the crotchets of any editor or the theory of any text-constructor. These crotchets and theories are a fertile source of amazement to unprejudiced students. Some of the author's best work is where he shows how wildly such a man as Griesbach could write upon this very passage of S. Mark; and the facts of the critics have to be looked to as well as their theories. With reference to the remark of Tregelles and Tischendorf, that certain "Scholia" give testimony adverse to his own view, Mr. Burgon says (p. 115), "These eminent persons have taken their information at second-hand,—partly from Griesbach, partly from Scholtz,—without suspicion, and without inquiry. But then they have slightly misrepresented Scholtz; and Scholtz (1830) slightly misunderstood Griesbach; and Griesbach (1796) took liberties with Wetstein; and Wetstein (1751) made a few serious mistakes." And then he goes on to explain how it all happened. Whilst editors thus disagree, and critics judge critics, the Catholic must always remember that the "usage" of the Church, and her authorized version, the Vulgate, is *his* guide to the integrity and authenticity of the Holy Scripture. As a mere human authority, the Vulgate, considered as a Church document, is perhaps as safe a guide as all the codices put together. But since it is in the nature of things that man's reason, left to itself, should find it as hard to ascertain the letter of Holy Writ as to make out its true sense, therefore it is reasonable that God should have left, as He has left, a guardian of His Word in the Church. We must hold that the Vulgate contains all holy Scripture, and that it contains only Holy Scripture. Phrases, words, collocations may here and there be erroneous,—that is to say, may not be the exact reproductions of the first original; but no error in substance or in integrity, much more no error in

* "Introduction," p. 6.

doctrine, can be admitted to have crept into the version which the Church has put into our hands. But we have no space, at the end of a notice, to attempt an exposition of the authority due to the Vulgate.

Conversion of the Teutonic Race. Conversion of the Franks and the English. By Mrs. Hope. Edited by the Rev. John Bernard Dalgairns. Washbourne: 1872.

THE appearance of this volume, anxiously looked for by all who knew of its forthcoming, is a genuine harbinger of good to English Catholics. In the first place it is good in itself, possessing considerable literary merit; then it fills up a blank, which has never yet been occupied, to the generality of readers; and, lastly and beyond all, it forms one of the few Catholic books brought out in this country which are not translations or adaptations from across the Channel. It is a growth of individual intellectual labour, fed from original sources, and fused by the polish of a cultivated and discerning mind.

It begins, too, at once, without preface or introduction, with ("Old Germany") the splitting of the great Japhetian, or Aryan family, somewhere and somewhen in the Hindù-Koosh; and, leaving its Eastern branch, with its artificial ripeness of civilization, in the fertile regions of India, follows the five families of the Western branch—the Greeks, Romans, Kelts, Germans, and Slaves. Of these, as all schoolboys know, the Greeks and Romans alone retained the borrowed civilization of India and Egypt, while the three latter rapidly fell into complete barbarism. The Germans especially so completely lost all knowledge of the antediluvian lore of their ancestors, that they called themselves "Thiuda," or earth-born; and, with those same practical but not elevating tendencies which we recognize in ourselves, occupied their time in war, hunting, tilling the ground, building huts, spinning linen and woollen, and tanning hides. At the same time—and again we discern our legitimate ancestry—their laws were well organized, thoroughly national and local; their family relations noble, tender, and pure; and the whole of society framed round a great reverence for, and loyal devotion to, women. "While the man was honoured for his deeds of strength, the woman was looked up to with reverence, or even awe, as the seat of wisdom." (p. 12.)

"The German wife was not, like her Eastern sister, the mere slave of her husband's will and pleasure, nor, like the Roman matron, only the mistress of his house and the nurse of his children, but she was his tenderly-cherished companion, confidante, and adviser. Her wedding gifts were a yoke of oxen, a horse, and a spear, to show that she was to help her husband in his field labours, to follow him to war, to mediate between contending hosts, to excite his courage in the hour of battle, to bind his wounds, to bury him, and, if needs be, *to avenge him.*" (p. 13.)

Again, in the following passage, Mrs. Hope admirably unravels the germ, or motive, of that purely German self-government, so puzzling to the Latin branch of the Teutonic family, which has produced such remarkable results.

"The great problem of government—how to unite personal independence with submission to authority—never appeared more difficult of solution than with the Germans. One sees a fierce, proud, self-willed race, wandering for long ages through boundless space, free as the air they breathed, wild as the beasts among whom they dwelt, revelling in the excitement of war and pillage, their very mien and bearing, their flowing locks, and bodies naked in battle, proclaiming their intolerance of restraint. Yet this uncontrollable race is found to submit with strange inconsistency to the daily, petty trammels of communistic life, and to respect, in a remarkable degree, the rights of their fellows and the traditionary law of their tribe. Two of their characteristics explain this curious anomaly. One was their warm affections, which gave greater strength to the natural ties of nationality and kindred. . . . They were incapable of compulsory obedience, but they could devote themselves to the object of their love. The other was their susceptibility to religious impressions, and the strong hold their religion was calculated to have on their daily life." (p. 15.)

And this same keynote of

"Be not like dumb cattle driven,"

explains also many of our own special difficulties and virtues.

An interesting chapter on "the invasions" of the Cimbri and Teutones also points out how forbearing and averse to bloodshed were these heathen strangers when they, as it were, knocked at the gates of the Roman empire in countless multitudes, asking only for settlements of land. How, under the consul Papirius, when victorious, they forbore to exterminate the Roman army, and again, under the consul Silanus, who lost army, camp, and life; and once again under Cneius Mallius, they sent petitions to the Senate for land, and when refused, turned their arms to wrest it from the Kelts instead of from Roman subjects. From this time, 102 B.C., when the Germans forced the Alps and settled in the northern Italian plains, reckoning their loss of 500,000 men in the first war with Rome as dust in the balance, they steadily advanced for the next five hundred years, and convinced the wisest Romans that the days of their great empire were numbered. And then occurred that most wonderful of all victories—the conquest of the conquerors—which was seen in our own country, on a small scale, after the invasion of the Normans. The laws of Rome fully obtained in the remote German provinces; Roman castles, towns, and cities spread along the network of magnificent roads; Roman schools taught the German youth a foreign language and civilization, and the distances from the Black Sea to the Northern Ocean were equally measured from the old milestone in the Roman Capitol. The very name of Rome even was as a ruling spirit.

"When Tiberius was encamped on the Elbe, an old chief crossed the river in his bark canoe, and asked to see him whom they called Cæsar. After contemplating Tiberius for some time in silence, he departed, declaring that this was the most glorious day of his life, for hitherto he had heard of gods, *but now* he had seen them." (p. 42.)

No wonder at the conscious pride in the words, echoed from a deeper secret of joy in our own hearts, "*Civis Romanus sum.*"

We could gladly linger over the chapters of the conversion of Sicamber, baptized as Clovis, St. Benedict, and the hermits of France, when the very wickedness and insolent cruelty of society drove religion into the wilderness, there to take fresh root and bring forth new fruits to the Church. This account ("Life springing out of Decay") of the development of spiritual life under the Merovingian kings, is one of the most valuable portions of Mrs. Hope's work.

The chief charm of this book, however, to ourselves, is the manner in which the one great lesson is conveyed by the clear narrative itself, not by engrafted preaching, of the indwelling Presence guiding, protecting, and multiplying the Church. Whether underlying or coming to the service of the world's history; whether ruling or obeying, encouraging or rebuking the great ones of the earth; or whether in exile and martyrdom, we have seen no narrative of its dimensions that more transparently delineates the character and office of the saints and special servants of God. They are truthfully represented as they lived and worked, with their greatness and their faults still intermingled, the miracles they wrought not explained away, their mistakes not apologized for; and the whole text of the book may be read by the key given in the words of wisdom quoted of S. Remi when Clovis was complained of—probably by some "scandalized" brethren—"*We should pardon much to one who has so widely spread the faith, and been the saviour of so many provinces.*" With this lesson so continually repeated and in such abundant variety before our eyes, we need never weary ourselves with anxieties whether the Church is moulded now as it was in the middle ages, or as it sprang into birth in the primitive times. Some men have a tendency to mourn over the diminution of old monastic houses; to look with suspicion upon new growth; to spend their time, means, and energies upon revivals of mediæval or primitive forms, usages, or externals. Whatever strays beyond the limits of their ideal, seems to them erroneous, mischievous, or out of place. This temper of mind is surely more likely to become narrow and rigid than resting in the thought that however it may diverge from past characteristics, the Church of our own age is as divinely informed with the presence of the Paraclete, moulding it as He wills for the time being.

It is scarcely necessary to say that Mrs. Hope has benefited by an unusual advantage in the editorship of Father Dalgairns, whose name is a full warrant for the accuracy of the references, besides adding a singular general value to the work.

The Switzers. By William Hepworth Dixon. Hurst & Blackettt. 1872.

We are no admirers of Mr. Hepworth Dixon. His assumptions, assurance, and flippant, bombastic style, so often further defaced by gross coarseness, are glaring faults, which offend us in nearly

every page of his books. It cannot, however, be denied that, Mr. Dixon opens his readers' minds to new fields of thought, and suggests farther possible regions still unexplored; and this is no small merit in any writer. Many of our readers will remember, when reading Mr. Dixon's "America," that they got up from its perusal with the feeling we have described,—that very much that was entirely new and unthought of had been suggested for their consideration. The same fact is even more signally true of his last work, "The Switzers," in which much information is given which it behoves us, above all other European peoples, to look into and apply to our own benefit. This book, with what we may call its Dixonian want of simplicity of title—for why not Swiss, as all the world calls them?—has no story, but a slight framework of two shadowy personages, meant to signify the Celtic and Teutonic types of "Switzer"—Sister Agnes and the Bernese engineer, and it is well to say at once that the theory is assumed throughout that the Celtic (or Catholic) Swiss are good for little or nothing; while the Teutonic (or Protestant) Swiss will carry all the world before them. We cannot but at once express an emphatic opinion that in that case Switzerland will become a most unpleasant place of abode.

"Fair types of South and North, of Celtic and Teutonic Switzerland, are these companions of the way—the girl from Sion and the man from Berne; one warm and feminine, with a drooping brow, and eyes that wait on nature and solicit saintly help; the other strong and masculine, with head thrown back, and eyes that peer into the granite, and rely on man's own wit and strength. The girl, with rosary hanging from her girdle, is a servant of the Cross; the man, with mallet in his lifted hand, a genuine son of Thor."

Although he does not say so in words, Mr. Dixon leaves us to assume that to his mind the religion of Thor, *i.e.* natural heathenism, is much the best and grandest of the two.

He associates this sentiment with one, implying the ridicule which his model progressist would naturally feel for the virtue of chastity, the beauty of modesty, the vow of celibacy—liberally generalized by him as "all that nonsense,"—which is quite worthy of it. It is unutterably coarse and offensive, and indicates a state of mind not only loathsome to us, but puzzling, as existing in a man who really possesses some culture, though he pretends to much more than he has.

The shadowy engineer, however, is made to utter in the end many real truths that it is well worth our while to hear, and the actual facts given go far to prove how and why it is that among the many pseudo-republics, commonwealths, and democracies of the world, whose name has been nothing but a delusion and a snare, Switzerland has always been and still remains a republic pure and simple in heart and act.

"We want good men, not great men. . . . . A republic is a league of equals, not a company of general officers and men-at-arms. . . . . We are a band of brothers, but without an eldest-born. Our rule is, all for each and each for all—the oath of Grütli. . . . . All teaching has with us this end in view, that no one shall grow up into a man till he has learnt to rank the public weal above his private gain."

That this is no empty boast is sufficiently proved in those chapters of this book which give statistics of Swiss education, the point above all others upon which we should at present fix our earnest attention. "In Switzerland, the primary business of the State is keeping school"; and much we wish that "Dame Europa" would throughout seriously take to heart that it is the primary business of all states, and not whipping-up majorities in parliament, or practising how most successfully to job the greatest amount of public money. "School comes to the Swiss man in his cradle and attends him to his grave," and this is proved by the significant fact that wherever there is a hamlet containing twenty boys and girls, there the mayor must provide a school and hire a master. These are the Communal schools, Primary and Secondary. After them rank the Burgher schools, and next beyond these again the Cantonal. The Polytechnic School in Zürich is considered to be a model school of practical life. Basel, Berne, Zürich, Neufchâtel, Geneva, Vaud, Luzern, St. Gallen, and Ticino, have each a separate university of their own; and hearing this, let us with shame contrast our own struggles and failures in Dublin in this respect, and our total nonentity and blank in Great Britain. Can it be that our whole British Catholic body can assume to be poorer, fewer in numbers, or less in intelligence, energy, and determination, than one poor little Swiss canton—say that of Vaud, or than one single Swiss town? Truly may Mr. Dixon say, "No people in the world can boast of so many seats of learning in proportion to their numbers as the Switzers can." There are internecine difficulties of course, as there must always—and we had almost said—as ought always to exist, for neither does religion best flourish in a tideless and saltless ocean.

"The Jesuits and their party put religion first; and if they had their way, would make it first and last. The liberals bring democracy to the front; and some among them, if they had their way, would make it all in all."

Curiously enough, Mr. Dixon mentions a late instance of one of these very strifes in Zürich which ended well for the coming population of that busy, bright, and most stirring little city. A new girls' school was the *casus belli*, and the clerical party and the liberal party came to words as to where it should be built.

"'Let us build this school for females near the Minster,' said the clerical party, 'for the female mind is more susceptible than the male; and if we keep the women, we shall always have the men.' The radical party met them with a counter cry: 'No more connexion of the Church and school: the clergy have no business in the class-room: let us build on neutral ground—beyond the ancient walls, among the vineyards, in the sunshine.' . . . . The war of words grew hot; elections turned upon it; till the clerical party got the sober people, known as *pères de famille*, on their side. These fathers said their girls should grow beneath the shadow of the Minster; it was better for them; it was more respectable. . . . . And so the school was built on the ancient cloisters, round the graves of venerable monks. A slice of public ground was added from the public square."

The *pères de famille*, be it observed, did not agree with Mr. Dixon; they had the bad taste to prefer the Cross to Thor. We give this extract to show, as others in this volume bear witness, that where the religious element in a

state is energetic and determined, it is able to fight its own way and make its own standing. *If we chose* to do it, that is, there is nothing to hinder us from bringing our London-Irish Arabs to feel like the Genevese Arabs, that exclusion from school is a serious blow to them and to their whole worldly future.

"Our city Arabs drop their nature when they come to school. Our laws are strict, and we enforce them with the utmost zeal. Our law declares that every child has a right to come to school. We punish by refusing him his seat. At six a boy should come to us of right and claim his place. . . . . After they have got their seats, they may be sent away for bad behaviour in the school and on the way to school. *A child is made to feel that coming to the school is like the going to a palace and a church.*

"But some of them must come in filth and rags? Yes, some; not many and not long. For dirt is but the habit of the eye, and habits of the eye are quickly changed. . . . . A mother gets ashamed on finding that some other woman has to wash her child. The child too gets ashamed, for all the little lads about him are as clean as new-shelled peas. No boy has ever to be washed three times."

In the Primary Schools every grade is mixed; the sons of professional men are found next to those of cabmen, and in a class at Zürich of fifty-two boys there were lately found twenty-one sons of shopkeepers, ten of merchants, two of professors, and the rest of all grades down to that of a day-labourer and "clothes-cleaner."

"No bodily pain, no bodily shame, is suffered in our schools. We cannot stint the boy's food; we cannot lock him up; we cannot put him in a corner; we cannot lay him on his back; we cannot crown him with a dunce's cap; we cannot make a guy of him, even though his parents should request us to employ such means. . . . . Our means are prizes—smiles, good words, good notes; all leading up to public acts of honour, when the more deserving pupils are the heroes of their time. Desire to win a prize has more effect than fear of punishment in keeping scholars out of mischief."

That the Swiss are entirely justified in these methods is proved by all who have studied human nature, and especially the nature of children. Once let the respect which is due to every creature be intermitted, and self-respect in its higher sense be thus broken down, and the debasement and demoralization of the character has set in. And that they are right also in another of their maxims, experience of children, prisoners, and difficult classes fully bears out; "It takes time to play pranks, and continuous work is the best means of staving off mischief." Even in the Primary Schools there are six "degrees," or what we should call forms. The first comprises reading, writing, and accounts, i. e. picture and object lessons and spelling; writing "pothooks and hangers," addition and subtraction up to twenty, and singing. The second opens with lessons on morals, natural history, the laws of health, and historical events. These four subjects are continued, with developments, up to the end of the course. Reading and tone are now advanced; writing is carried into small type, and in accounts the addition and subtraction go up to a thousand. French is also taught grammatically, and singing goes on. The third degree (besides the four subjects) advances

the reading carefully. Fine copies are written, and the four rules of arithmetic studied; French grammar and vocabulary are learned; drawing is taught, and singing continued. The fourth class, after the four subjects, gives studies in very careful reading and pronunciation, and in writing from dictation; French goes into etymology, and drawing advances to round models and groups of forms. Geography and drill are taught in this form, besides singing. In the fifth class, after the four subjects, reading includes recitation. The writing is from varied copies and dictation; the arithmetic extends to decimal fractions; drawing includes maps and plans; geometry and history are taught, and singing and drill are continued. The sixth and last class comprises the eight former subjects carried to much severer lengths, music, drill, gymnastic exercises, and—in the country schools—agriculture. The school week in Geneva numbers thirty hours; the school year from forty-four to forty-six weeks, and all classes have tasks set them to learn at home. The hours of study in total, including drill and home work, are sometimes twelve a day. Besides the day schools, there are excellent evening schools with the best masters that can be hired, so that any boy beginning at six years old may secure nine full years of excellent instruction before the State has discharged its duties towards him as a citizen.

If at the end of these nine years a Swiss boy—or his parents—aim at higher education, he may go to a Secondary School. The Communes often combine, generally four together, to keep up a Secondary school between them. In them are taught moral and physical science, elocution, higher geography, "civic duties," geometry, &c. Girls are taught how to keep house, and to serve and nurse sick and wounded men.

Next come the Burgher Schools, the highest is the College of Geneva. Any boy may go on entering into the classical or commercial section, as he chooses. The former course extends to seven, the latter to six years. After the final examination, the pupils receive certificates, and may pass on to the university, there to fit themselves for the bar, clerical duties, or professorial chairs, according to their bent. It is deeply painful and significant to learn that the College of Carouge, a Savoyard district annexed to Geneva, which is chiefly intended for Catholic students, has a course of only three years, that the hours of study in the week are fewer, and that the lads passing through the College of Carouge are not prepared for any higher course of study or professional rank.

With a very few exceptions of dwellers in remote isolated mountain-passes and gorges, idiots, and *crétins*,—"all the Swiss, male and female, may be said to read and write, to keep accounts, to sing, to shoot, and take a personal and intelligent part in what concerns the public weal." Several most pregnant facts follow—we should say—as necessary corollaries to the premisses here stated. First, in England and France and Germany, the war-budgets are in excess of the education-budgets as eight, ten, and twelve to one. In Switzerland the annual school-budget is £417,814, the war-budget £399,811; "*yet in Switzerland every man is drilled and armed, and ready to turn out to fight.*" Secondly, the crime-budget, which in this country may now be reckoned annually at £3,000,000, is in Switzerland next to nothing, at all. Where, then, do we, with all our ostentatious pride, stand in the

rank of civilized nations? Surely we did not say in vain, that here *are facts* which we may deeply and earnestly lay to heart. Besides statistics, Mr. Dixon's book gives here and there some other very suggestive hints, as in his third chapter, "Peopling the Alps," which forcibly suggests the value of the human will as a conquering power, and completely answers the often-asked but foolish question: "Of what use is Alpine-scrambling?" "A man who finds a pass and plants his foot upon a peak, secures that pass and peak." A shed is raised, a track is made, a habitation is fixed. The shed in course of time becomes a dwelling and the track a road. Even the very lakes are being drained and planted, and the waste waters which have deluged the valleys are being dried up. Following the civilizing touch of man, the larch gives way to the plum and walnut, and where formerly pines only were found, the vine is now flourishing. Wherever man settles, the growth of corn follows him, and corn is now seen at Pontresina, which is at least 6,000 feet above the level of the sea. "The granite walls of the Splugen, the Lukmaier, the St. Gothard are being tapped, and in a dozen years the railway trains will roll from Hamburg and Vienna through these mountains on their way to Rome."

Let those who have ears to hear and eyes "which bring with them the power of seeing," consider and profit by these facts.

The Universities and Secondary Schools of Ireland, with Proposals for their Improvement. By EDWARD HOWLEY, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Dublin: W. B. Kelly. London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

MR. EDWARD HOWLEY is already most favourably known as the author of a concise history of the English Constitution. His new work on the Universities and Secondary Schools of Ireland exhibits all the merits of his former one—accurate information, thoughtful and conscientious treatment of the subject, as well as a pleasant and interesting style,—while in contending for the right of Ireland's Catholic youth to a religious education, it takes higher and nobler ground, as far higher and nobler as living souls are above statutes and historical documents, as the Church is above the State, and the eternal above the temporal. It is not often that we meet with so much valuable matter, and so many useful suggestions contained within the narrow limits of 162 pages, or placed before us in so agreeable and attractive a dress. For the interest which Mr. Howley has succeeded in throwing round his subject, we are especially grateful, as works upon education are, for the most part, intolerably dry, although there is no reason why they should be so any more than that the speech of a Chancellor of the Exchequer upon the budget should be heavy and uninteresting. We have no doubt, therefore, that Mr. Howley's little

work has found its way into not a few hands which would have hastily dropped or thrown aside many more pretentious publications; indeed, if we may judge from the speeches at the recent education meetings in Ireland, it has served as a sort of mine from which eloquent speakers have dug up, sometimes we fear without acknowledgment, many a telling point and admirable suggestion. However, Mr. Howley is, evidently, no self-interested writer, and will no doubt be glad that the information he has taken so much pains to gather together, has thus been spread over the land, the highest and best interests of which he has so much at heart.

The work contains nineteen chapters, in which the author explains the wants and wishes of Catholics on the education question; contrasts the professors at Trinity College and the Queen's Colleges with those of other universities; points out the maladministration of the public endowment of Trinity College; exposes the low standard of education at the Queen's Colleges, where the entrance examination is less difficult than at Rugby; suggests plans both for secondary schools and university education, and drives home his arguments by examples or warnings from Prussia and France.

We should here mention that Mr. Howley is not in favour of conceding the power of granting degrees to the Catholic University, but he advocates a presiding University Senate, with four sets of affiliated university colleges; namely, the Catholic University, Maynooth College, Trinity College, and the Queen's Colleges.

"In my opinion," he says, "to concede the powers of granting degrees to the Catholic University could not satisfy the Catholic laity; because they are aware that the degrees of the new university would be devised by their Protestant fellow-subjects, and would at least require many years to win due estimation." (pp. 102-3).

In an article of our present number we have explained, that we defer this particular question for future treatment.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is that in which Mr. Howley exposes the shallow scholarship of Trinity College, and the ludicrous failure of the Queen's Colleges. One of the fellows of Trinity, Mr. Mahaffy, has lately affirmed, in the pages of the "Dark Blue," that the system pursued in the examinations (Trinity, Dublin) is peculiar in endeavouring to combine the "critical scholarship of Cambridge, the philosophical scholarship of Oxford, and the comparative philology of the Germans." We need not say how completely this somewhat boastful assertion fades away in Mr. Howley's pages, and how the utterances of the generally "silent sister" are more wonderful even than her silence. The reader will smile at the way in which Professor Barlow teaches history, and will laugh heartily at the scene in which Trinity College is brought up for judgment, and condemned. "During nearly three hundred years of privilege and plethoric endowment, the fellows of Trinity have produced at most half a dozen noteworthy, I will not say celebrated books; the rest being the usual staple of translations, things that make the eyes wink, *somniferous sermons*, and learned lumber." (p. 57.) Yet these are

the men who have had the monopoly of university education in their hands, and who have often cast the charge of ignorance in the face of priests and religious exiled for the faith. Surely we may say of them that, holding the key of knowledge, they entered not in themselves, and those who would have entered in, they hindered.

As for the Queen's Colleges, we have already said that the entrance examination is lower than that of Rugby for boys of 13 or 14. We may add that according to one of the professors quoted by Mr. Howley, half the boys at Harrow know a great deal more than the students entering Cork College. The following is a sample of an entrance examination in ancient history at a Queen's College.

"You think the Greeks were a great people, do you not?"

"I do, sir."

"You do not intend to pursue classics any further?"

"No, sir."

"You are passed. Good morning."

There are many other points of interest in Mr. Howley's book on which we would wish to touch, but our space forbids. We would, however, especially call attention to chapters VI. and VII., which treat of the maladministration of the public endowment of Trinity College, and of the breach of trust against Catholics. In conclusion, we must again thank Mr. Howley for his work, which deserves to be widely read and carefully studied.

Popular Romances of the Middle Ages. By George W. Cox, M.A., and Eustace Hinton Jones. Longmans & Co. 1871.

THE joint editors, or rather condensers, of these myths of our forefathers' days have judged wisely, perhaps, that they would add to the interest attaching to the several subjects by a more curtailed treatment than is met with in the originals. This plan of summarizing the British and Scandinavian romances certainly places them more within compass of the generality of readers in our busy age. No slight leisure and perseverance would be demanded of any one who should wade through old Sir Thomas Malory's version of the Arthurian geste, or, rather, collected rhapsody of gestes. The Morte d'Arthure always reminds us of Macaulay's saying about the Faerie Queene: "Very few and very weary are they who are in at the death of the Blatant Beast." Mr. Cox, after a Preface of some eighty pages, gives us the story of King Arthur and his knights in twenty-one chapters of not many pages each. Yet an obvious drawback attends upon this; that many life-like details and touches of exquisite simplicity and reality are thus perforce omitted. So much is candidly acknowledged by Mr. Cox in his Introduction. But he has assumed a more important office, and we venture to think a more questionable one, than that of epitomizing. He has become the critic and interpreter of the

sources from which the Arthurian romance has come down to us. And here he is a very Niebuhr in his iconoclasm, and destroys with unsparing hand our early implicit belief in the hero-king of Camelot. "From first to last," he says, "this alleged historical character of the myth is precisely the feature which, as we analyze the story, becomes more and more dim and vague. But as the connexion of the myth with the affairs of men becomes more shadowy, the real meaning and beauty and pathos of the legend will, it can scarcely be doubted, be brought out into a clearer and more enduring light." In other words, Arthur and his knights are symbolical and representative, rather than historical. Their adventures form the British and northern expression of one wide legend, or group of legends, pervading the Aryan family of nations, and cropping up in other climes under parallel or kindred forms. Thus, Arthur is Herakles (for Mr. Cox will not have our old friend of the Nemæan skin and club less Greekishly named); and Herakles himself is but a symbol of "the phenomena of the natural world and the course of the day and the year." There is much in this which tends to thought and inquiry, and we should be more than disposed to concede a good deal to such a theory as interpreting the Greek legends, brought as they were from Egypt, the land *par excellence* of observation of physical phenomena. But we must demur to its application when we come across details that speak distinctively of the faith. We will give up the Round Table to be a mere astronomical cycle; but when we come to the Holy Grail, we experience a shock at the strange treatment that most beautiful legend receives at the hands of Mr. Cox. Its beauty, indeed, he acknowledges, and equally that the conclusion to which he is brought regarding its origin and connection with other myths may "seem somewhat repulsive." The reader shall judge for himself. "We should be fully justified," says Mr. Cox, "in placing the mysterious dish in the class to which belong the cups of Rhea and Demeter, of Serapis, and of the milk-woman, or gardener's wife, in Hindu folk-lore, the lotos of Harp-i-chruti, the jar of Aristomenes, the divining-cup of Joseph, the ivory ewer of Solomon, the goblet of Taliesin, the luck of Edenhall, the horn of Amaltheia, the inexhaustible table of the Ethiopians, and the Round Table of Guenevere—all of these being simple modifications of the Hindu Yoni, which reappears in the ships of Isis and Athena, and the altar of Baal which supported the Semitic Ashera." (p. 49.)

We hardly know what comment to bestow on such a passage except to remark on its consonance with the prevailing tone of the days we live in, which holds all doctrine for a myth, and physics for the only objective truth. Our extract, moreover, is surrounded by other assumed parallelisms yet more abhorrent to all Christian thought.

Whenever our Catholic poet shall arise, if indeed he is ever to prove less a myth than Arthur and Olger, who are always coming and have not come, he will find abundant material in the legend of the Holy Grail, Mr. Cox's clattering of cups and pots notwithstanding. We have not space to enter on a subject so deeply interesting to a Catholic mind. The Poet Laureate has done something; nay, under the circumstances he has done much, both in his early and exquisite poem of "Sir Galahad," and in his later

and more extended interpretation. But that beautiful and essentially Catholic idea can receive due treatment at the hands of none to whose mind the faith is unhappily a stranger.

Pictures of Old Rome. By FRANCES ELLIOT, Author of "The Diary of an Idle Woman in Italy." New Edition. Chapman & Hall. 1872.

VIVIDNESS of description, great and really learned research, are the characteristics of this volume. If the author has truly defined herself in the title of her previous work, her habits of study must have developed in the meanwhile to no small degree. There is a great deal, compressed within the space of three hundred pages, which betokens a range of reading not often found in our degenerate days of shilling literature. Added to this is a strength of pen and terseness of expression which almost partakes of the masculine. Nay, as critics responsible for impartiality, we will add, that in describing pagan men and things, the *stylus* is here and there even a little broad at the point. How far this was to be avoided in giving any faithful pictures of Old Rome is a question on which it might exceed our limits to enter. Such a treatment has at least the good effect of intensifying, by contrast, our thankfulness for the introduction of Christianity, for the sake of the world at large as for our own. And if the men of our age will at length wake up to a perception of the danger of a simple and absolute return to paganism, in which we now stand, it is perhaps well that paganism should thus be occasionally defined by forcible sketches no less than in calmer treatises of Christian philosophy.

One thing may be fearlessly said in praise of this book. The author, though not a Catholic, and dating it indeed from the Deanery of Bristol, has not a word against the Church or the Church's faith. So far as we have seen, its tendency is rather on the side of truth than otherwise. There is something even touching in the reverential tone with which she takes leave of her subject when it transcends the limits of Old Rome, and stays its last footsteps on the Vatican. After quoting "a famous Catholic authority"—we should have liked the name—to the effect that no one can understand St. Peter's who is outside the faith, she concludes her volume with the simple words,—"Warned by this exordium, I conclude." We are unwilling to accept the conclusion. We cannot refrain from a hope that a third work from this really gifted pen may yet give us some pictures of the Rome of Faith, taken from the only point of view which brings all details within the true perspective.

The Church of England and its Defenders. A Letter to Anglican Friends who frequent St. John's, Torquay. By the Rev. W. R. Bernard Brownlow, M.A., Catholic Priest of St. Mary-Church. Torquay: Croydon; London: Washbourne. 1872.

THE letter of a priest, once a Protestant clergyman, to his former parishioners, especially in controversy with the actual incumbent, must be expected to abound in topics of local and personal interest. It is emphatically an *argumentum ad homines*, and from this characteristic derives its peculiar value. Mr. Brownlow's pamphlet, as addressed to those who formerly attended his Anglican ministrations, must have come home to them with the force which is always generated by the fact, more eloquent than all words, of a man having resigned worldly possessions and prospects for conscience' sake. We think Mr. Brownlow is amply justified in saying (p. 7) that "Mr. Robinson's moral theology seems a little confused,"—Mr. Robinson being the vicar. Mr. Robinson has published a sermon preached in his parish last November, entitled "Is the Church of England worth Defending? And why?" and with the arguments in this Mr. Brownlow's pamphlet deals. One of the vicar's illustrations is rather amusing. "The iron-clad men-of-war which anchored in Torbay in the summer were able to go from this bay, without break (qu. *let?*) or hindrance, to any part of the world. And so a communicant of this Church is in communion with the Catholic Church, which extends throughout all time." A simile drawn from iron-clads and war is hardly the one we should anticipate in illustration of the unity of the Church. It reminds one rather of a national Church carrying forth its missionaries under the broadsides of a national armament and against hostile flags. It receives some light from the *Devastation* frigate, which took out Bishop Alexander to Jerusalem, in the teeth of patriarchs and archimandrites of various confessions, who agreed only in resenting the schismatical intrusion.

Mr. Brownlow, in the latter portion of his pamphlet, gives a valuable and telling summary, drawn, as he says, chiefly from Strype, of ecclesiastical events in England from 1558 to 1562. It is for the purpose of refuting the often-repeated assertion, notably in Dr. Wordsworth's "Theophilus Anglicanus," that "the Church of England reformed herself." The assertion seems to have been insisted on by the Vicar of Torquay; and against it, Mr Brownlow advances an incontestable proposition, as follows:—"The Church which met in Convocation on January 12th, 1562, and approved the Thirty-nine Articles and Nowell's Calvinistic Catechism, was not the same Church which met on January 24th, 1559, and passed the Five Articles."

Lives of the Saints. By the Rev. S. Baring-Gould, M.A. London: Hodges. 1872.

THIS is a remarkable work from the pen of an Anglican clergyman. The spirit in which it is written cannot be better described than in the author's own words. In his preface he says, "It would have been unseemly to have carried prejudice, impertinent to have obtruded sectarianism, into a work like this. I have been called to tread holy ground, and kneel in the midst of the great company of the blessed; and the only fitting attitude of the mind for such a place and such society, is reverence." This intention has been fully carried out. The lives of Catholic saints have been narrated simply and unaffectedly as Catholic authorities have recorded them, and in the phraseology commonly used by Catholics. Our Lady is always treated with respect as the "Blessed Virgin," "our Blessed Lady," "the Virgin Mother of God," "the Queen of Heaven"; and the names of "Jesus and Mary" are linked together with loving familiarity. In two places alone the term "to celebrate," so expressive of Anglican ambiguity, is used, but on all other occasions we hear of the celebration of Mass, the "Divine" or "Unbloody Sacrifice," "the Holy Mysteries," and the priest "holding in his hands the Eternal Victim," and offering "himself in conjunction with the Sacrifice of Calvary"; while the Blessed Sacrament is called in plain language "the Sacred Body and Blood," the "Holy Blood of Christ," and "Supersubstantial Food." The "souls of the dead" are said to be "expiating the penalty of their sins in purgatory." Miracles are recorded in a spirit of "not doubt, but discrimination." The Church of God, we are told, "flashes forth some peculiar type of sanctity at one time, and then another. It is like a raindrop in the sun, blazing now crimson, now green, now yellow, now blue. As there is need, God calls up an army of saints, exactly adapted to meet the difficulties of the times, to uphold the truth, and form, as it were, a prop to stay up His tottering Church." This just appreciation of the infinitely varied working of the Holy Spirit in the Church, has enabled Mr. Baring-Gould to make a judicious selection of most interesting saints' lives. In fact, were it not for a few passing remarks, it would not be suspected that he is a non-Catholic.

The Anglican origin of the book is betrayed in a note to the life of S. Fulgentius, of whom his disciple has recorded, "In the tunic in which he slept, in that did he sacrifice." On this exceptional case Mr. Baring-Gould remarks, "that what was immaterial at a time when the Sacrifice of the Mass and the Real Presence were universally believed, is material at a time when both these verities are disputed." No well-instructed Catholic could have fallen into the error of supposing that any dogma of the faith is involved in the peculiar character of the vestments used at Mass. For though the use of particular vestments both at Mass and all other Church ceremonies, is based on Apostolic discipline and tradition, yet its object was in no way doctrinal, but regarded only reverence and propriety. This is evident from the fact that the present sacred vestments may be traced back to the ordinary dresses of the laity, both men and women, in the early ages of the Church; and it was only when they were discarded by the laity, that

they gradually assumed their exclusively ecclesiastical character. Up to the ninth century they were always white, and it was not till the eleventh century that the five colours now in use were definitively adopted. The absence of connexion between the Eucharistic vestments and the doctrine of the Mass, is further proved by the changes in their colour being dependent on the class to which belongs the saint whose intercession is sought, or the occasion on which the Mass is offered, without any reference to the Sacrifice or to our Lord's presence.*

Two quotations from Mr. Kingsley seem to us unworthy both of the author and the rest of his book. In the life of S. Telemachus, who closed for ever the gladiatorial fights by rushing between the combatants and thus sacrificing his own life, it is said that the Coliseum was "purified from the blood of tens of thousands by the blood of one true and noble martyr." Heroic as was S. Telemachus's self-devotion, it was not needed to purify the arena which had been sanctified for centuries by the blood of tens of thousands of even more noble martyrs, who had died for the fundamental dogma of the Christian faith. Again we are told that "some benevolent impulse—divine revelation his biographer calls it—prompted S. Severinus to return." We do not believe that Mr. Baring-Gould habitually reduces divine revelation to natural impulses, and we would suggest that both the above passages should have been included in the "necessary modifications" of Mr. Kingsley's words, which he professes to have made.

We notice a few historical inaccuracies for correction in a future edition. Milo, who long hindered S. Bonaface's reforms by retaining the dioceses of Rheims and Trèves, which Charles Martel had given him, was not an abbot, but only a tonsured cleric, as both S. Gregory II. and Hincmar assert. S. Adalhardt's sister could not have been given by Louis the Pious to the charge of S. Radegund, who lived three centuries earlier. S. Adrian was Abbot of S. Peter's, afterwards S. Augustine's, and not Archbishop of Canterbury. S. Wilfrid was not ejected from his see "by the bishops and King of Northumbria with the consent of S. Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury." He was at that time sole Bishop of Northumbria, and was deprived of the greater part, if not the whole of his diocese, by S. Theodore at King Egbert's request.

In conclusion, there is still another passage which demands consideration. We are told that S. Fulgentius was diverted from his intention of going to Egypt by S. Eulalius, who said to him, "A perfidious dissension has severed this country from the Communion of S. Peter. All these monks, whose marvellous abstinence is noised abroad, have not got with you the Sacrament of the Altar in common." Has it never occurred to Mr. Baring-Gould that he too is severed from the Communion of S. Peter; and that for that reason, if for no other, all the saints whose spirits he has summoned around him, could they appear before him in bodily form, would one and all refuse to have the Sacrament of the Altar in common with him? We must hope and pray that in return for the love and reverence with which, as he says, he

* This subject is fully discussed in the "Dictionnaire des Antiquités Chrétiennes," by the Abbé Martigny.

has knelt among them, they may obtain for him light and grace to quit his present unreal position in a body whose formularies he does not believe and in communion with archbishops and bishops, clergy and laity, whom he cannot but consider heretics, and to unite himself with "the great company of the blessed" in one common Sacrament of the Altar in the Communion of S. Peter.

Paul Seigneret, Séminariste de Saint-Sulpice, fusillé à Belleville, le 26 Mai, 1871. Notice rédigée d'après ses Lettres, par un Directeur du Séminaire de Saint-Sulpice. Paris: Adolphe Josse. 1872.

IT is no less true to-day than in primitive times, that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church. The sufferings undergone for truth of doctrine, and for maintenance of discipline, by those who have been most deeply imbued with the spirit of Christianity, go to make up the Church's attribute of sanctity, and form a persuasive argument in favour of her claims. It is not, therefore, without reason that the editor of this most interesting volume anticipates for it a powerful and moving influence among various classes of readers. He offers this notice of a youthful martyr, in the first place, to those who pursued their studies with Paul Seigneret in the Seminary of Saint Sulpice, and who still possess his body reposing in the midst of them; next, to all, in whatever place, who aspire to the priesthood; lastly, to men of the world, who may possibly be surprised to find so ardent a desire of suffering for faith and country in one who was trained under the tranquil shade of the altar. "At least," he says, "they will not withhold their sympathy from principles and feelings so elevated; and they will desire, with ourselves, for the honour and the safety of France, that many of our young men were animated by a like impulse, and would open their hearts to an ambition so noble." This ambition, in the saintly youth commemorated in the memoir, was for suffering, and especially for martyrdom. The desire, indeed, of yielding up his life for the faith seems to have grown upon him as the time approached when that privilege was to be his. From a general aspiration to realize the ideal of Christian sacrifice and self-denial, it ripened into the distinct oblation of his life, even to blood. Yet it is remarkable, and at once instructive and consoling to know, that this high supernatural desire coexisted in him with a considerable degree of shrinking from a violent death. He appears to have been of a temperament highly imaginative and impressionable; and such are not the natures likely to face with indifference the weapons of a massacre. They may triumph, by superior motives, over what appals the sense and the imagination; and faith may so vividly represent the truth, *Mori mihi lucrum*, as to render the triumph complete. But it is then with joy, never with the phlegmatic coolness of a nature less capable of representing things to itself, that the victim walks to the place of sacrifice. We do not say that Paul Seigneret showed anything like an unworthy weakness, of which, indeed, there is not a trace in this

memoir; but it is consoling, and would serve to make him imitable as well as admirable, to see that he did not possess that absence of fear which would result, according to Aristotle, from the absence of *προσδοκία κακῶν*. The simple and touching way in which these emotions of an imaginative nature are recorded will interest the reader at pp. 221, 222, of the volume. And such moments do but enhance our admiration of the predominant joy, desire of self-oblation, and—as the consummation of the sacrifice approached—the heavenly calmness which formed the supernatural gifts of this chosen martyr.*

The "souvenir de famille" before us—so it is modestly defined by its compiler and virtual author—will be a valuable contribution to the history of the Commune and of its crimes, whenever that shall be written at large. At the end of the volume we observe other publications, which will swell the terrific but instructive history. And we should like to see in English dress—provided it were not, as so often, an English disguise—besides Father de Ponlevoy's already noticed acts of his martyred brethren, the works here advertised. They are "The Martyrs of Picpus," by F. B. Perdereau, of that Congregation; "Memoirs of F. de Bengy, S.J.," Chaplain to the Eighth Ambulance during the War of 1870–71, and shot by order of the Commune on the same day with Paul Seigneret and his companions; "The Martyrs of the Second [Reign of] Terror," by the Vicomte de la Vausserie; "The Martyrs of Arcueil," by F. Lécuyer, V.G. of the Teaching Third Order of S. Dominic; and "Neuilly under the Commune," by the Priests of St. Croix, who were among the hostages. Last, stalks in the Nemesis, "À travers les Ruines de Paris, Impressions d'un Parisien à sa Rentrée dans la Capitale, après la Chute de la Commune."

The Place Vendôme and La Roquette: The First and Last Acts of the Commune. Authorized Translation from the French by C. F. Audley. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THE origin of this work, one of sad and solemn interest not to be surpassed, is assigned by the author,—who is most ably represented by Mr. Audley—to the following causes: "When I left La Roquette," says the Abbé Lamazon, "I had but one intent: henceforward to devote my whole life to God, as a mark of gratitude for His protecion in saving me, against all expectation, from the cut-throats of the Commune. My firm intention was to remain silent, so totally unable did I feel to convey, by any descrip-

---

* The writer is able to say (p. 220): "Even from the first days of his captivity, in the intimate conferences in which his soul poured itself forth, he manifested, again and again, how enviable death seemed to him when suffered from the one motive of hatred of God and of His priests:—'If we may be shot!' said he, 'how beautiful a death!'"

tion of mine, even an idea of the scenes I had witnessed—a series of horrors and monstrosities which, according to an eye-witness, the Abbé Perny, a priest of the Foreign Missions, would be sought for in vain among the most savage tribes. Yet I was scarcely restored to life and liberty, when, on my long and dreary road from my prison to the Madeleine, I discovered that hardly any one would believe in the massacres of La Roquette. I was positively obliged to affirm them in a letter, which called forth expressions of amazement throughout the civilized world." This letter appeared in the *Moniteur Universel*, 29th May, 1871, and created such interest, horror, and emotion that an extended narrative was demanded by a *consensus* which the Abbé Lamazon could not resist. He wrote the detailed account before us of the terrible events he had witnessed, and Mr. Audley has placed the awe-inspiring narrative within the reach of the English public, to whom the already voluminous literature of the War and the Commune has supplied no such simple record of the horror of the Red Rule in Paris. Long since the publication of this book the examination of persons concerned in the murder of the Archbishop of Paris and his fellow-martyrs has confirmed, in the minutest details, the truth of the facts which it records; and it no doubt will remain the most complete and authentic narrative of the frightful crisis through which Paris has passed, and the most touching and simple story of individual suffering and heroism which has come to us from a period as prolific in both as that of the great Revolution. It did not last so long—that is all there is to be said for the difference between the Revolution which elicited and that which extinguished the Bonapartes. Every one who wishes to understand the meaning of the dreadful drama on which the curtain has fallen for the present, to be lifted on who can tell what scenes of horror and violence the next time the devil who is the prompter of Paris gives the signal, ought to read this book. It is not only the story of an individual who suffered as a man, a priest, a citizen, and a patriot, a long series of the grossest injuries, terminating in the narrowest possible escape from the fate of the "hostages;" it is a candid, full, unimpassioned history of the aspect, the circumstances, the ruling notions, the general aspirations of Paris after the beautiful city had fallen into the hands of the insurgents.

The personal narrative is most affecting and terrible. Mr. Audley has done full justice to the simplicity of the style, which, with its mingled tenderness and manliness, the effort to keep back self, and the imperative requirements of authenticity, is a difficult one to render in English; and the narrative is one which appeals to every human heart and every Catholic conscience. We hope for and predict a wide circulation of this book, as a contribution to the history of our own time whose value is not to be overrated.

The Martyr Spirit; being the substance of a Sermon on S. Thomas of Canterbury. By Very Rev. Monsignore J. L. PATTERSON. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS sermon is so admirable in spirit, and unites so many diverse excellences, that we are led the more to regret the comparative infrequency of Monsignore Patterson's publications. There is thought enough in this sermon to admit of being advantageously expanded into an octavo volume. How pregnant with meaning, e.g., is the following passage:—

As our great bard says, of "the quality of mercy," that its very essence implies freedom, for if it is compelled it ceases to be mercy; so also of religious faith, it must be said that "it is not strained"; no compulsion can in any degree increase or limit, still less create or destroy it. When we speak of certain motives of belief *commanding* assent, we use the word to mean that they are such as justify our belief; but the adhesion of the will we know is not commanded by any such motives, and the merit as well as the essence of faith lies in its voluntary character.

"Blessed are those who have not seen and have believed," says our Lord, and the blessedness lies therefore in its not being constrained by evidence. The seat of faith no doubt is the intelligence; but it transcends the processes of mere reason, and finds its home *in that inner man which lies beyond* it. There are indeed in the natural, as well as in the supernatural order, truths which we can render no account of by reason; but our convictions are deeper than our reasons for them, more sacred and more intimate than our opinions, and *not to be wrenched from us by merely logical processes.* Thus it has become proverbial that one "convinced against his will" is really unchanged in his mind. And so you may see some clever dialectician force his reasons for disbelief even in the existence of God on an audience, *not one of whom may be able to refute, and yet all shall unite to reject, his teaching.* (pp. 5, 6.)

Again—

Just as theologians tell us that the brightness of our Lord's sacred countenance and person on the mount of Transfiguration, was not a transient illumination, but was rather the persistent and continuous, though habitually suppressed brightness of the sacred humanity, by reason of its hypostatic union with the Divine Nature, so the high emprise or the heroic death, is but a revelation of the continuous inner life of the Christian. (p. 11.)

In the next page Monsignore Patterson refers to—

The facility for intellectual indulgence afforded by the tide of literature in which we are immersed. The minds of most are no longer allowed a moment, day by day, to ponder on the great truths *by which only men properly are said to live.* The true and false chronicles of the world's gossip, swept together by thousands of active minds from every place far and near on the whole surface of the globe, obtrude themselves on each opening day, and fill the mind with an exhausting variety of subjects, whence it gathers no solid result of any kind; and as if this rapid phantasmagoria of things which either are not, or if they exist, have no concern with us as immortal souls, were not enough, the flood of fictions, esteemed in proportion to their pungent and stimulating power over that too 'forward and obtrusive

faculty,' the imagination, is let in in torrents, to debauch the mind and will with a hundred pernicious day-dreams and dissipating sentiments, fruitless and flowerless for this world and for the next. (p. 12.)

Let us take up the Cross then in our minds by suffering no human thing, call it by the name of views or opinions, or tastes, or long habit, to usurp in our intelligence one iota of that inmost mental homage which we owe to God's revealed truth. Not to permit the natural lights (so often proved fallacious) of any science, or of any literature, to dim the unclouded lustre of our faith, to quench its intrinsic force, or to limit its extension to "every word that cometh from the mouth of God": and as a means to this end, to wean ourselves from the taste for reading the greater part of the light literature, or pretentious so-called science of the day; checking the natural promptitude we usually have to criticise and sit in judgment on the actions and thoughts of authorities, just as we see and read of others doing, in the midst of whom we have to live and act. (p. 13.)

Compendium of the Art of always Rejoicing. By F. Alphonsus De Sarasa, S.J., translated by a Lady, with a Preface by the Rev. T. Meyrick, S.J. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS little work is a compendium of F. de Sarasa's greater work in fifteen treatises, which, we are told, was much esteemed by Leibnitz as a perfect model of composition and sound morality. The Compendium was drawn up by F. de Sarasa himself, but the present English translation is from F. Bresciani's Italian version of 1842. The art of always rejoicing at all times and in all places, in sorrow as well as in joy, in sickness as well as in health, in trials as well as in prosperity, seems to us to be one of the secrets of heroic sanctity. Still, this is no reason why those who are endeavouring to lead a spiritual life should not aim at acquiring it; on the contrary, the art of always rejoicing appears to us to be not sufficiently cultivated by beginners in the path of perfection, although both for themselves and for others, it is one of the most useful and sanctifying of graces. We can hardly, therefore, conceive of anything better calculated to teach this heavenly art, than some of the thoughts contained in the little volume before us; as, for example, how God takes care of the smallest things, or how nothing takes place in nature by chance, or how all things are well done which are done by God, or how God turns to good the evils of the universe, or how God selects that state of life which is most suitable to each person, or lastly, how tribulation, and death itself, are but happy messengers of God, calling us ever nearer to Himself.

"Reader, perfection consists in this, not only in bearing the changes in human fortune with patience, but in welcoming them and approving of them. This is true happiness, to wish things to be as they are, and not otherwise; this is the root of that grand 'Thy will be done,' by saying which we not only give God our will, but also our intellect. From this proceeds also the lively, ready, and sincere gratitude with which we return thanks to our Almighty Ruler for having so wisely selected for us,

amidst all the variety of events, states of life, and fortunes, that state which He judged the most suitable for our eternal safety, and for His greater glory." (pp. 90, 91.)

The treatise seems to us, in the words of the editor, to have been well and faithfully rendered.

The Grand Demonstration in Baltimore and Washington, D.C., in honour of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Election of Pius IX. to the Chair of S. Peter, June 17, 18, 19, A.D. 1871. Baltimore: Murphy & Co.; New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1871.

THIS interesting account of a demonstration, which it is no exaggeration to characterize as "grand," should have had its notice in a former number. It is a description of what the Introduction styles "the most magnificent religious pageant which ever occurred in Baltimore, and one which attracted a greater multitude than ever assembled in our streets." When it is remembered that the Provincial Council of the North American hierarchy, assembled in Baltimore some few years ago, was marked by processions of the mitred prelates and other external demonstrations of religion, which attracted the notice and won the respect of thoughtful non-Catholic spectators, we may judge that an occasion which eclipsed those solemnities must have been striking indeed. The whole subject of the progress of the Catholic faith amid the most democratic nation upon earth is fraught with interest to us on this side the Atlantic. In England, from Catholic sympathy, in Ireland, over and above that motive, from close and dear ties of kindred, the children of the faith, whose lot has been by birth or emigration cast in the States, are watched with a constant and lively interest. Moreover, religious philosophy is concerned in the problem, with what advantages or drawbacks that progress has its course by reason of the republican institutions and spirit of the country. It may be from the same curiosity and spirit of universal questioning which exists among that active-minded people even in an exaggerated form; but the American of every grade in life and degree of education, if not always open to conviction, is always ready for discussion. He may not have the guilelessness, or at least the docility, of Nathanael; but, like him, he is always ready to "come and see." It is cheering to think that in Baltimore, one of the most aristocratic cities of the Union, and in Washington, the very centre and seat of its Government, he should have come to see a spectacle so arresting and so significant as that of which the pamphlet under notice gives a detailed description.

Spiritual Contract of the Soul with the Lord our God. Translated from the Italian. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

THE idea of a Spiritual Contract, containing "certain ardent affections, together with certain pious and loving movements of the will," by means of which "the soul may lift itself freely on high and be united with God through perfect love," is said to be due to Father Alvaro Arias, S. J., who died at Rome 1643. The contract consists in this: That as often as certain affections or short aspirations, as, for example, "Lord, I offer to Thee," or "Lord, I repent," "My God and all things," "Oh! Mary," &c., are fervently uttered, without adding anything more, God should be asked to accept them according to the several intentions formed in the mind.

In the same way some of the saints have made a contract with God, that as often as they laid their hands upon their breasts, this outward action should also be taken as an inward act of love or of contrition or of intercession. We need not say, that the more we have of these simple devices of divine love, the easier will it be for men and women living in the world to keep the love of God alive in their hearts, in these days of care and trouble about many things.

Saint Joseph, Patron of the Universal Church. A Panegyric delivered in the church of S. Ignatius, Baltimore, March 19, 1871, to which is prefixed an historical sketch of devotion to S. Joseph. By Rev. JOSEPH E. KELLER, S. J. Baltimore: Murphy & Co., Printers to the Pope, and to the Archbishop.

THIS Panegyric of S. Joseph places before the reader the connection of the foster-father of our Lord with His Mystical Body the Church, which we have several times insisted upon in this REVIEW. It is well and thoughtfully written, and will, no doubt, help to spread devotion to S. Joseph in England as well as in America. We have been struck by the following passage:—

"Thus then we may say, that the entire Church, with its long centuries of trial and of varied fortunes, is nestled in the crib of Bethlehem; concealed in the outskirts of some Egyptian town, all unconscious of its prize; hidden in the house of Nazareth, as well as manifested in the public ministry of our Lord, afflicted in His persecutors."

Catholic Progress. The Journal of the Young Men's Catholic Association. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

WE have been immensely struck by the spirit with which this little serial has been sustained, and the frankness and straightforwardness with which it encounters the most critical Catholic questions of the day. We hope in our next number to give a detailed account of its first six issues.

INDEX.

Acts of the Captivity and Death of the Fathers Olivaint and four others of the Society of Jesus, *noticed*, 212.
Anderdon (Rev. W. H., D.D.), Christian Æsop, *noticed*, 235.
Anno Domini, 2071, *reviewed*, 76.
Arbitration instead of War, *reviewed*, 285.

Bain (Alex. A.M.), the Emotions and the Will. Chap. XV. The Moral Sense, *reviewed*, 44.
Baring-Gould (S.), Origin and Development of Religious Belief, *reviewed*, 249.
Benedetti (Le Comte), Ma Mission en Prusse, *reviewed*, 103.
Benni (Most Rev. C. B.), Tradition of the Syriac Church of Antioch, *noticed*, 231.
Bikkers (Dr. Alex. V. W.), Anno Domini 2071, *reviewed*, 76.
Book (The) of the Foundations of S. Teresa, of Jesus, *noticed*, 215.
Book (The) of Psalms; translated from the Latin Vulgate, being a Revised Edition of the Douay Version, *reviewed*, 351.
Book (The) of the Visions and Instructions of Blessed Angela of Foligno, *noticed*, 214.
Bowden (Rev. J. E.), Spiritual Works of Louis of Blois, Abbot of Liesse, *noticed*, 210.

Catherine of Ricci, S. (Life of), *reviewed*, 309.
Catholic Directory (The), *noticed*, 244.
Chiesa (La) e lo Stato, *reviewed*, 1, 285.
Christian Æsop (The), *noticed*, 235.
Cistercian Legends, *noticed*, 228.
Coleridge, (Rev. H. J., S.J.), Life and Letters of S. Francis Xavier, *reviewed*, 309.
Collins (H.), Cistercian Legends, *noticed*, 228.
Coming Race (The), *reviewed*, 76.
Contemporary Review (The), *noticed*, 195.

Dircks (Henry, LL.D.), Nature-Study, as applicable to the Purposes of Poetry and Eloquence, *reviewed*, 25.
Discourses addressed to various Roman Deputations by the Holy Father, *reviewed*, 168.
Dissertations and Discussions, by John Stuart Mill, *reviewed*, 44.
Doctrines (Les) Romaines sur le Libéralisme envisagées dans leur rapport avec le Dogme chrétien et avec les besoins des sociétés modernes, *reviewed*, 135.

Dogmatic Catechism (A), from the Italian of Frassinetti, *noticed*, 190.
Döllinger (Dr.), Fables respecting the Popes of the Middle Ages, *reviewed*, 363.

Eastlake, (C. L.), A History of the Gothic Revival, *reviewed*, 440.
Education to be Real must be Denominational, *reviewed*, 409.
Église (L'), et l'État, *reviewed*, 135.
Elwin (Rev. W.), Works of Alexander Pope, *noticed*, 238.
Essay (F. Faber's) on the Interest and Characteristics of the Lives of the Saints, *reviewed*, 309.

Favre (Jules), Rome et la République française, *reviewed*, 103.
Fictions of the Future, 76–103 : Criminal character of modern sensational fiction, 76 ; the necessity of a new pleasure to the jaded literary appetite, 77 ; the effect of sensational literature upon the youth of the present day, 77 ; Mr. Maguire in his book and in his actions a contradiction, 78 ; he is like Garrick, between Tragedy and Comedy, in Reynolds's celebrated picture, 81 ; the scenes he describes are still, among us, things to come, 82 ; his description of a House of Commons when the members are women, 83 ; general estimate of his book, 86 ; "The Age of Aluminium," 89 ; the work a failure on the whole, 89 ; Miss Lydia Becker's Journal, 90 *n* ; description of London in 2071, 92 ; "The Coming Race," 93 ; the "Woman's Rights" question present in all the "Fictions of the Future," 93 ; a journey to the interior of the earth, 94 ; the virtues of vril, 97 ; the formidable character of the inhabitants of the subterranean regions, 97 ; imaginary invasion of the next generation by the vril-ya, 101.
Francis Xavier (S.), Life and Letters of, *reviewed*, 309.

Gallerani (P. Alessandro), L'Infallibilità Pontificia, *noticed*, 226.
Gallwey (T., A.M.), Lays of Killarney Lakes, Descriptive Sonnets, and Occasional Pieces, *noticed*, 243.
Garnier (Jules), Voyage autour de Monde, *noticed*, 246.
Gerard (F.), Narrative of the Gunpowder Plot, *noticed*, 201.
Gothic Revival (The), 440–451 : The acrimonious spirit roused by the vexed question—the Revival of Gothic Architecture, 440 ; Mr. Eastlake more courteous in tone than the majority of writers on the matter, 440 ; arguments in favour of the revival, 441 ; Dr. Milner one of the earliest "revivers" in England, 441 ; objections to the revival, 442 ; general adoption of the style for the Catholic Churches in Holland, 442 ; substitution of the Gothic for the Italian in Germany, 443 ; the largest churches in Europe, which are without aisles, are Gothic, 443 ; Gothic churches are light in comparison with Italian, 444 ; and can be as easily heated, 445 ; the cost of an Italian church considerably more than a Gothic, 446 ; reasons for the failure of Italian architecture, 447 ; Gothic architecture, though in abeyance, never disappeared from England, 451.

Harper (Rev. T.), Sermons by Fathers of the Society of Jesus, *reviewed*, 285.
Huxley (Professor), Paper in the Contemporary Review, *noticed*, 195.

Imperial and Republican Diplomacy in France from 1866 to 1870, 103-135 : the unfounded charges against the French diplomatic agents in 1870, 103 ; no man will tamely, unheard and undefended, sit down to be condemned, 104 ; while the war lasted, and the Commune was not conquered, they could not raise their voices, 104 ; when peace was restored, Baron Stoffel the first to break silence, 104 ; his reports when published proved to be masterpieces, 105 ; though not according to official etiquette, Count Benedetti followed the example of Baron Stoffel, 105 ; M. Jules Favre, without the same necessity, publishes his despatches to the French agents in Rome, 105 ; the sympathy of Count Benedetti for Pius IX., 106 ; first period of his mission, 107 ; attitude of Prussia towards Austria, 107 ; the bad faith of Prussia, 107 ; the unscrupulousness of M. Bismarck, 108 ; struggles between the Cabinet and the Chambers in Prussia, 109 ; the aggressive policy of M. Bismarck, 109 ; quarrel between Prussia and Austria, 110 ; M. Bismarck's Letter to the *Times*, 110 ; his proposals to France, 111 ; public feeling in Europe against France, 111 ; M. Bismarck's desire for the neutrality of France in 1866, 112 ; his fear lest France should not enter into Prussia's plans, 113 ; his complaint of the reserve of France, 114 ; it was his idea to offer Belgium and Luxembourg to France, not that of the Emperor, 115 ; the Emperor's letter, 115 ; M. Bismarck's proposition to cede Mayence to France to secure her alliance, 115 ; his change of policy after the war, 116 ; his reply to the French ultimatum, 117 ; his change of feeling towards France after the Treaty of Prague, 118 ; despatch of M. Benedetti on the Roman question, 119 ; M. Bismarck's desire to fetter the energies of France, 119 ; his interview with a Garibaldian agent, 120 ; his growing ill-feeling towards France, 120 ; preparations of the Prussian Government for war, 121 ; nomination of the Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern, 121 ; policy of France for the two last centuries, 122 ; secret machinations of Prussia in favour of Prince Leopold, 122 ; the Emperor Napoleon's remarks on the candidature, 123 ; M. Bismarck's equivocation, 123 ; non-fulfilment of the Treaty of Prague, 124 ; M. Favre at the Foreign Office, 125 ; the defence of the Pope—his first public act, 126 ; his hopes of an alliance with Italy, 126 ; the reasons which prevented it, 127 ; his care for the Holy Father, 128 ; his language on the subject, 129 ; the application of the Papal Minister to the French Government, 130 ; despatch from the French Agent at Rome, 131 ; thanks of M. Favre to the Pope, 131 ; the ingratitude of Italy to the Papacy, 132 ; mission of M. Harcourt, 132 ; Europe and the Roman Question, 133 ; remarks of M. Favre upon the speech of the Bishop of Orleans, 134 ; the future policy of France upon the Roman Question, 134.

Intermediate and University Education in Ireland, *reviewed*, 409.

Irish University Education (*Edinburgh Review*), *reviewed*, 409.

Letter (A), signed "F." in *Fraser's Magazine*, *noticed*, 223.

Lewis (D.), Book of the Foundations of S. Teresa, *noticed*, 215.

Liberalism, Religious and Ecclesiastical, 1-24 : important service

rendered by dwelling on such doctrines as F. Liberatore has set forth, 1; three constitutive tenets of Catholic liberalism, 2; common origin of these, 3; the more prompt and disposed a man is to serve God the nearer is he to personal perfection, 3; in what human perfection consists, 4; "temporalism," 5; what is patriotism, 6; F. O'Reilly on the condition of the Roman people under the Holy Father, 7; the danger to Catholics in their intercourse with the Protestant world, 8; F. Newman on the work of the Church, 9; "Intellectualism," 10; Lord Brougham's idolatry of intellect, 10; danger to the Church from the Catholic intellectualists, 11; "Indifferentism," 12; its elements, 12; its opposition to the Church's most fundamental maxims, 14; ecclesiastical liberalism, 15; two objections against the denunciation of Catholic liberalism considered, 15; reply to the first objection, 16; Catholics holding tenets savouring of heresy, allowed to remain members of the Church, 16; F. Newman's remarks on dogmatic unity, 17; reply to the second objection, 21; under existing circumstances the denunciation of Catholic liberalism required in the interest of souls, 24.

Liberatore (F.), Father Harper and Lord Robert Montague, 285-308: Is it legitimate for a Catholic writer to allege publicly a charge of doctrinal unsoundness against any theory which other Catholics maintain, 285; F. Liberatore's language on Catholic liberals, 286; his charge against Signor Tagliaferri, 287; general statement of F. Liberatore's doctrine, 287; he teaches that Christian states are subject to the Church in spiritual matters, and that wherever Christian unity exists, the civil ruler acting in subordination to the Church should enforce that unity, 288; reasons for raising the question, 288; whatever doctrines the Church teaches in the Encyclical and Syllabus are those which she desires to be borne in mind and enforced, 289; reasons why such should be the case, 290; ecclesiastical liberalism the result of idolatry of temporal greatness, idolatry of intellect, and indifferentism, 292; F. Harper's volume, 292; his remarks on the sin involved in a preference of the creature over the Creator, 292; the special purport of his work, 294; evil consequences of England throwing off the social rule of the Catholic Church, 295; his comparison between modern ages and ages of the Church's social rule, 295; Lord Robert Montague's book, 298; the courage necessary to write such a work, 298; remarkable coincidences between his opinions and those of F. Harper, 300; character of F. Liberatore's work, 301; State's office in the merely national order, 302; opinions of S. Thomas, and of F. Harper, and of Lord Robert Montague on the same subject, 302; State's office in relation to the Church, 304; Lord Robert's ironical defence of the Commune, 307; existing tendencies of society, 308.

Liberatore (P. Matteo), La Chiesa e lo Stato, *reviewed*, 1, 285.

Lives of the Modern Saints, *reviewed*, 309.

Lord Kilgobbin, *reviewed*, 379.

Maguire, (J. F., M.P.), Next Generation, reviewed, 76.

Matrimonio (De) Christiano libri tres, reviewed, 135.

McCorry (Dr. S.), Monks of Iona, *noticed*, 229.
Meehan (Rev. C. P.), Fate and Fortunes of Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone, and Rory O'Donel, Earl of Tyrconnel, *noticed*, 245.
Mill (J. S.), Dissertations and Discussions, *reviewed*, 44.
—— Utilitarianism, *reviewed*, 44.
Mill (Mr.), on the Foundation of Morality, 44–76: The doctrine of necessary truth, 44; three points of domestic controversy in this matter, 45; the first the meaning of the phrase "moral faculty," 45; the second that of "moral turpitude," 46; the third the "moral obligation," 47; the issue joined with Mr. Mill, 47; moral goodness a simple idea, 48; the above proposition illustrated and established, 49; argument against Mr. Mill's theory, 50; certain moral truths self-evidently necessary, 51; intuitive knowledge that all acts, morally evil, are prohibited by a Personal Being, 55; this Being inferred to be Supreme Legislator of the universe, 56; F. Newman's remarks on man's conviction of the wickedness of acts morally evil, 57; Mr. Mill's appeal to man's primordial faculties, 59; the meaning of the word "intuition" among philosophers, 59; Mr. Hutton's essay on "a Questionable Parentage of Morals," 61; Mr. Bain's appeal to divergences of moral judgment, 62; F. Harper's reply to Mr. Bain, 62; explanation of the facts to which Mr. Bain has appealed, 63; the most barbarous nations agree that there is a right and a wrong, 63; universal detestation of murder and ingratitude, 64; high appreciation among barbarians of celibacy, 64; what is considered by mankind as good and what as evil, 65; Mr. Mill implicitly embraces the doctrine which he speculatively opposes, 71; his invective against a view ascribed to him by Dean Mansel, 72; remarks against Mr. Mill's consistency, 73; criticism of his speculative position, 74.
Mivart (St. George), Paper by, in *Contemporary Review*, *noticed*, 195.
Modern Saints (Lives of the), *reviewed*, 309.
Modern Scepticism, A Course of Lectures delivered at the request of the Christian Evidence Society, *reviewed*, 333.
Molloy (Dr. Gerard), The Passion-Play at Ober-Ammergau in the summer of 1871, *noticed*, 211.
Monks (The), of Iona, *noticed*, 229.
Montague (Lord Robert, M.P.), Arbitration instead of War, *reviewed*, 285.
Morris (F. John), Condition of Catholics under James I.: F. Gerard's Narrative of the Gunpowder Plot, *noticed*, 201.
Morris (W.) Earthly Paradise, *reviewed*, 25.
Moulart (F. J.), L'Église et l'État, *reviewed*, 135.

Nature and the Poets, 25–44: The study of Nature always intimately associated with Religion, 25; the gods of Greece and Rome merely the personification of natural phenomena, 25; the attitude of the Poets towards Nature the reflex of their religious system, 26; classic and modern Poets at variance in their appreciation of Nature, 27; of modern Poets, Milton, in his ideas and sentiments, approaches the nearest to the Classic Poets, 28; his characters merely the ancient mythological heroes reproduced, 29; Shelley's tribute of worship to Nature in his poem, "Alastor,"

32 ; S. Augustine's beautiful thoughts on the same subject, 33 ; Byron, through all his poetry, inconsistent in his religious opinions, 33 ; Nature an enigma to the old Classic Poets, 34 ; the change which Christianity caused in ancient ideas, 35 ; opinions of S. Paul on the present visible creation and on the future world, 36 ; S. Chrysostom's comments on S. Paul, 37 ; the true Poet's mission, 38 ; Sir F. Doyle's tribute to the high source of their inspiration, 38 ; specimens of Nature-Poetry, 39 ; Dr. Newman on the powers of Nature, 42 ; Sir F. Doyle's comments on Dr. Newman, 43 ; Dr. Newman's views partly professed previously by S. Francis of Assisi and by F. Faber, 43 ; Science and Poetry in harmony in bearing witness to the close connection between Nature and Religion, 43 ; Nature's teachings, if duly studied, are faithful, true, and holy, 44.

Nature-Study, as applicable to the purposes of Poetry and Eloquence, *reviewed*, 25.

Newman (Dr. J. H.), Essays, Critical and Historical, *noticed*, 207.

——— Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, *reviewed*, 44.

——— Lectures on certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans, *reviewed*, 1.

Next Generation (The), *reviewed*, 76.

Oakeley (Canon), Education to be Real must be Denominational, *reviewed*, 409.

Oblate Fathers of S. Charles, Dogmatic Catechism, *noticed*, 190.

O'Connor Don (The), What is meant by Freedom of Education, *reviewed*, 409.

Parliament and Catholic Education, 409-440 : The Government and Irish education, 409 ; the anti-Catholic prejudices of many of the Liberal party, 409 ; language of Mr. Gladstone on Professor Fawcett's Bill, 410 ; Christian education the great question of the day, 410 ; remarks of the Archbishop on the question, 410 ; the danger to Catholic education by legislative interference, 411 ; on the state of things in England, 412 ; the English Act, 413 ; its principle anti-Catholic, 413 ; Archbishop Manning's Pastoral, 414 ; compulsory education, 415 ; the Conscience clause and Time-table, 416 ; Pius IX. on primary education, 417 ; passages from Canon Oakeley's pamphlet, 417 ; actual power of the Catholic teacher under the English Act, 420 ; negative hardship of the conditions enforced by Government on schools which accept State interference, 421 ; importance of having good Catholic teachers, 422 ; tendency in this country towards an excess of imperfect education, 422 ; Mr. Froude on general knowledge, 422 ; the existing state of Catholic higher education gives grave reason of anxiety for the future, 424 ; the London University philosophical questions, 425 ; grievance under which Catholic youths labour, 425 ; the religious education of non-Catholics, 426 ; the Archbishop on National education, 426 ; the demands of the Irish Bishops, 427 ; their moderation, 429 ; the Irish National Schools, 430 ; the O'Connor Don on higher education, 432 ; his views on the state of Irish Catholic opinion, 434 ; tyrannical language of the *Edin-*

burgh reviewer, 436; English public men less favourably disposed now to Catholics than they were, 437; reasons for the change, 437; Ireland desires a purely denominational system, 438; concluding remarks, 439.

Passion-Play (The) at Ober-Ammergau in the summer of 1871, *noticed*, 211.

Pastoral Address of the Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, *reviewed*, 409.

Pastoral Letter by the Archbishop of Westminster, *reviewed*, 409.

Perrone (F. Jo.), De Matrimonio Christiano libri tres, *reviewed*, 135.

Philosophy (The) of Subjective Religion, 249–284: The application of philosophy to religion is both the natural outgrowth and the noblest fruit of that science, 249; a philosophical examination of subjective religion, or religiousness, a necessary part of the complete philosophy of religion, 249; subject-matter of such an examination, 250; methods of investigation, 252; functions, 253; object and plan of Mr. Baring-Gould's work, 253; exclusively devoted to the subjective side of the philosophy of religion, 255; the conclusion of his labours a curious mixture of Catholic doctrine with German philosophy and the notions of the High Church party, 255; the manner in which he has treated his subject, 256; not only our intellect, but no part of our nature can, if properly used, mislead us, 259; first argument, 262; second argument, 263; third argument, 265; two consequences, 265; primarily and secondarily religious instincts, 267; Mr. Baring-Gould's arguments against Positivism, 270; he accounts an instinct pointing to immortality to be the first of the forces which urge man toward religion. His analysis of it, 273; the second force is the moral law, 274; Asceticism, 278; the ethical leanings of Polytheism and Monotheism contrasted, 279; the religion of utilitarianism, 280; he accounts an instinctive tendency to look for a cause of observed effects to be the third force, and appears to hold the volition theory of causation, 281; the last of the primarily religious instincts is a disposition to form an ideal of attainment, which postulates the existence of an absolute idea—God, 283; concluding remarks, 284.

Plummer's (Mr.) Translation of Dr. Döllinger on the Popes, 363–379: Sorrow for Dr. Döllinger's present unhappy position, 363; his historical dogmatism, 363; the "Philosophumena" of Hippolytus, 364; exultation of the Protestant world on its publication, 364; Dr. Döllinger's triumphant reply, 364; Mr. Plummer's misrepresentation, 364; his unfair attack on Archbishop Manning on the question of the two wills, 366; German Protestant criticism at one with the Archbishop, 366; the identity of the two wills in the person of our Lord, 367; the question of the two wills, 368; opinion of S. Athanasius on the point, 367; origin of Monothelism, 369; the doctrine of Honorius identical with that of the Council of Constantinople and of S. Sophronius, 370; Dr. Dollinger on the arguments of Honorius, 371; the doctrine of Maximus, 372; Dr. Döllinger answered, 373; Mr. Plummer's view, 374; his ignorance of the meaning of the Monothelite heresy, 374; opinion of the Bishop of Rottenburg, 375; real value of Dr. Döllinger's

book, 376; good services of Pope Honorius to England, 376; necessity of union to Christendom in his time, 376; Dr. Döllinger demolishes the fables about Pope Joan, and of the bigamy of Count Gleichen, said to have been permitted by Gregory IX., 377; the mental agony he must be suffering through belying a whole life, 377; Mr. Plummer's prophecy, 377; defence of Pope Honorius by Dean Milman, 378.

Ponlevoy (F.), Acts of the Captivity and Death of the Fathers Olivaint and four others of the Society of Jesus, *noticed*, 212.

Pope (The) and Europe in 1872, 168–184: State of Europe at the commencement of the year, 168; influence of the German mind upon Europe, 169; M. Thiers as absolute in France in 1872 as Louis Napoleon in 1852, 169; the present unhappy moral aspect of France, 169; condition of Paris, 170; inauguration of the statue of Voltaire, and the election of M. Littre to the Academy, 170; the disaffected condition of the Parisian populace, 171; authority of M. Thiers, 171; his wonderful vitality, 172; the weakness of the Assembly, 173; position of the Duke d'Aumale, 173; policy of the Count de Chambord, 174; his too great tendency to wait, 174; comparison to Henry IV., 175; the question of the National flag, 175; the French army, 175; its improved character, 176; the Duke de Magenta, 176; his influence upon the French soldier, 176; his heroic courage, 176; his military character risked in the late war, 177; the true and the false France, 178; altered position of France since the commencement of the Emperor's reign, 179; delicate position of Austria, 179; her aggravating policy towards Russia, 179; possible dangers to Austria, 179; the non-coherent elements of that empire, 180; her former grand position, 181; the Holy Father on the apostate character of the age, 181; the Church and Christendom, 182; the Holy Father's words to the Roman Nobles and Cardinals, 183; his faith in the triumph of the Holy See, 184; the encouragement we ought to feel at his words, 184.

Protestant Lectures on Modern Scepticism, 333-350: The Protestant contest with Scepticism, 333; by virtue of their great numbers, Protestants have been enabled to bring into the field a large amount of ability, 333; Catholics may learn some lessons from them, 334; Dr. Ellicott's introductory paper, 334; the multitude of the schools of religious thought deprives them of all authority, 335; although Physicists reject the guidance of dogmatic religion, they have not renounced all idea of religion, 346; Catholic theology will, as a science, greatly benefit by the controversy with Scepticism, 337; disinclination of scientific men to anything miraculous, 338; prevailing secularism of thought, 339; private judgment, 341; scope of the Lectures on Modern Scepticism, 342; the subjects are treated in a popular manner, and with a solidity and common sense which commend them to the reader, 342; Dr. Payne Smyth's Lecture on Science and Revelation, 344; the theory of the gradual development of revelation, 343; the Bishop of Ely's lecture, 347.

Powell (J.), Two Years in the Pontifical Zouaves, *noticed*, 347.

Queries as to Irish Education, *reviewed*, 409.

Ramière (Le P. H.), Les Doctrines Romaines sur le Libéralisme envisagées dans leur rapport avec le Dogme chrétien et avec les besoins des sociétés modernes, *reviewed*, 135.

Reilly (Rev. F. O.), Queries as to Irish Education, *reviewed*, 409.

Revised English Version of the Psalms, 351–362: The spirit of praise and thanksgiving one of the chief outward manifestations of the Holy Spirit, 351; the songs and hymns of the Church of the New Law the same as those used by the Elder Covenant, 351; Archbishop Manning's preface, 351; the kingdom of nature typical of the kingdom of grace, and that again of the kingdom of glory, 352; the Old Law the shadow and the New Covenant the very image of the heavenly things to be revealed, 353; David an Evangelist rather than a Prophet, 353; in his crimes and in his penitence, in his imperfections and in his virtues, David stands almost unique among men, 353; this Revised Version a legacy from his Eminence Cardinal Wiseman, 355; early English versions of the Psalter, 355; the Rheims and Douay translations, 358; the Protestant version belongs more to the Catholic Church than to the Protestant, 360; a vigorous English style to be preferred to a Latinized diction, 360; a modern English Catholic version of the whole Bible to be desired, 362.

Revival (The) of Christianity in Syria, *noticed*, 227.

Rome et la République Française, *reviewed*, 103.

Saints' Lives as Spiritual Reading, 309–333: The study of Saints' lives a healthy sign of the growth of Catholic spirit, 309; value of such a study, 309; the Saints in England, 311; the religious orders in England, 312; their holy and unceasing labours promise an abundant harvest, 313; the poor of London, 314; saintly lives among the very lowest, 314; slow but sure growth of a sound Catholic spirit throughout the country, 315; increased loyalty to the Holy See, 316; great value of the works of S. Teresa, F. Hilton, F. Faber, and others, 317; the Oratorian Series, 318; F. Faber's Essay on Saints' Lives, 318; Lives of the Saints excite an absorbing interest in our minds on reading them, 321; they enable men to purify their daily lives, 322; they should be read slowly, 323; F. Coleridge's Life of S. Francis Xavier, 323; F. Vaughan's Life of S. Thomas of Aquinas, 324; valuable as it is, yet it does not come up to our idea of what such a work should be, 325; though as a biography it is perfect, 327; the Lives of Saints should be read by mankind, not as a mere intellectual pleasure, but as a means of reforming our manner of living, 330; God's grace has quickened the Catholic life-blood in England in these latter days, 331; the re-establishment of the Hierarchy in England, 332; a glorious future for the Church in England, 333.

Sermons by Fathers of the Society of Jesus, vol. ii., reviewed, 285.

Spectator (The) of October 28, 1871, noticed, 218.

Sweeney (Dr. N.), Joys of a Consecrated Church, noticed, 233.

TRADITION (THE) OF THE SYRIAC CHURCH OF ANTIOCH, concerning the Primacy and the Prerogatives of S. Peter and his Successors the Roman Pontiffs, *noticed*, 231.

Tyborne, and who went thither in the Days of Queen Elizabeth, *noticed*, 234.

WESTMINSTER (Archbishop of), Fourfold Sovereignty of God, *noticed*, 187.

———— A Pastoral Letter, *reviewed*, 409.

———— Sermons on Ecclesiastical Subjects, *noticed*, 185.

What is meant by Freedom of Education, *reviewed*, 409.

WORKS (THE) OF CHARLES LEVER, 379–408: Last appearances of popular characters are often unwisely repeated, 379; Mr. Lever's announcement of a final appearance as a novelist, 380; his specialties as a novelist, 380; the changes in public taste and manners since the publication of his early works, 380; no modern writer equals him in "slap-dash," 380; the viciousness of modern "muscular" novels, 381; Mr. Lever's works may be divided into the military, social, and politico-social, 382; in his early days he was without a rival, 383; popularity of his military novels, 383; Harry Lorrequer, 384; as a story feeble and untrue to nature, 384; absurdity of the concluding scene, 385; the choleric Irishman—a character never met with in real life—a favourite with Mr. Lever, 386; the racy, captivating humour in his pictures of Irish life, 387; his love of superlatives, 388; our author's female characters failures on the whole, 389; Peninsular pictures, 390; the originals of many of the characters well remembered when the novels first appeared, 391; Irish life as it was and as it is, 391; Frank Webber and Mickey Free, 392; unfair and prejudiced treatment of priests by Mr. Lever, and the offence given thereby to a large class of his countrymen, 394; the same continued through all his novels, 396; in his description of scenery, Mr. Lever comes next to Sir Walter Scott, 397; the same combinations of character and incident frequently repeated, 398; his villains and his schemers, 398; his young men are very surprising, his old men are very old, and his young ladies are very young, 400; his respect for women and the purity of his novels, 402; though he often borders on the absurd, it is impossible to withhold admiration for his deference to women, 402; Davenport Dunn and Roland Cashel, 403; Grog Davis and Annesley Beecher, 404; Mr. Lever's works regarded as a whole, 406; his great ladies are insufferably rude, ill-bred, and impertinent, 406; his dashing dragoons were real soldiers, but his statesmen are unreal, 407; his shallow views on political affairs, 407; his want of true sympathy with the Irish people, 407; his contempt of the Catholic faith, 407; the humour and pathos of his sketches of peasant life, 407; though his works are not all of equal merit, the fame which he achieved by his first novel not impaired by his last, 408.

WORLD (THE) TURNED ATHEIST: HOW IT BECAME SO, 135–168: The result of the so-called Reformation, 135; present condition of Christendom, *136*; prevalence of condemned errors in doctrine, 137; the causes, 137; Protestantism unlike any previous heresy, 138; its characteristics, 138;

England the fountain of deism and atheism, 141; the principles of Naturalism, 141; separation of Church and State, 142; a free Church in a free State, 142; the union of Church and State in strict accordance with God's revealed will, 143; the State bound by the laws of the Church, 143; one State bound to act with equity towards another, 144; duties of the Government towards the Church, 145; Lord Macaulay on the end of Government, 146; origin of Civil powers and Society, 150; S. John Chrysostom on Government, 151; God the source of supreme power, 151; the purpose of man's creation, 152; the growth of the Family, and afterwards of Society, 153; the immediate end and ulterior duties of Family and of Society, 153; religion necessary to the enduring existence of civil Society, 154; Lord Macaulay's argument examined, 156; all his illustrations vitiated by his false analogy, 157; his charge against Mr. Gladstone of being vague and indistinct, 159; the "propagation of religious truth" not the work of the Government, but of the Church, 159; the State should aid the Church in its work, 159; paternal Government, 162; its special characteristics, 163; the State contrasted with other associations, 164; the State's duty towards other good works, 167; conclusion, 168.

WYMAN AND SONS, PRINTERS, GREAT QUEEN STREET, LONDON, W.C.


3 6105 025 435 871

CECIL H. GREEN LIBRARY
STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305-6004
(650) 723-1493
grncirc@sulmail.stanford.edu
All books are subject to recall.

DATE DUE

MAR 2 9 2004
MAR 9 7 2004